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Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to make an original contribution towards understanding the position 
of morality in classical realism. To do so it develops the notion of “moral realism” as 
an explanatory framework to help understand why (and when) nations tend to act 
morally in their foreign policy choices. Three factors are identified that form the 
moral realist framework: (i) expectations of reciprocity between states; (ii) rational 
choice in calculating foreign policy decisions; and (iii) moral and material outcomes 
of foreign policy. The central argument of the thesis is that when states choose to act 
morally, they can stand to gain material benefits in return. To demonstrate this, the 
thesis applies moral realism to the foreign policy of Australia in three important areas: 
aid and development, humanitarian operations, and strategic alliances. It finds that – 
in the Australian case – moral outcomes were more likely when they also converged 
with material interests. 
 
Scholarly interest in how morality can be theorized has increased following the 
revival of classical realism in contemporary International Relations theory. But 
instead of this revival being an opportunity to revisit classical realism’s insights on 
understanding morality by the consequences of states choosing to act morally, recent 
scholarship has been dominated by normative and critical school approaches. I argue 
that this has contributed to a misrepresentation of classical realism’s core 
methodological and theoretical principles. This is where this thesis makes its main 
theoretical contribution. It addresses the lack of classical realist perspectives by 
presenting a way of understanding morality that remains within classical realist theory 
and method. My own offering, which I term moral realism, is consequentialist rather 
than normative, and has been developed by a careful examination of the ideas of three 
key classical realist scholars – Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan and Reinhold 
Niebuhr. 
 
Through an examination of Morgenthau, Kennan and Niebuhr, I detect three shared 
ideas used to characterize moral realism that are then applied to understand the 
foreign policy choices of states: expectations of reciprocity; rational choice; and 
moral and material outcomes. These three factors are then applied to a specific case 
study of foreign policy: in this thesis, to Australian foreign policy choices. This 
allows the thesis to assess whether or not moral realism is a valuable tool for 
understanding morality in foreign policy.   
 
I find that moral realism is capable of explaining Australia’s foreign policy choices, 
and thus represents a valuable contribution towards understanding the role of morality 
in explaining its policy decision-making. I find that Australia was primarily motived 
by calculations of expectations of reciprocity in each of the arenas under review. At 
the same time, a rational choice process helped inform when Australia chose to 
include morality as part of its foreign policy decisions. This indicates that moral and 
material outcomes were likely, which reinforced the core claim of a moral realist 
approach. 
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 1 
Introduction 
This thesis seeks to make a contribution towards understanding the position of morality in 
classical realism. To achieve this, I develop the notion of “moral realism” as an explanatory 
framework to help uncover why (and when) states are most likely to act morally in their 
foreign policy choices. Three factors are identified that form the moral realist framework: (i) 
expectations of reciprocity between states; (ii) rational choice in calculating foreign policy 
decisions; and (iii) moral and material outcomes of foreign policy. The main argument of the 
thesis is that when states choose to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices, 
they can actually stand to gain material benefits in return. To demonstrate this, the thesis 
applies moral realism to the foreign policy of Australia in three important areas: aid and 
development, humanitarian operations, and strategic alliances. It finds that moral outcomes 
were more likely in Australian foreign policy when they also converged with its national 
interests.  
 
Scholarly interest in how morality can be theorized has increased following the revival of 
classical realism in contemporary International Relations (IR) theory.1 Specifically, there has 
been a growing research agenda in rediscovering how classical realist scholars, such as Hans 
Morgenthau, Edward Carr, John Herz, Reinhold Niebuhr and George Kennan, viewed 
morality in international politics. The modern revival can be traced back to the early to mid-
2000s where contemporary IR scholars, like Richard Ned Lebow, Michael Williams, William 
Scheuerman, Campbell Craig and Sean Molloy introduced the notion that classical realists 
were not so easily characterized as “realist.”2 These scholars challenged the assumption that 
classical realists were only concerned with the laws of politics derived from human nature, 
                                           
1 This thesis refers to the body of work in this revival as the “classical realist revival.” This phrase is not unique 
to this thesis and has been mentioned by other scholars when referring to the recent re-engagement with 
classical realism in IR. For instance, see Sten Rynning and Jens Ringsmose, “Why are revisionist states 
revisionist? Reviving classical realism as an approach to understanding international change,” International 
Politics 45, no. 1(2008), pp. 19-39 and Nicholas Kitchen, “Systemic pressures and domestic ideas: A 
neoclassical realist model of grand strategy formation,” Review of International Studies 36, no. 1(2010), pp. 
117-143. 
2 This list is not extensive. These scholars have continued to publish on the classical realist revival. Reference to 
their later work, as well as contributions from other figures within this debate, will be discussed in greater depth 
in Chapter 2. Campbell Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, 
and Waltz (New York: Columbian University Press, 2003); Seán Molloy, “Realism: A problematic 
paradigm,” Security Dialogue 34, no. 1 (2003), pp. 71-86; Richard Ned Lebow, “Constructive realism”, 
International Studies Review 6, no.3 (2004), pp. 346-348. Michael Williams, The Realist Tradition and the 
Limits of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); William Scheuerman, “Was 
Morgenthau a realist? Revisiting scientific man Vs. power politics.” Constellations 14, no. 4 (2007), pp. 506-
530. 
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which operated in a constant state of war. Instead, they argued that a curious dualism existed 
in the work of classical realism.  
 
On the one hand, classical realists were focused on describing how the world worked 
according to power politics and were thus sceptical of the potential for progress in 
international affairs. Yet, on the other, they were critical of the status quo and made 
observations on how international politics ought to operate. These scholars also pointed out 
that the classical realist views on morality and power were heavily influenced by these 
scholars’ own individual experiences, biases and perceptions, leaving them open to Robert 
Cox’s claim that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose.”3 The identification of 
this “normative” and “critical” thread was the start of a renewed classical realist research 
agenda that has been dominated by scholars who are used to being at odds with the realist 
tradition’s core methodological and theoretical principles.  
 
In fact, so prolific have the contributions been from the critical theorists in particular that the 
“classical realist meets critical theorist” research network was established in 2012, with the 
stated aim of strengthening the convergence of classical realism and critical theory. 4 Other 
IR perspectives have also contributed to the revival. Scholars in support of the English 
School (ES), like Richard Little, for instance, have argued that the School is a “natural 
successor” of classical realism in that both perspectives make observations on how states 
interact in the absence of war.5 According to him, classical realists were focused on 
describing and prescribing the normative conditions of international society. Similarly, 
constructivists have also weighed in, with scholars like Samuel Barkin attempting to argue 
that classical realists understood the relationship between power and morality to be socially 
constructed, and hence are mutually constitutive norms of state behaviour.6 Even 
cosmopolitan perspectives, like those put forward by Richard Beardsworth, have argued that 
                                           
3 Robert Cox, “Social forces, states, and world orders: beyond international relations theory,” Millennium 10, 
no. 2 (1981), pp. 126-155. 
4 For more on this network see “Classical realism and critical theory,” Newcastle University (2012). Available 
at: http://research.ncl.ac.uk/classicalrealism/ (accessed 13 March 2014). All of the contributors are those that 
have identified various critical themes in classical realism such as Michael Williams, Sean Molloy, Felix Rosch, 
Hartmurt Buhr and Oliver Juetersonke. A scholarly contribution from the classical realist position is noticeably 
absent. These contributions will be discussed in more detail in the literature review chapter that follows.  
5 Richard Little argued that the key concepts of the ES, such as international society, international justice, and 
world society and world justice lay at the heart of classical realism. For more see Little, “English School vs 
American realism: A meeting of minds or divided by a common language,” Review of International Studies 29, 
no. 2 (2003), pp. 443-460. 
6 Samuel J. Barkin, “Realist constructivism,” Review of International Studies 5, no. 3 (2003), pp. 325-342.  
 3 
on closer inspection, classical realists are not so strongly opposed to normative assertions of 
progress, respect for universal human rights and distributive justice in international politics.7 
 
But despite the growing popularity of the classical realist revival as a research field, the 
contributions from classical realists themselves have been notably absent. This is somewhat 
surprising given that classical realism has a rich tradition of engaging with questions of 
morality, dating back to Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War, which argued that 
considerations of morality and justice were important for a political entity to remain in 
power.8 Likewise, Niccolo Machiavelli – in both The Prince and the Discourses on Livy –
emphasized the role of morality in contributing to the strength and good fortune of states.9 
The general absence of contributions that take a classical realist approach to theory has 
arguably led to a distortion of how classical realist scholars really saw morality as a concept 
involved in strengthening the power of the state, and evaluated according to the consequences 
of states choosing to act morally. For them, morality was not normatively prescribed, and 
instead was part of the menu of foreign policy options states could choose in their pursuit of 
the national interest.  
 
Not only has this led to a misinterpretation of classical realism, but it has also had the 
unfortunate effect of reinforcing the common caricature of realism as an immoral or amoral 
approach, ill-equipped to deal with the moral complexities of international politics. Even 
neoclassical realists, regarded as the closest contemporary to classical realists, have tended to 
dismiss or downplay morality in foreign policy decision-making, seeing it only as part of the 
agency variables that “intervene” on policy choices at the domestic level.10 Thus, it has very 
                                           
7 Richard Beardsworth, “Cosmopolitanism and realism: towards a theoretical convergence?,” Millennium 37, 
no. 1 (2003), pp. 69-96.  
8 Books IV to VII of the History describe the aggressive expansion of the Athenians and their downfall at the 
hands of Syracuse, Sparta, and other Sicilians. It is in this description where one can detect an appreciation for 
the role of ethics, justice and morality in connection to power. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 
transl. by Rex Warner, with an introduction and notes by M.I. Finley (London: Penguin Group, 1972). Indeed, 
the claim that Thucydides was concerned with morality and ethics has been made by others, like Julian Korab-
Karpowicz, who argued that Thucydides History outlined how an Empire unrestrained by morality was prone to 
hubris and would inevitably fail. For more, see Julian Korab-Karpowicz, “How international relations theorists 
can benefit by reading Thucydides,” The Monist 89, no. 2 (2006), pp. 232-244. 
9 Machiavelli’s views on morality where made clear in his description of the qualities of “The Prince” where he 
argued that a Prince must recognise where to be “good” and where to be “bad” according to necessity. For more 
see Nicollo Machiavelli, The Prince and Other Political Writings Stephen J. Milner transl. and ed. (London: 
J.M. Dent, 1995), pp.37-137. Similar observations can also be found in the Discourses, see in particular 
Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy transl. by Harvey C Mansfield and Nathancorv (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 34-35. 
10 Neoclassical realism has been regarded as the most recent adaption of classical realism since Gideon Rose 
coined the perspective in 1998. Rose described neoclassical realism as way forward for classical realism that 
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little effect on the foreign policy goals of states as these scholars largely regarded morality as 
a normative factor that, if followed, will likely lead to miscalculations in the state’s pursuit of 
power.11  
 
This is where this thesis attempts to make an original contribution. It addresses the lack of 
classical realist perspectives by presenting a way of understanding morality that remains 
within classical realist theory and method. My own offering, termed “moral realism” is 
developed via a careful examination of three key classical realist scholars – Hans 
Morgenthau, George Kennan and Reinhold Niebuhr. These scholars were chosen for their 
similarity in how they positioned morality in connection to power and its consequences in 
international politics, which enables a consistent line of thought in making my case for moral 
realism. Indeed, one of the very few classical realist inputs to the revival, by Anatol Lieven 
and John Hulsman, highlighted the commonality between these three scholars on how they 
understood morality.12  
 
These scholars were chosen for this similarity in the first instance, but they were also chosen 
because they shared the same view on classical realism as a perspective that explains both 
how international politics operates, and how foreign policy decisions are made.13 In this 
regard, they reinforce my positioning of moral realism as a perspective that explains foreign 
policy choices. This clarification is important as, to date, the majority of contributions to the 
                                                                                                                                    
recognised the determining effect of systemic variables, but also incorporated a role for “unit” or second image 
factors in how states responded to the balance of power. In other words, neoclassical realism connected power 
with policy and brought theories of foreign policy back into realist IR theory. For more see Rose, “Neoclassical 
realism and theories of foreign policy,” World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998), pp. 144-172.  
11 There are two ways that neoclassical realists view morality. The first is that it is a permissive force used to 
sell policy to a domestic audience. In this regard, it is a rhetorical device created by the agent in response to 
systemic pressures. The second is that it is attached to normative principles of international law, human rights 
and international justice, which can supervene on policy choices and lead to misperception of elites in 
responding to external pressures. For more on these see Randall Scwheller Unanswered Threats: Political 
Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) and Jennifer Sterling-
Folkner, “Neoclassical realism and identity: Peril despite profit across the Taiwan Strait,” in Steven Lobell, 
Norrin Ripsman and Jennifer Taliaferro ed. Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 99-138. 
12 Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman, Ethical Realism: A Vision for America’s Role in the World (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 2006). 
13 The best evidence to support this assertion comes from Morgenthau’s much-cited chapter “A realist theory of 
international politics” where he outlines classical or “political” realism as a theory of international politics and 
foreign policy. This chapter did not appear in the first edition of Politics Among Nations and was added to 
subsequent editions. Even though this chapter was added later, it was not new material for Morgenthau. This 
passage was a succinct summary of what was outlined in Chapters 1 and 2 of the first edition, as well as other 
material drawn from In Defence of the National Interest and “The evil of politics and the ethics of evil,” all of 
which discuss classical realist views on power, peace, morality and conflict in international politics. For more 
see Morgenthau, “A realist theory of international politics” in Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power 
and Peace 4th ed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), pp. 1-14.  
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classical realist revival have overlooked the fact that classical realism is primarily a theory of 
foreign policy, and thus is concerned with describing how states construct their foreign policy 
– and how this is conducted on the world stage.  
 
Through an examination of Morgenthau, Kennan and Niebuhr, I detect three shared ideas 
used to characterize moral realism. These are: expectations of reciprocity between states; 
rational choice in calculating foreign policy decisions; and moral and material outcomes of 
foreign policy.14 These three factors form the moral realist framework that is then applied to a 
specific case study of foreign policy: in this thesis, to understand Australia’s foreign policy 
choices. The application of moral realism to a case of foreign policy allows for an assessment 
of whether or not moral realism is a valuable tool for understanding the outcomes of morality 
in foreign policy choices. But before I move to a further explanation of what is meant by 
moral realism and the choice of Australia as an appropriate case to test its validity, it is 
important to define how this thesis conceives of morality, and how this differs from the 
perspectives identified above. This is necessary because it will inform how moral realism 
incorporates the classical realist view of consequential morality.  
 
Decoding morality: Understanding morality in international politics 
Defining or “decoding” morality in international politics is a difficult and slippery endeavour. 
But generally, the place of morality in IR theory can be thought of as operating along a 
continuum with two opposing ends. At one end are the cosmopolitan perspectives, like those 
put forward by Charles Beitz and David Held, which theorize that morality is an independent 
variable capable of determining international politics.15 Here, morality is defined as a 
categorical imperative and tied to the rational capacity of enlightened actors to learn, reform 
and modify their behaviour, with the goal of peace as their modus operandi. Human nature is 
essentially “good,” but individuals have been prevented from reaching their rational potential 
because of deficiencies in the social order. Individuals (and states) are considered moral 
actors and have the ability to treat others as ends in themselves. From this perspective, a 
                                           
14 For clarity of argument and descriptive consistency, in the main text of the thesis I will use the abbreviations  
“expectations of reciprocity,” “rational choice” and “moral and material outcomes” when referring to these 
categories.  
15 Charles Beitz, Political Theory of International Relations (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979); 
Beitz, “Bounded morality: Justice and the state in world politics,” International Organization 33, no. 3 (1979), 
pp. 405-425; Beitz, “Cosmopolitanism and global justice,” Journal of Ethics 9 (2005), pp. 11-25; David Held, 
Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010); and Held, “Restructuring global 
governance: cosmopolitanism, democracy and the global order,” Millennium 37, no. 3 (2009), pp. 535-547. 
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moral order derived from abstract principles is possible and can be achieved by the rational 
progression of human nature. Applied to international politics, this means cosmopolitan 
approaches focus on prescribing how actors ought to interact, and point towards an emerging 
Global Civil Society (GSC), international solidarity movements and greater interdependence 
as evidence of a universal morality that independently motivates behaviour.  
 
Reflexive approaches, like those primarily employed by constructivists, understand morality 
to be intersubjective and part of how actors and structures are socially constructed. While this 
means cosmopolitan and constructivist approaches view morality differently in relation to the 
process of cause and effect, they are similar in seeing it as a normative factor that determines 
state behaviour. For constructivists like Christian Reus-Smit, morality is part of a state’s 
identity, which is constructed from the values, beliefs, customs and traditions of collective 
group interaction over time.16 Morality is thus a social product that guides states on the 
“right” way to act, and is synonymous with normative principles of international law, 
international justice and universal human rights. This means that, despite its claim to inter-
subjectivity, constructivism maintains a commitment to rationality that places it close to 
cosmopolitanism on the theoretical spectrum.  
 
Critical theoretical approaches to morality largely see it as part of their positivist and post-
positivist critiques of both IR theory and practice. Scholars like Craig and Brown focus on 
how the researcher’s own values and perceptions of events can shape their approach to 
theory. Therefore, when theorizing about morality, scholars are prone to making conscious 
judgments on what actions are deemed morally good, or morally bad.17 This usually means 
that critical theorists are sceptical of cause and effect, critical of attempts to universalize 
concepts, and see morality as a biased concept, fashioned from the researcher’s own pre-
conceived views of it. But having stated this, the critical contributions examined in the 
classical realist revival share similarities with cosmopolitanism and constructivism in their 
view of morality as a normative principle that prescribes how international politics ought to 
operate.18  
 
                                           
16 Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: Cultural, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality 
in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
17 Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviathan, pp. 6-7 and Brown, “The ‘practice turn,’ phronesis and classical realism: 
towards a phronetic international political theory?” Millennium 40, no. 3 (2012), pp. 439-456. 
18 Viewing morality this way can leave them open to a contradiction between relativism, where theory is always 
for someone, with themselves just another subjective morality, and universalism or prescriptive subjectivism.  
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The ES can be located somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. Here, morality represents a 
set of codified standards or laws that can regulate (and in some instances, transform) both 
human and state behaviour. The ES view on morality is grounded in empiricism, meaning the 
laws and mores that govern international society, such as mutual respect for sovereignty, 
have been determined by the historical accumulation of what these states see as the “right” or 
“wrong” way to act. As a result, the ES is often presented as representing the “moral middle 
ground” between cosmopolitanism and realism.19 But, as this thesis will demonstrate, the 
contemporary ES, with inputs from Timothy Dunne, Nicholas Wheeler and Alex Bellamy 
(amongst others), has come to promote a normative conception of morality rather than an 
empirical one, and as a result the School leans more towards the cosmopolitan understanding 
of morality.20 
 
From classical realism to moral realism: Morality and the national interest 
It is at the other end of this spectrum that one finds positivist perspectives that place anarchy, 
the state and “interest defined as power” as the defining principles of IR theory and practice. 
At the far end is neorealism, which sees morality as having no place in understanding 
international politics.21 Classical realist perspectives sit variously between the ES and 
neorealism. Neoclassical realism, as a bridge between systemic forces and agency variables, 
sits close to neorealism, while classical realism, as a perspective that derives its assumptions 
exclusively from human nature, can be found between the ES and neoclassical realism.  
 
                                           
19 The ES claim to empiricism and practical knowledge has meant that it is often characterized as employing a 
middle-ground ethic between positivist and rationalist theories of IR. For more see Molly Cochran, “Charting 
the ethics of the English School: What “good” is there in a middle-ground ethics,” Review of International 
Studies Quarterly 53, no. 1 (2009), pp. 203-225. This point about a middle-ground ethic was elaborated further 
by Cochran in 2014, but was done in the broader context of positioning the ES as perspective that has always 
been concerned with normative theorizing. Interestingly Cochran also goes further and argues that the ES 
middle-ground ethic needs to incorporate “normative justifications” of the goods involved in pursuing either a 
solidarist or pluralist international society. More on the ES view of morality, including the solidarist versus 
pluralist debate will be discussed in the chapter that follows. For more on the tradition of normative theorizing 
in the ES see Cochran, “ Normative theory in the English School,” in Cornelia Navari and Daniel M. Green eds. 
Guide to the English School in International Studies (West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2014), p. 196.  
20 The pluralist nature of the ES makes finding agreement on a philosophical stand point difficult, especially so 
given that many now see a constructivist stream in some of the School’s scholarship. This thesis argues in the 
succeeding chapter that British empiricism, put forward by John Locke and David Hume, is the approach 
associated with Bull and his views on moral action as learned behaviour that has been created by state 
experiences of what is the wrong and right way to act. However, I also argue that the current focus of the School 
on notions of international human rights, international justice and Non-State Actors (NSAs), has pushed it closer 
to the idealism associated with Kantian cosmopolitanism where morality is determined by obligation and duty 
towards a universal rule of law.  
21 This thesis does not go into further detail on the views of neorealism. As a theory of international politics, 
neorealism is critical of approaches that derive their assumptions from human nature. Therefore, it would not be 
useful to include neorealist perspectives in a discussion on classical realism and how they understood morality.  
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Deriving assumptions from human nature means that classical realism understands there to be 
no difference between the statesperson and the state, and hence any analysis of morality is 
performed on the actions of states in the international system. And since classical realism is 
also a theory of foreign policy, this means that identification of any “moral” action is 
assessed on how a state conducts its diplomacy with other states. This distinction is important 
as it links to how classical realists understood the position of morality in international 
politics. As mentioned above, morality in the tradition of classical realism has been tied to 
improving the power of the state, and this has continued with the contemporary classical 
realists discussed in this thesis.  
 
Morgenthau and Niebuhr, for instance, argued that morality could be found in the action of 
states in considering the interests of others when calculating what policy choice would 
achieve the national interest.22 But unlike cosmopolitan and constructivist perspectives, this 
consideration of the “other” was not determining, and was linked to the pursuit of interest 
defined as power. This means that instances of states including morality in foreign policy 
choice – for example, in choosing to commit resources to peacekeeping operations – were 
contingent on whether it achieved any real national interest benefits for the state itself. Such a 
view of morality naturally implies a certain level of rationality, where states have the capacity 
to reason that, in certain contexts and under certain conditions, it is prudent to include moral 
considerations, and pursue policy options that go beyond the narrow self-interest.  
 
Classical realists also argued that this rationality was a limited one, as human nature existed 
in a constant state of war, which there was little hope of ever escaping.23 Rationality was thus 
determined by the ability to make rational calculations of whether it was within a state’s 
interest to consider the wellbeing of others. This notion of rationality engages with the 
classical realist assumption that individuals do not exist alone in human nature, and must, for 
their survival, interact with others. From this perspective, acting morally is not defined by 
states’ rational capacity to accept a universal moral standard, nor is it defined by their ability 
to modify or reform their behaviour. Instead, it is defined by a rational calculation on whether 
                                           
22 Morgenthau, “National interest and moral principles in foreign policy: The primacy of the national interest,” 
American Scholar XVII (spring, 1949), pp. 207-212; and Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in 
Ethics and Politics (New York: Touchstone, 1995), pp.5-17 
23 George Kennan, “Morality and foreign policy,” Foreign Affairs, 64, no. 2 (1985), pp. 205-218; Niebuhr, 
“Idealist and realist theories,” Mans Nature and his Communities: Essays on the Dynamics and Enigmas of 
Man's Personal and Social Existence (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1966), p 82; Morgenthau, Politics Among 
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 4th ed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), pp. 26-27.  
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it achieves any real benefit for the state choosing to include morality as part of their foreign 
policy calculations, and for the intended recipient of this policy decision.  
 
In sum, the difference between the two ends of the spectrum can be defined as the difference 
between deontological ethics and consequentialist ethics. The former is used to judge 
morality in foreign policy on whether it reflects an inherent duty and adheres to a specific set 
of rules, and the latter is used to assess whether the inclusion of morality achieves the greatest 
good or greatest benefit. Assessing morality in foreign policy according to its consequences 
actually has quite a long history in classical realism and can be traced back to Machiavelli’s 
notion of prudence and virtu, where skilful rulers were expected to weigh decisions, 
including ones dealing with morality, against factors of proportionality, benefit to the state 
and civilian population, as well as whether it achieved any gains comparable to the costs 
involved. 24 Similarly, Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Kennan argued that consequentialism, or an 
“ethic of consequence,” which takes into consideration the effects of policy choices, was the 
best way to evaluate morality in foreign policy. 25 Together, then, a limited consideration of 
the other and a concern for the consequences of morality in foreign policy defines the 
classical realist view of morality. But where does moral realism fit along the theoretical 
spectrum? And, crucially, what does it add to classical realism that sets it apart as a 
distinctive approach?  
 
This thesis locates moral realism next to classical realism. It supports the classical realist 
assumptions of morality being conceptualized in relation to “interests defined as power,” and 
evaluated depending on whether it achieves any real benefit to the state choosing to include 
morality as part of its foreign policy choices. But it also goes further than the classical realists 
in arguing that morality, as part of a state’s calculation of the national interests, can be a 
factor that achieves both moral and material outcomes. This is where moral realism connects 
considerations of the other with whether it has any real effect, both on the state’s national 
interest and the recipient state(s) that are the intended beneficiaries of the policy. This allows 
for an evaluation of moral realism that is based on empirical inquiry, as observations on 
                                           
24 Machiavelli, The Prince and Other Political Writings Stephen J. Milner transl. and ed. (London: J.M. Dent, 
1995), Chapter 15.  
25 Kennan, “Morality and foreign policy,” p. 217; Morgenthau, “The demands of prudence,” Worldview (June, 
1960), p. 6 and Niebuhr, “Foreign policy and moral problems,” in Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics: His Political 
Philosophy and its Application to Our Age as Expressed in his Writing ed. Harry R. David and Robert C. Good 
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1960), pp. 331-332.  
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whether a state is acting morally is determined by evidence of whether the state’s policy 
produced any outcomes, both moral and material.  
 
Evidence of moral and material outcomes is useful for assessing whether motives match 
outcomes, and it is also central to defending the key empirical claim of moral realism: that 
when states choose to include morality as a part of foreign policy choice, they can actually 
stand to gain material benefits in return. The importance of assessing outcomes in moral 
foreign policy is hence two-fold. First, it allows for the use of evidence to support moral 
claims in foreign policy; and second, it reinforces the causal role of interests. In this way, 
moral factors form part of the rational calculation of foreign policy decisions and do not have 
the capacity to independently determine policy outcomes.  
 
Normative versus empirical designs of research: The “is” and “ought” of IR theory.  
Now that I have outlined how this thesis characterizes morality as part of a moral realist 
approach, it is time to examine how this thesis establishes the most appropriate research 
design and methodology for testing the evaluative potential of moral realism. A brief 
background on how this thesis broadly represents an empirical inquiry, and thus employs a 
descriptive (rather than normative) research design is important to clarify first, since it 
reinforces the value of moral realism as a tool for understanding foreign policy choices. This 
also sets moral realism apart from previous contributions towards the classical realist revival 
that I argue have misrepresented classical realism by seeing it as a form of “disguised” 
normative theory on the role of morality in international politics. 
 
The above description on the ways to understand morality in international relations 
summarizes the views largely into deontological and consequentialist camps. As well as 
having implications for how IR theories conceptualize morality, these differences can denote 
specific methods of conducting research on morality in international politics. These are what 
we might call the “is” and the “ought” of IR theory and method. This divide has its origins in 
the separation of normative and empirical research that gained popularity during the first 
great debate between idealism and realism, which was particularly present in American IR.26  
                                           
26 It is not the intention of this thesis to make any evaluation on the merits of “American” or “European” 
influences during the history and development of IR theory. For more on this see Stanley Hoffman’s, “ An 
American social science: International relations,” Daedalus 106, no. 3 (1977), pp. 41-60. Nor is it my intention 
to engage with current critical theory debates on classical European émigré scholars and their role in IR. Instead, 
my point is to establish how moral realism broadly represents an empirical study. It has especially become 
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In this thesis, I argue that “ought” implies an inherently normative approach to morality, 
which can be used to summarize the majority of the contributions towards the classical realist 
revival. To conduct normative research in IR is to make statements about how international 
politics ought to be, by placing value on how actors behave, which includes whether their 
behaviour is right and wrong, good and bad. This type of research is typically guided by an 
assumption that morality is deontological and represents a set of principles that actors should 
follow at all times, under all conditions. So, for instance, normative perspectives would argue 
that international law is a universal good that all actors must follow regardless of the 
circumstances, and actors ought to do this because they have an inherent duty to adhere to 
these laws. But, as already established, in an international order still characterized by 
anarchy, this does not yet occur, and thus the main purpose of normative research in IR is to 
prescribe how the world can be better.27 
 
In contrast, moral realism makes empirical assumptions. It does not make claims that states 
should be “moral” because it can lead to certain outcomes, it only describes the factors, 
conditions and consequences that occur when states include morality as part of their foreign 
policy choices, and when these appear, morality is more likely to occur in their decision-
making, which makes it possible to derive inferences about the position of morality in 
international politics. Adopting an empirical approach makes sense for an investigation of 
morality primarily defined by the consequences of states choosing to include it as a factor 
that furthers the national interest. It also means that moral realism can account for why states 
can sometimes be seen to include morality in their foreign policy decisions in the one 
instance, and then fail to do so in another.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
popular amongst critical theory scholars to speculate on the intellectual history of IR theory by contextualizing 
the heritage and experience of its key contributors. In the contribution edited by Felix Rosche, classical realists, 
Morgenthau, Herz and Carr are examined as European scholars that immigrated to the US, and this emigration 
affected their input towards the discipline. For more see Felix Rosche, ed, Émigré Scholars and the Genesis of 
International Relations: A European Discipline in America (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).  
27 Charles Beitz argued that the normative purpose of IR theory is to discover moral standards that justify or 
promote change towards achieving a more equitable and just world, or, in other words, how to achieve progress 
in international affairs. For more see Beitz, Political Theory of International Relations (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1979), pp. 1-15.  
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The design of the moral realist framework: Expectations of reciprocity, rational choice and 
moral and material outcomes.  
Now that I have defined how moral realism conceptualizes morality and how I aim to 
position the perspective as following the classical realist tradition, it is necessary to briefly 
define the three themes of moral realism, which will be discussed in more detail in the 
chapter that follows. The three themes of moral realism (expectations of reciprocity, rational 
choice, and moral and material outcomes) reflect a holistic model for testing that is distinct 
from normative perspectives in a number of ways. 
 
Expectations of reciprocity between states 
The first category of moral realism is expectations of reciprocity.28 An expectation of 
reciprocity incorporates the classical realist view of considerations of the other. Moral 
realism argues that when states are seen to include morality by considering the interests of 
others when making policy choices, they are doing so because of an expectation that it will 
achieve material benefits in return. Thus, moral realism makes a distinction between acts of 
altruism that are judged to be moral simply by states performing them, and the motives 
driving states to act morally towards others. This means that the scope for states to consider 
morality in their foreign policy choices is actually limited, and only expected to occur when 
moral choices converge with the state’s pursuit of the national interest. An expectation of 
reciprocity between states keeps moral realism in line with the view of rationality found in 
common amongst Kennan, Morgenthau and Niebuhr. This is because the determining factor 
motivating state decisions is interests, and not an inherent duty or obligation to follow a set of 
moral rules.  
 
Rational choice in the calculation of foreign policy decisions 
This second category is rational choice. The reference to rational choice here is not 
specifically found in classical realism and is more commonly associated with quantitative 
economic models like game theory, which have been used to explain instances of state 
                                           
28 It is important to note here that in referring to reciprocity as part of the moral realist framework, I am not 
referring to the same notion of reciprocity put forward by neoliberal scholars like Robert Keohane. For 
neoliberal scholars, reciprocity is interpreted through the prism of rational states seeking mutual gain. Here, the 
benefits are determined by mutuality between states according to agreed upon norms and rules. From a moral 
realist perspective, expectations of reciprocity are determined by a calculation of the consequences for each state 
(the donor and the recipient) of a particular course of action or policy. This allows a moral realist to consider the 
effects a policy choice has on the “other” state. For a neoliberal interpretation of reciprocity, see Robert Keohan, 
“Reciprocity in international relations,” International Organization 40, no.1 (1986), p. 6-8. 
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competition and cooperation.29 However, other scholars like Colin Elmen and Michael Jensen 
have recognised that classical realism included “rational micro-foundations” in that foreign 
policy is understood to be decided rationally, once the costs and benefits of alternative 
courses of action have been considered. 30  Morgenthau himself even stated that international 
politics was based on a “rational hypothesis,” where scholars could deduce meaning from the 
presumption that all actors acted in a rational manner.31 Simply put, rational choice, as part of 
a moral realist framework, explains that morality is contingent on time and place, and hence 
not expected to appear in state foreign policy calculations at all times. Thus, rational choice 
neatly follows an expectation of reciprocity, given that states have the option to choose to 
consider morality during the process of rational decision-making. Moral realism expects that 
when a state is seen to include morality as a part of foreign choice, they have done so because 
it was calculated to be in the state’s national interest.  
 
Moral and material outcomes of foreign policy 
The third and final category of moral and material outcomes draws out the ability of moral 
realism to reflect a valuable research tool for foreign policy analysis, and is where this thesis 
combines theory with practice. Normative approaches have tended to overlook the need to 
apply observable inferences to testable evidence. But since classical realists emphasised the 
moral consequences of foreign policy decisions, any approach that attempts to incorporate 
their views on morality must take into consideration the outcomes of state policy once 
implemented. Therefore, I argue that moral realism can help understand the results of a 
state’s decision to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices. 
 
Here again, it is important to clarify that this was not a specific category employed by 
classical realists, and is one that is particular to the moral realist framework being advanced 
here. It is an important inclusion because it emphasizes the classical realist concern for the 
ethic of consequence when making policy decisions that include moral considerations. It does 
                                           
29 Like reciprocity, the moral realist interpretation of rational choice is different to how a neoliberal scholar 
would understand it. Rational choice, from a neoliberal perspective, is based on the cost/benefit calculation of 
states pursuing absolute gains. States pursuing absolute gains are indifferent to the effects their actions have on 
other states and thus their calculation of expected benefits is based solely on what the donor state is predicted to 
achieve. A moral realist view of rational choice, in comparison, takes into consideration the effect a donor 
state’s policy has on the recipient state, which is part of the cost/benefit calculation of the expected benefits. A 
clearer account of the neoliberal view of rational choice can be found at Keohane, “Rational Choice Theory and 
International Law: Insights and Limitations,” The Journal of Legal Studies 31, no. S1 (2002), pp. 307-319. 
30 Colin Elmen and Michael Jensen, ed. The Realism Reader (New York, Routledge, 2014), p. 4.  
31 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 4th ed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1966), p. 5.  
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this by linking policy guided by expectations of reciprocity with whether or not it leads to 
any moral and material outcomes. In this category, moral outcomes are evaluated on whether 
the policy actually has an effect in assisting the recipient state, and material outcomes are 
determined by whether it has any benefit for the state choosing to include morality as part of 
their foreign policy choices. This forms the rationale for exploring the moral realist claims 
that when moral and material considerations converge as part of a state’s foreign policy 
choice, it can actually stand to gain material benefits in return.    
 
These three categories form the expectations, calculations and outcomes of a moral realist 
approach to understanding the position of morality in foreign policy choices. They stop short 
of the prescriptive theorising found in normative IR scholarship. An emphasis on moral and 
material outcomes is central to the moral realist framework being proposed because it 
incorporates the classical realist tradition of moral consequentialism. This is also distinct 
from neoclassical realism, which generally limits its investigations of morality to how it 
shapes the perceptions of elites in domestic discourses. The emphasis on reciprocity and 
rational choice fills an important gap in identifying how the classical realists theorized 
morality as a concept that is connected to states’ calculation of the national interest, and 
contingent on time and place. Hence, this is an empirical investigation, and while there is by 
nature some degree of qualitative analysis, this is also common in the social sciences. 
 
Method: Single focused case study 
So far I have defined how this thesis conceives of morality as part of the moral realist 
framework. It has also briefly defined the parameters of moral realism and how this fits 
broadly within the classical realist tradition of empirically focused research and morality 
determined by judging the consequences of policy. The next step is to outline how this thesis 
conducts its research and to what evidence the moral realist framework will be applied.  
 
This thesis employs a discipline-specific single focused case study to construct a modified 
explanatory tool (moral realism) to understand foreign policy choices that sits at the 
crossroads of neoclassical realism and the more reflexive cosmopolitan, critical and ES 
approaches. To do this, I identify three different categories that define moral realism, which 
are used to explain the position of morality in Australian foreign policy. These are: 
expectations of reciprocity, rational choice and moral and material outcomes.  
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Once the moral realist framework has been established, it is then applied to three different 
policy arenas of Australia’s foreign policy: aid and development, humanitarian operations 
and strategic alliances. These policy arenas represent a broad sample of the potential for 
Australia to include morality as part of its foreign policy choices. They encompass one where 
it is expected to find significant moral outcomes; one where there is an expectation of both 
moral and strategic outcomes; and one where the literature has expected only strategic 
considerations will occur. This allows for a more comprehensive evaluation of moral realism 
that accounts for potential criticism of focusing too narrowly on one policy area, or too 
broadly on a historical sweep of events.  
 
Defence of the single focused case study 
Moral realism argues that morality is observable in the state’s calculation of material 
interests, which means a discipline specific single focused case analysis is the most 
appropriate fit with the research design, given that morality is not normative. Thus, discourse 
and content analysis is not likely to yield anything interesting about the nature of morality 
tied to the national interest. Meanwhile, space constraints preclude the use of a comparative 
case study that may have shed some more light on the veracity of my claims, but nonetheless 
would have been too unwieldy for a project of this type. Essentially this thesis is an exercise 
in applied theory, with the primary purpose of evaluating the merits of moral realism as an 
explanatory tool.  
 
Australia was chosen as the case study because there has not yet been a study that identified a 
moral realist framework and applied it to test Australia’s foreign policy choices. A survey of 
the literature on this reveals that views on morality could be summarized in two camps. On 
the one side were the ES and constructivists, who argued that it was possible to identify a 
specific type of diplomacy that is distinctly “moral.” These scholars argued that Australia’s 
unique geographic position, history of “activist” diplomacy, preference for multilateralism, 
and acceptance of a rules-based international order, indicated a particularly moral foreign 
policy.32 On the other side are the realist perspectives that were found to focus on Australia’s 
                                           
32 Together, the ES and constructivist scholarship on Australian foreign policy loosely represent the normative 
perspectives. Both of these perspectives argue for the importance of international society as a set of rules and 
norms that guide Australia’s foreign policy. For more see John Donald Bruce (J.D.B) Miller, The Conduct of 
Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1969); Ramesh Thakur, “Australia’s 
regional engagement,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 20, no. 1 (1998), pp. 1-21; Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, 
Australian Foreign Relations (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1991); Paul Keal ed., Ethics and 
Foreign Policy (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992); Alex Bellamy and Marianne Hanson, “Justice beyond borders? 
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policy responses dictated by the balance of power, and influenced by the relative constraints 
of being a middle power. For realists, this explained Australia’s need to establish alliances 
with “great and powerful friends” and to prioritize national resources primarily for the pursuit 
of its strategic and economic interests, which left little space for the inclusion of morality in 
Australia’s decision-making. 33 
 
The debate between normative and realist perspectives in Australian scholarship has been 
particularly distinctive in that it was generally resolved by an acceptance that Australian 
diplomacy could be found to follow the middle-ground or “international societal” approach.34 
Yet, despite this consensus, others like Michael Wesley have argued that Australia’s 
diplomacy shows a concern for policy consequences that sits uncomfortably with the ES. 
Specifically, Wesley argued that Australia demonstrated a preference for prudence in 
constructing its foreign policy, and was generally sceptical of the capacity of institutions and 
ideas to change or modify state behaviour.35 This uncovers a gap in the literature which is 
where I position moral realism: with its focus on moral and material outcomes, as being 
useful in understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices.  
 
Australia is thus an appropriate case study for what Arend Lijphart, Alexander George, 
Andrew Bennett and Harry Eckstein have termed “theory testing.”36  The selection of 
                                                                                                                                    
Australia and the International Criminal Court,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 3 (2002), pp. 
417-433; and Bellamy, “The responsibility to protect and Australian foreign policy,” Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 64, no. 4 (2010): 432-448. 
33 More references will be provided in the literature review: for a select sample of realist scholarship on 
Australia, see William Tow “Australia and the United States,” in James Cotton and John Ravenhill ed. The 
National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 19996-200 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
2001), pp. 171-192; Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1988); Thomas Bruce (T.B) Millar, Australia in Peace and War (South Yara: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1978); Paul Dibb ed. Australia’s External Relations in the 1980s: The Interaction of Economic, 
Political and Strategic Factors (Canberra: Groom Helm Australia, 1983); and Dibb, “Australia’s alliance with 
America,” Melbourne Asia Policy Papers 1, no. 1 (2003), pp. 1-11. 
34 This characterization of Australian foreign policy and Australian IR in general was first popularized by 
Martin Indyk in 1985 and has since been made by others such as James Cotton and Richard Devetak. See 
Martin Indyk, “The Australian study of international relations” in Don Aitkin, ed. Surveys of Australian 
Political Science (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1985); James Cotton, “Realism, rationalism, race: On the early 
international relations discipline in Australia,” International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 3 (2009), pp. 627-647 and 
Richard Devetak, “An Australian outlook on international affairs? The evolution of international relations 
theory in Australia,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 55, no. 3 (2009), pp. 335-359.  
35 Michael Wesley, “The rich tradition of Australian realism,” Australian Journal of Politics & History 55, no. 3 
(2009), pp. 326-327. 
36Arend Lijhart, “Comparative politics and the comparative method,” American Political Science Review 65, no. 
3 (1971), pp. 692-93; Harry Eckstein, “Case studies and theory in political science,” in Fred Greenstein and 
Nelson Polsby ed. Handbook of Political Science, Volume 7 (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 79-138; 
Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge: Belfler Centre for Science and International Affairs, 2004), p. 75. 
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Australia as a “most-likely” case for theory testing allows for the examination of a specific 
set of theoretical concepts (in this case, the three categories of moral realism: expectations of 
reciprocity, rational choice and moral and material outcomes) in order to develop generalized 
observations from specific examples of foreign policy. 
 
George and Bennett’s three phases of theory-orientated case studies is used to examine the 
evaluative potential of moral realism as a tool for foreign policy analysis.37 Phase 1 
establishes the use of moral realism as a theoretical framework that can interpret the reasons 
for the appearance of morality in Australia’s foreign policy. In this regard, Phase 1 identifies 
the gap or inadequacies of existing accounts of the evidence, such as those put forward by the 
ES and constructivism, and the merits of proposing modified or new explanations.38 In other 
words, Phase I establishes the aim of the thesis: to discover whether moral realism represents 
an appropriate analytical tool for understanding morality in Australia’s foreign policy 
choices. Once the appropriateness of moral realism as a new explanation becomes clear, this 
is then used for empirical testing, which is conducted on the case study evidence identified in 
this thesis as Australia’s foreign policy choices in the areas of aid and development, 
humanitarian operations and strategic alliances.   
  
Next, in Phase 2 of theory testing, interpretations are made from the application of the moral 
realist framework to the case evidence.39 This allows for the authority of an explanation to be 
enhanced to the extent that the assumptions made by moral realism are found to be more or 
less consistent with the evidence, or more or less supported by available generalizations. This 
method has the added benefit of providing scope for “feedback” from observations and 
insights found from a moral realist examination, which provides the setting for Phase 3. 
Phase 3 is where the final analysis on the merits of moral realism is made and implications 
for understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices are drawn from the evidence found.40 
Once this process has been completed, I will be able to answer the research questions posed 
by this thesis, which are: 
 
 
                                           
37 The three phases are outlined in George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, pp. 73-125. 
38 Ibid. pp. 73-89.  
39 Ibid. pp. 89-109.  
40 Ibid. pp. 109-125 
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Primary research question 
 
Is moral realism an appropriate analytical tool for understanding Australia’s foreign policy 
choices?  
 
This question is supported by two secondary research questions: 
 
Secondary research questions 
 
1.  Are moral and material considerations present in Australia’s foreign policy decision-
making?  
 
2.  Does Australia stand to gain when morality is a part of foreign policy choice?  
 
To answer these questions the thesis employs an array of empirical material compiled from 
primary sources that include documents from the National Archives of Australia, the 
Morgenthau and Niebuhr archives at the Library of Congress, as well as the Hedley Bull 
papers from Oxford University. Archival research is used in combination with other primary 
sources, such as parliamentary debates, legislation and policy documents, speeches and 
media releases, White Papers, treaties, and newspaper articles. I also incorporate semi-
structured interviews conducted with key individuals within the Australian foreign policy 
community, as well as secondary sources such as books, journal articles, policy reviews, and 
seminar and working papers.  
 
Thesis outline 
This thesis is divided into 6 Chapters. Chapter 1 reviews the main contributions to the 
classical realist revival. It begins with normative approaches, and finds that these 
contributions, by inflating their reflexive and rationalist methodologies, have misrepresented 
how the classical realists understood morality. It then moves to the realist contributions and 
finds that these have been limited to neoclassical realists who have remained sceptical about 
the position of morality in foreign policy choices. I then present the moral realist framework 
as a realist contribution that more accurately incorporates the classical realist view of 
consequential morality. Finally, I draw out the three moral realist themes of expectations of 
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reciprocity, rational choice, and moral and material outcomes. These represent the moral 
realist framework, which are applied for testing in the empirical cases that follow.  
 
Chapter 2 represents the start of the empirical analysis. This chapter applies the moral realist 
framework to understand Australia’s foreign policy choices in aid and development. I find 
that both moral and strategic calculations were present in guiding where Australia’s aid was 
directed and what types of aid it preferred, which indicated that moral and material outcomes 
were likely. This strengthened the moral realist claim that states can sometimes gain material 
benefits from choosing to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices. In Chapter 
3 the same method is used to examine the motivations and outcomes involved in Australia’s 
policy towards humanitarian operations. Specifically, this chapter applies the moral realist 
framework to understand Australia’s decision to adopt a leadership role in implementing the 
humanitarian operations in Cambodia and Timor Leste. It finds that in both instances, 
Australia was guided by a consideration for self-determination, as well as strategic 
expectations of material gain. This further supports the use of moral realism to understand 
Australia’s policy towards strategic alliances, which is done in Chapter 4. In Chapter 4 I 
examine the US-Australian security partnership as Australia’s most important strategic 
alliance, and find that moral calculations as part of an expectation of reciprocity were 
sometimes present in how both states sought to achieve peace and stability in the Asia-
Pacific. This indicated that moral and material outcomes were likely and strengthened the 
potential for material gains for Australia.  
 
Chapter 5 is where I conduct the final analysis. This chapter brings together the evidence 
found in the empirical cases, and in doing so provides a defence of moral realism in light of 
the evidence presented, and against potential criticism. I find that moral realism is capable of 
explaining Australia’s foreign policy choices and thus represents a valuable contribution 
towards understanding the role of morality in its foreign policy decision-making. 
Specifically, I find that Australia has been primarily motived by calculations of expectations 
of reciprocity in choosing to include morality as part of its foreign policy choices. This is 
supported by the existence of rational choice in informing when, and under what 
circumstances, Australia chose to include morality as part of its decisions. This indicates that 
moral and material outcomes were likely, which reinforced the core moral realist claim that 
when states choose to include morality in their rational decision-making, they can actually 
stand to gain material benefits in return. The key findings of the thesis and its implications for 
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understanding morality in Australia’s foreign policy choices are then provided in Chapter 6, 
which also identifies the potential problems with moral realism, as well as highlighting some 
avenues for future research. 
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Chapter One 
 
The return of classical realism: Perspectives on morality, interests and inter-state 
relations. 
 
International Relations (IR) scholars interested in the concept of morality have recently 
turned their attention to the way early classical realists understood the concept. This has led 
to a reinvigoration of efforts to theorise the role of morality in IR, as well as how this can be 
used to explain the position of morality in states’ foreign policies. In this chapter I chart the 
various perspectives in IR theory that have contributed to this debate.41 I begin with an 
examination of cosmopolitanism, constructivism and critical revivalism. Respectively, these 
represent the normative, reflexive and critical methods of forming assumptions about the 
nature and purpose of morality. I also examine the English School (ES), as a collection of 
perspectives that claim to represent a “moral middle ground” between cosmopolitanism and 
realism. Within this critique, I pay particular attention to the critical revival as the perspective 
that has dominated the return to classical realism. I find that these contributions share 
similarities in how they perceive morality as a set of normative prescriptions, and thus their 
attempt to revive the work of classical realists has actually led to a displacement of the realist 
tradition’s core theoretical assumptions.  
 
The misrepresentation of classical realism has not elicited much of a defence from realist 
scholars themselves. Indeed, a cursory reading of the literature can leave one wondering: 
where have all the realists gone? Those who identify with a different theoretical school of 
thought have almost exclusively populated the return to classical realism. Hence, in contrast I 
propose moral realism as my own contribution towards the return to classical realism. I argue 
that realist thought can accommodate morality as a dependent variable linked to interest 
                                           
41 It is not the intention of this thesis to engage with liberal perspectives, such as classical liberalism and liberal 
institutionalism (neoliberalism). Scholars writing from these perspectives, like Michael Doyle, Robert Keohane 
and Joseph Nye, have tended to overlook the views of classical realism, engaging with them only to make 
passing critiques. In terms of considering the role of morality in international politics, classical liberalism has 
generally supported Kant’s notion that states are duty bound to pursue peace and cooperation. Here, morality is 
a categorical imperative, which has also informed the cosmopolitan perspectives of international relations 
discussed in this thesis. Thus, a discussion on classical liberalism would not add anything further to an analysis 
of morality in international politics, or to current debates on the views of classical realists. Neoliberalism, like 
neorealism, has very little to say about the role of morality, viewing it through the lens of cooperation. And 
since they shy away from theories of foreign policy, it is irrelevant to a discussion of both classical realism and 
morality.  
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defined as power, and that it is possible to observe states choosing to include morality as part 
of their foreign policy choices that goes beyond simple rhetoric. This means that morality can 
be viewed as an important factor involved in achieving the instrumental foreign policy goals 
of states. This in itself is not a new claim. Classical realists have frequently advocated for a 
morality involved in the rational calculations of a state’s national interest, which is evaluated 
according to whether it achieves any outcomes. Where moral realism adds to this is in its 
argument that when moral and material interests are evident, states can actually achieve 
increased material benefits in return.  
 
To achieve this I then conduct an analysis of the work of Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold 
Niebuhr and George Kennan, and in doing so draw out three common factors used to 
construct the moral realist framework. Specifically, I address the expectation of reciprocity 
between states, rational choice in the calculation of foreign policy decisions, and the 
outcomes – both moral and material – of foreign policy. This helps reveal that moral realism 
remains informed by notions of power and interest, and by traditional realist assumptions 
about the role of the state. This chapter therefore establishes the rationale for identifying the 
moral realist framework as an evaluative tool capable of enhancing our understanding of 
foreign policy. This forms the basis of analysis for the empirical cases laid out in the next 
three chapters.  
 
Cosmopolitan realism: The classical realist meets cosmopolitanism 
I begin with cosmopolitanism.42 Cosmopolitan perspectives argue for the existence of a 
universal morality tied to the rational capacity of individuals to treat others as “ends.” 
Applied to international politics, this means that cosmopolitan thinkers, like Charles Beitz, 
David Held and Andrew Linklater, have typically focused on notions of international justice, 
international law, self-determination and global citizenship, to argue that states should be 
guided by the pursuit of a moral order that works above the “morality of states.”43 For them, 
increased independence, the global structure of international law, and the advent of Global 
                                           
42 To maintain brevity, this thesis will restrict the analysis of cosmopolitanism to those that deal with a universal 
form of morality within the context of a pluralist state system. This allows for deeper analysis of morality under 
the critical revival, where notions of a transformative foreign policy agenda and the world state are recurring 
themes in new interpretations of classical realism made by critical theorists. 
43 Charles Beitz, Political Theory of International Relations (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979); 
Andrew Linklater, “The problem of community in international relations,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 
15, no.2 (1990), pp. 135-154 and David Held, Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2010).  
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Civil Society (GCS), provided evidence of a shift from assessing morality through the prism 
of the security of the state, to one that focused on safeguarding the liberty of the individual.  
 
Yet despite these attempts to locate a universal morality, the asymmetrical structure of power 
that has cemented the state as the highest moral and political authority in international 
relations has been a significant theoretical roadblock for cosmopolitanism. In order to work 
around this, some scholars have recently argued for a convergence between cosmopolitanism 
and classical realism.44 Richard Beardsworth, in particular, has argued for a “cosmopolitan 
realism” that accepts the political reality of global interdependence and engages with an 
expanded definition of the nature and effects of power.45 According to him, Morgenthau had 
a differentiated view of power in which qualitative and quantitative aspects were inextricably 
linked. Therefore, power has an inherently ethical dimension, and cannot be analysed without 
considering its relationship with various norms, values and morals.46 So rather than 
representing a fixed hierarchy with hard power at the top and soft power at the bottom, power 
is horizontal in nature, and can be transformed into a fluid variable that offers actors more 
choice in deciding what “type” is wielded. 
 
If the properties of power can be shaped according to the political realities of the time, 
Beardsworth argues that this can be combined with the classical realist acceptance of the 
concern for the “other” during the struggle for power. Qualitative dimensions of “power as 
interest” are then defined by corresponding judgments on the quality of its motives. This 
means that for power to be an effective political tool in the pursuit of interests, actors must 
evolve from always relying on its coercive proprieties, as negative judgments can lead to 
consequences for the state’s position in world affairs. Morgenthau termed this quality of 
power “prestige,” but Beardsworth refers to it as “legitimacy.” 47 
 
                                           
44 Beardsworth, “Cosmopolitanism and realism: towards a theoretical convergence,” Millennium 37, no. 1 
(2008), pp. 69-96; Beardsworth, Cosmopolitanism and International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2011); and Alistair Murry, Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethic (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1997).  
45 Beardsworth, “Cosmopolitanism and realism: towards a theoretical convergence,” pp. 81-82. Similar 
arguments on the use of “cosmopolitan power” in an interdependent world have been made by Giulio Gallarotti, 
who argued that Morgenthau understood legitimate power to be linked to whether others viewed it as being 
morally justified. For more see, Giulio M. Gallarotti, Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations: A 
Synthesis of Realism, Neoliberalism and Constructivism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 
150.  
46 Ibid, p. 82.  
47 Morgenthau outlined prestige in the chapter “The struggle for power: policy of prestige,” in Politics Among 
Nations, pp. 69-82.  
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Legitimacy, from this perspective, is tied to morality through the state’s concern for how its 
power is received by others. Greater interdependence means the legitimacy of power can be 
determined as more inclusive when considering the effects political power has on the 
relationship between states. The struggle for power is reshaped as the struggle for the 
establishment of principled behaviour that evolves over time. And according to cosmopolitan 
realism, the social relationship between the individual and the other has progressed as the rate 
of interdependence increased. Eventually, this means the power structure of the state will 
give way to some form of world community.  
 
However, in this context morality is not blended with power but conflated with it, tying 
power to the global legitimacy of states. Like the realist-constructivist adaptations of classical 
realism described below, this makes it difficult to determine what motivates moral 
considerations in foreign policy. Cosmopolitan realism assumes that states in search of 
legitimacy will naturally seek a power that transcends material forces. But Morgenthau, and 
classical realists in general, argued that ideational components of power were considered 
second order phenomena, and did not have the capacity to motivate state behaviour on their 
own.48 To be effective ideational factors must be supported by material strength, given the 
mistrust states hold for each other under a system of anarchy. In this environment, qualitative 
factors wield less weight than quantitative ones in order to ensure survival. And since 
classical realists also argued that anarchy is a permanent condition, the calculation of hard 
power interest will always out-weigh qualitative ones of morality. 
 
This calls into question the validity of cosmopolitan realism in its claim that morality is a 
factor that can transform international politics. The assumption in reframing power to mean 
legitimacy is that states will be deterred from the use of violence for fear of moral 
opprobrium, and this reflects a moral good for inter-state relations that will eventually lead to 
the creation of a stable global community. But this overlooks the classical realist notion that 
moral principles are dependent on the context in which states choose to include them as part 
of their foreign policy calculations. Even if it is accepted that international relations is 
reaching an unprecedented level of interdependence, it is not necessarily given that states will 
always choose to avoid the use of force, and in some instances may employ force to achieve a 
                                           
48 Morgenthau neatly described this in his “Elements of national power,” where he ordered material qualities of 
power, such as geography, natural resources, military preparedness industrial capacity, as more important than 
qualitative ones relating to national morale, national character, quality of diplomacy and quality of government. 
See Morgenthau, “Elements of national power,” in Politics Among Nations 4th ed, pp. 106-158.  
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moral end, as in humanitarian intervention. There may also be some instances where the 
state’s use of violence is unavoidable (for example, in situations of self-defence), or to 
protect an ally. In these instances, the state will only decide on an alternative course of action 
if it determines that the consequences for the national interest over-rule any benefits gained in 
return.  
 
The calculation of the national interest is thus important in determining the relationship 
between power and morality. More broadly, it draws out the problems with emancipatory 
perspectives, which fail to properly consider the motives compelling states to act in a moral 
way. Cosmopolitanism understands morality to be normative and best theorized as a 
prescriptive force where motives are replaced with the inherent duties and obligation states 
have to protect others. Classical realists, on the other hand, argued that if a state was to 
consider the needs of the other, over the needs of the self, then there must be a material 
incentive involved, or, put another way, an expectation of reciprocity that there will be some 
form of material interest achieved alongside the moral one.49 Such a difference means that 
attempts at merging the two approaches will produce the evaluative problems outlined above, 
and thus provide little in the way of understanding how the classical realists view morality, 
and more specifically, how one can identify morality in foreign policy choices. Indeed, a 
similar problem is encountered by constructivism, to which I now turn.  
 
Constructivism: Moral norms and the mutual constitution of identity and interests 
The advent of constructivism in IR theory corresponded with a general shift away from 
positivist approaches to international politics after the Cold War.50 Instead of conceiving 
events and their consequences through the prism of fixed structures and the relationship 
between independent and dependent variables, constructivism argues that international 
relations could more accurately be described by viewing these elements as mutually 
constituted. Material structures previously thought of as being permanent, like anarchy, could 
be transformed by discursive processes as they are contingent on the agents’ experiences and 
perceptions of them. Meaningful behaviour is thus characterized by the intersubjective 
acquisition of knowledge as actors developed their perceptions and identities by sharing their 
                                           
49 The concept of expectations of reciprocity will be examined later in the chapter where I discuss the areas of 
commonality between the three classical realists. Briefly, it incorporates the limited concept of rationality 
outlined in the introduction where I describe that it is possible to identify a consideration of the “other” in 
classical realism.  
50 Ted Hopf, “The promise of constructivism in International Relations theory,” International Security 23, 1 
(1998), pp. 171-200.  
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experiences with others. Social structures have the capacity to shape an actor’s identity and 
interests, as well as their behaviour, which allows constructivism to represent an alternative 
to both materialism and rationalism.51 Together this forms a “socially constructed” approach 
towards understanding international politics, whereby norms and ideas are important in 
establishing mutually constituted agents and structures.  
 
Despite the claim to inter-subjectivity, constructivists, and Alexander Wendt’s 
characterization in particular, have treated interests and identity as separate testable 
phenomena that have specific roles to play in the process of social construction.52 This 
uncovers one of the main methodological flaws in the circular logic that operates within 
constructivism. In order to overcome the problem of conflating causal relations that 
reflexivity inevitably engenders, Wendt argued that interests are dependent on identity and 
each of them has their own distinct causal force, with interests being motivational, and 
identity being cognitive and structural. 53 In separating identity and interests, Wendt is 
admitting they are not necessarily mutually constituted, and have quite different uses in 
explaining state behaviour. This leads one to ask: what, then, is the source of interests and 
identity if they are not formed through the intersubjective process? 
 
Such criticism has been largely overlooked by the majority of constructivists currently 
dominating the field that have moved on from Wendt to focus instead on establishing 
whether ideational factors are significant in shaping state interaction. Specifically, 
constructivists have attempted to demonstrate that norms have independent causal effects that 
are separate from interests.54 Rather than engaging in debates on whether interests and 
identity are indeed mutually constituted, these scholars examine instances where norms 
independently guide state behaviour. This has been one of the primary research areas for the 
                                           
51 Alexander Wendt, “Constructing international politics,” International Security 20, no. 1 (1995), pp. 71-81; 
Wendt, “The agent structure problem in international relations theory,” International Organization 41 (1987), 
pp. 335-70; Wendt “Constitution and causation in international relations,” Review of International Studies 24 
(1998), pp.101-117; and Wendt Social Theory of International Politics (UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1999).  
52 Wendt was the founder of structurationism. He argued that the intersubjective process of social construction 
meant an actor’s perception of a structure and its corresponding constitution of the agent’s identity could change 
according to changes in shared understanding. Ideas and interests were then mutual constituted meaning 
constructivism could explain structural change, as anarchy was capable of being transformed through social 
practice. See Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p 1.  
53 Wendt, “Collective identity formation and the international state,” American Political Science Review,” 88, 
no.2 (1994), p. 385. 
54 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking stock: the constructivist research program in international 
relations and comparative politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001), pp. 391-416.  
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“social constructivist” strand of constructivism that focuses on arenas of international law, 
foreign aid, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, human rights and ethnic conflict.55  
 
It is here that constructivism clearly engages with the concept of morality, which is tied to 
state action in following certain norms. 56 Constructivists generally begin this argument with 
the assumption that most states are part of a rules-based international society, and therefore 
exist in an environment where norms like respect for sovereignty and the rule of law are 
important in how states construct their foreign policies, and how they respond to global 
events. In an international society, norms establish the guidelines for behaviour, which can 
then become the motivation for states to act. Since these norms are the result of social 
interaction over what is considered “right” for states to follow, they are inherently moral, 
with the capacity to shape decisions in foreign policy.57 Christian Reus-Smit, who argued that 
states have an inherent moral purpose in conducting their international affairs, developed this 
view. This moral purpose was formed by tying the state’s identity to the way domestic norms, 
like those on procedural justice, were constitutive of the state’s political and social structures, 
which were then diffused into international society. 58 
 
The main problem with this approach is that it assumes international society to be inherently 
cooperative, which limits the explanation of state behaviour to areas where state interaction 
will produce positive outcomes. This also uncovers the problem of where international 
society comes from, and how it is constituted. The circular logic of reflexivity means it is 
difficult to discern whether the state or international society came first, and whether the state 
constituted the society, or the society constituted the state. The state could just as well 
develop a moral purpose in waging war as it could in developing non-violent forms of 
political order, and this point leads to questions as to what motivates societies to identify with 
the state as the political unit. Here again, the illogics of reflexivist methodologies are 
                                           
55 Finnemore, The National Interest in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Peter J. 
Katzenstein Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1996); Audie Klotz Norms in International Relations: Struggle Against Apartheid (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1995); Richard Price, “A genealogy of the chemical weapons taboo,” International 
Organization 49, no. 01 (1995), pp. 73-103; and David Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in International Relations: 
The Foreign Aid Regime 1949-1989 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).  
56 Wendt himself did not clearly refer to morality, and only briefly mentioned that constructivism had a 
normative purpose in promoting social change. Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social 
construction of power politics,” International Organization 46, no. 02 (1992), p. 417 
57 Annika Bjorkdahl, “Norms in international relations: Some conceptual and methodological reflections,” 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 15, no. 1 (2002), pp. 1-23.  
58 Christian Reus-Smit, Moral Purpose of the State: Cultural, Social Identity and Institutional Rationality in 
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).  
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revealed. Constructivists find this difficult to reconcile, as their ontology is one that 
disregards both rationality and materialism, leaving the source of what motivates an actor’s 
behaviour vaguely defined. Thus, a gap exists in conceptualizing the factors that motivate 
states to form these moral relationships, which then constitute the structures that are needed 
to maintain them. 59 
 
The impossible bridging of the ontological divide: Classical realism via construction.  
Recently, constructivists have argued for a synthesis between classical realism and social 
construction that could bridge the divide between an actor’s motivation and the meaning 
attributed to them via social construction. Samuel Barkin has argued that a constructivist 
engagement with classical realists could be useful in demonstrating how these paradigms 
understood international politics to be socially constructed.60 Barkin draws on Thucydides, 
Morgenthau and Edward Carr to argue that these writers viewed human nature as a social 
practice where individuals ascribed value to power and interests through their interaction 
with others.  In this context, morality is also defined socially as a factor involved in the 
formation of collective identities.  
 
Barkin is correct to point out that classical realists understood human beings to be inherently 
social, and this allowed them to make a link between power and morality through 
consideration of the other. However, the difference is that classical realism saw morality as a 
factor that strengthened the power of the state, rather than one that could independently 
motivate it. This distinction uncovers the tension between universal conceptions of morality 
and the particularism preferred by classical realism. Constructivists see morality as a 
permissive force that stems from the desire of individuals to achieve self-actualization 
                                           
59 To be fair to constructivists, they are not necessarily concerned with questions like “why are states moral?” 
and would answer criticism about motivation with the assumption that states learn, through social construction, 
that it is a social good to be moral. But this is a difficult argument to sustain given that it still requires an 
acceptance that individuals (and states) have the rational capacity to determine which practices lead to 
embedded normative standards, and which, from feedback of the group, are considered harmful. This point has 
also led some, like Amitav Acharya, to claim that constructivist IR has a “liberal” or “cosmopolitan” bias and 
prioritizes research in universal “western” norms, like human rights, distributive justice, and the just use of 
force, over others like norms of Islamism, collective rights and nationalism. For more, see Amitav Acharya, 
“How ideas spread: whose norms matter? Norm localization and institutional change in Asian regionalism,” 
International Organization 58, no. 02 (2004), pp. 239-275. These norms are also considered “good” because 
recognized principled agents promote them; such as the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which reinforces the liberal hegemony in constructivism.   
60 Samuel Barkin, Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), p. 7.  
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through their interaction with others.61  In this regard, constructivism, like cosmopolitanism, 
assumes a higher degree of rationality where individuals are born with the reasoned ability to 
learn, and to develop social norms that reflect good or bad behaviour.  Morality, using this 
reasoning, is inherently tied to ideas that have the independent causal capacity to transcend 
material constraints and is therefore not exclusively dependent on social construction. Such 
an interpretation of morality is then left supporting the same assumptions put forward by 
cosmopolitan approaches, which are deontological, and determine morality by adherence to a 
set of rules, obligations, rights and duties.  
 
Classical realists, in stark contrast, argued that individuals are motivated to form groups for a 
shared purpose in achieving security. Over time, these groups develop internal mechanisms 
(rule of law, and social and political institutions) that regulate the group’s behaviour, but 
informing this is the pursuit of power that naturally separates societies into distinct “tribes” 
maintained by the individual members’ mutual interest in survival.62 The structural 
constraints of the relative balance of power mean that morality, while partly social, is 
contextual, and hence cannot be a factor that motivates an agent’s behaviour across time and 
place.  
 
This highlights a further problem with reflexive theories: it shows that inter-subjectivity 
makes it difficult to identify a relational reference that explains why states are moral. It 
means that in terms of methodology, every action can be perceived as moral as the state is 
constructed as a moral agent. This leads into concerns about consistency when analysing 
morality in foreign policy, as it is unclear which factors need to be present to determine when 
a state is choosing to include morality as part of its foreign policy choices. To work around 
this, some constructivists have argued for a loose convergence between social constructivism 
and the classical realist view of the relationship between power and morality. Yet the analysis 
conducted above has demonstrated that these two approaches have fundamentally different 
ways of conceptualizing this relationship. Classical realism sees this through the prism of the 
national interest, while constructivism views this through the prism of social norms.    
 
 
                                           
61 Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).  
62 Jennifer Sterling Folkner, “Realist constructivism and morality,” Special Issue: Bridging the Gap: The 
Realist-Constructivist Dialogue, International Studies Review 6 (2004), pp. 342-244.  
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The critical revival: Critical reflections on morality in classical realism 
The constructivist and cosmopolitan engagement with classical realism has been brief, with 
little further being offered outside the initial contributions aimed at renewing academic 
interest in it as a field of research. The contributions from the “Critical School63” of IR 
theory, however, have been much more comprehensive. They share some similarities with 
cosmopolitan perspectives, in that some studies focus on positioning morality in classical 
realism as a factor that embodies progress. Others have been part of a growing wave of post-
positivist thinkers who argue that the classical realists’ own values, morals and experiences 
influenced the way the theory was constructed and how it was used.  
 
Michael Williams was one of the first scholars of critical theory to propose a re-evaluation of 
how morality is viewed in classical realism, and he has specifically drawn on the work of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Hobbes, Thucydides and Morgenthau.64 Williams has 
termed his contribution “wilful realism:” a characterization that speaks to his view that these 
scholars have been misrepresented in their claim to realism. This view can be divided into 
three parts: scepticism, relationality and power politics. According to Williams, wilful 
realism is sceptical of the merits of empiricism and self-determination based on ignorance 
towards the “other.”65 Key to this re-characterization is the acceptance of the limits of 
rationality and the recognition of the ability of knowledge to create relational properties in 
the construction of an actor’s own interests, by understanding the interests and ideas of others 
                                           
63 The Critical School of IR theory can trace its roots to the Frankfurt School of Political and Social Research, 
but gained specific popularity within IR during the 1980s as the discipline expanded to include a more “critical” 
approach towards the structure and function of positivist theories. The scope of literature claimed under the 
critical umbrella is much too broad to be given full attention in this thesis, ranging from the Marxists and neo-
Gramscian views of Immanuel Wallerstein and Robert Cox, to the post-modern and post-structuralist 
perspectives made by Jacques Derrida and James Der Derrian. This thesis will instead restrict its analysis to the 
contributions that deal with morality in specific relation to classical realism.  
64 Richard Ned Lebow has also been influential in igniting a return to the moral and ethical aspects of classical 
realism. He argued that classical realism offered a principled response to how neorealism understood order by 
combining the pursuit of both ethics and interests in state interaction. Lebow drew on Thucydides, Carl Von 
Clausewitz and Hans Morgenthau to discover whether it is possible to construct a framework of ethics that is 
tied to the states interest in pursuing order, rather than through traditional notions of justice. In attempting to do 
so, Lebow is adopting the reflexive methodology employed by Williams and others who conflate the means and 
ends of states. Here, there is a lack of understanding as to whether the state views order as the end goal or as a 
means to achieve their own interests. For more see, Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and 
Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
65 Williams, “Why ideas Matter in international relations: Hans Morgenthau, classical realism, and the moral 
construction of power politics,” International Organization 58 no. 4 (2004), pp. 633-655 and earlier by Michael 
Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger, Political Traditions in Foreign Policy Series (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), pp. 155-165.  
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within the international system.66 Therefore, for Williams, the separation between reason and 
construction maintained by classical thinkers is a false one, as political and social order is 
constructed through the interaction of knowledge and experience. 
 
Wilful realism re-castes classical realism as a reflexive doctrine, given that notions of the 
other are reflected onto the pursuit of the national interest.67 In this regard, his contribution 
follows a similar epistemology to the realist-constructivist merging of interests with morality. 
But Williams goes further, and applies this to how classical realists understood an “ethic of 
responsibility,” and its importance in determining foreign policy outcomes. Classical realism 
views this ethic as being the source of prudence, where an appreciation for the outcomes of a 
policy guided by the national interest, allows states to exercise both moral and material 
restraint, thereby reinforcing the importance of rationality in the classical tradition. Wilful 
realism sees this relationship as a mutually reinforcing discursive practice. In other words, 
ideas and identity formation are important in shaping actors’ expectations of policy 
outcomes. The ethic of responsibility, previously understood as a concern for the effect 
policy choices have on others, is re-constituted into the actor’s own determination of the 
national interest.68  
 
The entry of reflexive thought into classical realism is open to much criticism, and the most 
important comes from the classical realists themselves who argued that it was theoretically 
unwise to conflate morality with the instrumental ends of states. The recalibration of the 
national interest into an intersubjective process invalidates the evaluative purpose of placing 
“interest defined by power” as the signpost for mapping foreign policy choices. 
Methodologically, this allows for consistency in analysing state behaviour, as the national 
interest is derived from human nature, and therefore not tied to the fluid construction and 
transfer of ideas. This enables classical realists to present a clearer conceptualization of 
morality as a second order phenomenon that is linked to the rational calculation of the 
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national interest, and contextually dependent on whether it will achieve certain benefits in 
return.   
 
The world state: The normative purpose of classical realism?  
So far I have outlined how some critical theorists have attempted to reinvent classical realism 
as a reflexive doctrine. Next, I move to consider some of the post-positivist contributions that 
are now dominant within the revival. I start with Chris Brown who has argued that 
international relations is currently undergoing a “practice turn”, in which assumptions about 
how the world works should be drawn by those who have experience within it.69 In order to 
apply this to a reading of classical realism, Brown has linked Aristotle’s ideas of phronesis 
(prudence) and habitus (practice) to argue that Morgenthau and Kennan exercised practical 
reason based on their experience as advisors and policy practitioners.70  
 
According to Brown, Kennan’s experience as a diplomat stationed in Moscow – and as the 
architect of the Truman Doctrine – directly shaped the US policy of containment. In looking 
at Morgenthau, Brown goes further, suggesting that his experience as a lawyer under the 
Weimer republic was central to presenting political realism as a set of laws on how 
international politics should operate. This is consistent with other contributions from the 
Critical School, which merge the views, experiences and values of the observer with their 
approach to generating theory. This challenges the positivist framework of rational theories 
of IR, as the accumulation of the observers’ experiences is translated into practical 
knowledge on how state behaviour ought to be, and not how it is.  
 
This re-interpretation has gained significant momentum in critical perspectives, with an 
emerging group of scholars claiming that realism is a theory of “moderate” progress (or more 
specifically one that outlines steps for global reform).71 Campbell Craig has argued that the 
core American realists – Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Kenneth Waltz – were primarily guided 
by a normative purpose in arguing that the best way to achieve international security is in the 
                                           
69 Chris Brown, “The ‘practice turn,’ phronesis and classical realism: towards a phronetic international political 
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70 The influence of Aristotle on Morgenthau has also been the focus of contributions made by Anthony J. Lang. 
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71 William Scheuerman, “ The (Classical) realist vision of global reform,” International Theory 2 no.2 (2010), 
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absence of war.72 According to Craig, these scholars were conscious of the effect their 
perspectives had on public debate and, as a result, frequently made “judgments” on the state 
of international affairs from their own set of “good” and “bad” values.73  This was most 
obvious during the Cold War, when the fear of thermonuclear war was present in both public 
and academic discourses.  
 
The American Cold War project of building a thermonuclear arsenal to deter Soviet 
expansionism, a policy strategy that Morgenthau, Waltz and Niebuhr supported, accelerated 
the arms race between the US and the Soviet Union. Yet Craig states that by the end of the 
1950s, these scholars had come to question their support of this policy and their confidence in 
the explanatory power of realist theory. In particular, they demonstrated support for the 
possibility of a new world “leviathan,” as the only means of maintaining international peace 
and security. 74 This prescriptive change was the result of what Morgenthau viewed as the 
impossible choice between advocating for the US to engage in a limited war with the Soviet 
Union and risk nuclear annihilation, or the US surrendering its superpower position and 
admitting defeat. Faced with these decisions, Craig argued that Morgenthau began to stray 
from his original assumptions that war is the result of the self-interested pursuit of power 
embedded in human nature, and instead determined it as a consequence of competing 
ideologies.  
 
Similarly, Craig has argued that Niebuhr viewed war as the outcome of a sinful human nature 
that sorted individuals into “good” and “evil” categories.75 Here, he claimed that Niebuhr saw 
the US acquisition of the H-bomb and its potential use against the Soviet Union as a “just” 
policy action by a peaceful regime against an aggressive one. Hence Niebuhr and 
Morgenthau came to advocate a normative approach because they viewed war not as the 
pursuit of the national interest, but as a result of totalitarian regimes in Nazi Germany and the 
Soviet Union. Such a normative understanding of foreign policy could not be reconciled with 
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the prospect of nuclear war and, as a result, both Morgenthau and Niebuhr suggested that a 
transformation of the international order was the morally and instrumentally preferred policy 
option.  
 
But viewing classical realism this way has arguably led to a misinterpretation of what these 
scholars understood to be the end goal of rational decision-making: the national interest. To 
begin with, Morgenthau and Niebuhr were not concerned with whether war was good or bad, 
and therefore came to see that it should be avoided. For them, war was sometimes necessary, 
but should be chosen as the last resort because it led to instability and insecurity in the 
international system. A policy that heightened the risk of war when it could have been 
avoided was also foreign policy folly, as it increased the potential threats to the national 
interest. Indeed, they both argued that foreign policy guided by particular ideals (like the 
spread of democracy or human rights) led to moralizing, often to the detriment of the national 
interest. Hence, they were vocal critics of US involvement in Vietnam and were concerned 
about the creeping influence of democracy promotion as part of the Truman Doctrine. And 
while they did cloak their arguments in normative terms in order to sell their views to policy 
elites and the wider public – a point Craig himself admits – this did not affect their theoretical 
approach.  Indeed, Morgenthau cautioned scholars to resist this temptation:   
 
The human mind tends naturally to identify the particular interests of 
states, as of individuals, with the moral purposes of the universe. The 
statesman in defence of the national interest may, and at times even 
must, yield to that tendency; the scholar must resist it at all times. 76 
 
In spite of this, others have since added support to the reform agenda of classical realism. 
Perhaps the most notable has been William Scheuerman, whose own contribution has been 
termed “progressive realism.” Like Craig, he draws on Morgenthau and Niebuhr, as well as 
Carr and John Hertz, to expand on the realist logic of world government. Scheuerman also 
begins where Craig left off, in that he argues for a reinterpretation of how these scholars 
understood the national interest, the balance of power and the nature of international order. 77 
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First, in relation to the national interest, he has argued that classical realist scholars were 
acutely aware that in an increasingly interdependent world, nations had to move beyond the 
narrow calculation of the self-interest. Technological advancement and growing economic 
and military interdependence meant the territorial divide between national and global 
interests had become harder to define, charging states with a greater moral responsibility to 
consider each other’s interests.78 In this regard, classical realists saw more flexibility in 
determining the national interest than what the fixed pursuit of power would allow.  In other 
words, the national interest could be transformed alongside changes in the international order. 
And, over time, greater interdependency of national interests could lead to the emergence of a 
world community.  
 
A more flexible national interest allows for a re-evaluation of the balance of power. 
Sheuerman suggests that Morgenthau and Niebuhr both agreed there were limits to the ability 
of the balance of power to preserve peace. The anarchy of the international system meant 
competing states could never be certain of their power calculations when it came to assessing 
their relative capabilities. Hence the security dilemma would always drive states to maximize 
their power, making the notion of an equilibrium within the international system an 
inherently unstable mechanism for achieving peace and security. This is why, according to 
Scheuerman, classical realist’s left room for the possibility of “institutional change” in 
achieving international order, as a way to compensate for this limitation.79 The current 
distribution of power (in the form of competing sovereign states) could potentially be 
replaced by a configuration of larger, and qualitatively different, units. And much like 
Craig’s analysis, Scheuerman takes this to mean support for the evolution of a world state as 
a more effective means of maintaining international order.  
 
Yet both Craig and Scheuerman overlook the classical realist focus on rational calculation of 
the national interest. It might very well be the case that a state chooses to pursue global 
interests, for instance, in committing resources to humanitarian intervention, but this will 
always occur within the context of what gains can be expected in return. Even if it is accepted 
                                                                                                                                    
his views on the potential for global reform and the development of a world government. For more see 
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that the system itself can accommodate a transformation, as Scheuerman and Craig claim, 
this is unlikely to ever be achieved, because faced with situations where the necessity of the 
self-interest clashes with more lofty notions of world governance, states, according to 
classical realists, will always choose the former over the latter.80 This means that in the end, 
Scheuerman and Craig fall into the same trap as the constructivist and cosmopolitan 
interpretations of classical realism, in that they conceive morality normatively, and conflate 
this with the states’ national interest when determining what motivates them to include 
morality as part of their foreign policy choices.  
 
Such a misreading of classical realism becomes clearer when applied to specific cases of 
foreign policy. Scheuerman has argued that the US, under President Barack Obama, has 
demonstrated potential in adopting a progressive realist foreign policy approach. Yet his 
evidence for this is based on speeches and interviews where the President referred to Niebuhr 
as a key influence in shaping his view on America’s role in the 21st Century.81 Absent is any 
reference to instances of foreign policy to suggest Obama is pursuing global reform. If this 
was provided, Scheuerman would probably find that – unlike his predecessor – Obama has 
been a much more pragmatic foreign policy realist, keenly aware of the limits in pursuing 
change in the international system, especially when charged with safeguarding the national 
interest. To demonstrate this, one only needs to look at the extensive list of foreign policy 
choices during his first three years in office (the time Scheuerman was writing). In his first 
                                           
80 Much of the literature on the classical realist world state has been in response to revisions of Morgenthau’s 
Politics Among Nations. The development of nuclear weapons led to increased debate on the merits of 
democratic peace and the need for a “world state” and “global community” to maintain international peace and 
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483-517.  
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power in the 21st Century. For a select sample see Obama’s Nobel Laureate acceptance speech, “A just and 
lasting peace,” speech, 2009. Available at: 
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and an interview with David Brooks at the The New York Times when Obama was campaigning for President in 
2007. In both instances Obama drew on Niebuhr’s ideas of seeing America’s power as a balance of self-interest 
and humility. For more see Brooks, “Obama, gospel and verse,” The New York Times, 26 April 2007. Available 
at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/26/opinion/26brooks.html?_r=0 (accessed 23 May 2014).  
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year, Obama directed a troop surge in Afghanistan and increased the US’ use of drone strikes 
in northwest Pakistan. By his third year he had ordered the extra-judicial killing of Osama bin 
Laden, carefully crafted the US “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific, and signalled to American 
allies that they can expect a greater share of the responsibility in maintaining international 
peace and security, evidenced by the US strategy of “leading from behind” during the 
NATO-led intervention of Libya. 82 
 
In terms of areas where the US indicated a change in foreign policy, such as re-engagement 
with the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the commissioning of the first Quadrennial 
Diplomatic and Development Review (QDDR), these were done with the usual consideration 
of the hard power national interest involved. Increased cooperation with the ICC 
demonstrated reputational benefits by signalling US support for the international criminal law 
regime after criticism of its policies on Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs).83 However, 
this did not amount to any real change in US foreign policy, with the US participating in the 
annual Assembly of State Parties at The Hague only as an observer, and Obama stating that 
the US had no intention of re-signing the Rome Statute or submitting the Treaty for Senate 
approval.84 Likewise, the QDDR was a reflection of the need for the US to rely more on 
allied support or “burden sharing” in the areas of crisis management, conflict resolution and 
nation building. This was a foreign policy approach that elevated development and diplomacy 
alongside defence, in other words: “leading through civilian power”; and provided added 
support for US interests post-withdrawal of its military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.85 It 
                                           
82 In 2011, Obama made a major speech to the Australian parliament outlining the US rebalance towards the 
Asia-Pacific. For the transcript, see Remarks by President Barack Obama to the Australian Parliament, 
Parliament House, Canberra, The White House: Press Office, 17 November 2011. Available 
at:https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament 
(accessed 23rd May 2014). 
83 The White House, “National security strategy” (May 2010), p. 48. Available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed 23 May 
2014). 
84 BIAs or Article 98 (2) non-surrender agreements of the Rome Statute were prominent during the Bush 
Administration. 102 agreements were signed guaranteeing the non-surrender of any US national from any state 
party to the Statute. During negotiations the US would often threaten to cut military and economic aid to the 
recipient nation if they resisted. This practice, introduced in the fiscal year of 2005, as the Foreign Operations, 
Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (H.R. 4818), dubbed the “Nethercutt Provision,” 
was not renewed by Obama when it came up for executive approval in March 2009. This ended the tying of US 
approval for foreign assistance to the signing of BIAs. The US has not negotiated any further BIAs since Obama 
took office in 2008, but all of the existing agreements remain in force. For more see the Americans Non-
Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Court “The Obama Administrations 
evolving policy towards the international criminal court,” (2011) Available at: 
http://www.amicc.org/docs/ObamaPolicy.pdf(accessed 23 May 2014) 
85 US Department of State, “Quadrennial defence and development review,” (2010) Available at: 
http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/2010/index.html (accessed 23 May 2013).  
 38 
did not indicate a deeper shift towards an accommodation of so-called “global interests” in 
the making of US foreign and defence policy.  
 
This demonstrates that while notionally being critical of universal theorizing, critical 
perspectives still maintain an emancipatory bias that tie state action to orders of morality that 
are outside the national interest of the state. This is visible in the more reflexive approach 
undertaken by Williams, and the post-positivist critiques employed by Craig and Sheurman. 
These scholars fundamentally misrepresented the way classical realist scholars understood 
the role of morality. Classical realists were wary of assigning states the ability to follow 
prescriptive abstract moral principles. Likewise, they were also critical of perspectives that 
attempted to locate morality by incorporating the observer’s own personal values and morals.  
 
The English School: Presenting a “moral” middle ground? 
This thesis will now discuss the various positions of the ES in order to counter its claims that 
it represents an extension of the classical realist view of IR.86 The ES is seen to occupy an 
uneasy place in IR theory. This depiction was best epitomized by Roy Jones’ call for the 
School’s closure, while simultaneously being the first scholar to define it as a distinct School 
of IR.87 It can trace its intellectual lineage back to the British Committee on the Theory of 
International Politics, and the works of Martin Wight, Adam Watson, Herbert Butterfield and 
Hedley Bull.88 But scholars largely associated with other approaches, such as Barry Buzan, 
Andrew Linklater, Ken Booth, Ian Clark and James Der Derian, have also claimed ES 
affiliation.89 This has led to some confusion as to what body of thought characterizes an ES 
perspective, and an internal divide within the school itself as to how to categorize the order of 
                                           
86 Richard Little, “Revisiting realism and the balance of power,” Freyberg-Inan, Annette, Ewan Harrison, and 
Patrick James, eds. Rethinking Realism in International Relations: Between Tradition and Innovation 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), pp.21-45 
87 Roy Jones, “The English School of international relations,” Review of International Studies 7, no. 1 (1981), 
pp. 1-13. 
88 The Committee met three times a year for nearly three decades. Butterfield, Watson, Wight and Bull each 
held a Chair and over its thirty years of meeting published papers, essays, monoliths and books from the 
contributions of nearly 50 writers. For a more detailed history of the Committee see Brunello Vigezzi, The 
British Committee on the Theory of International Politics (1954-1985): The Rediscovery of History, transl. Ian 
Harvey (Milan: Edizioni Unicopli, 2005).  
89 For a select sample of their work see Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez ed International Society and the 
Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009); Linklater, 
“Citizenship and sovereignty in the post-Westphalian state,” European Journal of International Relations 2, 
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World Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008); Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); and Der Derian, “Hedley Bull and the idea of diplomatic culture” in Rick Fawn and 
Jeremy Larkin eds, International Society After the Cold War (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 88-95.  
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international society: whether as a world order (and therefore solidarist); or an international 
order (and therefore pluralist).90  
 
However, despite this, it is possible to locate a starting point for how ES scholars understood 
the role of morality in international politics. Generally the School is classified as charting a 
moral middle ground between liberalism and realism, hence the label “Liberal-Realism” to 
describe its theoretical approach. This is mostly attributed to the work of Bull, and his oft-
cited book, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Affairs.91 Bull developed the 
concept of a regulating “international society” that moderated power politics in an anarchical 
system. In doing so, he presented an alternative framework for understanding order that was 
seen to go further than realism in its engagement with notions of justice, yet stopped short of 
the morally prescriptive views of Kantian liberalism.  
 
In order to understand how this view on the nature of anarchy and the role of morality has 
shaped contemporary ES scholarship, it is useful to turn back to the British Committee. 
Following the end of WWII, realism’s (and particularly American realism’s) emergence as 
dominant framework in IR prompted criticism from several, mainly British, intellectuals that 
IR theory had taken a distinctly pessimistic turn. Indeed, this was the motivation behind 
Martin Wight’s seminal essay, “Why is there no International Theory?,” which argued that 
international relations lacked the philosophical richness found in political theory because it 
failed to include perspectives on the “good life.” 92 The Committee made contributions that 
sought to correct this by referring to the advent of human rights norms, the increased role of 
international institutions, greater interdependence and the establishment of mutual alliances.93 
 
                                           
90 The search for solidarity in the ES literature has prompted an extensive 95-page bibliography of key works. 
This was commissioned by Buzan and consisted of 150 different writers split into three categories: central 
figures, regular contributors, and participants. For more see “English School: a bibliography.” Available at: 
www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/english-school/english-school-bibliography-feb-12.pdf (accessed 
25th July 2013).  
91 Bull, Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977).  
92 Martin Wight, “Why is there no International Theory?” in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight eds., 
Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), pp. 
17-34.  
93 The edited volume by Butterfield and Wight is considered the defining text produced by the Committee, 
which included inputs by Michael Howard, D.M. Mackinnonn and G. F. Hudson. These scholars outlined their 
views on natural law, the values of the international society and the type of orders that defined international 
society. For more, see Butterfield and Wight eds., Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of 
International Politics.  
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For these scholars, state interaction formed more than a zero-sum game analysed through the 
narrow prism of power as interests, and instead formed a cooperative society of states guided 
by a set of rules, laws and norms.94 More broadly, the research agenda of the Committee was 
to distinguish a body of thought that was concerned with more than describing the structures 
and forces of the international system, and could engage with broader questions on whether it 
was possible for actors to achieve both order and justice. Realism, with its focus on anarchy, 
was ill-equipped to consider the ability of states to pursue goals that were outside the realm 
of power and interests. Likewise, at the opposite end, the idealism of normative approaches 
placed too much faith in the capacity of individuals (as well as states), to represent their own 
moral compass. This left the ES with empiricism as its approach towards understanding 
morality, since its members were largely hesitant to make moral prescriptions about the role 
of states, and argued instead for their responsibilities as creators and managers of the order of 
international society.95 Empirical approaches towards morality within the ES drew their 
assumptions from natural law empiricists like Hugo Grotius and Samuel von Pufendorf who 
argued that morality, like the natural world, could be observed and learnt through experience. 
Empiricism could explain why and how an international society of rules and laws had 
developed between states, despite their tendency towards conflict, by referring to their learnt 
experience in understanding that war should be avoided, and cooperation is preferable. 96 
 
A great deal of the ES literature has also been occupied with the Grotian tradition of 
international order, which includes empirical assumptions about natural law, but also 
incorporates Wight’s views on rationality, the protection of individual liberties and the just 
use of force. The Grotian tradition in ES was first characterized by Wight who argued that it 
was in fact a rationalist approach, as it acted as via media between realism and 
revolutionism.97 According to Wight, Grotian rationalism accepted the state of nature, but 
also accepted that individuals were able to act reasonably towards each other.98 The 
international order was characterized by the pluralist state system dictated by the balance of 
                                           
94 Bull, “Society and anarchy in international affairs,” in Butterfield and Wight eds. Diplomatic Investigations, 
pp. 35-50.  
95 Cochran, “Charting the ethics of the English School: What “good” is there in a middle-ground ethics?”pp. 
203-225.  
96 Ibid, pp. 203-225.  
97 It is important to note here that the characterization of “Grotian rationalism” is Wight’s own characterization, 
which confuses the acknowledged empiricism Grotius is generally argued to have followed. Natural law 
empiricists were actually quite critical of an individual’s capacity for reason and instead abided by the notion of 
a “blank slate.” Individuals are essentially socialized into understanding what is right and wrong, good or bad.  
98 Wight,  “The three traditions,” in Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter eds., International Theory: The Three 
Traditions (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991), pp. 13-14.  
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power, which was inherent in nature and reflected a social fact. Thus, from this perspective, 
states were constrained by common rules derived from natural law.99 The focus on natural 
law as the source of international societal order links the ES with cosmopolitanism, as acts 
are considered moral if they conform or adhere to the laws of rational nature.   
 
Bull was actually rather sceptical of the Grotian tradition, seeing it as conflating natural law 
with morality. As a study of his papers reveals, he was particularly critical of international 
law and the UN as the creation of these entities presupposed international solidarity, which 
made universal agreement the only effective means to obtain any moral authority to act in 
response to global insecurity. Given the anarchical nature of the international system and the 
internal structure of the UN itself, this was a near impossibility. More tellingly, in response to 
a publisher’s criticism that his Anarchical Society should include a separate chapter on the 
role of international institutions, he wrote:  
 
I am very reluctant to do this because 1) as explained in the 
Introduction, I prefer to deal with international institutions under other 
headings rather than in a chapter devoted directly to them; 2) to treat the 
UN etc., as a factor making for order comparable with those to which 
the chapters are devoted in Part II, would be contrary to the general 
thesis of the book; 3) I am not very interested in international 
organisations, and do not have anything profound to say about them. 100 
 
In this regard, he was similar to Morgenthau who, in response to a question on the UN and its 
capacity to promote human rights stated: “I have a tendency to deal only with important 
matters and so I leave the United Nations out.”101 Bull was also critical of scholars that he 
thought were too preoccupied with identifying the principles of just and un-just wars, and 
found the arguments that drew on Thomas Aquinas problematic. Here again, he demonstrated 
his distaste for arguments about natural law, since wars fought based on being “just” 
according to law dictated that only one state could be seen as following them. Therefore, “the 
                                           
99 Ibid.  
100 Hedley Bull Papers, “Letter to Social Science Editor Shaie Selzer of Macmillan Press,” Box 8, File 3,14th 
November 1975.  
101  Morgenthau Archives, “Human rights and foreign policy,” Lecture Series Texts, Box no. 176, File no. 1, 
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protection of the law cannot be afforded equally to both parties.”102 And since the “interests 
of the society of nations requires victory of the side representing the law,” the only form of 
justice possible was essentially “victors justice.” 103 
 
This challenges ES scholars who argued for the moral authority of international law, while 
still maintaining the existence of a pluralist state system. For them, the spread of common 
values amongst states created a relationship between duty and blame. Over time, international 
society developed a “moral force” that denoted a subjective condition of duty where states 
judged that others may be more vulnerable in their ability to interact in world affairs, and this 
vulnerability implied an obligation to act. This was then used to justify the ability of states to 
“intervene” when others were unable to help themselves.  
 
Such a view has been the basis for arguments in support of the use of force to uphold human 
rights. Debates on humanitarian intervention proliferate through the various (and varied) 
literature of the ES. Here, scholars such as Timothy Dunne, Nicholas Wheeler and Alex 
Bellamy have focused overwhelmingly on building a case for the legitimacy of an 
international society that is independent of the sovereign state system, and has its own causal 
force.104 These scholars turned to Wight to argue that the current organization of international 
society was out of balance in that the same body of international law, which cemented human 
rights, also cemented the right of states to sovereignty and non-interference. The balance of 
power limited moral behaviour to the boundaries of the state and pulled the principle of state 
sovereignty further away from the moral duty to protect individual freedoms. And the moral 
purpose of international society was to correct this by reaching agreement on when it was 
justified to overrule the principle of sovereignty, and move it closer to the moral order that 
upholds individual rights. 
 
                                           
102 Hedley Bull Papers, “The Grotian conception of international society,” The British Committee on the Theory 
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instrumental, legitimist and coercive interpretations of international society,” Millennium 30, no. 1, (2001), pp. 
67-91; Nicholas Wheeler, “Pluralist and solidarist conceptions of international society: Bull and Vincent on 
humanitarian intervention,” Millennium 21, no. 3, (1992), pp. 463-487; and Dunne and Wheeler, “Hedley Bull’s 
pluralism of the intellect and solidarism of the will,” International Affairs  72, no. 1 (1996), pp. 91-107.  
 43 
This characterization of international society inevitably leads to moralizing in state behaviour 
and the creation of “norm entrepreneurs,” as states are charged with selecting when and 
where intervention will occur against another state that is deemed to act immorally. Since 
states still operate in an environment of anarchy dictated by the balance of power, they will 
naturally consider their own interests above the interests of international society. The ES does 
argue that order comes from anarchy, through the behaviour of states that have agreed on 
certain standards of diplomacy, but these standards are mostly procedural, like following the 
laws governing the use of force, and do not relate to why states are motivated to follow these 
norms, and what happens when these norms clash with the interests of the state.  
 
In most instances, states are found to act against gross human rights abuses when their 
interests are aligned, thereby selecting which norm (whether that be for instance the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the non-use of chemical weapons or the prevention of 
genocide), suits their interests at the time. Even if states were motivated solely by moral duty, 
it does not follow that they will always have the capacity to perform the actions necessary to 
achieve a successful intervention. In this regard, the moral obligation to act can sometimes 
impose a set of prescriptions on states that they can fail to properly fulfil, and a failure to 
achieve policy goals can have negative consequences on both the moral and material 
structures of international society.105 As discussed earlier in relation to cosmopolitan 
perspectives, this argument rests on the existence of a set of agreed norms that all states 
accept as the standard for behaviour. A focus on whether states follow certain rules and laws 
overlooks the reasons why states are committed to upholding them. Some solidarist scholars, 
like Dunne, have drawn on constructivism to argue that states are “socialized” into accepting 
the principles of international society. 106 But this still does not address the motives of states 
in choosing to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices. In the end, solidarism 
confuses the means and ends of states, viewing the process that states follow when 
committing a moral act as the same as the end goal.    
 
Bull held a somewhat different view. He argued that moral action stemmed from behaviour 
that occurred between states and could be analysed by identifying patterns from this 
behaviour. The condition of anarchy dictated that the balance of power restricted 
                                           
105 There may indeed be examples where the national interest and the norms of the international society align, 
and this can lead to benefits for both the state and the international society, but this still does not explain what 
compelled states to follow those norms in the first instance.  
106 Dunne, “The social construction of international society,” pp. 367-389 
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participation to the boundaries of the state and overtime their interaction produced a mutual 
recognition of co-existence. Therefore, the sovereign state system was essential to 
maintaining order in international society:  
 
The great virtue that the states system has in relation to other possible 
forms of universal political organization is that a consensus in favour of 
it – however tentative – actually exists. If it were to break down under 
strain it might well be replaced by a neomedievalism or any other form of 
political order, but by a slide into chaos.107 
 
The independence of states afforded individuals certain protections that would have been 
difficult to achieve under a single government. Hence Bull supported pluralism and moral 
diversity over the establishment of any world or moral authority.108 The stability of the 
sovereign state system allowed for a general consensus to be made on what were the accepted 
rules and practices of international society. These then regulated the effects of the states 
search for power by conditioning states to exercise restraint. In this way, international society 
was quite limited and was dependent on the actions of states in agreeing to maintain and 
sustain it.109 It did not have the independent capacity to motivate states to pursue morally 
right policy goals. Therefore, international order was characterized by moral skepticism, as 
the norms of international society did not normatively prescribe state behaviour, which 
appears to place Bull closer to the assumptions of classical realism. 
 
Yet Bull also argued for the existence of a certain type of “moral consensus” created by a 
select number of states that had a higher moral purpose, which went beyond the concern for 
their own actions in maintaining international society. Specifically, he argued that the great 
powers were bestowed with special rights and responsibilities in upholding the principles of 
international order.110 As the main contributors to the structure of the international society 
post-WWII, they had a distinct moral obligation to “right” any perceived imbalance. This 
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meant that not only were these nations charged with the maintenance of the society, they 
were also responsible for any breakdown in its order.  
 
The observations above now places Bull closer to solidarism, in arguing that since the great 
powers had the capacity to act, they also had an inherent duty to do so. As mentioned, this 
imposes a set of expectations on states that they are unlikely to ever fully achieve, given that 
the pursuit of power will outweigh any moral concerns for the stability of the international 
society. This, however, does not automatically dismiss instances where states (including the 
great powers), will consider acting in response to issues that affect international society. 
Rather, it means that this will always be motivated by the achievement of self-interested 
ends, and determined by whether the perceived benefits exceed the costs involved to the 
state’s resources, which is where moral realism departs from the ES in arguing that the 
primary motivation is the interest of the state, and not, in the first instance, the order of 
international society.  
 
To summarize, Bull sat variously between rationalism and realism, which places him 
squarely in line with the British empiricism that originally informed the philosophical 
outlook of the School. Indeed he stated that his own view: 
 
Rests on the element of consensus in the actual practice of states, and it 
is on this rather than “human reason” that (in common with other 
contemporary “Grotians”) I rest the case for taking international society 
seriously. 111 
 
Regardless, the solidarist stream has moved the ES closer towards the emancipatory agendas 
found in cosmopolitanism. Their view of morality is primarily normative, prescribing how 
the rules and laws of international society can represent norms on what states should do 
rather than what they can, or are willing to do. Such a conclusion demonstrates a disconnect 
between morality and its dependence on national interests that does much to counter claims 
                                           
111 This indicates that Bull also had a tendency to misrepresent Grotius as “rationalist” rather than a natural law 
empiricist. Hedley Bull Papers, “Letter to Social Science Editor Shaie Selzer of Macmillan Press,” Box 8, File 
3, 14th November 1975. 
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that the ES represents the “natural succession” of classical realism within contemporary 
debates of how they understood morality in international politics. 112 
 
Neoclassical realism: Morality, norms and domestic discourses  
This chapter has so far focused on normative approaches towards the classical realist revival, 
and examined where they have misrepresented the classical realist understanding of morality. 
This section engages with contributions by realists – and specifically neoclassical realists, 
who represent the most contemporary classical realist perspective. It finds that neoclassical 
realism does not go far enough in capturing the emphasis on consequential morality by 
classical realist scholars. In particular, neoclassical realism fails to consider the position of 
morality in producing moral and material outcomes. This is important as the theme that 
distinguishes moral realism from current realist interpretations. After the critique of 
neoclassical realism, I then conduct my own analysis of key classical realist scholarship. In 
doing so, I identify more thoroughly the areas of commonality between Morgenthau, Niebuhr 
and Kennan that subsequently show how this thesis conceives its moral realist framework.   
 
The neoclassical turn in realist IR theory made room for the influence of first- and second- 
image factors in tying systematic forces to foreign policy outcomes. Such an approach 
enabled realism to reclaim the analytical integrity critics argued was absent from it following 
the failure of structural perspectives to predict the end of the Cold War. Rather than viewing 
anarchy as a constraint on the actions of states, neoclassical realists argued that it was a 
permissive force, which provided states room to develop their own unique approach to world 
affairs. Neoclassical realism opened the “black box” in order to make the methodological 
leap from a theory of international relations to a theory of foreign policy. In doing so it 
claims it can account for the presence of both material and non-material factors in foreign 
policy decision-making. 113 
 
Neoclassical realism notionally achieves this by positing the state as the unit of analysis that 
connects systemic factors with domestic affairs (Innenpolitik). It has also expanded on 
classical realism by pointing to social resources like norms, rules and laws as important in 
                                           
112 Little, “Revisiting realism and the balance of power,” pp. 21-45 
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justifying policy decisions.114 These points of difference allowed neoclassical realism to 
assume states’ foreign policies reflect rational choices, applying the causal force of relative 
power to politics at the inter- and intra-state levels.115 As a result, the distribution of power 
(as the independent variable) has the capacity to shape both morality and interests. This was 
an argument best represented by William Wohlforth and Steven Brooks, who stated that ideas 
change when material conditions do.116 Therefore, to explain the end of the Cold War, an 
examination of what prompted Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking was necessary. But 
rather than it representing an attempt to change the constitutive ideas of international society 
– as a constructivist approach would claim – it reflected a need for Gorbachev to address the 
massive economic power imbalance between the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR).  
 
However, the ability of neoclassical realism to make a connection between structural forces 
and the selection of potentially moral foreign policy responses is at times tenuous. This is, in 
part, reflected in the emergence of various different “strands” of neoclassical realism. Here, it 
is possible to identify three different types: orthodox, semi-orthodox and revivalism.117 The 
more conservative strands of neoclassical realism are close to Waltz, placing an emphasis on 
how states respond to systemic pressures. Considerations of morality are only useful to 
explain instances where elites made foreign policy decisions that appear to work against 
structural forces, as some have suggested occurred when the George W. Bush Administration 
launched the 2003 war in Iraq.118 The semi-orthodox, or middle ground approach, still holds 
structural forces to be the independent variable, but places a greater emphasis on non-
material factors as “intervening” on policy in response to international stimuli.119 This 
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incorporates contextual factors like timing and place to explain foreign policy behaviour in 
the absence of direct threats. Viewed this way, non-material factors are thus only helpful as 
tools to construct foreign policy at the domestic level, and have no added analytical value.  
 
Revivalism, as put forward by Tudor Onea, claims to go further in arguing that the interaction 
of different polities needed to be considered when analysing foreign policy choices. 120 This 
goes beyond the comparative analysis of economic and military capabilities favoured by 
conservative neoclassical realists, and includes the geopolitical position of states, the 
historical relationship between them, and the perception and capability of elites to accurately 
predict the behaviour of others. 121 From this perspective, anarchy allows for more strategic 
diversity and might account for why states can seem to be motivated by multiple foreign 
policy goals (for instance, to gain a material advantage or to garner international prestige).  
 
On the surface, revivalism appears to incorporate considerations of the “other” and ideas of 
reciprocity championed by classical thinkers. Yet in reality, this follows the already 
established neoclassical realist readings of foreign policy. The state remains the individual 
unit whose behaviour is dictated by the balance of power, and norms are tools for elites to 
shape foreign policy choices. It does not demonstrate how the state’s perception of 
interdependence represents a qualitative variable that could explain both moral and material 
outcomes. For instance, Onea used it to argue that the US policy of expansion after the Cold 
War was shaped by its interaction with the other great powers, as well as the shared 
perception of policymakers that it must maintain its leadership of the normative international 
order. He pointed towards US involvement in the First Gulf War and its push for the Dayton 
Accords as evidence of Washington’s desire to cement America as the “indispensable 
nation.”122 At the time, the US had been subject to international criticism by its European 
allies, which had an impact on how it conducted its foreign policy on issues of geopolitics 
and human rights. Therefore, perceptions of other states matter, but rather than viewing this 
as a domestic factor intervening on foreign policy choices from the bottom up, the qualitative 
measures of strategic interaction supervene from the top down.  
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The effect of this may be to move neoclassical realism away from focusing on domestic 
variables such as regime type, demographics and policy process. In doing so it arguably 
moves closer to the views held by the some social constructivists: it still treats morality 
normatively, but as a rhetorical device that supervenes on policy choices at the unit level. The 
point here is that neoclassical realists generally maintain systemic forces as the independent 
variable and view non-material factors, like morality, as a normative prescription about how 
states ought to act. And thus evidence of it in foreign policy decision-making is generally 
thought to contribute to greater uncertainty in the anarchical international system. This means 
that neoclassical realism accepts the consequential action of states and the function of 
morality as separate testable factors. Notions of morality only reflect the ability of elites to 
“sell” policies, and cannot be counted as state interest variables that lead to specific 
outcomes.123  
 
Yet surely morality can go further than this: whereas a neoclassical realist would see 
Australia’s recognition of Timor Leste’s sovereignty (for instance) as a rhetorical device 
rather than a purposive strategy, one could argue that this was an example (amongst many 
others) of a convergence between moral and strategic objectives. On this basis, it may be 
possible to discern a much more “moral” realism as a way to understanding foreign policy 
choice. It is to this task that I now turn.   
 
Towards a moral realist framework: Re-examining the “classics” 
Classical realists argued that an approach that viewed morality independently of interests was 
unsatisfactory. At worst it decoupled morality from statecraft, rendering moral arguments as 
mere rhetoric to legitimate policy for domestic and international audiences. At best it did 
little more than explain why states sometimes make miscalculations, choosing value-laden 
paths dictated by “popular passions” over more sober policy made on the basis of rational 
egoism.124 Indeed, rather than putting morality into a separate normative analytical basket, 
classical realists deliberately framed their positions on morality within debates about the 
struggle for power. Niebuhr, Morgenthau and Kennan all dealt with the same question: 
whether the struggle for power was an empirical end, and hence embedded in human nature, 
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or whether it was the means that derived from processes inherent in the creation of society.125 
They also left room for moderation, law, order and justice, arguing that such moral factors 
had specific social faculties, and because the state was the highest form of social order they 
were also important in decision-making. According to Morgenthau, “universal moral 
principles, such as justice and equality” could only guide political action “to the extent that 
they have been given concrete content and have been related to political situations by 
society.”126 
 
Methodologically, this means that the relationship between interests (A) and morality (B) can 
only be understood by examining the moral and material outcomes that flow primarily from 
A. In contrast, rationalists merely state that A (interest) is not B (morality). This represents 
both the main methodological and theoretical problem with deontological morality. In 
arguing for the independent power of morality to explain how states ought to shape their 
foreign policy, rationalists and (some reflexive theorists) must also argue for the existence of 
empirical facts in order to justify the use of cause-and-effect analysis. In this instance, 
morality becomes a casual necessity used to both describe and prescribe state behaviour. As 
outlined earlier, arguing for morality in foreign policy according to necessity is theoretically 
difficult in an anarchical international environment where evidence supports the notion that 
states are primarily concerned with the pursuit of power.   
 
Niebuhr, Morgenthau and Kennan – the philosopher, the political scientist and the policy 
practitioner – recognized this empirical reality and broadly argued for a consequentialist 
morality as the best possible account of morality in foreign policy that is constrained by the 
state of nature. Each of these scholars reached this conclusion in a slightly different way, but 
were nonetheless united in seeing morality as a factor linked to the state’s pursuit of power, 
which can then be assessed according to the consequences it is likely to produce. To provide 
some context as to how I draw out the moral realist framework, I will now briefly discuss 
how each of these scholars understood the place of morality in IR.  
 
Niebuhr did recognize the existence of a certain type of morality operating above the state, 
but an imperfect human nature meant a universal form of it was impossible. As a theologian 
                                           
125 Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, pp. 51-82; Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations 4th ed, pp. 4-17; 
Morgenthau, “The twilight of international morality,” Ethics LVIII, no. 2 (1948), pp. 79-99; and George 
Kennan, American Diplomacy (expanded edition), (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984). 
126 Morgenthau, American Foreign Policy: A Critical Examination (New York: Methuen, 1952), p. 34.  
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and a political scientist, Niebuhr’s views on morality were heavily informed by Judeo-
Christian ethics, as he argued that the pursuit of national interest could be moderated through 
the maxim “do unto others as you would have done to yourself.” He also privately felt that 
the highest expression of morality for rational beings was “mutual love” – or acts of giving 
and receiving between parties of equal worth. Yet he also acknowledged that this level of 
mutuality was unattainable in an international system composed of states with unequal 
material capabilities.127 Thus, a morality guided by reciprocity and evaluated by its 
consequences was the best way for states seeking to include it in their foreign policy choices. 
In his words, this reflected a necessary compromise since “a rational ethic seeks to bring the 
needs of others into equal consideration with those of the self.”128  
 
Kennan saw the role of morality somewhat differently. For him, anything moral to come out 
of American diplomacy that had produced the strategy of containment was centrally tied to 
US interests in Europe, and the need to balance against Soviet influence.129 This was best 
illustrated in his initial enthusiasm for the Marshall Plan, which neatly blended moral 
considerations for the security and development of Eastern Europe with US interests in 
stopping Soviet expansionism.130 In terms of conceiving morality, Kennan argued that an 
agent’s perception mattered in foreign policy decision-making because leaders tended to seek 
outcomes that they filtered through the prism of their own moral choices.131 But while an 
agent’s moral compass mattered, statesmen should be cautioned against relying solely on 
judging moral acts according to one’s own moral code of what is good or good, because this 
led to miscalculations in foreign policy. Kennan therefore made a distinction between the 
morality of individuals, who have the luxury of being principled actors, and the morality of 
governments that are foreign policy agents, and have a greater moral responsibility to protect 
                                           
127For Niebuhr’s approach to politics and ethics see An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (San Francisco: 
Harper, 1963), pp. 60-95. On Niebuhr versus consequentialist ethics, see Mark L. Hass, “Reinhold Niebuhr’s 
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128 Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 57. 
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the national society.132 Applied to whether a government should include moral 
considerations, for example, in intervening to protect others, this must be determined by 
whether it is in the interests of the nation and considered according to the consequences of 
acting versus the consequences of inaction. 133 
 
Morgenthau, meanwhile, was closer to Kennan than Niebuhr in his scepticism about a 
statesperson’s ability to advocate for a morality as part of foreign policy that was divorced 
from his or her own ethical values. He argued that Niebuhr’s method of viewing morality 
reflected an incomplete road map for evaluating contingent political action that was 
dependent on time and place.134 When moral principles were applied to the realm of politics 
he saw them as useful only in the context in which they were called upon to operate. Instead 
Morgenthau emphasized the consequences of power for morality, and saw little room for a 
moral code operating above and outside the nation-state.135 Hence, he argued that morality 
was always a second-order factor in shaping foreign policy choices.136 He was criticized for 
advocating an immoral or amoral foreign policy, and for highlighting that moral factors are 
always at risk of being overruled in situations of necessity, with morality sacrificed for the 
preservation of the state.137 But in fact he and Niebuhr agreed on the importance of 
reciprocity and moral consequences in foreign policy, given the constraints of what is 
understood today as strategic interdependence.138 
 
The classical realists were correct to identify the logic of consequences – or the outcomes of 
policy decisions – as superior analytical tools. This is because transferring the moral 
characteristics of the individual to the state is a risky theoretical exercise. Morgenthau was 
particularly concerned with the methodological flaws in relational conceptions of morality 
that required the state to have self-reflexive properties, in which morality remained tied to the 
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establishment of values.139 From an empirical perspective this relationship could only be 
understood if the moral action was predetermined to have a connection with a valuating 
subject. For instance, the idea that democracy promotion can be a preferred moral policy 
outcome comes about because it has already been tied to notions of right and wrong. The 
relationship between object and agent is tautological: in the same example above, democracy 
is good because it is moral and moral because it is good. This also demonstrates the dangers 
of conceiving morality as an ideology. Here the words of Morgenthau are useful:  
 
Morality as an ideology makes it appear as though the interests and 
policies of an individual nation were the manifestations of universal 
moral principles. The part aspires to become the whole, and there is very 
little to counteract that aspiration. It is not so much morality, which limits 
individual interests, as it is the individual interests, which identify 
themselves with morality. 140  
 
This is one of the many reasons why classical realists opposed the US intervention in 
Vietnam.141 Even contemporary realists associated with structural approaches were against 
the war in Iraq, which they perceived as moralizing.142 Anatole Lieven made this point in 
connection to the War on Terror (WoT), in which he foresaw that notionally “global” 
American values, presented as the reasons for US anti-terrorism policies, would come to be 
perceived as neo-imperialism.143 He has taken this further in his more recent work on 
Pakistan concerning the need for “developmental” realism. In doing so he is focusing 
explicitly on outcomes, in which morality in foreign policy choices must be evaluated 
relative to whether or not they advance a state’s material interests.144 
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The realism of Morgenthau, Kennan and Niebuhr was less interested in ascribing specific 
weight to morality. It was more heavily influenced by temporal and spatial conceptions of 
reality, in which various moral codes might operate at any given time. According to classical 
realists, morality did not produce causal “chains” of events whereby A causes B, and B 
causes C. Instead, they argued that it could be understood through causal sequences. This is 
based on the idea that all reality can be observed as sequence of cause and effect. Here, 
morality is seen as an interlinking factor that is part of how states calculate what policy is in 
their best interest, which is assessed according to whether it produces any real benefits. This 
means that morality may not always be present, and hence is not observed as part of a 
transformative chain where it is responsible for the overall end result of policy.145 But, at the 
same time, classical realists also saw that the placement of moral considerations into a 
separate analytical space to interests might not adequately capture how the two can interact:  
 
There exists of necessity a relativism in the relations between the moral 
problems and foreign policy that one cannot overlook. This relativism is 
two fold. It is a relativism in time [...] when certain principles are 
applicable in one period of history and not applicable in another period of 
history and a relativism in terms of culture -- of contemporaneous culture 
-- in that certain principles are obeyed by certain nations, by certain 
political civilizations, and they are not obeyed by others.146 
 
This is why Morgenthau in particular was careful to include morality as a motivational force 
associated with the qualitative components of national power.147 According to him, “a foreign 
policy derived from the national interest is in fact morally superior to a foreign policy 
inspired by universal moral principles.”148 A morality in foreign policy derived from a 
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calculation of the national interest, as opposed to one that is derived from moral principles, is 
morally superior because it is allows for greater consistency in how states act. Human nature 
dictates that states will always act in the national interest, and this is the only reliable signpost 
for understanding state behaviour. Of course, what states determine to be in their national 
interest may vary. For instance, a state may prioritize a relationship with a particular trading 
partner to be in its economic interests. Similarly, it may pursue an alliance partnership in 
order to achieve its national security and defence. However, while the type of interest being 
pursued varies, the end goal remains the same: the national interest. Tying morality to the 
interests of states can lead to problems of moral relativism, where all action conceived in the 
national interest is determined to be moral. As I discuss in more detail below, this is why 
classical realists also argued that morality in foreign policy must be evaluated according to 
the consequences it produces.  
 
The analysis above has demonstrated that one can identify a distinct strand of classical 
realism that focuses on morality and its connection to material interests, and which 
preferences the logic of consequences. The identification of a moral consequentialist theme in 
classical realism is important to counter claims that what I am proposing here is still a 
traditional reading of political realism where states are primarily guided by the pursuit of the 
national interest and make foreign policy decisions according to whether it will maximise 
their power. The moral realist framework put forward in this thesis is not a rejection of these 
core realist claims, nor is it a revision or rewriting of classical realism. I only seek to show 
that an appreciation for morality in IR theory and foreign policy has always been present in 
classical realism and that it is possible to develop a moral realist framework from the views 
of these classical realists, and may even contribute to current debates on how best to conceive 
of morality in international politics. What then, specifically, might a moral realist view of 
foreign policy look like?  
 
As I have mentioned already, there have been few attempts by realists themselves to 
articulate a moral realist position that reflects the views of the classical realists.149 Lieven has 
emerged as a champion of what he first termed “ethical” (and now “developmental”) realism. 
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And others, such as Sten Rynning and Jens Ringsmose, have put forward a potential moral 
realist research agenda that identifies a role for morality within the motives of states seeking 
to maintain international stability during times of change.150 But while this work has been 
valuable, the preliminary nature of the moral realist research project means that it has been 
mainly concerned with eking out basic commonalities on the place of morality in the classical 
realist literature. Hence the primary purpose of the next section is to present how I conceive 
of a moral realist framework, which can then be used to understand the potential for morality 
as part of Australia’s foreign policy in the case analysis.  
 
Building a moral realist framework: Expectations, choices and foreign policy outcomes  
When constructing a framework for moral realism, three themes are significant. First, 
classical realists focussed heavily on expectations of reciprocity when states develop their 
foreign policies. This acts as a bridge between morality on the one hand, and interests on the 
other. Put simply, considering the reactions of a target state to one’s intended choices 
constitutes action that is inherently moral. Second, morality can only be observed if we 
assume that states are capable of rational choice in calculating their foreign policy decisions. 
Although there has been much debate on the rational actor model, even amongst realists 
themselves, rationality was nonetheless central to classical realist thought. Finally, and as a 
result of this, it is possible to identify outcomes that are both moral and material. In other 
words, rather than viewing these as dichotomous, it is possible for states seeking to act 
morally to engender material gains as well. 
 
Considerations of the “other:” Expectations of reciprocity between states 
I begin with expectations of reciprocity because classical realists saw it as the factor that 
connected morality to interests. Both Morgenthau and Niebuhr pointed out that foreign policy 
is often constructed upon expectations of reciprocity at either the bilateral or multilateral 
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levels of diplomacy.151 For these scholars, understanding the notion of reciprocity begins with 
considerations of the “other” that is tied to the basic classical realist assumption that 
individuals are both rational and social.152 Human nature is primarily defined by the struggle 
for power in an environment of scarce resources, which inevitably places self-interest as the 
key motivator for action. Yet this struggle for power does not occur in isolation. Every 
individual strives for power, meaning the aspirations of one individual naturally impinge 
upon the aspirations of another. This power dynamic results in the struggle against being used 
as the “means” by which others pursue their own ends. Thus, the balance of power can be 
seen to act as a check on an unrestrained human nature. According to Morgenthau, not only 
does this act as a limitation on power; but over time it leads to the creation of a certain moral 
order where a system of rules, ethics and laws exist that guide human behaviour more 
“objectively than the inner mechanics of power politics could do.” 153 
 
In this context, the mutual experience in being subject to the whim of others converges to 
create an understanding that to survive in an environment of finite resources, one must be 
aware of how one’s behaviour affects the security of others. Morgenthau states that a concern 
for the interests of the other reflects the inherently dualistic moral and political nature of man:  
 
Every man is the object of political domination and at the same time aspires 
toward exercising political domination over others. His back is bent under the 
political yoke, yet while he bends down he must be aware of somebody, at 
least in his imagination, who bears the yoke on his behalf. Man is the victim 
of political power by necessity; he is political master by aspiration. It is this 
aspiration, which drives him toward obscuring the fact of his political 
dependence, and giving it an ethical justification.154  
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For Morgenthau, self-interest was tied to morality in such a way that it reflected a curious 
dialectic whereby “the latter in spite of itself prevents the former from escaping its judgment 
and normative direction.”155 Individuals are still motivated by the desire to advance their own 
interests first, but in tying morality to the means involved in the struggle for power, there is 
limited room for progress through human rationality. This can be found in the expectations of 
reciprocity that he saw as underlying all social relations. Of course, it is not always the case 
that individuals will consider the well-being of others as part of these expectations. 
Reciprocity in this instance only requires that individuals develop a certain standard of 
behaviour that they would then have applied to themselves.156 In the realm of international 
relations, this does not imply consent: it only implies the rational capacity of states to seek a 
common ground on what course of action might be of mutual benefit. Morgenthau’s 
understanding of reciprocity stopped short of considering the potential gains by nations in 
pursuing this policy. However, when expectations of reciprocity are combined with the 
classical realist focus on policy outcomes, this can be taken further so that – in some 
circumstances – it is possible that states can actually gain material benefits when they choose 
to adopt reciprocity as part of their foreign policy choices.  
 
Of equal importance to reciprocity itself is that it forms part of states’ expectations. The 
similarity between Niebuhr and Morgenthau on this point is uncanny, given that both came 
up with almost identical positions independently. Niebuhr saw morality as being connected to 
a broadening of the national interest that included an appreciation for the interests of other 
states. This was not always inherent in national interest calculations. Instead, like 
Morgenthau, Niebuhr’s conception of this was of a complex relationship between what he 
termed “mutual interests” and self-interest. Such a view attempted to lay bare the problems 
faced by more orthodox realist approaches that sought to separate the two into “high” and 
“low” politics.157 A state’s moral commitment to foreign aid, for example, brings with it 
economic advantages that are primary to the national interest. This means that both the moral 
and material considerations that inform these two sets of foreign policy goals are explicitly 
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linked, and separating them for methodological convenience is incorrect. Niebuhr understood 
this to mean that the highest form of morality possible occurs when states are governed by 
the “wise apprehension of concurrent interests,” rather than by sacrificing universal interests 
for the higher interests of the state.158 Prudence, therefore, is a modest but important indicator 
of progress in human reason that blends an appreciation for the limits of rationality embedded 
in nature, as well as sympathy for the tribalism that primarily dictates state behaviour.  
 
To demonstrate this Niebuhr emphasized the existence of a mutual “bridge” between the 
Soviet Union and the US during the Cold War, whereby each party recognized a shared 
responsibility not to wage nuclear war. Here, the collective interest was not served by a direct 
cause-and-effect relationship between each actor’s primary intentions. Rather it was viewed 
as a corollary, resulting from each state’s rational desire to survive. In this respect, 
expectations of reciprocity validate a core assumption of moral realism: that there are 
constraints on the possibilities of human nature. The convergence between partial and 
universal interests strengthens those views, which “emphasize the importance of the residual 
freedom of human rationality.”159 This reinforces the classical realist’s view of a limited 
rationality that can accommodate a consideration of the other, but only when there is an 
expectation that it will achieve the state’s interests.   
 
In international relations this means that states still exist in an anarchical arena characterized 
by strategic competition. This said, international anarchy does not automatically preclude the 
existence of mutual interests, especially if we accept the logic of strategic interdependence. 
Using the example of foreign aid, it is unlikely that partnerships would form between states 
of equal power. Instead, they tend to be between strong states acting as patrons, and weak 
ones adopting the role of recipients. Some scholars would argue that this gives rise to notions 
of clientism, patrimonialism and even neo-imperialism. Yet this misses the point that most 
wealthy states are generally seeking to engender positive development outcomes by being aid 
donors. According to both Niebuhr and Morgenthau, the giving of aid is a political act, 
deriving from the national interest. As a result, aid has both strategic and moral benefits in 
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that the giving of aid, in some instances, can improve the living standards of the recipient, 
and achieve the strategic goals of the donor. 160  
 
Choosing morality: The importance of rational choice in calculations of foreign policy 
decisions 
The notion that morality is contingent on the effects of reasoned action informs the second 
key assumption of the moral realist approach articulated here: rational choice. As noted 
above, Niebuhr argued that a consideration of mutual interests in foreign policy reflected the 
surest conception of morality in state decision-making, but the necessity of self-interest and 
the limits of human rationality prevented this from being universally realized. This means 
that whether or not a state includes morality, as part of its foreign policy decisions is 
contingent on a calculated and rational choice to do so. It was here that both Morgenthau and 
Niebuhr outlined their distaste for political action based on notions of a universal morality or 
one that is derived from an actor’s own “good” intentions. Political actors have a distinct 
moral responsibility to act wisely that goes well beyond their personal moral aspirations.161 In 
other words they should act in accordance with the national interest. Foreign policy must first 
be defined in strategic or economic terms: a policy determined solely by moral principles is 
“a policy of national suicide” because it makes the transformation of international society the 
primary achievement, rather than the fulfilment of the national interest.162 Moralizing in such 
a way also leads to miscalculations in foreign policy decision-making that can render 
decisions both morally and materially defective. Hence any “universal” moral standard leaves 
little room for compromise as “one can compromise on the national interest, but one cannot 
compromise on principles.” 163  
 
And yet contrary to the accepted wisdom on this topic, Morgenthau did not actually deny the 
existence of a universal morality. In fact, he argued that universal moral principles do exist, 
but pointed out that they cannot be applied to the behaviour of states in their abstract form. In 
this regard he differentiates between his views and the cosmopolitan ones discussed earlier, 
in that expectations of reciprocity are not universally realized by all states at all times and 
cannot be viewed causally, nor can they independently drive state behaviour. Instead, their 
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inclusion in foreign policy decisions must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of 
time and place. This is an important distinction to make, as it strengthens the process of 
rational calculation by allowing for the “weighing of these principles against the moral 
requirements of concrete political action, their relative merits being decided by prudent 
evaluation of political consequences to which they are likely to lead.”164  
 
Here again both Morgenthau and Niebuhr agreed that material capabilities, such as the 
exercise of military power, are ineffective when unsupported by a strong moral and political 
base. Along with Kennan and Walter Lipmann they were critical of America’s irreverence 
towards Asia, which was seen as threatening its prestige. According to them, US foreign 
policy during the Cold War had little regard for the cultural and social upheavals plaguing the 
continent, preferring instead to focus diplomatic efforts on solidifying perceptions of its 
superior military might. As a consequence, and like a policy determined primarily by moral 
principles, policies undertaken solely as shows of force increase the risk of miscalculation. 
For instance, Niebuhr argued that the contempt displayed by the US for India’s relationship 
with the Soviet Union was misplaced, since New Delhi’s behaviour was motivated by a 
developing state’s desire to “hedge its bets,” and not as a demonstration of support for either 
communism or communist regimes.165 This episode was broadly consistent with 
Washington’s general approach towards Asia, which severely damaged America’s ability to 
develop strong relationships in the region, as well as encouraging a view of the US as a neo-
imperialist power.  
 
Although he was not entirely at home with political philosophy, and more inclined to foreign 
policy analysis, Kennan’s views on morality help establish the limits of reciprocity. Kennan 
agreed with Niebuhr that US policy was being guided by a “legalistic moralist” approach that 
was underpinned by an over-reliance on moral and constitutional schemes, with little concern 
for the effect this style of diplomacy had on other states.166 He argued that American foreign 
policy should be guided by the awareness that its own interests represent the limits of what 
                                           
164 Morgenthau Archives, “Another great debate: the national interest of the United States,” Lecture Series 
Texts, Box 98, File 3, p 988.  
165 Niebuhr, “The limits of military power,” in Earnest Leafer ed., World Crisis and American Responsibility 
(New York: Associated Press, 1958), pp. 117-118. 
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can reasonably be achieved in its relationships with other states. Kennan followed 
Morgenthau and Niebuhr in understanding the constraints of human rationality, and the 
dangers – both moral and material – in devising policy based on universal ends. In the 
example of Asia during the Cold War, US policy reflected the sin of pride (for Niebuhr), or 
hubris (for Morgenthau and Kennan). Instead, they argued, a show of humility in dealing 
with prospective alliance partners would have yielded more success in shoring up long-term 
support for US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, President Barak Obama has adapted 
this style of diplomacy as part of the “pivot” towards the region, especially given that US 
alliance partners are expected to accommodate increases in military presence, in exchange for 
continued regional stability and security under a policy of offshore balancing. 
 
The benefit to a state from including morality as part of its foreign choices is therefore often 
long-term rather than transient. It is also the case that the expected returns from this cost- 
benefit calculation may not always be provided by the recipient, and this can be described as 
“indirect reciprocity,” where second-order factors such as prestige can enhance the function 
of a state’s resources. This is particularly visible in the creation of alliance networks, where 
individual states realise they can stand to benefit by trading off asymmetrical wants for more 
lasting security.167 Thus, when expectations of reciprocity are included in the rational choices 
of states they can bring coherence to domestic debates, and assist elites to sift good decisions 
from bad ones. Consistency and coherency in foreign policy reduces the risk of 
miscalculation and increases the likelihood of obtaining material gains in return.  
 
The material benefits of choosing to include morality as a part of foreign policy choice: 
Moral and material outcomes of foreign policy 
An expectation of reciprocity outlined how classical realists saw morality connected to states’ 
interest and rational choice outlined how they understood morality to be contingent on a 
state’s rational calculation in choosing policy. It is insufficient, however, for a moral realist 
framework to stop here and only describe the expectations of actors and the means by which 
they operate. Any useful framework for foreign policy analysis must take into consideration 
the outcomes of policy once they are implemented. Hence I argue that moral realism can 
assist our understanding of the results of foreign policy by connecting motives to outcomes. 
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This draws attention to the third and final theme in a moral realist framework: the potential 
for both moral and material outcomes to stem from policy choices.  
 
As has been discussed above, Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Kennan were united in their 
consequentialist approach to understanding morality in foreign policy choice. Morgenthau 
was particularly clear in this respect. He argued that: 
 
There can be no morality without prudence, that is, without consideration 
of the political consequences of seemingly moral action. Realism, then, 
considers prudence – the weighing of the consequences of alternative 
political actions – to be the supreme virtue in politics.168 
 
Morgenthau’s views on moral consequences echoed Machiavelli’s notion of prudence as the 
highest moral value for states guided by the self-interest. Niebuhr was a little less clear on 
this, with some debate as to whether his Christian ethics meant he understood morality to be 
deontological, but evaluated through the consequences to which acting morally might lead.169 
Despite this debate, Niebuhr still argued that when it came to interaction between states, the 
best possible form of morality was one that considered the consequences of policy choices.170 
Likewise, Kennan argued that the inconsistencies of personal moralities amongst elites meant 
claims of states acting morally must be judged on the behaviour of states in deciding to 
include it as part of their foreign policy choices.171 In other words, morality must be 
evaluated by the consequences of policy decisions.  
 
Classical realists preferred a morality characterized by the results of foreign policy because it 
properly accounted for the effect policy choices have on others, and minimized the type of 
moralizing which they cautioned would lead to negative or unintended consequences for both 
the national interest, and for any benefits achieved by the recipient nation. Hence, this theme 
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draws together the previous factors of reciprocity and rational choice in that a state’s 
expectation of achieving benefits in return for including morality as part of their foreign 
policy choices is premised on what outcomes such a policy is likely to produce, for both the 
state and the recipient. The classical realists did not specifically outline moral and material 
outcomes as part of their approach, and this is where I seek to expand on classical realism by 
positioning moral realism as a perspective that can connect state interests with policy 
outcomes, which can then be tested by foreign policy evidence.  
 
A moral realist approach naturally focuses on the outcomes of foreign policy decisions 
because it is mindful of changes in the structure of the international system, and accepts that 
anarchy makes conformity to prior moral standards an impossibility. The nature of strategic 
interdependence dictates that morality has relational properties when it is exercised by an 
actor, and then has an impact on the state the policy is aimed at affecting.172 Against this 
setting morality can be viewed as a means of reinforcing structural properties, which can lead 
to certain benefits for states. Moral realism also accepts that it may not always be necessary 
for a state to be concerned with both its own position in the international system, and with the 
position of others. For example, a state could simply opt not to give foreign aid. Conversely, 
it could choose to take into consideration the needs of other states in providing economic and 
social development, when doing so could bring material advantages. Relative gains are still a 
distinct possibility, but elites can determine that small concessions might lead to enhanced 
material payoffs (for example, in shoring up alliance support, or in smoothing diplomatic 
relations towards the signing of Free-Trade Agreements (FTAs)).  
 
Evidence of both moral and material outcomes is important because it establishes the central 
empirical claim of moral realism: that when states choose foreign policies that are both moral 
and instrumental, they can sometimes stand to gain material benefits in return. This can be 
more significant than if they had acted out of altruism alone, or equally from a desire to 
engender relative gains. In the case of weak actors, for instance, the prospect of state failure, 
commonly found in debates on the use of force for humanitarian purposes, can create further 
insecurities and security dilemmas. Spillover effects of poverty, instability and political 
violence thus create both moral motivations to ameliorate them, as well as strategic and 
economic interests in promoting stability. In some cases, this can also lead to material 
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outcomes in reconstruction contracts, increased trade and business links, as well as closer 
defence cooperation. Therefore, when moral and material outcomes appear, moral realism 
expects there to be evidence of a material gain in return for the state. 
 
It is important to note again that moral realism as conceived of here is not explicitly 
prescriptive. It does not advocate that states should consider morality in every calculation of 
its national interest and, like the example of aid above, it may choose not to intervene to 
protect human rights if the consequences from doing so are considered too high. It is also the 
case that a state may reap benefits that were unexpected and not necessarily linked to the 
motives determining its decision to act morally. The problem of unintended consequences is 
one that has been extensively debated, in both moral philosophy and IR theory.173 From a 
moral realist perspective, unintended consequences can interfere with the logic of linking 
expectations of material benefits with moral and material outcomes. A state may, for 
example, be found to participate in humanitarian intervention because they expect some 
strategic benefit and any positive effect on the recipient state is an unintended advantage. 
Comparatively, it might be the case that the intervening state has the interests and welfare of 
the recipient as factor contributing towards its decision to intervene, and yet the intervention 
may fail, leading to negative consequences. This means that a moral realist argument must 
demonstrate a connection between an expectation of reciprocity and moral and material 
outcomes before a proper evaluation of morality in foreign policy decisions is made.  
 
Australia’s decision to intervene in the Timor Leste crisis is a good example to illustrate how 
moral realism can address the problem of unintended consequences. As will be shown in 
more detail in Chapter 3 on Australia’s participation in humanitarian operations, its decision 
to use force in response to outbreaks of violence after the Timorese referendum for 
independence from Indonesia was contingent on the expected consequences this policy was 
going to produce. At the time, Australia was criticized for not intervening before the vote as 
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evidence indicated further conflict was inevitable following the referendum. But it had not 
yet secured the approval of Jakarta, and intervening without it would have been considered an 
act of war. This could have increased the potential for unintended consequences and led to 
unacceptable loses for Australia in severely damaging its most important strategic 
relationship, and not achieving much either in the way of ensuring peace and security for 
Timor Leste. When it did receive Indonesia’s consent, and the agreement of key Southeast 
Asian nations to join its multinational coalition, Australian decision-makers expected positive 
outcomes, both moral and material, which increased the likelihood of material gains. Moral 
evaluation as part of the category of moral and material outcomes is thus very much 
consistent with the classical realist concern for an “ethic of consequence.”  
 
Together, expectation of reciprocity, rational choice and moral and material outcomes 
establish moral realism as an empirical approach that is rooted in the traditions of classical 
realism. The focus on the consequences of moral policy makes the perspective distinct from 
other classical realist perspectives, like neoclassical realism, which still conceives of morality 
normatively and only important as a factor that shapes the perceptions of elites in domestic 
discourses. The emphasis on reciprocity, rational choice and moral and material outcomes 
fills an important gap in identifying how the classical realists theorized the position of 
morality in connection with the national interest, which is then evaluated by the expected 
moral and material benefits. Yet moral realism also goes further than the classical realists in 
stating that when states choose to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices, 
they can sometimes stand to gain material benefits. Most importantly, this means that moral 
realism avoids making normative prescriptions about how states ought to behave, placing it 
firmly within the classical realist method of theory generation and application.  
 
Understanding Australian foreign policy: The case for moral realism 
Now that the themes of moral realism have been established, it is necessary demonstrate why 
Australia is a useful choice as the most likely single focused case study. There have been a 
number of thematic and chronological surveys attempting to identify a distinct type of 
“Australian” diplomacy.174 Realism and the ES have been the main theoretical 
contributions.175 Realist scholars have argued that Australia’s foreign and security policy has 
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been primarily concerned with maintaining the global balance of power and have highlighted 
the explanatory power of its alliances with “great and powerful friends.” William Tow, Coral 
Bell, Paul Dibb, Thomas Bruce Millar and Desmond Ball have been the key proponents of 
this view.176 They leave little room for the possible role of morality in state decision-making 
and have instead prioritised Australia’s ability to advance its strategic and economic interests 
in the face of potential threats.  
 
ES perspectives, in comparison, have presented Australia as a revisionist power that sought to 
benefit from pursuing a normative international order. Scholars and policy practitioners such 
as John Donald Bruce Miller, Ramesh Thakur, Bruce Grant and Gareth Evans have argued 
that Australia’s size and wealth in natural resources, combined with its distinct activist 
diplomacy, meant it had the capacity to achieve more on the world stage.177 They pointed 
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towards Australia’s history as an advocate for small and middle powers, its preference for 
multilateralism, and its role in international institutions as evidence of its ability to “punch 
about its weight” in resolving both regional and global conflicts. These scholars argued that 
Australia’s comparative affluence and geographic position in a region of developing states 
meant it had a responsibility to act as a “Good International Citizen” (GIC). This was not 
only the morally right approach to pursue; it was also one that would ensure Australia’s 
broader security and economic interests as an active participant in international society.   
 
The combination of GIC and the pursuit of material interests has led to the commonly-held 
view that Australia’s foreign policy is best understood by referring to Bull’s “international 
society” approach. 178 And yet despite this, Michael Wesley has argued that in the mists of 
the tug-of-war between the realists and rationalists, a certain amount of moral scepticism and 
appreciation for the consequences of policy choices has been maintained that sits 
uncomfortably with the Grotian-inspired rationalism of the ES.179 In this regard, the realist-
rationalist divide in Australian scholarship has been unique in that it does not appear to have 
followed the traditional “great” debates within the discipline of IR.180  
 
This makes Australia a most-likely case for the application of moral realism, as there is 
already evidence to suggest that morality has played a part in shaping Australia’s foreign 
policy decisions, but there has not yet been any work that applies a moral realist approach. 
Having strengthened the rationale for Australia as an empirical case, it is now prudent to 
justify the selection of aid and development, humanitarian operations and strategic alliances, 
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as the policy arenas examined to answer the primary research question posed at the outset of 
this thesis.  
 
Australia’s foreign aid and development policy 
Australia has an established history of being a principle aid donor, being in the top 15 of aid 
donors based on Gross National Income (GNI).181 Yet despite this, there has not been a 
serious and systematic examination of the motivations and outcomes of Australia’s foreign 
aid policy from a moral realist perspective. Indeed, there is a general lack of substantive 
research within the literature on foreign aid that considers the potential link between 
motivation, and moral and material outcomes. Examinations of a country’s foreign aid policy 
have been centred on providing evidence to demonstrate the explanatory potential of 
Recipient Need (RN) versus Donor Interest (DI).182 This has often been done alongside 
studies focussing on what type of aid was more efficient, whether that be tied or conditional, 
financial loans or grants, and project-specific or more general budget support.183 The mode of 
delivery has also been an area of interest, with extensive research into the merits of 
multilateral modes versus bilateral ones.184 The assumption here has been that multilateral aid 
delivery through international institutions and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) was 
more moral, because these bodies were not constrained by the national interest and could thus 
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focus their efforts on the singular goal of alleviating poverty. As a result, the literature in this 
area has tended to overlook the impact of strategic motivations in the bilateral delivery of aid.   
 
In terms of where structural forces and strategic motivations have been considered, this has 
been done in reference to the policies of the US as the largest per capita aid donor.185 Similar 
but limited studies have been conducted from an Australian perspective, and these have 
produced quite interesting results. Instead of finding exclusive support for DI, scholars like 
Rukmani Gounder have found evidence of both RN and DI in the delivery of Australian 
aid.186 But other than these early observations, there has been little further investigation into 
what this means for how Australia’s foreign aid and development policy can be properly 
understood. Recent scholarship has been concerned with how best to meet domestic 
budgetary constraints without affecting the national interests gained from maintaining a 
healthy foreign aid policy. As a consequence, the moral dimension has been lost amongst 
policy debates on whether Australia should give more foreign aid, or target this to where it 
has the capacity to achieve the most financial effect. There is thus significant space in the 
literature for a moral realist approach to help understand the motives and outcomes of 
Australia’s foreign aid and development policy.  
 
Australia’s participation in humanitarian operations: Cambodia and Timor Leste 
The second policy area I evaluate in terms of moral realism is humanitarian operations, and 
specifically, Australia’s participation in the missions into Cambodia and Timor Leste.187 The 
literature on humanitarian operations is generally divided between analysing instances where 
there has been a perceived failure to respond to gross human rights abuses, as in Rwanda and 
Darfur, or where intervention has occurred, and why and how this was justified on 
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humanitarian grounds.188 As a result, the majority of academic contributions have come from 
normative perspectives of IR where scholars have been preoccupied with establishing the 
legitimacy of each operation by referring to evolutions in international law, and to changes in 
the norm of sovereignty.189 This means that rather than examining the motives and context in 
which states will consider the use of force, scholars have sought to establish the legal 
authority of the interveners.190 In instances where the motives and outcomes of states have 
been included, they have usually been critical of states’ motives, citing imperialism and great 
power hegemony.191  
 
In relation to the two missions identified in this thesis there has been very little scholarship 
charting the actions of Australia, even though it played a considerable diplomatic role, and 
took the lead in implementing the military component of each operation. Here, investigations 
have focused on what effect the decision had on Australia’s regional standing and whether 
each mission upheld certain normative standards.192 Apart from Wesley’s engagement with a 
possible realist ethic of intervention, examination of the motives and effects of Australia’s 
policy decisions have been scarce,193 and have focused on viewing each case individually.194 
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190 James Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene? 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
191 Mohammed Ayoob, “Third world perspectives on humanitarian intervention and international 
administration,” Global Governance 10, no. 1 (2004), pp. 99-118 and Ayoob, “Humanitarian intervention and 
state sovereignty,” International Journal of Human Rights 6, no.1 (2002), pp. 81-102. 
192 William Maley has presented a critique of Australia’s decision to intervene citing the “litany of errors” that 
occurred during the policy process leading up to the intervention. Here, he argued that Australia had misjudged 
and misunderstood its relationship with Indonesia during its involvement in the Timor crisis and this had an 
effect on its own diplomatic dealings with the country. However, Maley did not discuss the motivations behind 
Australia’s decision to intervene nor did he consider what it expected to gain in return. For more, see William 
Maley, “Australia and the East Timor crisis: Some critical comments,” Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 54, no. 2 (2000), pp. 151-161.   
193 Wesley’s notion of a realist ethic attempts to create an international agreed framework for when and where 
intervention should take place. In other words, for states to “treat like cases alike.” He argued for the potential of 
transnational threats to represent a universal interest for states to be motivated to intervene. This would then lead 
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There has not been a study that includes a comparison of Australia’s actions in both cases. A 
moral realist analysis of both Cambodia and Timor Leste would then be potentially beneficial 
in terms of identifying the motives and outcomes of Australia’s foreign policy choices in 
these two humanitarian operations.  
 
Strategic alliances: Australia-US security partnership 
The third and final policy arena evaluated with respect to moral realism is strategic alliances, 
and specifically, Australia’s security partnership with the US. The inclusion of alliance 
politics is important as the moral dimension is often overlooked, and where it has been 
included, it has been in reference to the presence of establishing a “moral consensus.” Here 
the main assumption has been that states, which share similar ideas on political and social 
organization, are more likely to “align” in their responses to issues of international security. 
This is not only beneficial for each individual state, but also for the security and stability of 
international society. Therefore, alliances are seen as mechanisms that maintain international 
order and reflect a moral good.195  
 
Such a view of alliances has contributed to the proliferation of collective, common and 
cooperative explanations of security following the end of the Cold War. This came about in 
response to the continuation of alliances in the absence of a common material threat in the 
                                                                                                                                    
to a shared perception on state failure as a normative justification for intervention. While Wesley’s contribution 
was useful in identifying how realist scholarship can resolve the problem of inconsistent state responses towards 
intervention, it did not shed any specific light on the foreign policy choices of Australia. For more see Wesley, 
“Towards a realist ethics of intervention,” Ethics and International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005), pp. 55-72. David 
Martin Jones and Mike Lawrence Smith did provide a realist perspective on Australia’s intervention in Timor 
Leste in Reinventing Realism: Australia’s Foreign and Defence Policy at the Millennium, but this was done in 
the context of being critical of the previous Labor government’s overall security and defence policy. It 
overlooked the case of Cambodia under Labor and did not provide much detail in terms of the interests behind 
Australia’s decision to intervene. For more see David Martin Jones and Mike Lawrence Smith, Reinventing 
Realism: Australia’s Foreign and Defence Policy at the Millennium (London: The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 2000).  
194 On Australia’s role in the intervention in Timor Leste see Cotton, “Peacekeeping in East Timor: An 
Australian policy departure,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 3 (1999), pp. 237-246; Cotton, 
“Against the grain: The East Timor intervention,” Survival 43, no. 1 (2001), pp. 127-142; Cotton, East Timor, 
Australia and Regional Order: Intervention and its Aftermath in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2004); 
Moree Dee, “‘Coalitions of the Willing’” and humanitarian intervention: Australia’s involvement with 
INTERFET,” International Peacekeeping 8, no. 3 (2001), pp. 1-20; Derek McDougall, “Australia’s 
peacekeeping role in the post-Cold War era,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 3 (2002), pp. 590-608; Peter 
Chalk, “Australian and Indonesia: Rebuilding relations after East Timor,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 23, no. 
2 (2001), pp. 233-253. On Cambodia see Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, “The Cambodian Peace 
Settlement,” in Making Australian Foreign Policy 2nd ed. (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 
51-84.  
195 Andrew Hurrell, “Collective security and international order,” International Relations 11 (1992), pp. 37-55. 
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spread of communism and Soviet aggression.196 For many normative theorists, non-material 
factors such as shared identities held more explanatory weight when it came to what 
motivates states to form alliances and what is important for their long-term viability.197 These 
investigations have largely focused on the ability of alliances to contribute to overall 
international peace and security, and have disregarded the possibility of moral and material 
outcomes in the action of states in forming alliances. This has been particularly so for 
bilateral alliances, as multilateral ones are considered inherently more cooperative, and hence 
more moral.198 As a result, there is a gap in current understandings of bilateral security 
alliances and this becomes clear when looking at how scholars have traditionally perceived 
the US-Australian security partnership.  
 
Much has been written about the importance of this relationship for Australia’s long-term 
security interests, which has been highlighted predominately by realist scholarship.199 But 
there are currently few clues as to whether morality has played apart in shaping Australia’s 
foreign policy choices within the partnership. During the 1980s debates on non-proliferation 
and disarmament, there was some mention of whether it was morally right for Australia to 
accept US extended nuclear deterrence as part of ANZUS, however this was primarily in 
reference to Australia’s ability to exercise an independent foreign policy and not on the 
potential for morality as part of Australia’s policy approach towards the alliance.200 Thus a 
moral realist explanation might be useful for discovering whether both moral and strategic 
                                           
196 Timothy Dunne, “‘When the shooting starts’: Atlanticism in British security strategy,” International Affairs 
80, no. 5 (2004), pp. 893-909.  
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occurred with the end of the Cold War. For more see Frank Schimmelfenng, “NATO expansion: A 
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politics,” Political Science Quarterly (1989), pp. 117-149; Tow and Henry Albinski, “ANZUS-Alive and well 
after 50 Years,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 48, no.2 (2002), pp. 153-172; Bell, Living With 
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as an Asia-Pacific Regional Power: Friendships in Flux (United Kingdom: Routledge, 2007), pp. 12-29 and 
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200 See Joseph Camilleri, The Australia, New Zealand, US Alliance: Regional Security in the Nuclear Age 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1987); Camilleri, “Nuclear testing and pacific defence policies,” Politics 22, no. 1 
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calculations were present in Australia’s decision to align with the US, and whether this has 
led to moral and material outcomes.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the central theoretical debates on how best to conceptualise 
morality in classical realism. Morality has occupied a precarious place in international 
politics, and recent interest in the concept has ignited a return to how the classical realists 
understood it. But rather than adding clarity to classical realism, contributions within the 
revival have misappropriated classical realism into normative IR. And in doing so, these 
perspectives have overlooked the classical realist concern for the roles of interests in 
motiving states to include morality as part of their foreign policy calculations, and the 
consequences these decisions are likely to produce.  
 
The aim of this chapter was to strengthen the case for proposing moral realism as my own 
contribution towards this revival that attempts a more authentic reading of the position of 
morality in classical realism. To achieve this, I began with a critical examination of 
normative, critical and contemporary realists perspectives that have contributed towards the 
classical realist revival. The morally prescriptive views of normative and critical perspectives 
were found to be at odds with the empirical and descriptive focus of classical realism. The 
realist perspectives within the revival were notably absent and limited to a few neoclassical 
realists scholars who argued that morality was only useful as a rhetorical device that 
supervened on foreign policy choices at the domestic level. Neoclassical realism was found 
to not go far enough in analysing instances where states choose to include morality as a part 
of foreign policy choice, with the expectation that it will lead to both moral and material 
outcomes. This is where I positioned moral realism, with its focus on moral 
consequentialism, as an approach that properly represents how the classical realists 
understood morality in foreign policy.  
 
I developed the moral realist framework by drawing out three areas of commonality between 
Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Kennan. These were: the expectations of reciprocity between 
states, rational choice as part of foreign policy decisions, and the moral and material 
outcomes of foreign policy. Together, these three factors properly reflect the classical realist 
concern for seeing morality in connection with material interests, as well as their prioritizing 
of the logic of consequences over prescriptive universalism. An emphasis on the outcomes of 
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states’ foreign policy choices also allows moral realism to go further than the classical 
realists and claim that when morality and interests converge, states can actually stand to gain 
material benefits. This is the central empirical assumption of moral realism and one that sets 
it apart from classical realism as a distinctive approach. Finally, this chapter identified 
Australia as an appropriate case for the evaluation of moral realism as a tool for 
understanding morality in state foreign policy choices. It is to this objective that the following 
three chapters now turn.   
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Chapter Two 
 
Moral realism and Australia’s foreign aid and development policy 
Realism would seem an unlikely candidate for understanding the role of morality in a state’s 
foreign aid and development policy. With its focus on the national interest and the 
competition for power, realist explanations of foreign aid are often overlooked for normative 
ones that directly engage with moral questions. Yet it is a misconception to suggest that all 
aspects of realism are solely concerned with the material dimensions of state power, and the 
mechanisms to exercise it. It fuels a general caricature of realism: that blunt, rational state 
interests exclusively guide foreign policies. In this chapter, I argue that the moral realist 
framework I have developed can shed some light on how morality is viewed in a state’s 
foreign aid and development policy.  
 
I start with an examination of the dominant perspectives on the role of morality in foreign aid 
and development, with the aim of drawing out a distinction between foreign aid based on 
perceived “good” intentions, and one that considers the outcomes of aid policy. This will 
make it easier to assess how easily moral realism can be applied to understand the evidence 
presented. I then chart the development of Australia’s foreign aid and development policy 
from a moral realist perspective, beginning with an evaluation of its early aid program under 
the Colombo Plan. I then move to analyse specific country aid relationships, as well as 
assessing which aid sectors (education, agriculture, and good governance), are prioritized in 
how Australia chooses to deliver its aid. In doing so, I draw out trends in Australia’s aid 
policy: for instance, the consistent attention paid to aid delivery to states in Australia’s region 
and the tendency for the sectors of aid to change according to the material interest being 
pursued. This evidence is used to conclude that moral realism is useful for understanding 
Australia’s foreign aid and development policy choices.  
 
Defining foreign aid: Official development assistance 
Before I begin my discussion on how the literature has approached foreign aid, it is important 
to define what this thesis means when referring to Australia’s foreign aid and development 
policy. Foreign aid is typically defined as Official Development Assistance (ODA), which 
describes all aid flows, including grants and concessional loans, between registered 
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Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members and developing nations.201 ODA also 
characterizes the purpose of aid as “the promotion of the economic development and welfare 
of developing countries as its main objective.” 202 For an analysis of Australia’s foreign aid, 
this definition is not always sufficient, as Australia was not a member of the DAC until 1966, 
and its aid program began with the implementation of the Colombo Plan after WWII. Thus, 
for the purpose of this thesis, any reference to Australia’s foreign aid before its membership 
to the DAC refers to those resources (whether food, equipment, technical assistance, 
infrastructure development or direct financial assistance)203 that are voluntary, and exchanged 
bilaterally between governments, with the stated moral purpose of reducing poverty by 
increasing economic and social development. This is broadly in line with how Australia has 
viewed foreign aid as advancing its national interest through sustainable development and 
poverty reduction. 204 
 
Understanding morality in debates on foreign aid: Intent versus outcomes 
There is a natural assumption that a state’s aid policy should include moral considerations.  
This is largely the approach taken by normative perspectives that emphasize the morality 
                                           
201 OECD, “Official development assistance – definition and coverage,” (2014). Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm (accessed 30 January 
2014). 
202 This clarification was made to exclude military aid as part of DAC members overall measurement of aid. As 
will be mentioned, there were some instances where Australia’s aid did not always fit the ODA standard on 
keeping military aid separate from development programs. This was most obviously in Afghanistan where the 
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“militarization” of aid is an important one as it can lead to the blurring of the moral dimension of aid. However, 
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disaggregated data. It was later found that the total of ODA delivered by Australian aid in Afghanistan was less 
than half between 2006-07, which then increased to between 70% and 75% by 2012. For more see Stephen 
Howes and Jonathan Pryke, “Australian aid to Afghanistan: Submission to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade Reference Committee.” Development Policy Centre, Crawford School of Public Policy, ANU College of 
Asia & the Pacific. Available at: http://observgo.uquebec.ca/observgo/fichiers/25713_aideaustralienne.pdf 
(accessed 2 February 2014).  
203 The mode of aid that states provide can be important in determining the expectation of return and the 
outcomes of giving aid. Aid can be targeted to certain projects often involving experts and contractors from the 
donor nation, provided as relief or development assistance in concert with business and NGOs, given as low or 
no interest loans, or even injected directly into a recipient nations budget through General Budget Support 
(GBS). Yet while there are important distinctions to be made in identifying a state’s preference on the mode of 
aid, assessing these differences is beyond the scope of this thesis. This is for the very simple reason that the 
mode of aid makes no difference to the core premise that aid, guided by an expectation of reciprocity, can lead 
to both moral and material benefits.  
204 This objective was clearly stated in the Simons Review on aid commissioned in 1997, which identified 
sustainable development and poverty reduction as the humanitarian purpose of Australia’s aid program. For 
more see Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (henceforth DFAT), Australian aid, “One clear objective: 
Poverty reduction through sustainable development,” Committee of Review of Australia’s Foreign Aid (Simons 
Report), April 2007. Available at: http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Documents/simons.pdf (accessed 25 
February 2014). As will be discussed, development and poverty reduction had always been a clear expectation 
guiding Australia’s aid, which continued in its contemporary aid program.  
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involved in formulating policies that promote human rights, foster democracy and contribute 
to economic development. In doing this, they stress the value of common humanity and 
distributive justice as principles of the foreign aid regime that can bring about moral 
transformation within the international system. There are broadly two perspectives that hold 
this view: cosmopolitanism and constructivism.   
 
Cosmopolitan thinkers like Charles Beitz and Lukas Meyer have argued that foreign aid can 
be analysed as the international extension of the Western domestic principles embodied in the 
liberal welfare state.205 Here, the moral dimension is attributed to the inherent obligation of 
the strong to aid the weak. These scholars typically highlight the perceived injustice of the 
international system for the developing world and the duty of the industrialised nations to 
correct this by adopting foreign aid policies that mimic the process of redistribution 
employed within their own borders.206 For them, the post-World War material redistribution 
recast the material wealth along recognisable ethical boundaries between donor countries and 
recipient states. And following the 1970s, the institutionalisation of aid as a multilateral 
practice further cemented the foreign aid regime into a collective order or a “global social 
contract.” As evidence, they point towards the steady increase of aid over the last 50 years 
amongst OECD donors, and the inability to account for the reasons for giving aid by referring 
to the political and strategic motivations of the donor. Instead, they argue that the moral duty 
of wealthy nations to give to less development ones – along with the spread of democracy, 
free-trade and international law – has led to the blurring of distinction between the Global 
North and the Global South, which will eventually produce the equalisation of global 
wealth.207 
 
This explanation of foreign aid leaves much to be desired. To begin with, the empirical 
record does not always present such a clear picture. The programs of social development that 
exist within the internal structures of the welfare state cannot be directly comparable to its 
                                           
205 See for instance, Alain Noel and Jean-Philippe Therien, “From domestic to international justice: The welfare 
state and foreign aid,” International Organization 49, 3 (1995), pp. 523-553; Lukas H. Meyer, “Liberal 
cosmopolitanism and moral motivation,” Global Society 14, no. 4 (2000), pp. 631-647 and Charles Beitz, 
“Cosmopolitanism and global justice,” The Journal of Ethics 2, no. 9 (2005), pp. 11-27. These scholars argued 
that aid reflected an international transfer of wealth that flows only one-way from the donor country to the 
recipient, thereby contributing to the eventual equal distribution of wealth. These perspectives do not pay 
attention to whether the donor country can benefit in return. In fact, cosmopolitanism views this aspect of aid to 
be one its main problems because it interferes with the transformative process by prioritizing the material 
interests of the donor, which reinforces the un-equal distribution of wealth.  
206 Brian Opeskin, “The moral foundations of foreign aid,” World Development 24, 1 (1996), pp. 21-44.  
207 Beitz, “Cosmopolitanism and global justice,” p. 17 
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ability to give aid on a global scale. States like Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Norway, known for their generous social welfare programmes, do spend the most relative to 
their Gross Domestic Product (GDP). But the US, Japan and the UK, often criticised for their 
poor domestic welfare systems, have spent more on foreign aid in dollar amounts than the 
widely-praised Scandinavian countries.208 Regardless of the metrics used to identify the most 
generous aid donors, inside-out perspectives find it difficult to link the motives of why states 
give aid, with whether it actually achieves any benefits. This perspective is also out-dated and 
cannot account for the rise of developing aid donors like China, whose social and political 
system is at odds with the welfare model and yet is a rising participant in the foreign aid 
regime.209 Likewise, cosmopolitanism cannot properly accommodate the presence of South-
to-South aid cooperation where the transfer of wealth is between developing countries. 
 
Constructivist understandings of the moral dimension in foreign aid share similarities with 
cosmopolitanism in that they start by looking outside the economic and political interests of 
the state.210 David Lumsdaine has argued that the giving of aid arose from mutual 
humanitarian concerns amongst donor states. From this perspective, the giving of aid reflects 
a shared response or “identity” in relation to poverty and inequality, which over time turned 
the practice into a guiding norm for pro-social state behaviour.211 These shared identities 
combine with the common belief that long-term peace and stability can only be achieved if 
all members of international society were able to prosper. Foreign aid is thus a normative 
practice guided by an acceptance that developed states have obligations to resolve global 
economic injustice. Therefore, like cosmopolitanism, constructivists understand the giving of 
aid as a mechanism that transforms international order by closing the gap between rich and 
poor nations. As a result, constructivists have tended to gather evidence from states that share 
a common identity, such as the Scandinavian states identified above. In doing so, though, 
                                           
208 In 2012, the US, the UK and Japan were the per dollar top aid donors. Japan has recently moved further 
down the list, and has been replaced by France and Germany. The US and the UK have remained the top two 
aid donors. “Top ten largest donors of foreign aid in the world,” Development Diaries (2013). Available at: 
http://developmentdiaries.com/top-10-largest-donors-of-foreign-aid-in-the-world/ (accessed 23 March 2014).  
209 In the period between 2000 and 2012, China’s financial commitment to foreign aid amounted to US$84.68 
billion. For more statistics and time series data see AidData, “Open data for international development,” (2013). 
Available at: http://china.aiddata.org (accessed 26 March 2014). Between 2004 and 2009, China’s yearly 
budgetary aid commitment increased by 30%. Clair Provost, “China publishes first report on foreign aid,” The 
Guardian, 28 April 2011. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2011/apr/28/china-
foreign-aid-policy-report (accessed 23 March 2014).  
210 Martha Finnemore, The National interest in international society (New York: Cornell University Press, 
2001). 
211 David Holloran Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in International Relations: The Foreign Aid Regime 1949-1989 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 24.  
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they also frequently overlook the material factors involved in determining where aid is being 
delivered, and the state’s primary purpose in delivering it.  
 
Whether viewing aid through the lens of obligation or identity, both cosmopolitanism and 
constructivism see it as a product of “good” intentions. In terms of practical application this 
places an idealised set of assumptions on the benefits of aid as it transcends the realm of 
foreign policy practice, charging aid with its own purpose and set of justifications. In doing 
so, normative approaches turn aid into a prescriptive force that establishes a standard of what 
states ought to do rather than what they can or are willing to do. The standard for judging the 
rationale and effects of aid is then confined to meeting the normative requirements of good 
intentions, which means normative perspective tend to avoid post-facto assessments of 
whether the giving of foreign aid actually achieves good outcomes. Therefore, what aid does 
is central to discovering where it fits in a state’s foreign policy and an emphasis on assessing 
the consequences of aid is important in judging whether it achieves its objectives, for both the 
donor and the recipient. 
 
The realist turn: The moral and material outcome of foreign aid and development 
policy  
In light of this, recent realist literature on the function of a state’s foreign aid has turned to 
evaluating the potential for moral and material outcomes rather than on the state’s moral 
intent. Specifically, Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman, as part of their developmental realist 
agenda, have argued that an analysis of a state’s foreign aid policy needs to focus on 
programs of economic development that can produce visible evidence of equable results for 
the recipient nation. For them, the practice of developmental realism is much like the Cold 
War policies of the US in Europe, and East and Southeast Asia, where aid was used as a 
means to counter the spread of communism, promote economic development, and open new 
markets for foreign investment.212 The moral dimension is seen to compliment the material 
interests of the donor state by generating strategic and commercial advantages.  
 
The work of Lieven and Huslman has been useful in contributing to what has traditionally 
been a one-sided debate on the moral aspects of foreign aid. Yet they arguably have not been 
                                           
212 Anatol Lieven and John Huslam, “Developmental realism,” Harvard Law and Policy Review (16 January 
2007) Available at: http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/developmental_realism_4876 
(accessed 12 January 2014).  
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extensive enough in fleshing out a set of principles that could be used to test the validity of 
their claims. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to provide evidence of how a moral realist 
framework could explain the position of morality in a state’s foreign aid and development 
policy.  
 
Expectations of reciprocity 
Moral realism takes a similar approach to developmental realism in how it understands the 
motivations and outcomes of a state’s foreign aid and development policy, in that it 
understands it to be guided primarily by expectations of material benefits. But moral realism 
also goes further in stating that this expectation of reciprocity can have outcomes for the 
recipient state as well. In the first instance, where the aid is delivered is determined by 
whether it follows the state’s strategic interests. Here, geography can be a significant factor 
for certain states, like Australia, where its main recipients are in the Asia-Pacific, or it can 
follow certain military objectives, as was the case with US foreign aid delivered to Iraq in 
2003 and to Afghanistan in 2001.213 Foreign aid policy guided by material factors thus 
increases the expectation of reciprocity, and can lead to certain benefits (described below) in 
improving diplomatic relations, and in helping to secure economic advantages.  
 
Rational choice 
It is important to note that aid will not always appear in the same form, and be directed to the 
same recipient. This is where moral realism can account for the variability of aid in a state’s 
foreign policy. In some instances, a state might adjust the type of aid, from a focus on 
economic development and education, to one that targets the improvement of good 
governance and transparency. In others, it might adjust the level of aid to a particular country, 
even deciding to stop aid all together. These shifts are indicative of a process of rational 
choice as to where the greatest expectations of reciprocity lie, because the returns for giving 
aid are calculated against the cost to the state in administering it. This is especially important 
in foreign aid, as leaders are often forced to justify the merits of aid to a taxpaying domestic 
audience. As well as accounting for policy change, rational choice can also explain why the 
benefits the donor receives from giving aid outweigh concerns for the interests of the 
recipient. Even though the donor may aspire to absolute standards in foreign aid policy, like 
                                           
213 For more on the trends in US bilateral foreign aid, see Robert Fleck and Christopher Kilby, “Changing aid 
regimes: US foreign aid from the Cold War to the War on Terror,” Journal of Development Economics 91, no. 2 
(2010), pp. 185-197.  
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universal primary education under the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), this 
outcome is unlikely to ever be achieved, as it would require a greater amount of commitment 
than what the state, guided by its own interests first, is willing to give. Therefore, while moral 
realism expects there to be benefit for the recipient in giving aid, this is part of the state’s 
calculation that it will achieve its national interest in return.  
 
Moral and material outcomes 
Expectations of reciprocity and rational choice address the motivations for aid, and where aid 
is most likely to be directed. This leaves the effect of aid policy, or the moral and material 
outcomes. Consideration of the effect of aid is important because, in itself, the act of 
providing aid is neither good nor bad. In some instances, the delivery of aid can lead to aid 
dependency and further corruption. In others, it can lead to increased standards of living and 
growth.214 Hence, for moral realism, evidence of moral considerations must be found in the 
outcomes that result from policy implementation. I understand, of course, that evaluating the 
effects of aid on the recipient can be difficult, given the differences of opinion on what 
exactly counts as positive aid results, and the sometimes lack of reliable information on the 
progress of certain aid projects. But, in stating this, it is possible to identify instances where 
aid has lead to specific benefits for the recipient. For example, positive effects of aid have 
been found in the delivery of education and health programmes, with evidence that the 
building of schools and training of teachers directly increases the number of primary school 
enrolments.215 Similar results have also been seen in the implementation of health 
                                           
214 It is important to note that in claiming that bilateral aid can have a positive effect on reducing poverty or 
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ameliorating the conditions that lead to entrenched poverty. Indeed, the academic literature on measuring the 
effectiveness of aid has shifted from relying on traditional macroeconomic indicators (such as GDP, savings and 
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foreign aid,” European Economic Review 40, no. 2 (1996), pp. 289-329. 
215 Channing Arendt, Sam Jones and Finn Tarp, “Aid and growth: have we come full circle?” Discussion Paper 
No. 2009/05 United Nations University (2009). Available at: http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-
papers/discussion-papers/2009/en_GB/dp2009-05/ (accessed 30 January 2009).  
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programmes with significant correlations found between these initiatives and the reduced rate 
of infant mortality.216  
 
The moral outcomes are one part of this category. A moral realist understanding of foreign 
aid must also demonstrate whether this brings material benefits for the donor. This further 
connects the expectations of reciprocity (as the material interests of the state) with the 
outcomes achieved once the policy has been implemented. So, for example, the decision to 
provide aid in the form of infrastructure development will often bring increased benefits to 
the donor state in the sale of donor materials, in the development of business links and in 
garnering international prestige. For the recipient, benefits can be found in local employment, 
the construction of vital infrastructure and, in some cases, the establishment of diplomatic 
communications where previously this was limited. 
 
This is merely a preface to what a moral realist might say about a state’s foreign aid policy. 
To get a clearer picture, I now engage in an analysis of Australia’s foreign aid and 
development policy. This will set the scene for a closer evaluation of the moral realist 
framework and its potential to understand the position of both morality and interest in the 
construction of a state’s foreign aid and development policy.  
 
Expectations of reciprocity: Morality and interests in Australia’s foreign aid and 
development policy 
Australia’s early approach to foreign aid demonstrated an expectation of reciprocity in terms 
of where aid was delivered, and which aid sectors Australia preferred to target its resources. 
Australia’s geography dictates that it is crucial for its strategic environment to be 
economically stable. As a one-sided economy that relies on exports of raw materials, the 
internal strength of neighbouring countries is imperative for regional stability and the 
establishment of bilateral trade. These strategic, diplomatic and economic expectations have 
guided Australia’s aid towards the Asia-Pacific, which began with the inception of its official 
aid program under the Colombo Plan. 217 The Colombo Plan was a Commonwealth bilateral 
                                           
216 Prachi Mishra and David Newhouse, “Health aid and infant mortality,” International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
Working Paper 07/100 (2007). Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07100.pdf 
(accessed 30th January 2014). 
217 Before the Colombo Plan Australia had contributed to WWII reconstruction efforts in the form of “relief aid” 
to PNG which Australia administered up until its independence in 1975. This aid was limited to small grants, 
usually under $100,000. All values in this thesis are in Australian dollars, except where cited otherwise. It was 
not until 1951 that Australia began a “program” of aid to several nations.  
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foreign aid initiative proposed in 1950 and set in force in 1951. Australia played a significant 
diplomatic role in developing the plan, which was often termed the “Spender Resolution,” 
after former Australian Foreign Minister, Percy Spender, whose idea for a collective overseas 
aid program provided a framework for discussions in the first consultative meeting on the 
Plan in Ceylon.218 
 
Following the end of WWII, the immediate foreign policy priority for Australia was to shore 
up US commitments to security in the Asia-Pacific. At the time, Australian policymakers 
were concerned about the lack of US interest in the region, as the majority of the world’s 
political and economic capital was focused on the reconstruction of Europe. Being a middle 
power, Australia relied on the security guarantee of “great and powerful friends” and the US 
was the obvious candidate. Security assurances were already being achieved by Australia 
with the signing of ANZUS 12 days after the Colombo Plan, but a related concern was the 
need to bolster this with US financial support in the region. A regional development 
programme was seen as a policy that would appeal to US attitudes of “burden sharing” and 
contribute to broader goals of economic development.219 This was eventually achieved when 
the US joined the second consultative committee in 1951 and pledged financial support to the 
Plan. In fact, it became the largest bilateral contributor of aid to both the Colombo Plan states 
and wider Southeast Asia. 220 
 
Apart from the expectation that it would contribute to Australia’s strategy of US engagement, 
this was also a way for Canberra to advance its own approach to regional security. Australia 
had arguably maintained a certain level of irreverence towards the political and economic 
issues brewing in its own backyard, preferring instead to focus on securing its ties to the 
West. This changed after WWII as the process of decolonisation brought attention to the 
                                           
218 The Plan was originally amongst Commonwealth countries (Australia, Canada, Sri Lanka, India, New 
Zealand, Pakistan and the UK. It then expanded into an international plan for Co-operative Economic 
Development in South and South-East Asia and by 1954 included the US, Malaya (which became Malaysia and 
Singapore in 1963), Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Japan, Laos, Japan and The Philippines. In 1977, the name 
changed to “The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific,” to 
reflect the expanded membership and its increased activities in infrastructure, skills training, education and 
health promotion.  
219 Richard Casey, “International affairs,” Ministerial Statement, House of Representatives (hereafter HoR), 21 
June 1951. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=1;query=Colombo%2
0Plan%20United%20States%20Decade%3A%221950s%22%20Year%3A%221951%22;rec=5;resCount=Defau
lt (accessed 10 January 2014).  
220 After the first five years of operation (1951-1956), the US had contributed $US2 billion dollars. Australia 
had only contributed $72 million. During the major Cold War period (1951-1984), the US contributed over half 
the amount of aid distributed through the Colombo Plan, around US$42 billion. 
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potential threat of communism and state collapse. By 1950, the defeat of the nationalist 
regime in China, and evidence of insurgencies in Burma, Indochina, Malaya and Thailand, 
had signalled to Australian policymakers that its geographic proximity to politically and 
socially unstable neighbours meant it had to pay more attention to the region. As Spender 
stated in 1951:  
 
We have deep and far reaching interests in the Pacific. We have similar, 
strategic and otherwise, in the South and Southeast Asian region. No 
nation can escape its geography. That is an axiom that should be written 
deep into the minds of every Australian. Above all, it is in our interests to 
foster commercial and other contacts with them and give them what help 
we can in maintaining stable and democratic governments in power, and 
increasing the material welfare of their peoples. In doing so, we take the 
long view. We will be helping to provide them and ourselves with the best 
defence against the effective penetration of communism.221 
 
The Colombo Plan was one measure that Australia adopted in pursuit of these goals. In the 
beginning, the major recipients of aid were India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. At the time, 
Australia did not have a central institution that could implement and coordinate targeted aid 
programmes, which made it prudent to concentrate on nations where it had an established 
presence – on PNG as a trustee territory; on India, Pakistan and Sri-Lanka as Commonwealth 
states; and on Indonesia as the closest state to Australia. The attention paid to India, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka diminished as Australia’s aid program developed to focus more on states 
closer to its own sphere of influence, and PNG and Indonesia went on to become Australia’s 
largest aid recipients. 
 
Australia’s general approach to aid under the Colombo Plan was to implement “grass-roots” 
policies of economic development, such as technical cooperation and industrial production, 
as effective tools to promote nationalism, and deter the adoption of communist governments. 
The decision to focus on economic development was informed by both moral and material 
expectations. The material expectations, as described above, were linked to Australia’s desire 
to develop friendly relations with nations in an area of strategic importance and to participate 
                                           
221 Percy Spender, “International affairs,” Foreign Policy Ministerial Statement, HoR, no. 206, 9 March 1950, 
pp.628-629. 
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in an economically competitive market. The moral intentions were linked to expectations that 
local development programs would increase domestic consumptions levels, as well as 
improve the standard of living of recipient nations. Spender highlighted these dual 
expectations when he claimed that:  
 
There are several reasons why this external assistance should be given. In 
the first place, on humanitarian grounds we cannot ignore the basic needs 
of such a large and important section of the world’s population. Secondly, 
a permanent improvement in world trade depends in a substantial degree 
upon the economic development and increased productive capacity of the 
countries of South and South-East Asia.222 
 
Technical cooperation was a key aspect of Australia’s participation in the Colombo Plan and 
one where it achieved significant reciprocal benefits. As mentioned above, Australia had a 
fairly limited relationship with neighbouring countries and this was not helped by the image 
of a “racist” Australia amongst many Asia-Pacific states – a perception that was largely the 
result of its “White Australia Policy.”223 A program that allowed for an exchange of 
personnel and cultural experiences was viewed as one way for Australia to counter this image 
and reap some returns in the process.224  
 
Australia provided the majority of its support through the Colombo Plan’s Technical 
Assistance Cooperation, which was divided into the awarding of scholarships for academic 
study and training awards for local skills training. It also included sending Australian experts 
in exchanges of technical expertise. The latter aspect of the aid program was particularly 
                                           
222 Spender, “South and South-East Asia,” Speech, HoR, 6 June 1950. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/hansard80/hansardr80/1950-06 
06/0108/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf (accessed 19 September 2015).  
223 The White Australia Policy or the Immigration Restriction Act was a policy that restricted “non-white” 
immigration to Australia by implementing a number of discriminatory measures, one of which was to provide 
dictation tests to potential immigrants in a language that the applicant was not familiar with. The Act was 
introduced after federation in 1901, and existed in some form until 1973. It was introduced in response to fears 
of economic competition from Asian labourers and from a general anxiety of an “Asian invasion” that would 
threaten Australia’s traditional European based customs, values, traditions and lifestyle. For more see, James 
Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera: The Story of Australian Immigration 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007).  
224 The main material purpose of the Colombo Plan was economic, but it was also accepted that a qualitative 
expectation of the Plan was to counteract negative perceptions of Australia, both regionally and internationally, 
as a result of the White Australia Policy. This claim has been made by others, for instance see Alex Auletta, “A 
retrospective view of the Colombo Plan: Government policy, departmental administration and overseas 
students,” Journal of Higher Education Policy Management 22, no. 1 (2000), pp. 47-58.  
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profitable because it allowed Australia to achieve the greatest amount of benefit without the 
added financial expense of project aid, which required the sending of administrative staff, 
materials and grants. Quite often, Canberra ran into problems associated with the lack of 
information being provided by the recipient state on what was needed to successfully 
complete projects. Recipient governments were also not always forthcoming on how the 
capital aid was being spent and the administrative staff that oversaw these projects was not 
always educated on how best to use the equipment and goods provided.225 Therefore, 
technical cooperation represented comparable success for Australia in getting the most out of 
its aid program.  
 
Expectations and outcomes of Australia’s aid preferences: Technical cooperation, 
education and agricultural development 
In terms of technical assistance, Australia’s climate and reliance on primary industries meant 
it had expertise in agricultural irrigation, sanitation and agribusiness, all of which were useful 
for many of the under-developed Southeast Asian states that were similar in their reliance on 
agriculture. Malaya, Indonesia, Thailand and South Vietnam received 55% of the total $42 
million of Australia’s technical assistance.226 The focus on agricultural development 
represented a twin gain for Australia, and followed the moral and material expectations 
outlined above. 
 
It enabled Australia to contribute to reducing poverty, with agriculture as the primary source 
of employment, while also allowing it to carve out a niche area of development that would 
flow into Australia’s broader trade interests. By 1964, considerable gains had been achieved 
in economic development as overall GDP of Southeast Asia had increased by 8%. However, 
agriculture and rural development had failed to keep up with the demand of local populations 
and it was here that Australia saw the potential of aid in agriculture.227 In fact, this was an 
early aim of Australia and part of the original blueprints for the Plan in 1950, where the main 
areas of Australia’s involvement were earmarked for agriculture.228 Not only did this 
represent a unique area of development for Australia, it also led to further payoffs in 
                                           
225 National Archives of Australia (hereafter NAA), A1838 2020/1/12 Part 2. “Colombo plan Australia’s 
progress reports,” Australia’s Part in the Colombo Plan Progress Report, 19 June 1958.  
226 All numerical values cited in this thesis are in Australian dollars, except where cited as otherwise.  
227 NAA, A1838 740/4/5 Part 3, “Colombo plan,” Inward Savingram, Consultative Meeting, 30 October, 1964.  
228 NAA, A1838 708/13/4. “Colombo plan for cooperative economic development, reports, publications, 
printing etc,” Department of External Affairs, Departmental Notes on the London Meeting of the 
Commonwealth Consultative Committee, 6 September to 4 October, 1950.  
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expanded investment opportunities. In 1966 Australia introduced investment guarantee 
schemes designed to encourage direct investment through joint venture enterprises that were 
generated from the diplomatic and trade contacts achieved through its technical assistance.  
 
Technical assistance in agriculture (or what is now commonly referred to as “food security”) 
has arguably continued to be a focus of Australia’s aid that has led to outcomes for both 
Australia and recipient states. A particularly good example of this can be found in the work 
of the Australian Centre of International Agriculture Research (ACIAR) established in 1982. 
This centre was partly funded by Australian aid, which during the 1980s and 90s represented 
around 3% of the aid budget. In 2013, Australia’s annual commitment had reached over $100 
million.229 It worked to deliver projects in developing states to overcome production 
difficulties (including in livestock, aquiculture, fisheries and horticulture), with the overall 
aim of improving self-sufficiency for subsistence farmers.230 It utilised Australia’s expertise 
in agriculture science and agribusiness, with project delivery and research mainly taking 
place in the recipient country. Like the Colombo Plan, the majority of these projects were 
implemented in states in Southeast Asia and the Pacific with Indonesia being the largest 
recipient.231 The expertise provided produced quite significant returns for Australia as the 
majority of the research was focused on wheat improvement, which was Australia’s highest 
agricultural export, worth 16.3% of Australia’s trade (or approximately $6 billion).232 A 
report on a sample of 48 of 600 bilateral projects administered by the ACIAR calculated the 
                                           
229 This may seem small, but ACIAR is one of the largest contributors of agricultural research for development 
globally. In 2010-12, ACIAR was in charge of $US120 million, which has been estimated to represent 13% of 
global ODA in agricultural research.  This is in comparison to the 3-4% of global ODA that Australia’s total aid 
represents. Robin Davis and Stephen Howes, “ Fowl or fish? A submission to the review of ACIAR,” 
Development Policy Blog, The Development Policy Centre, 29 January 2013. Available at: 
http://devpolicy.org/fowl-or-fish-a-submission-to-the-aciar-review-20130129/ (accessed 25 February 2014).  
230 The Crawford Fund, “Doing well by doing good task force report,” (2013) Available at 
http://www.crawfordfund.org/assets/files/publications/task_force_report_4_page_summary.pdf ( accessed 9 
January 2014).  
231 This was because of its strategic importance and because of the ability of aid to assist a relatively large 
population living in poverty. In Indonesia the agriculture sector accounted for 40% of employment and yet 
contributed to only 14% of GDP. Programs that focused on lifting the productivity of Indonesia were therefore 
thought to produce moral and material outcomes. Indeed, Australia has already benefited with real returns in 
investment on agricultural research in partnership with Indonesia estimated at 13%. More on the nature of 
Australia’s aid to Indonesia will be described later in the chapter. Information on Australia’s Indonesia ACAIR 
country program can be found at the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, “Indonesia: 
achievements,” (2013). Available at: http://aciar.gov.au/country/indonesia/view/achievements (accessed 10 
January 2014) and Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, “Indonesia, country program,” 
(2013). Available at: http://aciar.gov.au/country/indonesia (accessed 10 January 2014). 
232 Other areas of important research focused on improving production in harsh climates through AusAID 
funding of the International Crops Research Institute for the semi-arid Tropics and the International Centre for 
Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas. For more see DFAT, “Trade at a glance,“ (2012). Available at: 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade/trade-at-a-glance-2012.pdf (accessed 9 January 2014).   
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financial return to be estimated at around $2.5 billion, which is equal to the cost of 
investment since the inception of ACIAR. The real returns are potentially higher given that 
the sampled 48 projects represented only 7% of the measured benefits.233 
 
The other part of Australia’s technical assistance – the scholarship program – is regularly 
regarded as the most successful aspect of Australia’s technical cooperation, and seen as an 
invaluable tool in Australia’s strategy to become more engaged in Southeast Asia.234 Over the 
course of the Colombo Plan, an estimated 40,000 students were awarded scholarships to 
study in Australian universities, some of whom went on to be high-level public servants and 
ministers in their own governments.235  Australia’s approach to the scholarship program was 
also distinctive in that it preferred to have the students undertake their studies in Australian 
universities, rather than support subsidised university fees in the home nation. Australia 
pursued this approach because it anticipated a greater return in the capital spent by these 
individuals while studying, and through the exchanging of cultures at the domestic level.236 It 
also enabled Australia to reach a wider range of nations through the Commonwealth 
supported exchange schemes in the US and Africa. 237 Some 6,500 Asians and 300 Africans 
had trained in Australia by the end of 1967, and Australia had become second to the US in 
the number of training places it awarded. Further flow-on effects were also had in stimulating 
the interest of private citizens. By June 1960 the number of private students studying in 
Australia from Colombo Plan countries had tripled to 7,918.238 
 
This focus on education continued in Australia’s aid program to the point where education 
became Australia’s largest aid sector. Its total aid investments in education are set to reach 
                                           
233 Australian Broadcasting Corporation (hereafter ABC), “Foreign aid spending benefiting Australian farmers,” 
Australian Network News (2013). Available at: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-12-17/an-foreign-aid-
spending-benefiting-australian-farmers/5161858 (accessed 9 January 2014).  
234 This claim has been made by others, see for instance, Lyndon Megarrity, “Regional goodwill, sensibly 
priced: Commonwealth policies towards Colombo plan scholars and private overseas students, 1945–
72,”Australian Historical Studies 38, no. 129 (2007), pp. 88-105. 
235 “APPROPRIATION BILL (No.1) 1966-67,” HoR, 29 September 1966. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=APPROPRI
ATION%20BILL%20students%20%201966-
67%20Decade%3A%221960s%22%20Year%3A%221966%22%20Month%3A%2209%22%20Day%3A%2229
%22;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 9 January 2014). 
236 NAA, A1838 724/5 Part 9, “Australian relations with development aid committee and organization for 
economic cooperation and development., P.J Flood The Secretariat Department External Affairs on “Aid: one 
percent or not?” 21 August 1967. 
237 Ibid.  
238 NAA, A1838 2020/1/12 Part 2, “ Colombo plan progress reports” and “Australian Colombo plan aid reaches 
$36m,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 5 April 1961.  
 90 
$1.158 billion by the end of 2014, with the expectation of Australia becoming one of the 
largest bilateral donors in education by 2015-2016.239 Here again, the awarding of 
scholarships has been a key part of the education aid program and was expected to lead to 
significant moral and material payoffs. In 2013, Australia invested in 6,000 Australia Awards 
Scholarships and Fellowships. This initiative was largely established in response to the 
commitments made as part of the “Australia in the Asian Century” White Paper, which 
emphasised the need for Australia to broaden its public diplomacy to include the Indo-Pacific 
area.240 As part of this push to deepen relationships with Indo-Pacific states, the Abbott 
government announced in 2013 the creation of the New Colombo Plan. This time, the 
scholarship exchange program went in reverse, with Australian students being sent to study 
and work in partnered Asian countries.241  
 
Technical assistance and education were important aspects of achieving Australia’s early 
diplomatic objectives in its participation of the Colombo Plan and its wider aid program. 
There were also economic and financial outcomes sought by Australia, although these were 
not as originally significant. The exportation of goods into Asian countries as part of the 
Colombo Plan was expected to increase the prospects of long-term markets for Australia, but 
this was not tied to an increase in direct two-way trade. Instead, the economic potential of aid 
was focused on securing the co-operation of manufacturers and the use of Australian goods 
and services. In the beginning, Australia preferred to deliver the entirety of its aid in the form 
of grants that were notionally “untied” to certain conditions or performance targets by the 
recipient. This had the benefit of allowing these nations to set their own pace of development 
without having to factor in repayment of the loans and, for Australia, it had the advantage of 
opening channels of dialogue for further trade and investment, as these grants were mainly 
                                           
239 DFAT, Australian Aid, “Education,” (2014). Available at: 
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/aidissues/education/Pages/home.aspx (accessed 24 February 2014).  
240 Bob Carr, “ 2013-14 International development assistance budget,” Minister for Foreign Affairs, Media 
Release, 14 May 2013. Available at: http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2013/bc_mr_130514b.html (accessed 
14 February 2014). The term “Indo-Pacific” crept into Australia’s foreign policy debates in 2012 defence White 
Paper which recognised that Australia’s direct sphere of strategic and economic interest had expanded: “The 
Indian Ocean is now surpassing the Atlantic and Pacific oceans as the world’s busiest trade corridor. Rapid 
economic growth in South, Northeast and Southeast Asia is driving stronger economic links with the resource-
rich Middle East and Africa. One-third of the world’s bulk cargo and around two-thirds of global oil shipments 
now pass through the Indian Ocean.” Department of Defence (Hereafter DoD), “ Australia’s defence white 
paper 2013,” p. 13. Available at: http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf (accessed 
16 February 2014).  
241 Julie Bishop, “Indonesia to participate in new Colombo plan,” Minister for Foreign Affairs, Media Release, 2 
October 2013. Available at: http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2013/jb_mr_131002.html (accessed 14 
February 2014).  
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given in the form of food aid and equipment.242 For example, after only two years of 
operating, Australia had provided the value of $6.84 million of flour and wheat to India, 
which was then sold in local markets, with the proceeds going to development of the 
Tungabhadra water conservation and hydroelectric project. This type of food aid was 
successful because it allowed Australian exports to diversify into foreign markets, and it had 
the dual developmental effect of assisting in food shortages as well as being a source of 
revenue for much needed infrastructure projects. 243  
 
The heavy focus on grants and food aid began to change during the 1970s. For over two 
decades Australia had shied away from providing direct cash loans to recipient states (with 
the exception of budget support to PNG), for the simple reason that its capacity to shell out 
large sums of money was limited, and it was decided that it could achieve more of its aid 
objectives by focusing on technical cooperation and food assistance.244 Following the 
establishment of Australia’s independent aid agency, Australia’s Development Assistance 
Agency (ADAA)245 in 1974, Australia slowly began to introduce aid through Development 
Import Grants (DIGs) and loans, as a means of increasing the potential commercial returns 
                                           
242 The delivery of aid was also premised on the lack of internal structures and resources in the Southeast Asian 
nations and not necessarily related to the costs of imports of capital goods for projects. These were also not 
determined by the forward forecast of balance-of-payment deficits and not related to debt repayments. This 
meant that if, or in fact, when, a nation forecasts a surplus, it does not entitle it to redirect financial assistance 
through taxation or loans. This was done to allow for the delivery of long-term development projects that were 
not tied to the overall health of the nation in GDP terms and it also allowed Australia some flexibility in 
adjusting the amount of aid it provides in case of structural changes to its own economic situation. NAA, A1838 
708/13/4. “Colombo Plan for cooperative economic development, reports, publications and printing,” 
Department of External Affairs Notes on the London Meeting of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee, 6 
September to 4 October 1950.  
243 Similar grants were given to Pakistan and Sri Lanka where the sale of Australian wheat and flour contributed 
to the establishment of tuberculosis clinics and major infrastructure, such as roads and bridges. Richard R. 
Casey, “Colombo plan helps towards peace and plenty in Asia,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 Monday 1953. 
Available at: http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/18401132 (accessed 20 February 2014).  
244 During the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was a debate over whether or not Australia should shift the 
focus of its aid to long-term low interest loans in order to better control the price of its commodity aid. Yet this 
was largely rejected in favour of grants. As a net importer of capital, Australia did not have the capacity to 
sustain a significant loan program and would have needed to establish a separate fund. The use of grants also 
generated significant goodwill in recipient nations and contributed to a more favourable climate for increased 
diplomatic relations. The potential loss of prestige and the lack of financial capacity meant that proposals for a 
major shift to loans were dismissed. NAA A1838 740/4/5 “Colombo Plan –loans,” Draft for Mr Hay, 13 
February 1958 and NAA, A1838 735/2 Part 1, “Australia’s foreign aid program,” Draft Working Paper 
Australia’s Contribution to International Assistance, W. Brady Department of External Affairs, 21 May 1961.  
245 Australia’s aid agency has gone through several incantations. It changed to the Australian Development 
Assistance Bureau (ADAB) and was integrated into the Foreign Affairs and Trade department in 1976 by the 
Fraser government. It had a name change again under the Hawke government and became the Australian 
International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB) in 1987. In 1995, the Keating government renamed it 
the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). In October 2013, AusAID was dissolved by 
the Abbott government and was integrated into DFAT. For the remainder of this thesis, in order to maintain 
consistency, I will refer to Australia’s aid delivery mechanism as “AusAID.” 
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associated with its aid.246 Australia’s dependency on primary exports meant it shared the 
same disadvantages as under-developed nations in being susceptible to rises and falls in 
commodity prices. This meant that when commodity prices were low, potential dividends 
were also low, thereby limiting the amount Australia could receive in return for its aid 
contributions. Hence, it was accepted that grant aid should be supplemented by concessional 
or “soft” loans that allowed the receiving country to borrow money from Australia at a 
discounted rate. This also had the benefit of allowing Australian export companies to remain 
competitive with those in other donor countries. 247 
 
One of the most significant examples of this shift in the commercial priorities of aid was the 
establishment of the Development Important Finance Facility (DIFF) in 1980, which came to 
represent 8% of Australia’s overall aid budget.248 The DIFF also corresponded with an 
institutional change in the management and objectives of Australia’s aid that culminated in 
the first official aid review in 1983, called the Jackson Report. 249 The Report emphasized 
more specifically the economic interests of Australia’s aid program and the need to 
incorporate a holistic approach to foreign aid delivery that focused on country 
programming.250 And the DIFF did just that. It combined development objectives, such as 
increased employment and the construction of infrastructure, with macro-economic principles 
                                           
246 Development Import Grants (DIGs) for the purchase of development orientated goods and services from 
Australia were introduced in 1978 and represented half of Australia’s bilateral food aid. The remaining half was 
provided as untied cash payments to the International Development Association (IDA). Loans were introduced 
later in 1980 as part of the Development Important Finance Facility (DIFF), “APPROPRIATION BILL (No. 1) 
1978-79,” HoR, 26 September 1978. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=APPROPRI
ATION%20BILL%20Development%20important%20grants%20%20(No.%201)%201978-
79%20Decade%3A%221970s%22%20Year%3A%221978%22%20Month%3A%2209%22%20Day%3A%2226
%22;rec=1;resCount=Default  (accessed 18 January 2014).  
247 “Question no. 258 export finance and insurance corporation: overseas aid,” HoR, 25 February 1981. 
Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Question%20no.%20258%20Exp
ort%20Finance%20and%20Insurance%20Corporation%20Overseas%20Aid%20Decade%3A%221980s%22%2
0Year%3A%221981%22%20Month%3A%2202%22;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 18 January 2014).  
248 DFAT, Australian Aid, “A review of the effectiveness of the development import finance facility,” (January 
1996). Available at: http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Documents/diffrevw.pdf (accessed 18 January 2014).  
249 The Jackson Review was the first comprehensive review into Australia’s aid program. Previous studies of its 
aid objectives were made in the Harries Report, which focused on Australia’s relationship with the Third World. 
Here, aid was viewed in the context of where it fits in Australia’s broader strategic and geopolitical approach to 
Lower Developing Countries (LDCs). It did not cover in depth the function and purpose of Australian aid. For 
more on the Harries Report see Owen Harries Australia and the Third World: Report of the Committee on 
Australia’s Relations with the Third World (Harries Report) (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service, September 1979). The Jackson Report was conducted by Sir Gordon Jackson and commissioned by 
former Foreign Minister Bill Hayden.  
250 Previously, Australia aid had been provided to countries on an “ad hoc” basis as each type of aid, whether 
that be granting of scholarships, project aid, technical assistance or food aid, was administered by separate 
branches of government.  
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of subsidised imports, finance credit and concessional loans.251 The program ran until 1996 
and had significant benefits for both Australia and its recipient nations. 252 
 
DIFF aid was originally distributed exclusively to ASEAN as it was expected to achieve the 
twin goals of promoting export market competitiveness for Australia in the context of a rising 
Asia, and assist in Australia’s aid objective of alleviating poverty in its direct sphere of 
influence. Eventually this was broadened to make all recipients of Australian aid eligible, but 
the majority was still going to Southeast Asia, which by 1989 was receiving 90% of DIFF 
aid.253 In terms of its success, a review by AusAID found that 47 of the 51 projects being 
administered across 13 different countries were effective in delivering economic and social 
advancement for the recipient nations.254 In the case of Indonesia, for example, which 
received 46% of total DIFF funding, the Steel Bridges Project assisted in the transportation of 
local goods for trading and access to social facilities that lead to an increased rate of 
economic return for Indonesia from 7% to over 200%.255 
                                           
251 The DIFF was described as a “tied aid mixed credit” scheme that sourced finance from grants provided by 
AusAID, and export credit financing provided by the Export Finance and Insurance Cooperation (EFIC) of 
Austrade. These funds were then bundled together into a concessional loan with the rate of interest and 
repayment schedules determined by negotiation between Australia and the recipient nation. DFAT, Australian 
Aid, “A review of the effectiveness of the development import finance facility,” (January 1996), p 5. Available 
at: http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Documents/diffrevw.pdf (accessed 14 January 2014).  
252 DIFF was abolished in 1996 after considerable parliamentary debate that focused on the potential blurring of 
Australia’s aid objectives with its commercial ones. This decision also prompted a senate committee inquiry 
into the pros and cons of cancelling the program. In the end, the decision to cancel the scheme was based on 
budgetary constraints. A key part of the liberal party’s campaign to win government was to cut spending. For 
more on this see “Foreign affairs, defence and trade legislation committee – department of foreign affairs and 
trade program 6 development cooperation,” Senate, 23 September 1996. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Foreign%20Affairs,%20Defence
%20and%20Trade%20Legislation%20Committee%20%20Department%20of%20Foreign%20Affairs%20and%
20Trade%20Program%206%20Development%20Cooperation%20Decade%3A%221990s%22%20Year%3A%2
21996%22%20Month%3A%2209%22%20Day%3A%2223%22;rec=1;resCount=Default(accessed 14 January 
2014); and “Matter of public importance – overseas aid,” HoR, 18 June 1996. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Matter%20of%20Public%20Impo
rtance%20Overseas%20Aid%20Decade%3A%221990s%22%20Year%3A%221996%22%20Month%3A%2206
%22%20Day%3A%2218%22;rec=2;resCount=Default (accessed 14 January 2014). Yet, interestingly, while the 
scheme was cancelled, four recipient nations – Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines and China – were given 
approval to proceed with certain high priority projects, such as mining and infrastructure development. The 
money for these projects was incorporated into the 1996/97 aid budget allocation for each nation.  
253 Ravi Tomar, “A DIFFerence of opinion: cancellation of the development import finance facility,” Current 
Issue Brief 20 1995-1996, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group, p. 3. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/LLZ20/upload_binary/LLZ20.pdf;fileType=applica
tion%2Fpdf#search=%22A%20DIFFerence%20of%20%20Cancellation%20of%20the%20Development%20Im
port%20Finance%20Facility%22 (accessed 14 January 2014).  
254 In terms of overall estimates, two-thirds of the projects were found to have achieved 75% of their intended 
development outcomes. Op cit, footnote 240.  
255 DFAT, Australian Aid, “A review of the effectiveness of the development import finance facility,” (January 
1996), p 25. Available at: http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Documents/diffrevw.pdf (accessed 14 January 
2014). 
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The DIFF also represented increasing recognition that Australia’s aid had the potential to 
deliver investment opportunities and commercial benefits for Australian businesses. In this, 
the scheme proved quite successful. In combination with the EFIC and the $285 million of 
AusAID funds, the 51 projects identified above generated direct expenditure in Australia 
estimated at around $709 million.256 These returns increased when follow-on business and 
expected follow-on business were also included. Follow-on business, which was financing 
already tendered by Australian businesses, was estimated at $263 million. The expected 
follow-on, which was the amount expected in the following year of the survey, was estimated 
at $397 million. This meant the overall total business generated for Australia was $1.37 
billion, or roughly five times the amount spent on aid. 257   
 
The scheme also had further economic payoffs in keeping Australian businesses viable 
during the early 1990s recession. Westinghouse Brake and Signal, an Australian subsidiary of 
the British railway and signalling company, stated that had it not been for the DIFF-financed 
Rail Signalling project in Thailand in 1989, it would have had to shift the majority of its 
operations off-shore, resulting in significant job loses. 258 In other instances, it expanded the 
market reach of Australian businesses involved in infrastructure development. Indeed, 
projects that involved construction were the most funded with transport and communication 
representing 46% and 11% respectively. It was noted by Ian Berckelman, Managing Director 
of Labax International, which was working in Indonesia to establish environmental 
conservation projects that “the DIFF scheme was the only tool that Australia had to enable it 
to secure infrastructure projects in the developing countries in Southeast Asia.”259  
 
After the DIFF program ended in 1996, Australia went back to delivering its aid entirely in 
grant form, which apart from the loan provided to Indonesia after the 2004 Tsunami, has 
                                           
256 Ibid. 
257 These businesses had already been granted tender by the DIFF and were administering these projects by the 
time further funding proposals under the DIFF scheme were cancelled by the liberal government when they took 
office in March 1996. Therefore, the total expected return amount of $1.37 billion was unaffected.  
258 Ravi Tomar, “A DIFFerence of opinion: Cancellation of the development import finance facility,” Current 
Issue Brief 20 1995-1996, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group, p. 4. Available at: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Arc
hive/CIB/cib9596/96cib20 (accessed 25 February 2014).  
259 Barrie Cassidy, Kerry Obrien, Andrew Thomson, Ian Berkelman and Xiaowu Wu, “Axing of development 
import finance scheme causes concern in neighbouring asian countries.” 7:30 Report, 22 May 1996. Available 
at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Axing%20of%20Development%2
0Import%20Finance%20Scheme%20Causes%20Concern%20in%20Neighbouring%20Asian%20Countries;rec=
0;resCount=Default (accessed 25 February 2014).  
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remained the principal mode of delivery for Australia’s aid. In 1997, the Liberal government 
under Prime Minister John Howard commissioned the Simons Review of aid that sought to 
streamline the purpose of Australian aid to represent one clear objective: the reduction of 
poverty through sustainable development.260 Previously, under the Labor government, it was 
thought that Australia’s mixed motives approach to aid, which tied the humanitarian 
objectives with Australia’s strategic and economic interests, was diluting the effectiveness of 
Australia’s aid and detracting from the overall aim of reducing poverty. Thus, a policy 
framework that redirected Australia’s aid towards the one singular goal was expected to 
better assist in getting the most out of Australia’s aid dollar. Yet as I will demonstrate below, 
in practice, nothing much changed. Australia continued to pursue the commercial benefits of 
aid that were evident in the introduction of nation-building and post-conflict reconstruction 
where the expectations of economic returns were substantial, particularly in infrastructure 
development.  
 
The delivery of Australia’s aid program: The prominence of bilateralism 
As well as favouring grants, Australia has preferred to deliver its aid bilaterally. This has 
mainly been because it was the expected to be best way for Australia to extract the most, both 
morally and materially, from its aid program. The flexibility of government-to-government 
ties allows for increased diplomatic relationships and business contacts.261 When 
multilateralism was being considered at the start of the aid program, it was thought that 
“Australian aid would loose its identity if too much was channelled multilaterally,” as aid 
filtered through multilateral channels made it difficult to distinguish the objectives of the 
donor from that of the institution. 262 This was of particular concern for a country the size of 
Australia, which made a small contribution in aid relative to the contributions of other 
donors. Its geographic position in a region traditionally populated by a diverse mix of 
developing nations also added to the overall difficulty of identifying the achievements of aid 
towards Australia’s national objectives. Hence, it was generally preferred that Australia 
conduct its aid relations with each recipient state individually, and this is where the annual 
                                           
260 DFAT, Australian aid, “One clear objective: Poverty reduction through sustainable development,” 
Committee of Review of Australia’s Foreign Aid (Simons Report), April 2007. Available at: 
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Documents/simons.pdf (accessed 25 February 2014).  
261 NAA, A1838 2021/2/2, “ Aid estimates 1966-67,” Colombo Plan - Economic development aid - Estimates 
and program schedules, 13 March 1967.  
262 NAA, A1838724/5 Part 9, “ Australia’s relations with developmental aid committee and organization for 
economic cooperation and development,” Record of Discussion with Mr E. M. Martin Chairman of the 
Development Assistance Committee of the OECD and Senior Offers of the Department of the External Affairs 
and Commonwealth Departments, 1968.  
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consultative meetings during the Colombo Plan were useful for policymakers to conduct 
what is now termed “serial bilateralism.” 263 
 
Indeed, the political preference for bilateralism has continued throughout the history of 
Australia’s aid program. By the mid-1970s, only 7% of Australia’s aid budget was going 
through multilateral channels, such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Food Program (WFP).264 The 
percentage amount remained relatively steady at under 10% until the mid-2000s when it 
started to increase reaching an average of 30% by 2012-2013.  
 
 
 
Sources: OECD/DAC and World Bank 
 
                                           
263 NAA, A1838 2020/2/12 Part 2, “Colombo plan Australian progress reports,” Australia’s Part in the Colombo 
Plan Progress Report General Introduction, 31 December 1960. Serial bilateralism is generally described as the 
process of conducting bilateral diplomacy with a variety of nations, either within an existing multilateral setting, 
or through a “series” of bilateral meetings. For more see Richard Leaver, “The meanings, origins and 
implications of “the Howard Doctrine,” The Pacific Review 14, no. 1 (2001), pp. 15-34 and Mari Pangestu and 
Sudarshan Gooptu “ New regionalism: Options for East Asia,” in Kathie L Krumm and Homi J, Kharas eds. 
East Asia Integrates: A Trade Policy Agenda for Shared Growth (Washington DC: Word Bank & Oxford 
University Press, 2004), pp. 48-50.  
264 Australian Bureau of Statistics (hereafter ABS), “ Yearbook 2001: A short history of Australian aid,” 
(January 2001). Available 
at:http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/1301.0Feature%20Article72001?opendocument&
tabname=Summary&prodno=1301.0&issue=2001&num=&view= (accessed 25 February 2014).  
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While this may seem like a significant increase, and fuel assumptions that there was a 
diluting of Australia’s national interest priorities, the majority of this aid was “non-core aid.” 
Approximately 58% of Australian multilateral aid is non-core, which is aid that has been 
earmarked by a country’s aid agency for specific projects chosen by the donor. 265 This gives 
the donor more control over where and how the money is spent, and for Australia, this has 
been very much inline with its strategic and commercial expectations flowing from its aid 
program. The largest multilateral recipient of Australian aid was the World Bank Group 
where Australia directed the bulk of its funds to the Pacific and Southeast Asia, with the 
majority going to joint programs in Indonesia and the Mekong. In sum, Australia has 
delivered its aid budget on a bilateral basis as a means of ensuring the greatest amount of 
strategic, economic and political return. 266   
 
Australia’s strategic approach to foreign aid: The expectations, calculations and 
outcomes of its policy choices 
So far I have provided a general view of Australia’s aid program, with the intention of 
drawing out early material determinants of where aid went, and how this could be explained 
by referring to an expectation of reciprocity and rational calculation of the benefits to 
Australia’s national interests. Yet this is not enough to paint a convincing story. There are 
still questions as to whether the strategic focus has remained in Australia’s foreign aid and 
development policy and to what extent the dominant types of aid such as agriculture, 
education and infrastructure development, have prevailed. For the remainder of this chapter I 
attempt to answer these questions. In doing so, I will evaluate whether the expectations of 
reciprocity informing Australia’s foreign aid has produced both moral and material outcomes, 
and whether this has also led to material gains for Australia.  
 
I start with the Pacific because Australia is currently the largest bilateral contributor of aid in 
the Pacific, representing 60% of the overall aid delivered to the region. This is estimated at 
$1.1 billion, or around 25% of Australia’s total aid budget.267 On the surface, this seems like 
                                           
265 Australia also ranks low amongst other OECD nations in its participation within the multilateral aid system. 
As of 2010, its total use of multilaterals was estimated at 37% of gross ODA (this includes bilateral aid 
administered through multilateral institutions as intermediaries, meaning the real amount is much lower). The 
DAC average is set at 40%, placing Australia 18th out of the 23 OECD members. 
266 OECD, “Multilateral aid report,” (2012), pp. 64-68. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-
architecture/DCD_DAC(2012)33_FINAL.pdf (accessed 15 January 2014).  
267 DFAT, Australian Aid, “ Pacific – 2012-2013 budget.” Available at: 
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/pacific/pages/home.aspx (accessed 13 January 2014).  
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a significant amount, one that is often heralded as demonstrating Australia’s generosity. But a 
closer look at the breakdown of Australia’s aid to the Pacific shows that this claim is quite 
misleading. Nearly 50% of Australia’s aid to the Pacific was delivered to PNG where 
Australian aid represented 70% of its ODA. A further $196.5 million was directed to the 
Solomon Islands where Australian aid increased from just $33.5 million in 2003 to a high of 
$258,358 million in 2010.268 This decreased to $196.5 million in 2013 after Australia moved 
its aid delivery from the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), to a 
country strategy and decreased again to $176.4 million at the end of 2014.269 Yet despite this, 
Solomon Islands was Australia’s third largest recipient of aid after PNG and Indonesia.  
 
The initial increase of funding was part of Australia’s commitment to RAMSI. Over 8000 
Australian personnel from the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Australian Defence 
Force (ADF) served in the country between 2003 and 2013.270 Australia’s aid to Solomon 
Islands through RAMSI was part of the government’s growing recognition that a breakdown 
in law and order can have significant effects on development and overall prosperity. In the 
words of then Foreign Minister Alexander Downer:  
 
The links between development and security has never been greater. The 
tragic events of Bali in October 2002 as well as the deterioration of law and 
order in Solomon Islands demonstrate the consequences of instability in 
undermining growth prospects and hard-won development gains…. Where 
insecurity prevails and the rule of law is weak, individuals’ vulnerability to 
conflict and crime increases and poverty is exacerbated.271  
The government’s focus on the connection between conflict as a cause for low development 
and poor development as a facilitator of conflict was solidified in the 2002 policy paper 
                                           
268 Ibid. 
269 DFAT, Australian Aid, “Solomon Islands,” (2013). Available at: 
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/pacific/solomon-islands/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 17 February 2014).  
270 Australia’s original contribution to RAMSI in July 2003 included 1,800 ADF personnel, 155 AFP and 80 
members of the Australian Protective Service, as well as a small number of officials drawn from relevant 
government. Stephan Arnbuster, “Solomon Islands marks ten years of RAMSI,” SBS News, 25 July 2013. 
Available at: http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2013/07/25/solomon-islands-marks-10-years-ramsi (accessed 
16 January 2014).  
271 Alexander Downer, “Ministerial statements: Australia’s development cooperation program,” HoR, 26 
November 2003. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=9;query=solomon%20islands%20aid;rec=1
1;resCount=Default (accessed 17 February 2014).  
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“Peace, Conflict and Development Policy,” which merged the principles of conflict 
prevention, reduction and post-conflict peace-building with the traditional goals of overseas 
development as a means of reducing poverty.272 The new policy acknowledged that 
Australia’s geographic proximity to areas of intense civil conflict meant it had to reconsider 
how it approached issues of regional security. In this way, it also represented a shift in how 
Australia determined the security of its strategic environment, viewing “failing” and “failed” 
states as having an effect on regional order through the spread of diseases, Transnational 
Organized Crime (TOC) and increased flows of refugees and asylum seekers. The connection 
between failed states and the threat of terrorism was a particular security concern. Indeed the 
mission into the Solomon Islands corresponded with Australia’s support of the War in Iraq as 
part of the broader “War on Terror” (WoT). For Australia, failed states offered a place for 
terrorist organizations to conduct training, store arms, base communications and generate 
business to further fund terrorist acts.273 And the collapse of law and order in Solomon 
Islands demonstrated to Australian policymakers that the threat of terrorism was close to its 
borders. Indeed, there was evidence of this becoming an immanent possibility with Solomon 
Islands police armouries being raided by rebels and local gangs.274  
Evidence of a weakened state in Solomon Islands was also present. The GDP had halved 
during the six years prior to 2003, averaging around US$500 million. Economic growth had 
declined by 14% in 2000, and a further 9% in 2001.275 Social welfare infrastructure had 
ceased to function efficiently with limited funds going towards vital health services. Power 
generation had also stopped, affecting the water supply and power to hospitals and schools. 
Kidnapping, murder and rape had forced nearly 2000 to be internally displaced. 276 The 
Solomon Islands’ police force was unable to control further civil unrest and in most cases 
                                           
272 DFAT, Australian Aid, “Peace, conflict and development policy,” June 2002. Available at: 
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Documents/conflict_policy.pdf (accessed 18 February 2014).  
273 Petro Georgiou, “Main committee: Solomon Islands,” HoR, 19 August 2003. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=Solomon%2
0Islands%20Security;rec=13;resCount=Default  (accessed 14 February 2014).  
274 Alexander Downer and Tony Jones, “Foreign Minister discusses a terrorist alert from US Department of 
Home Security; and situation in the Solomon Islands,” Transcript from Lateline, 31 July 2003. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=Solomon%2
0Islands%20Security%20Decade%3A%222000s%22;rec=5;resCount=Default (accessed 17 February 2014).  
275 John Howard, “PM statement: Solomon Islands,” HoR, 12 August 2014. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=Solomon%2
0Islands%20Security%20Decade%3A%222000s%22%20Year%3A%222003%22%20Month%3A%2208%22;r
ec=7;resCount=Default (accessed 17 February 2014).  
276 ABC, “Warnings of refugees fleeing the Solomon’s,” Radio Australia, 15 July 2003. Available at: 
http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/2003-07-20/warnings-of-refugees-fleeing-parts-of-
solomons/694512 (accessed 17 February 2014).  
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were instigators of the violence. Australia’s involvement in Solomon Islands was guided by 
clear moral and material expectations. First, there were direct security concerns that a total 
collapse of Solomon Islands would have a direct physical impact on Australia. Second 
Australia feared that the Islands would become a “hub” for regional insecurity. Alongside the 
material expectations informing Australia’s decision was the moral expectation that it would 
assist RAMSI in achieving its goals of ensuring law and order, good governance and respect 
for human rights.277 In this way, the shift in viewing weak states as a security threat also 
corresponded with a shift in how Australia determined the best way to achieve the moral 
purpose of its aid program. These factors indicate that Australia’s aid and assistance to the 
Solomon’s were guided by expectations of reciprocity in achieving its national interest in 
maintaining regional stability. 
 
This does not cancel out the benefits to Solomon Islands, and here moral outcomes in line 
with its moral intentions, can indeed be found in the initiatives Australia implemented to 
improve the social situation on the ground. Education was an area that produced positive 
outcomes. Through its fee removal initiative, Australia assisted more than 145,000 primary 
school children to gain access to education.278 Assistance in education also included the 
awarding of 177 scholarships for students to study at Australian universities. Other 
development gains were also had in decreased child mortality. Australia’s training of 
midwives meant an estimated 85% of women in the Solomon’s are able to give birth with a 
skilled midwife.279 Through the Solomon Islands Road Improvement Program (SIRIP), 
Australia assisted in the maintenance of 344km of roads, which contributed to the short-term 
employment of around 207,000 Solomon islanders, 55% of whom were women.280  
 
A clear material gain for Australian from its development assistance was the establishment of 
                                           
277 Downer, “White paper on foreign affairs and trade: Advancing the national interest,” Speech, Q & A at the 
launch of the foreign and trade policy, Canberra, 12 February 2003. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=2;query=Alexander%
20Downer%20Solomon%20Islands%20human%20rights%20Decade%3A%222000s%22%20Year%3A%2220
03%22;rec=14;resCount=Default (accessed 23 September 2015).  
278 Bob McCullen, “Australia puts more Solomon Island children in school,” Media Release, 9 April 2010. 
Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=solomon%20islands%20aid;rec=3
;resCount=Default (accessed 17 February 2014).  
279 Bob Carr,“ Response to question without notice,” Senate, 21 August 2012. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=8;query=solomon%20islands%20aid;rec=4
;resCount=Default (accessed 17 February 2014).  
280 DFAT, Australian Aid, “Solomon Islands: Road improvement program,” (2013). Available at: 
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/pacific/solomon-islands/Pages/economic-infrastructure-init1.aspx (accessed 14 
February 2014).  
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business links and increased trade. Indeed, in 2010, Australia’s Parliamentary Secretary for 
Trade Juliet Elliot stated that: “RAMSI had been very good for our trading relationship,” and 
“an important factor in business confidence.” 281 Before the Malaitan Eagles Force (MEF) 
instigated a coup in 2000, Australia had over 100 businesses in the Solomon’s, 30 of which 
were based there.282 But by 2002 the country had been declared insolvent and only between 
5-10 of the 100 businesses remained.  Two-way trade had also decreased to just $56 million 
in 2001-02 after being on the increase to over $106 million.283A total collapse in law and 
order therefore represented significant economic losses for Australia, and was a source of 
reciprocity in its commitment to restore stability to the state. After ten years of RAMSI this 
started to pay off.284 In 2013, two-way trade had increased to $233.5 million. This trade 
relationship was in Australia’s favour with Australia being the Solomon’s principle source of 
imports, estimated at 27%, in comparison to its export destinations, where Australia was 
ranked second at 11.2%.285  
 
The commitment to reconstruction was a key part of Australia’s aid contribution and 
corresponded with its economic expectations of aid. This led to further material gains in 
business opportunities with the awarding of contracts by Solomon Islands’ government, such 
as the Brisbane telecommunications provider, CBO Telecommunications, which by 2013 had 
completed a $3.25 million metro area network rollout that connected 85 government offices 
                                           
281 Justine Elliot, “Address to Australian Solomon Islands business forum,” Speech, Brisbane, 22 October 2010. 
Available at: http://ministers.dfat.gov.au/elliot/speeches/2010/je_sp_101022.html (accessed 17 February 2014).  
282 The Malaitan Eagles were a secessionist group led by Andrew Nori that seized of Honiara and demanded the 
resignation of then Prime Minister, Bartholomew Ulufa'alu. Ulufa’alu rlater resigned in exchange for his release 
and Manasseh Sogavare was elected.  British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), “Coup in Solomon Islands,” 
BBC News, 5 June 2000. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/778009.stm (accessed 18 
February 2014).  
283 Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), “Our failing neighbour: Australia and the future of the Solomon 
Islands,” ASPI Strategy Report, June 2003, p. 14. Available at: 
https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/41686/3/solomons.pdf (accessed 17 February 2014).  
284  In 2014 the Lowy Institute released a comprehensive report on the success, failures and lessons of RAMSI. 
There was some criticism that Australia’s overall $2.6 billion spent on the mission significantly outweighed any 
benefits achieved. This was particularly the case in the ability of the Solomon Islands police force to maintain 
law and order independently of the regional mission. In terms of the effectiveness of Australia’s aid Jenny 
Hayward Jones argued that the focus on aid in “good governance” has not been beneficial, as the domestic 
population did not respond well to social and civil administration being dictated by foreign forces. However, 
Hayward Jones did conclude that the operation was a success in restoring law and order and Australia’s aid did 
assist in ensuring stability in Solomon Islands, which contributed towards an 80% growth in Solomon Islands 
economy. For more see Jenny Hayward-Jones, “Australia’s costly investment in Solomon Islands: The lessons 
learned,” Lowy Institute for International Policy (May 2014). Available at: 
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/hayward-jones_australias_costly_investment_in_solomon_islands.pdf 
(accessed 24 May 2014).  
285 DFAT, “Solomon Islands,” (2013). Available at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/solo.pdf (accessed 17 
February 2014).  
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across the capital Honiara.286 Mining was a particular area of increased business for 
Australia, given the large amount of untapped mineral wealth in zinc, lead, nickel and gold. 
In 2005, Australian Solomon’s Gold (ASG) won the tender for the development of the Gold 
Ridge mine. In 2012, Australian-based gold produce and explorer St Barbara Ltd acquired 
Allied Gold, and took over operations of the mine. 287 In 2011 it reached full production 
capacity and was estimated to produce 95,000 ounces of gold each year.288 For Solomon 
Islands this provided opportunities for short-term local employment with 85% of the 600 
workers being locally employed. 289 
 
The remaining aid to the Pacific, now around $400 million after inclusion of PNG and 
Solomon Islands, was scattered across the remaining 13 islands of the region.290 Rather than 
reflecting an overall concern for the stability and prosperity of the Pacific, it indicates that 
Australia had quite specific expectations guiding where the aid went. Indeed, from the 
beginning of its aid program Australia had shown very little interest in the region.  During the 
Colombo Plan, there were national interest gains in Australia developing closer ties with 
Pacific nations, especially as the majority were isolated from the great-power competition 
dominating Indochina. But Australia’s material commitment was not sufficient to make this a 
reality. After ten years of operation, Australia had only awarded 17 student scholarships to 
the Pacific under the Colombo Plan’s technical assistance program.291 The majority of its 
financial and diplomatic capital was directed to PNG, which up until 1966 was the only 
recipient of Australian aid to the Pacific. Even then, the amount of aid to Pacific nations did 
not noticeably outweigh the amount given to PNG until 2005, and as explained above, this 
was largely the result of Australia’s humanitarian mission to Solomon Islands.  
                                           
286 Hafizah Osman, “CBO completes $3.25m Solomon Islands government network rollout,” ARNnet, 28 June, 
2013. Available at: 
http://www.arnnet.com.au/article/466163/cbo_completes_3_25m_solomon_islands_government_network_rollo
ut/ (accessed 17 February 2014).  
287 This allowed St Barnara’s commercial mining interests to spread across the Pacific, as its assets already 
included the Simberi mine in PNG. “St Barbara Limited – profile,” (2008-2014). Available at:  
http://www.stbarbara.com.au/profile/profile-subtitle/ (accessed 17 February 2014).  
288 ANZ, “ Solomon Islands – economic overview,” Asia Pacific connect (2013). Available at: 
http://www.anzbusiness.com/countries/solomon-islands.html (accessed 17 February 2014).  
289 Juliet Elliot, “Address to the 4th Australia- Solomon Islands business forum,” Speech, 9 October 2012. 
Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=1;query=solomon%20islands%20aid;rec=1
2;resCount=Default (accessed 17 February 2014).  
290 This included the $106m spent on “Regional Pacific,” which supported regional initiatives such as the 
Australia Pacific Technical College (APTC). For more see DFAT, Australian Aid, “Regional Pacific,” (2014). 
Available at: http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/pacific/rp/Pages/home.aspx. (accessed 13 January 2014).  
291 NAA, A/1838 277/2/7, “Aid scheme for the Pacific Islands,” A.H. Tange Secretary of the Department for 
External Affairs, 4 August 1961.  
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Since independence from Australia in September 1975, Australia’s aid to PNG has more or 
less remained on the increase. For the majority of Australia’s aid program, PNG received the 
largest amount of ODA, being awarded an average of $350 million per annum.292 Since 2008, 
it has been Australia’s second largest aid recipient, with a budget worth over $500m in 2013, 
which increased to $527 million by the end of 2014.293 Between 1975 and 2013, Australia 
spent a hefty $16.5 billion on development to PNG. Australia’s aid to PNG therefore stands 
out amongst its other aid recipients for its size and longevity, and requires further attention to 
understand why it occupies such an important place in Australia’s foreign aid and 
development program. This is particularly so as much of the scholarship on Australia’s aid to 
PNG has been quite critical, stating that it has done very little to improve the lives of 
everyday Papuans and has contributed to ongoing corruption of the PNG government. 294 
Even as recently as February 2014 Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop stated: “despite 
the fact that Australia invests about half a billion dollars each and every year into Papua New 
Guinea it will not meet one of its Millennium Development Goals. In fact, it is going 
                                           
292 “Aid program remains stable despite political change,” Australia Network, Transcript of interview John 
Middleton and Peter Baxter, 27 June 2013. Available at: http://australianetwork.com/focus/s3792770.html 
(accessed 14 February 2014).  
293 DFAT, Australian Aid, “Papua New Guinea,” (2014). Available at: 
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/pacific/png/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 14 February 2014).  
294 The criticism is mainly centred on how the aid is delivered. The majority of Australia’s aid to PNG had been 
in GBS with little or no oversight by Australia or an external auditor on where and how this money was being 
spent. This was phased out in the mid-1990s and since then, Australia has technically provided no aid to any 
country through GBS. However, it has provided aid through partnered government agencies for earmarked 
projects. This form of direct government-to-government financing has continued the debate on whether this 
money is used for the intended purpose. For more on this see Grant W. Wilson, “An argument for reframing 
debates about corruption,” Asia-Pacific Viewpoint 54, no. 1 (2013), pp. 61-76 and Gary Walton, “Is all 
corruption dysfunctional? Perceptions about corruption and its consequences in Papua New Guinea,” Public 
Administration and Development 33, no.3 (2013), pp. 175-190. Concerns over corruption has also fuelled the 
signing of a joint statement on the “Zero Tolerance of Fraud” in aid to PNG and the Abbot governments push to 
include ‘mutual obligation’ as part of Australia’s country aid programs. For more on “mutual obligation” see  
Julie Bishops extended interview with John Middleton, Australia’s News Network, “Julia Bishop extended 
interview,” Newsline, 16 February 2014. Available at: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-02-13/julie-bishop-
extended-interview/5258258 (accessed 19 February 2014). It is beyond the scop of this thesis to examine the 
effects of corruption in the delivery of Australia’s aid. I will say that in the case of PNG, claims of corruption 
have been levelled at what PNG government officials do with their own budget, which hinders PNGs own 
development and contributes to overall poor social indicators. There has been no proven case of Australian aid 
being used by PNG officials for purposes other than approved projects. For more on this see head of the Lowy 
Institutes Melanesia Program, Jenny Hayward-Jones interview on ABC, “A Focus on corruption in PNG,” 
Radio Australia, 12 September 2013. Available at: 
http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/program/pacific-beat/a-focus-on-corruption-in-papua-new-
guinea/1194730 (accessed 19 February 2014).  
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backwards.”295 This leads one to ask the question: why, then, has Australia continued to 
supply aid to PNG when it appears to have no material or moral benefit?  
 
The answer is that Australia does so for strategic reasons, which can be traced back to the 
importance of the state to Australia’s sea-line of defence. PNG sits on the northeast entry 
point to what has been described as Australia’s “inner arc.” The inner arc encompassed the 
Indonesian archipelago, Timor Leste and PNG to Australia’s north and northeast, and 
Vanuatu, Fiji, Solomon Islands and New Caledonia to the east. To defence policy planners, 
this represented the direction from which any threat to mainland Australia would be 
mounted.296 PNG was of particular concern because of its inherent instability, which made it 
susceptible to major power influence. And given the shortest distance between the two 
nations is just 150 km, spillover effects from the fragmentation or collapse of PNG were 
calculated to have severe disadvantages for Australia’s strategic interests. A healthy aid 
program was part of Australia’s foreign policy expectations aimed at preventing this from 
occurring. In fact, given that at the time of independence, Australia’s aid represented half of 
PNG’s budget, the general consensus amongst policymakers has been that without 
development assistance to PNG, the nation would have struggled to maintain internal security 
and social stability.297 The moral and material expectations were therefore linked in that 
Australian decision-makers viewed foreign aid as a means to assist a neighbouring state to 
achieve its development goals, and as a way to reduce the potential security issues associated 
with a failed PNG.298 
 
In 2013, Australia’s aid to PNG represented 70% of all donor aid, making it PNG’s principle 
source of funding for development.299 In this regard, Australian aid can be seen as having a 
                                           
295 Asia Editor Catherine McGrath, and staff “Australia to demand greater accountability for overseas aid 
program,” ABC News, 14 February 2014. Available at: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-02-13/an-aust-pacific-
bishop-aid/5257818 (accessed 16 February 2014).  
296 Paul Dibb, “The importance of the Inner Arc to Australian defence planning,” Security Challenges 8, no. 4 
(2012), pp. 13-31.  
297 “Question: Papua New Guinea,” Senate, 29 October 1975. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=aid
%20papua%20new%20guinea%20budget%20Decade%3A%221970s%22;rec=6;resCount=Default (accessed 21 
February 2014).  
298 Downer, “Foreign minister discusses PNG; Solomon Islands; aid and North Korea,” 2GB Sydney, Transcript 
of radio interview with Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, 17 October 2006. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=1;query=aid%20PNG
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(accessed 23 September 2015).  
299 Clair Provost, “Australia’s foreign aid spending: how much and where?” The Guardian, 22 August 2013. 
Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/datablog/2013/aug/22/australia-foreign-aid-
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reciprocal effect, and despite its poor performance towards reaching the MDGs and its 
decline in rank in HDI from 152 to 156 between 2011 and 2013, Australia’s aid has delivered 
some positive results.300 Evidence of this can be found in the area of health. While not 
usually placing a specific focus on this area, Australia’s health program to PNG has produced 
some moral outcomes. Spending on health to PNG increased during the ten years between 
2000 and 2010, and is now around 20% of Australia’s aid to PNG.301 The large health 
program in PNG is tied to its closeness to mainland Australia, making the potential spread of 
diseases a public health concern. This was realized in 2010, when a cholera outbreak on Daru 
Island, a part of PNG located in the Torres Strait, forced Australia to close the border with 
PNG as a precaution to stop the disease entering Queensland.302 A further disease scare 
occurred in 2011 when PNG had several reported cases of multi-drug resistant Tuberculosis 
(TB).303 This was the motivation behind the $32.9 million commitment to support the 
detection and treatment of TB in PNGs Western Province.304  
 
A significant amount of Australia’s aid to PNG has also been spent on technical assistance.  
This is mainly due to how Australia delivers its aid through “managing contractors” who 
                                                                                                                                    
spending-data (accessed 14 February 2014). On the July 15, 2013 Prime Minister Kevin Rudd announced a 
Regional Resettlement Arrangement with PNG at the same time as announcing an increase of foreign aid to 
$420m over the next four years. The aid was budgeted for the traditional development areas, health, education 
and good governance, and did not go towards the resettlement of refugees and asylum seekers on Manus Island. 
However, the timing of the aid increase prompted some commentators to argue that Australia was reprioritising 
its foreign aid. It is not the intention of this thesis to engage with debates on morality in Australia’s asylum 
seekers and refugee policy as it has traditionally been viewed as a domestic policy area. For more see Ravi 
Tomar, “ Official development assistance: Australia’s aid program,” Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security 
Section, January 2014. Available at: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBo
ok44p/ODA (accessed 14 February 2014). I do, however, acknowledge that in 2012 the Labor government 
under Julia Gillard redirected $375m from the foreign aid budget to assist in the resettlement of asylum seekers 
and refugees. This meant that Australia was the third largest recipient of its own aid budget. There is not enough 
space in this thesis to adequately discuss the implications of this policy except to state that a moral realist would 
argue that this policy change diminishes the ability of Australia to achieve the most in terms of moral and 
material outcomes from its foreign aid and development policy.  
300 UNDP, “Human development report 2013- the rise of the South: Human progress in a diverse world,” 
Human Development Index, p. 154. Available 
at:http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/14/hdr2013_en_complete.pdf (accessed 19 February 2014).  
301 DFAT, Australian Aid, “PNG: Health,” (November 2013). Available at: 
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/pacific/png/Pages/saving-lives.aspx (accessed 20 February 2014).  
302 Lindsay Murdoch, “Cholera outbreak spreads to PNG,” The Age, 26 November 2010. Available at: 
http://www.smh.com.au/national/cholera-outbreak-spreads-to-png-20101125-1895s.html (accessed 20 February 
2014).  
303 This was a concern for Australia as TB can remain dormant in some individuals and is easily transferred, 
meaning it could pass undetected through any national screening program. Guy Marks, “PNG, drug resisted TB 
and Australia,” The Conversation, 9 September 2011. Available at: https://theconversation.com/papua-new-
guinea-drug-resistant-tuberculosis-and-australia-3310 (accessed 18 February 2014).  
304 Pacific Friends of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, “HIV, pregnancy and 
parenthood in PNG,” 13 July 2013. Available at: http://www.pacificfriendsglobalfund.org/png/ (accessed 19 
February 2014).  
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provide expertise and advice directly to government departments, or who oversee specific 
projects in infrastructure development and health delivery.305 In 2006, the amount spent on 
technical assistance reached 70% of total aid to PNG. Such a high proportion corresponded 
with a general shift in the governments aid policy to a “whole of government” approach that 
focused on reducing corruption and promoting good governance. This also mirrored the 
Howard government’s broadening of regional security issues to include the effects of failed 
and weak states. And Australia’s foreign aid focus on corruption and good governance was 
expected to achieve these security interests.  
Previously, Australia’s approach followed the dominant neoliberal thinking of the time, 
which was to limit the role of the state and administer small, program specific projects with 
the help of NGOs or private enterprise. However, this changed following a shift in 
international best practice that saw a direct link between the health of a state’s institutions 
and a breakdown of law and order.306 As a result, a new partnership was signed in 2004 
termed the Enhanced Cooperation Partnership (ECP), which expanded Australia’s aid to 
PNG to include a significant role for other Australian departments, such as legal, policing, 
finance and immigration.307  
The level of technical assistance then quickly declined to 45% in 2010, and was down to 37% 
by 2013. A concern for good governance in PNG has been the oft-cited explanation for 
Australia’s focus on technical assistance, but this is not the only motivation. A less well-
canvased one is the economic benefits reaped by Australia in trade in services.  In 1999, this 
was the third largest source of exports to PNG, and in 2013 this was worth $570 million, the 
majority of which was in professionals, teachers and business advisers. 308 The scale of the 
economic returns for Australia are increased when one considers that technical assistance 
cost less than other types of aid, such as commodity or capital aid. Yet opinion on whether 
                                           
305 DFAT, Australian Aid, “PNG – how we give aid,” (1 November 2013). Available at: 
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/pacific/png/Pages/how-aid.aspx (accessed 19 February 2014).  
306 Francis Fukuyama, “The imperative of state-building,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 (2004), pp. 17-31. 
307 The ECP was then renamed the Strengthening Government Program (SGP) in 2008 and fell under the new 
PNG-Australia Partnership for Development. The ECP included 18 non-policing law and order officials, 36 
treasury and finance, 10 immigration and border protection, 2 transport personnel, 3 custom workers and 1 civil 
aviator. The agreement also included 230 police officials, but these individuals were later withdrawn from the 
country after PNG ruled certain exceptions covering their conduct violated PNGs sovereignty and were 
unconstitutional. Alexander Downer, “New era of enhanced cooperation,” Media Release, 11 November 2003. 
Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=10;query=P
NG%20security;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 21 February 2014). In 2010, technical assistance had 
reached 360.  
308 DFAT, “PNG Fact sheet,” (December 2013). Available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/png.pdf (accessed 
19 February 2014).  
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aid in technical assistance has been money well spent is divided. In terms of the flow on trade 
benefits for Australia outlined above, this has been quite lucrative, but the outcomes for PNG 
are not so clear. Some like Anita Doraisami and Ronald May have argued that this has been a 
type of “boomerang aid” where the benefits have largely flowed to Australia in wages and 
labour.309 It is important to note, though, that in December 2004, Australia amended its 
eligibility criteria for the tendering of contracts in its bilateral aid program allowing firms and 
businesses in the receiving state to participate.310  
 
Despite these criticisms, Australia’s technical assistance has been the only source of training 
and expertise, which occurred frequently in health where PNG had few trained professionals 
and technical assistance represents 47% of Australia’s health commitment. In other areas, 
Australia’s assistance helped PNG attract further aid from external sources, as was the case 
when PNG’s application for funding for the Global Fund in 2009 was rejected over concerns 
it did not have the facilities and procedures in place to properly treat HIV and AIDS 
patients.311 Australian adviser’s assisted in the resubmission and in 2010 PNG was awarded a 
$46 million grant to treat new cases of HIV/AIDS.312 In fact, the PNG government has 
demonstrated a preference for advisers over physical aid. For example, in the law and justice 
sector, the participating departments were offered a choice between technical assistance and 
direct financing, and the result was 60% of funds going towards the employment of 
Australian advisers.313 
 
The moral outcomes stemming from Australia’s aid to PNG have also led to benefits for 
Australia. The state of PNG itself, while drastically underdeveloped, is rich in natural gas, oil, 
                                           
309 Anita Doraisami, “Australia’s boomerang foreign aid program: building bridges for Australian business,” 
Asian Studies Review 18, no. 1 (1994), pp. 99-108; and Ronald May, “Papua New Guinea: issues of external and 
internal security,” Security Challenges 8, no. 4 (2012), pp. 47-60. 
310 Downer, in making this announcement, singled out PNG as an important recipient. Alexander Downer, 
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311 ABC, “Global Fund assistance to PNG HIV victims,” Radio Australia, 23 February 2010. Available at: 
http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/onairhighlights/the-global-fund-assistance-to-png-hiv-
victims (accessed 19 February 2014).  
312 DFAT, “PNG-Australia bilateral meeting,” Joint Statement at Alotau International Hotel, Alotau, Milne Bay 
Province Papua New Guinea, 7-8 July 2010. Available at: http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2010/fa-
s100709a.html (accessed 19 February 2014).  
313 DFAT, Australian Aid, “Review of the PNG-Australia development corporation treaty 1999,” (19  
April 2010), p. 23. Available at: http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Documents/PNGAustralianAidReview.pdf 
(accessed 18 February 2014). 
 108 
gold and cooper, which accounted for around 70% of the states exports. At the time of the 
first Development Cooperation Treaty, PNG was Australia’s 11th largest investment 
destination worth $2.3 billion.314  Yet the overall two-way trade was low, worth $2.1 billion, 
or about 1% of Australia’s trade, meaning there were significant opportunities for growth. 
Indeed, growth in trade, and particularly in energy, was the key motivation behind Australia’s 
loan of $548.55 million to the development of the joint LNG project in PNG. This was 
established in 2010 as an initiative to capitalize on PNGs “resource boom.” Between 2003 
and 2012 PNGs national revenue tripled from K3.6 billion to K10.2 billion respectively.315 At 
the time, Parliamentary Secretary for Pacific Island Affairs Richard Marles stated: 
 
Australian companies are well positioned to benefit from Papua New 
Guinea’s economic growth. The potential exists for two-way trade to 
increase significantly, particularly if estimates are realized of a 15 to 
20% annual increase in GDP as a result of the PNG LNG Project.316  
 
Even though the project is not due to start operations until 2015, Australian businesses have 
already benefited. The LNG project’s major sponsor was Exxon Mobil Corp, but Australian 
companies Oil Search and Santos gained significant shares in the development.317 From the 
$19 billion project, $3 billion went to contracts for Australian businesses for work during the 
construction phase.318 The economic gains for Australia were not just restricted to the mining 
and resource sector. By 2013 over 4,000 businesses were investing in PNG and Australia was 
PNG’s principle destination for exports at 35.9% and top source of imports at 34.4%. Total 
Australian investment in PNG had also increased to $18.618 billion, which was equal to its 
investment in China. This was in comparison to PNG investment in Australia, which had run 
                                           
314 Ibid.  
315 Stephen Howes and Andrew Anton Mako, “Lessons from PNGs budget trends over the last decade,” 
Devpolicyblog, Development Policy Centre, 12 November 2012. Available at: http://devpolicy.org/lessons-
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16/australia-trade-minister-visits-png/4823396 (accessed 19 February 2014).  
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to debt at -$465 million.319 What this demonstrates is that overall Australia’s close 
development relationship with PNG has resulted in significant financial payoffs.  
 
 
 
Sources: OECD QWIDS and AusAID Budgets 
 
Australia’s foreign aid and development to Southeast Asia: The Indonesian focus 
It has been shown that Australia’s aid to the Pacific has largely been targeted towards states 
where Australia has a long-standing strategic interest, in the case of PNG, or where a change 
in Australia’s regional environment has required a recalculation of Australia’s aid priorities, 
as was seen in increased aid to Solomon Islands. It has also been shown that Australia’s 
foreign aid is guided by specific moral and material expectations of receiving beneficial 
returns. This was found in the type of aid Australia’s prefers (agriculture, economic 
development and good governance) and where Australian policymakers anticipated that 
Australia’s aid would best achieve its moral expectation of reducing poverty.  
 
This demonstrates the importance of rational choice in understanding where Australia 
delivers its foreign aid and a similar pattern emerges when assessing Australia’s aid to 
“Asia.” Aid to this region has been largely directed to Southeast Asia and to one nation: 
Indonesia. By 1975, it was the largest recipient of educational scholarships and technical 
                                           
319 DFAT, “PNG fact sheet,” (December 2013). Available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/png.pdf (accessed 
19 February 2014). 
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assistance under the Colombo Plan and represented half of Australia’s aid to the entire East 
Asian region. Since then, it has been the region’s largest recipient of aid, receiving on 
average 13% of total Australian ODA.320 In 2008, it replaced PNG as the largest recipient of 
Australian aid with a jump from $230 million in 2005 to $457 million in 2010. And by 2012, 
it was over $500 million – representing around 40% of Australian aid to East Asia.  
 
The reasons for this high level of aid activity are fairly clear. Like PNG, Indonesia is 
strategically close to Australia, the shortest distance between the two states is 200 km with 
overall sea distances ranging from 500km to 900km. Apart from being proximate, Indonesia 
is also populous, with a population 10 times the size of Australia at 247 million as of 2013. 
The size and geographic proximity has meant that Indonesia is often described as Australia’s 
most important strategic and diplomatic partnership. As a founding member of ASEAN, a 
stable and productive relationship with Indonesia was thought to act as a bridge into closer 
ties with other nations, making it Australia’s largest regional asset. And yet, while there has 
been a desire for positive relations in regional cooperation and bilateral trade, this has been 
offset by security concerns from what Australian strategic studies experts, such as Paul Dibb 
and Robert Ayson, have termed the “arc of instability.”321 The notion of an arc of instability 
derives from the nature of Indonesia’s geography. Indonesia is an archipelago consisting of 
17,500 separate islands, which stretch over 5,100km above Australia’s northern borders. Its 
political and social organization has also been traditionally unstable, with a decentralised 
governmental system, frequent breakdowns in law and order and risks of separatist 
                                           
320 In 2000, Australian aid to Timor Leste exceeded Indonesia by $37 million. Like Solomon Islands, this 
corresponded with Australia’s leadership of the International Intervention Force for East Timor (INTERFET). 
Before INTERFET, Australia gave no aid to Timor Leste, apart from the $500,00 provided between 1975-1976 
over the “Balibo Affair.” After 2000, aid to Timor Leste declined from its high of $160.77 million to $85.42 
million in 2001. It increased slightly to $104 million in 2012 and is expected to be $114.6 million by the end of 
2014. What this demonstrates is that while aid to Timor Leste increased during the INTERFET operation and 
continued during the period of state-building after independence, this has been as significant when compared to 
the level provided to Solomon’s under RAMSI. As such, it does not warrant further examination here. Instead, 
the expectations and outcomes of Australia’s involvement in INTERFET will be covered in the next chapter on 
humanitarian operations. Statistics used here are compiled from multiple sources. See OECD, “Query wizard for 
international development statistics.” Available at: https://stats.oecd.org; “Australian aid over time,” 
Development Policy Centre (2012) Available at: https://sites.google.com/site/australianaidovertime/home and 
DFAT, Australian Aid, “Timor Leste,” (December 2013). Available at: 
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/eastasia/timor-leste/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 25 February 2014).  
321 Paul Dibb originally coined the expression “arc of instability,” during the late 1990s when strategic opinion 
centred on the security effects flowing from a rapidly rising Asia. Since then, this sense of strategic insecurity in 
Australia’s direct sphere of influence has guided strategic and political policy towards one of its nearest 
neighbours. For more see, Paul Dibb, David D. Hale and Peter Prince, “Asia’s insecurity,” Survival 41, no. 3 
(1999), pp. 5-20; and Robert Ayson, “The Arc of instability and Australia’s strategic policy,” Australian 
Journal of International Relations 61, no. 2 (2007), pp. 215-231.  
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movements. All of these factors together meant Indonesia represented the largest potential 
threat to Australia’s mainland and maritime security.  
 
In this regard, Australia’s aid to Indonesia shares a similar purpose to PNG in that it has been 
guided by the strategic need to ensure the island chain remains relatively secure. A certain 
amount of regional obligation also motivated Australia’s high level of commitment. Given 
the nature of Southeast Asian politics and the steadfast ASEAN commitment to the principle 
of non-intervention, it was accepted that Australia could not assume that others in the region 
had the ability to respond to a failed and fragmented Indonesia – a concern that was realised 
during the Timor Leste crisis, where Australia was the only state with the capacity and 
willingness to lead a multi-nation stabilization force.322 
 
The strategic importance of Indonesia is evident in the consistency of Australia’s aid to the 
state, which continued despite various instances of conflict in the relationship. One of the 
earliest examples was the decision to continue aid during the Konfrontasi when Australian 
and Indonesian forces clashed in Malaya.323 Aid to Indonesia was heavily debated and it was 
decided that Australia needed to continue its aid as a means of securing open airline 
communications.324 By 1995, Australia’s development assistance to Indonesia had increased 
to over $100 million, which reflected its growing relationship with the nation, and a 
significant indication of the Hawke-Keating Labor governments accelerated push into 
Southeast Asia.  
 
Following the end of the Cold War, Australia was again concerned about the US’ 
commitment to Southeast Asia. In 1992, the US shut down its six bases in the Philippines and 
indicated that it would take a stronger stance on Indonesian human rights abuses and labour 
practices.325 This fuelled, in part, Australia’s policy of “comprehensive engagement” that 
focused on building regional security and a key aspect of this was closer ties with Indonesia, 
                                           
322 Paul Dibb, “The key to Southeast Asia’s security,” International Affairs 77 no. 4 (2001), pp. 829-842.  
323 NAA, A1838 2036/5 Part 8, “Suspension of Colombo plan aid to Indonesia,” 1963.  
324 There was a particular concern that if Australia did not continue to supply aid to Indonesia, it would loose 
out on the knowledge, contacts and prestige acquired in administering certain projects, such as the Aeronautical 
Fixed Telecommunication Network (AFTN), to other nations. NAA, A663/3/10, “Provision of AFTN project 
under Colombo plan aid,” Head Intelligence Coordination Branch, 30 September 1964.  
325 Following the deaths of protestors in Dili by the Indonesian military in November 1991, in 1992 the US 
suspended Indonesia’s participation in military training exercises as part of the International Military Education 
and Training Program (IMETP). This was re-instated later in 1995 under President Clinton with certain 
conditions. For more see, Robert G Sutter, The United States in Asia (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 
pp. 100-110.  
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which had already produced payoffs in Indonesia’s support for Australia’s Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) initiative and the potential for increased trade; Indonesia’s 
real GDP growth had reached an annual average of 7%.326  
 
A combination of security and economic expectations of reciprocity led to a flurry of 
diplomatic activity between the two nations. In 1994, Foreign Minister Gareth Evans began 
secret talks with Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Ali Alitas on a bilateral security agreement 
between the two nations. In the same year, Minister for Trade, Bob McMullen led a 
delegation of 250 business leaders to Jakarta, which, at the time, was the largest single 
overseas Australian delegation. This coincided with the second meeting of the Australian-
Indonesian Ministerial Forum (AIMF).  The AIMF was the first bilateral dialogue that 
brought ministers together from foreign affairs, trade, business, development and defence.327 
Shortly after this meeting, Evans announced plans for $150 million worth of concessional 
loans to Indonesia for infrastructure development.328 The stimulation of business and trade 
interest in Indonesia showed signs of producing dividends for Australia. In the five years 
between 1989-1994, exports to Indonesia had tripled to $1.8 billion, and of this, $766 million 
was in manufactured exports. Australia was Indonesia’s 10th largest source of investment 
with over 180 Australian companies operating in the nation. 329 
 
                                           
326 This rate of growth continued until the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) hit in 1997 and Indonesia’s economy 
contracted significantly. By 1998 its GDP growth was -13.45%. “Indonesia GDP – per capita (PPP)” Index 
Mundi (2013). Available at: http://www.indexmundi.com/indonesia/gdp_per_capita_(ppp).html (accessed 5th 
February 2014).  
327 The first AIMF was in 1992 and was held biannually until 2008 when it was replaced by the Lombok 
Dialogue, which followed the signing of the Lombok Treaty. Stephen Smith, “Joint ministerial statement - 9th 
Australia-Indonesia ministerial forum,” Media Release, 12 November 2008. Available at: 
http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2008/9_aimf_statement.html (accessed 5th February 2014). 
328 The majority went towards the building of its rail and transport sector and included tendering for Australian 
businesses in the $21.7 million Traffic Control Project in Bandung, the Bekasi to Bandung Railway 
Resignalling Project worth $74.5 million and the $3.9 million Brantas River Industrial Waste Treatment Plants 
Project. This coincided with the $135 million already provided under its development assistance. In reference to 
the importance of its ODA to Indonesia, Evans stated that: “The program not only provides benefits to 
Indonesia, it continues to provide opportunities for Australian business to showcase technology and expertise in 
areas crucial to continued economic growth in Indonesia.” Gareth Evans, “Successful outcome to Indonesian aid 
talks,” Press Releases, 8 September 1994. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/summary/summary.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=1;query
=Indonesian%20aid;resCount=Default (accessed 3rd February 2014).  
329 Gareth Evans, “Foreign affairs, defence and trade committee report: Government responses,” Senate, 2 June 
1994. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Foreign%20Affairs,%20Defence
%20and%20Trade%20Committee%20Report%20Government%20Responses%20Decade%3A%221990s%22%
20Year%3A%221994%22%20Month%3A%2206%22%20Day%3A%2202%22;rec=1;resCount=Default 
(accessed 3rd February 2014).  
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The shift to focus Australia’s diplomatic resources on regional engagement was the foreign 
policy approach publicly pursued by the Hawke-Keating government that argued successive 
Coalition governments had not done enough to advance Australia’s status in the region. This, 
however, was largely rhetorical. The Colombo Plan was a Coalition initiative, which 
continued under successive Labor and Coalition governments. Recognition of Indonesia’s 
importance to Australia thus had strong bipartisan support, which was particularly evident 
during the Timor Leste crisis when Australia’s aid to Indonesia was intensely debated. This 
time, Prime Minister Howard threatened to cease monetary aid to Indonesia as punishment 
for their conduct in Timor Leste but this was never carried out.330 In fact, after a dip in aid in 
1998 to $97.09 million, which occurred before the crisis, aid to Indonesia was back to equal 
1995 levels, and by 2004 had increased to $158 million.  
 
Alongside the strategic and economic interests, the giving of aid to Indonesia was also a way 
for Australia to contribute the most to the moral expectation of reducing the conditions of 
poverty. Prime Minister John Howard emphasised this point when he stated that the purpose 
of Australia’s aid to Indonesia was both moral and strategic. In his own words:  
It addresses the humanitarian needs; it also serves to bring our countries 
and peoples closer together. It is a strategic commitment to raise the 
living standards of the people of Indonesia.331 
 
Approximately 120 million Indonesians live on less than $US2 a day, and more than 32 
million live below the poverty line.332 And despite an increase in overall growth indicators, 
the state still ranks 121 out of 187 on the HDI.333 The geographic closeness of Indonesia to 
Australia meant that its aid could achieve more in assisting the poor, and Indonesia’s 
importance to Australia foreign and security policy meant the expectations of reciprocity 
                                           
330 John Howard and Helen Daley, “East Timor: PM discusses the situation.” Transcript of interview with John 
Howard and Helen Daley, Today Show, Channel Nine, 11 September 1999. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/summary/summary.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query
=Indonesian%20aid%20Decade%3A%221990s%22;resCount=Default (accessed 3rd February 2014).  
331 Howard, “Australian-Indonesian partnership for reconstruction and development,” Press Releases, 5 Janruary 
2005. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=7;query=John%20Ho
ward%20Indonesian%20aid%20SearchCategory_Phrase%3A%22media%22%20Decade%3A%222000s%22;re
c=10;resCount=Default (accessed 20 September 2015).  
332 Word Bank, “Indonesia Overview,” (2014). Available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/overview (accessed 20 January 2014).  
333 UNDP, Human Development Index, “Human development report 2013- the rise of the South: Human 
progress in a diverse world,” p. 203. Available at: 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/14/hdr2013_en_complete.pdf (accessed 27 February 2014). 
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were potentially increased. In fact, these expectations were quite significant given the size of 
Australia’s aid commitment. In 2005, following the 2004 tsunami, Howard announced a $1 
billion aid and relief package, the Australian-Indonesian Partnership for Reconstruction and 
Development (AIPRD), which was provided alongside Australia’s development assistance to 
Indonesia, bringing the total amount of ODA to $2 billion over the four years between 2005 
and 2009.334 This made Australia the single largest grant aid donor to Indonesia.335  
 
 
 
Sources: Development Policy Centre and AusAID Budgets 
 
Australia’s aid to Indonesia was not, in the first instance, determined by a humanitarian 
obligation to help a neighbour in response to a natural disaster. It reflected Canberra’s 
broader foreign aid policy that had expanded to consider non-traditional security threats and 
their link with domestic instability and social decline.336 Here, the threat of terrorism and 
                                           
334 DFAT, Australian Aid, “Australian-Indonesian partnership for reconstruction and development: Partnership 
framework,” (2005). Available at: http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Documents/partnership_framework.pdf 
(accessed 3 February 2014).  
335 The AIPRD was originally set to operate between 2005 and 2009 with annual contributions of $500m going 
towards programs of both reconstruction and social development. However, given the size of the aid package, 
this was extended in 2008 to run until 2013. In total, $2.5 billion was spent on the AIPRD making Indonesia the 
recipient of the single largest aid program ever implemented by Australia. By 2013, its yearly commitment had 
reached $541.6 million, which is expected to increase to $583.6 million by the end of 2014. DFAT, Australian 
Aid, “ Indonesia country brief,” (December 2013). Available at: 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/indonesia_brief.html (accessed 26th January 2014).  
336 John Howard, “Foreign policy in the age of terrorism,” Address by the Prime Minister John Howard to the 
Sydney Institute Intercontinental Hotel, Sydney, Speech, 1 July 2003. Available at: 
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Islamic extremism was significant. The Bali terrorist attacks had occurred 2 years before the 
tsunami, and in the same year that Howard announced the AIPRD Australia began talks on a 
new security treaty with Indonesia that included cooperation on counter-terrorism, people 
smuggling and police training. This was no coincidence: as Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Dr 
Hassan Wirajuda indicated, Australia’s assistance went a long way to quell domestic 
criticism of Indonesia’s relationship with Australia after Timor Leste, which made it easier to 
start negotiations on a new treaty.337 The overall effect of this was three-fold and was linked 
to the moral and material expectations described above. 
 
Australia’s assistance facilitated the creation of a new security pact, which also spearheaded 
Indonesia’s support for Australia’s participation in the East Asia Summit (EAS). Three 
months after the aid package was announced, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in a 
meeting with Prime Minister Howard stated that he “stressed the importance of Australia’s 
close engagement with the region, and I reiterated Indonesia’s support for Australia to join 
the East Asia Summit this year.”338 This paid off when Australia was accepted into the EAS 
in Malaysia in December 2005.  
 
Further gains were also achieved in improving Australia and Indonesia’s trade and 
investment relationship. Following Yudhoyono’s visit, Australia and Indonesia signed a new 
economic framework that opened investment for Australian business in mining, agriculture 
and agribusiness, the automotive sector and finance.339 Two–way trade with Indonesia 
increased from $8.5 billion in 2004 to over $10 billion in 2013, making Indonesia Australia’s 
8th largest export destination and 10th largest source of imports.340 Investment increased from 
                                                                                                                                    
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=9;query=Joh
n%20Howard%20Indonesia%20aid%20Decade%3A%222000s%22;rec=12;resCount=Default (accessed 27 
February 2014).  
337 Mark Forbes, “Jakarta plan Australia’s key to the region,” The Age, 21 March 2005. Available at: 
http://www.theage.com.au/news/National/Jakarta-plan-Australias-key-to-Asia/2005/03/20/1111253887354.html 
(accessed 28 February 2014).  
338 “Indonesia and Australia to strengthen ties,” The New York Times, 5April 2005. Available at: 
www.nytimes.com/2005/04/04/world/asia/04iht-indo.html (accessed 28 February 2014).  
339 Mark Vaile, “Australia and Indonesia announce trade and investment framework,” Media Release, 18 April 
2005. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=1;query=Ind
onesia%20development%20business%20Decade%3A%222000s%22;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 28 
February 2014).  
340 Some of the investment opportunities included Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBAs) Indonesian 
banking subsidiary, PT Bank Commonwealth (PTBC), acquiring Surabaya-based regional bank; Newcrest 
Mining Limited, opening mines in Gosowong on Halmahera Island and Australia’s largest oil and gas producer 
Santos expanding production across East Java.  
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$350 million to over $7.35 billion by 2013, $6.75 billion of which was Australia’s investment 
in Indonesia.341  
Based on this evidence, Australia’s decision to increase its ODA to Indonesia was motived by 
the expectation of reciprocal benefits for Australia’s national and regional security. The 
delivery of aid also produced certain moral and material outcomes. An important aspect of 
the AIPRD was the $500 million in concessional loans that went towards infrastructure 
development. The other $500 million was spread through a grant assistance program, which 
included health, education, rehabilitation and capacity building.342 The concessional loans 
were long-term, with no interest up to 40 years, and were open for Australian, Indonesian and 
New Zealand contracts. Several major Australian companies were awarded building 
contracts, such as Boral, BlueScope Steel, OneSteel, Leighton Holdings, Thiess and Linfox. 
A large share of the loans, around $300 million, was channelled through the Eastern 
Indonesian National Road Improvement Program (EINRIP) and went towards road transport, 
water and sanitation.343  
The EINRIP yielded significant results and was heralded as one of the more effective aid 
programs delivered under the AIPRD, to the extent that by 2013 infrastructure development 
under the program represented nearly 30% of Australia’s total ODA to Indonesia.344 The 
EINRIP was designed to provide 20 major road projects across nine provinces, with a total of 
395km of national roads being constructed and 1300 meters of fabricated steel bridges. To 
date, 8 of the 12 projects have been completed with the remaining 4 under implementation.345 
                                           
341 DFAT, “Indonesia,” (December 2013). Available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/indo.pdf (accessed 28 
February 2014).  
342 $50 million went towards economic and social programmes, $5 million went towards rehabilitation and 
capacity building to assist in future responses to natural disasters and $50 million went towards skills and 
knowledge training for Indonesian administration and governance. For more see DFAT, Budget 2005-06, 
“Australian-Indonesian partnership for reconstruction and development,” (2005). Available at: 
http://www.budget.gov.au/2005-06/ministerial/html/ausaid-07.htm (accessed 3 February 2014).  
343 The loans were supported by $28 million grants package for operational and administrative support.  Peter 
Costello, “Third joint ministerial statement,” Press Release, 7 December 2005. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=EI
NRIP;rec=2;resCount=Default (accessed 5 February 2014).  
344 An estimated 85% of AusAID expenditure on infrastructure aid was delivered through the EINRIP, and its 
administrative counterpart the Indonesian Infrastructure Initiative (IndII). The remaining 15%, around $13 
million, went to small projects delivered in partnership with the WB and the ADB. “Performance audit 
AusAID’s management of infrastructure aid to Indonesia: Australian agency for international development,” 
Auditor-General Audit reports for 2012-13 No. 39, 28 May 2013. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/summary/summary.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query
=EINRIP;resCount=Default (accessed 5 February 2014).  
345 The program has now been extended to close in December 2014 to allow for completion of the existing 
projects. DFAT, Australian Aid, “Eastern Indonesian national roads improvement project program fast facts,” 
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These projects led to flow on development effects in granting greater access to health and 
education facilities, particularly for women and children.346 As mentioned above, Australian 
business benefited from procurement contracts through AusAID. For example, consultancy 
firm URS Australia PTY LTD was the recipient of one of largest contracts ever undertaken, 
being awarded an estimated $20 million over 3 years.347 The majority of Australia’s activity 
was directed towards those provinces closest to Australia – Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Nusa 
Tenaggara, Papua and West Papua. Therefore the policy was in line with its overall strategic 
interests in Indonesia.348 
Another key area of Australian development assistance was in education and training, which 
was expected to lead to both moral and material outcomes. Indeed, education represented the 
largest sector of funding to Indonesia, approximately $500 million or 25% of its ODA to 
Indonesia. The Australian-Indonesian Basic Education Partnership (AIBEP) was part of 
Australia’s counter-terrorism strategy as it argued that the teaching of radical Islam was a 
factor in acts of terrorism and improving education was the one way that Australia expected 
to counter potential terror attacks. This was a problem in Indonesia where Islamic schools 
(both madrasah and pasentren) comprised of one-third of the education sector.349 As then 
                                                                                                                                    
(May 2013). Available at: http://aid.dfat.au/countries/eastasia/Indonesia/Documents/einrip-fact-sheet.pdf 
(accessed 5 February 2014).  
346 Further benefits were also had in the increased transport times, and greater access to local communities has 
also attracted private investment in primary commodities, such as corn and sandalwood. The operation of 
EINRIP was also effective in comparison to other multi-donor aid initiatives. The World Bank sister road 
project was three years behind schedule as of 2011, even though it started at the same time as the EINRIP. 
Australia also had more success in holding the Indonesian Ministry of Public Affairs to account as it attached 
safety and productivity conditions on its loans. For more see Charles Tapp, “Study of Australia’s approach to 
aid in Indonesia: Final report,” A Report to the Panel Conducting the Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, 
(2011). Available at: www.aidreview.gov.au/publications/study-indonesia.doc (accessed 5 February 2014).  
347 DFAT, Australian Aid, “Independent completion report: EINRIP PPC,” EINRIP Implementation, Planning 
and Support Facility, (December 2009). Available at: http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Documents/einrip-ppc-
icr.pdf (accessed 5th February 2014).  
348 Several resource contracts were awarded to Australian companies. These included Australia’s Rio Tinto, 
which was awarded the contract to develop Indonesia’s US$2 billion Sulawesi Nickel Project. A six-year 
US$610 million contract for the provision of mining services at the Wahana coal mine in South Kalimantan was 
awarded to PT Wahana Baratama Mining and a US$70 million coal mining contract was given PT Multi 
Harapan in East Kalimantan to increase the Botang coal export terminal from 8.5 million tones per annum to 
18.5 million. Aero Energy Australia was awarded 4 multi-million dollar Coal Bed Methane (CBM) projects in 
South Sumatra and Kalimantan, which assisted in the development of Indonesia’s gas sector. Warren Truss, “ 
Australia and Indonesia strengthen trade and investment partnership,” Media Release, 26 June 2007. Available 
at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=Ind
onesia%20development%20business%20Decade%3A%222000s%22;rec=9;resCount=Default (accessed 28 
February 2014).  
349 In Indonesia, the madrasah’s are those that teach the national secular curriculum and are typically described 
as moderate or mainstream. The parsentren are those schools, which are largely unregulated and remain outside 
the national exam system.  Two of the Bali bombers, Mukhlas and Amrozi, were educated at a parsentren in 
Solo established by convicted terrorist and radical cleric Abu Bakir Bashir. Tim Lindsay, “Hardline Islam a 
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Foreign Minister, Bob Carr, stated as recently as 2013: “It is in our interests and in 
Indonesia’s interests to seeing that the country has a good education system.”350 Here, 
Australia’s interests guided where this program was targeted. The majority of Australia’s 
education activity was directed towards Eastern Indonesia and corresponded with the targeted 
development approach of other programs, such as the EINRIP described above. These 
provinces also happen to rank the lowest on the HDI and, in this regard, Australia’s national 
interest converged with moral expectations to produce both moral and material outcomes.351 
 
Over 330,000 new school places were created through building or extending 2,074 junior 
secondary schools, which included 504 Islamic schools constructed to meet national 
curriculum standards. The administrative aspect of this program also produced quite tangible 
benefits for Indonesia. A study in 2009 on the impact of teacher training and school 
management assistance found that AIBEP schools thrived against non-AIBEP counterparts. 
In general they provided better access to post-primary education in remote areas, greater 
distribution of textbooks and employed higher quality teachers. Of the 30 AIBEP schools 
sampled, 87% had a long-term budget and strategic plan in place, twice that of the non-
AIBEP schools.352 On top of the assistance through the AIBEP, Australia awarded 350 
scholarships a year to Indonesian students to study in Australia, which is set to increase to 
500 by the end of 2014.353 Stimulating education exchange was part of Australia’s trade 
relationship as educated-related travel represented nearly half of its trade in service exports at 
$579 million. 354 
 
The examination of Australia’s aid to Indonesia demonstrates that strategic expectations were 
the defining factor motivating its high level of commitment, which was part of Australia’s 
overall policy of regional engagement. Alongside these strategic expectations was the moral 
                                                                                                                                    
bigger threat than terrorism,” The Australian, 7 July 2011. Available at: 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/hardline-islam-a-bigger-threat-than-terrorists/story-
e6frgd0x-1226089230379 (accessed 20 January 2014).  
350 Australian Associated Press (APP), “ No Aussie funds going to radicals: Jakarta,” The Australian, 5 April 
2013. Available at: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/no-aussie-funds-going-to-radicals-
jakarta/story-e6frgcjx-1226612677940 (accessed 27 February 2014).  
351 UNDP, “Indonesian human development report,” (2013). Available at: 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/IDN.pdf (accessed 20 February 2014). 
352 DFAT, Australian Aid, “Australian Indonesian basic education program – small in-depth study of early 
impact of AIBEP on school management and finance,” (December 2009), p. 3-5. Available at:  
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Documents/aibep-early-impact.pdf (accessed 20 January 2014).  
353 DFAT, Australian Aid, “Indonesia: Australia awards,” (November 2013). Available at: 
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/eastasia/indonesia/Pages/australia-awards.aspx (accessed 27 February 2014).  
354 DFAT, “Indonesia,” (December 2013). Available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/indo.pdf (accessed 28 
February 2014). 
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anticipation that Australia’s aid would contribute towards reducing the conditions of poverty. 
These expectations converged to led to economic benefits that were tied to specific 
development projects like EINRIP. Together with Australia’s aid to PNG, this demonstrates 
that geography played a significant role in the calculation of where Australia’s aid went. This 
is not necessarily surprising and follows what was expected in terms of understanding 
Australia’s foreign aid and development policy. What is less clear, though, is where Australia 
gave aid that was not linked to geographic considerations, and whether this was also guided 
by expectations of reciprocity and produced both moral and material outcomes. This is the 
task of the next section of the chapter, where I examine Australia’s foreign aid to Sub-
Saharan Africa and the Middle East. While traditionally less of a focus for Australia’s aid, 
this will add to the moral realist claim that aid can change depending on a shift in how 
Australia calculates its material interests. 
 
Strategy beyond geography: Expectations of reciprocity guiding Australia’s foreign aid 
to Africa and the Middle East 
During the Colombo Plan, Australia’s only aid to Africa was through the scholarship support 
scheme. In 1974-75, when a separate Australian aid department was established, aid to 
African nations totalled only $6 million. By the mid-1980s this had increased to $80 million, 
but by 2002 this had decreased to just $50 million.355 However, in the five years between 
2008 and 2013 Australia quadrupled the amount of aid to Africa, from $100 million to $385.6 
million respectively.356 It had reached a peak of $436.348 million in 2012. In relative terms, 
this was still a small amount, representing around 9% of the total aid budget. But given that 
Australia went from being a largely insignificant aid donor, to an active aid player in the 
short space of five years, this is significant.  Australia’s contribution followed the global shift 
in aid and development to Africa as a result of the latter’s near tripling of GDP, which 
demonstrated potential for significant market opportunities in trade and investment. Africa 
also has 30% of the estimated global mineral reserves, and Australia’s African aid program 
was adjusted to reflect this reality with new initiatives, such as the Australian Mining for 
Development Program (M4D) in Africa, being delivered alongside the established focus on 
                                           
355 “Australian aid overtime,” Development Policy Centre (2012) Available at: 
https://sites.google.com/site/australianaidovertime/home/australian-aid-recipients-over-time (accessed 15 
January 2014).  
356 ABS, “International relations: Where we give aid,” (2012). Available at: 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/1301.0~2012~Main%20Features~Where%20
we%20give%20aid~218 (accessed 13 January 2014).  
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agricultural and health.357 In this regard, despite a temporary shift in where Australia 
provided its aid, it was still guided by a calculation of the same moral and material 
expectations that traditionally underpinned the aid program. As the Foreign Minister Stephen 
Smith said at the time:  
 
There’s a lot that Australia can do both from an economic point of 
view, a capacity-building point of view, and development assistance 
point of view, in areas where we’ve got great comparative advantage or 
expertise.358 
 
The Australian mining presence was quite extensive and can be seen as a major contributor to 
Australia’s increased aid to the region. Over 200 Australian resource companies were 
involved in 650 projects in 42 African nations. The total combined value of Australia’s 
mining investments in Africa was estimated at $62 billion.359 As of 2013, one in 20 
companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) was invested in Africa, and the 
continent hosts the largest amount of Australian overseas mining companies, approximately 
40%. In 2013 Australia hosted an Africa Down Under Conference on Minerals and Oils, 
where it was announced that AusAID would spend $140m on the M4D in Africa.360 Yet, 
despite the increase in aid and expected returns in investment, Australia’s total two-way trade 
to African states had declined by 24.3% in 2009, indicating that the reciprocal benefits were 
not so clear.361 Perhaps more telling was the correlation between Australia’s interest in Africa 
                                           
357 Australia has been active in these two areas since the 1980s when there was a broad increase in its aid 
activities. For example, since 1984, it has been a major contributor to the Hamlin Fistula Hospital in Addis 
Ababa, which focused on both treatment and training for local medical professionals. It treats, on average, over 
2,500 women per year.   DFAT, Australian Aid, “Sub-Saharan Africa: Mining for development in Africa,” 
(2013). Available at: http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/sub-saharan-africa/Pages/mining.aspx (accessed 13 January 
2014) 
358 Stephen Smith and Fran Kelly, “Foreign minister discusses relationship with Africa; aid to Gaza; and aid for 
family planning organizations,” Transcript of interview with foreign minister Stephen Smith, Radio National, 30 
January 2009. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=5;query=African%20
aid%20Decade%3A%222000s%22%20Year%3A%222009%22;rec=9;resCount=Default#HIT9 (accessed 24 
September 2015).   
359 Andrew Burrell, “Investing in Africa via Oz miners,” The Australian, 9 November 2013. Available at: 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/investing-in-africa-via-oz-miners/story-e6frg9df-
1226756151439#sthash.sJbcumrp.dpuf (accessed 24 January 2014).  
360 Kevin Rudd, “Australia-Africa relations: Challenges and prospects,” Inaugural Australia-Africa Address, La 
Trobe University, Speech, Melbourne, 6 August 2013. Available at: 
http://www.att.org.au/pdf/Hon%20Kevin%20Rudd_Australian-African%20Dialogue%20Speech.pdf (accessed 
24 January 2014).  
361 DFAT, “Australia’s trade with Africa and the Middle East 2010,” (November 2011). Available at: 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/stats-pubs/Trade-Africa-Middle-East.pdf (accessed 25 January 2014).  
 121 
and its campaign to win a rotating non-permanent UNSC seat where African states make up 
54 of the 193 votes in the General Assembly. This claim is further supported by the projected  
$155.2 million decrease of aid to Africa in the 2014 budget.362  
 
 
Sources: Development Policy Centre and AusAID Budgets 
 
This, of course, does not necessarily detract from the moral outcomes of Australia’s aid in 
terms of social and economic development, nor does it fully account for where in Africa this 
aid was directed. In terms of the recipient benefits, Australian aid has assisted in vaccinating 
an estimated 2.5 million African children against measles, 2.6 million against polio and 
25,000 against diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus. It has also assisted in the establishment of 25 
rural maternal health clinics and its scholarship program has increased, from a low total of 
300 during the Colombo Plan years, to over 4,000 Australian Awards and Scholarships being 
awarded to African students. Contributions towards food security and agriculture have been 
particularly notable, and this has guided where Australia has directed a large majority of its 
aid. 363 
                                           
362 Bianca Hall, “Government’s $650m foreign aid cuts slammed,” The Age, 8 January 2014. Available at: 
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/governments-650m-foreign-aid-cuts-slammed-
20140118-311c5.html (accessed 31 January 2014).  
363 The ACIAR – the Australian aid funded agricultural research centre – implemented projects in Eastern and 
Southern Africa that improved livestock and wool production, as well as increased the space of arable land to 
over 24,853 framers. For more see ACIAR, “Sub-Saharan: Achievements.” Available at: 
http://aciar.gov.au/country/kenya/view/achievements (accessed 31 January 2014) and the ACAIR, “Annual 
report 2012-2013,” (2014), pp. 47-50. Available at: http://aciar.gov.au/files/aciar_annual_report_2012-
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Zimbabwe has been the major recipient of Australian aid to Africa, representing 25% of the 
African aid program. Between 2008 and 2012, Australia gave $194.662 million to 
Zimbabwe, making Australia its fifth largest aid donor. For Australia, Zimbabwe was 
expected to represent a fertile aid destination,364 and it was cost effective in terms of 
Australia’s ability to deliver aid. As a former member of the Commonwealth; Zimbabwe had 
some of the administrative infrastructure already in place to implement aid and development 
projects. Greater material benefits were also expected in that Zimbabwe had land and climate 
similar to Australia and therefore was suited to Australian agricultural expertise. Here, 
Australia saw potential for economic returns as it enjoyed a trade imbalance in its favour, 
with Australian exports to Zimbabwe worth $6,743 million, while Zimbabwean imports were 
worth $242,000. Roughly half of the export total was wheat, at $3,481 million, indicating that 
agricultural assistance to Zimbabwe coincided with interests in expanding Australian primary 
export markets.365  
 
This section showed that even when Australia chooses to provide aid to nations outside its 
direct strategic sphere of influence, it is still guided by expectations of reciprocity, and 
rational calculations of where its national interests can be achieved. This was found in the 
original decision for Australia to increase its aid to Africa under the expectation that it would 
lead to reciprocal payoffs in its bid to be a non-permanent member of the UNSC. An increase 
in aid also corresponded with the opening of Africa to international mining and investment, 
and programs like M4D presented an opportunity for Australia to share its expertise while 
also reap some economic benefits in return. But mining opportunities were shown to be a less 
significant expectation of reciprocity than the UNSC membership, as Australia’s aid to Africa 
decreased after its diplomacy was successful. As well as highlighting the importance of 
expectations of reciprocity, this also demonstrated the importance of rational choice in that 
Australia’s decision to increase aid to Africa was determined by a rational calculation of 
whether it would achieve its diplomatic and economic objectives at the time.  
 
                                                                                                                                    
13_rev.pdf (accessed 31 January 2014). 
364 Steven Smith and Jim Middleton, “Foreign Minister discusses food, food aid to Zimbabwe and Afghanistan.” 
Newshour, Australia Network, 6 June 2008. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=1;query=Zi
mbabwe%20aid;rec=4;resCount=Default (accessed 12 February 2014). 
365 DFAT, Australian Aid, “Zimbabwe,” (2014). Available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/zimb.pdf (accessed 
2 February 2014).  
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Reconstructing Australia’s ODA in the Middle East: Moral and strategic considerations of 
Australia’s foreign aid 
Australia’s foreign aid to the Middle East has a longer history than in Africa, but similar 
patterns of decision-making can be found that further support the observations made above.  
During the Colombo Plan, Australia paid some attention to Pakistan and Afghanistan in 
assistance in agriculture and food aid, but the region was not a significant factor in 
Australia’s aid priorities. However, this changed during Australia’s commitment to the war in 
Afghanistan, as part of NATOs International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Australia’s 
aid increased from zero during the height of Soviet offences in 1985, to $198.394 million in 
2012.366 There was a slight increase following Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and Evans, as 
Foreign Minister, announced a $20 million relief and aid package over three years, most of 
which went towards food aid where Australian wheat was sold and distributed by the World 
Food Program (WFP) at subsidised prices.367 This then decreased again during the Taliban 
occupation to just $671,000 in 2001. In percentage terms, over the 10-year period between 
2001 and 2012, Australian aid to Afghanistan went from 0.4% of the total to 3.9%.368 As of 
2013 it represented Australia’s fourth largest aid partner, after Indonesia, PNG and Solomon 
Islands.369  
 
                                           
366 These statistics can be found in the graph compiled below.  
367 Approximately $2 million went to UN agencies for assistance in Afghan returnees, $10 million went to food 
aid and the remaining went to other relief efforts such as clean water, sanitation and hygiene. Foreign Minister 
Gareth Evans, “Questions without notice: Afghanistan aid,” Senate, 5 May 1989, p. 1921. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Questions%20Without%20Notice
%3A%20Afghanistan%20Aid%20Decade%3A%221980s%22;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed February 
2014). In 1993, another $4 million was announced which included the distribution of 7000 tones of Australian 
wheat. Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gareth Evans, “Australian wheat in $4m aid package for Afghanistan,” 
Media Release, 20 December 1993. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=“Australian
%20Wheat%20in%20$4m%20aid%20package%20for%20Afghanistan.”;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 2 
February 2014). 
368 This represents the total ODA to Afghanistan, which includes the assistance provided by the Australian 
Defence Force (ADF), the Australian Federal Police (ADF) and the Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
(DIC). AusAID delivered the majority, between 70 and 75%.  
369 Stephen Howes and Jonathan Pryke, “Australian aid to Afghanistan: Submission to the foreign affairs, 
defence and trade reference committee,” Development Policy Center, Crawford School of Public Policy, ANU 
College of Asia & the Pacific. Available at: 
http://observgo.uquebec.ca/observgo/fichiers/25713_aideaustralienne.pdf (accessed 2 February 2014).  
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Sources: Development Policy Centre and AusAID Budgets 
 
A significant chunk of this aid was targeted to the Uruzgan province, around 20%, where 
Australia had the largest troop presence. The remaining 80% was directed towards national 
programming that included infrastructure development, agriculture and education. These 
projects had benefits for both Australia and Afghanistan. The most significant area of interest 
for Australia was in infrastructure development. For three years between 2010 and 2013, it 
led the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). It is no coincidence that Australia’s aid 
contribution increased to its largest point in 2010 when it took over from the Dutch in leading 
the PRT. It is also instructive that Australia’s aid to Afghanistan has declined since the end of 
the PRT, from a high of $198.3 million in 2012, to an expected expenditure of $152.3 million 
by the end of 2014. But during this time, Australia’s aid produced quite significant outcomes 
for both Australia and Afghanistan.   
 
The focus on Uruzgan was not guided solely by strategic concerns. It was also where 
Australia expected to achieve the most in terms of its aid objectives. Downer emphasised the 
convergence of these moral and material expectations when he stated that Australia’s aid 
would: 
 
Reinforce the progress of the militarily-led reconstruction effort in 
Oruzgan Province – one of the neediest parts of Afghanistan. It will 
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improve the delivery of essential services such as health and education, 
strengthen agricultural production and help build security and stability in 
Afghanistan and adjoining areas of Pakistan.370 
 
The province was one of the poorest in Afghanistan with literacy rates for women estimated 
at 1% compared with the rest of the state at 18%.371 Australia’s commitment specifically 
targeted education for girls and women and assisted in the increase construction and 
rehabilitation of over 200 schools.372 Some of the PRT funded projects also led to job 
opportunities for local Afghanis. The construction and upgrade of over 200 km of roads and 
bridges generated employment opportunities for over a 1000 people.373 And supported a 
further 350 small-scale community infrastructure projects relating to agricultural 
development and health.  
 
Perhaps an overlooked aspect of Australia’s commitment to reconstruction and development 
in Afghanistan is the potential for private investment as the security situation increased. In 
2010, then Australian Foreign Minister, Kevin Rudd, addressed the “Afghanistan 
International Investment Conference,” in Dubai and announced there was “significant 
potential for Afghanistan as a destination for private and public investment.”374 For Australia, 
there was substantial interest in the largely untapped mineral wealth and under-development 
mining sector, with reserves estimated to be worth $US3 trillion.375  
Part of Australia’s aid already went towards increasing the capacity of the mining industry 
under the expectation that it would lead to certain economic payoffs. It provided funding for 
Afghan mining officials to study geology at Australian universities as part of the Australian 
                                           
370 Downer, “Aid to Afghanistan boosted,” Speech, 23 August 2007. Available at: 
http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2007/fa106a_07.html (accessed 23 September 2015).  
371 DFAT, Australian Aid, “Afghanistan annual performance progress report 2011,” (July 2012), p. 2. Available 
at: http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/southasia/afghanistan/Documents/afghanistan-appr-2011.pdf (accessed 5 
February 2014).  
372 Phillip Coorey, “Long war ends in hope, says Tony Abbot,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 29 October 2013. 
Available at: http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/long-war-ends-with-hope-says-tony-abbott-
20131028-2wc4j.html (accessed 5 February 2014).  
373 DFAT, Australian Aid, “Afghanistan” (2014) 
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/southasia/Afghanistan/Pages/home.aspx (accessed 5 February 2014).  
374 Kevin Rudd, “Address to the Afghanistan international investment conference, ” Speech, 30 November 2010. 
Available at: http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2010/kr_sp_101130.html#sthash.BprVuD15.dpuf. 
(accessed 5 February 2014).  
375 Sue Lannin, “Afghanistan to benefit from first commercial oil production,” ABC News, 19 May 2013. 
Available at: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-05-18/australia-backs-afghanistan27s-struggling-
miners/4698082 (accessed 5 February 2014).  
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Awards program, and its M4D partnership with Afghanistan assisted in the exchange of 
officials to train at the Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum. This led to reciprocal 
payoffs when the Afghanistan government indicated that Australia was a natural source of 
mining investment and expertise. The Afghani Mines Minister, Wahidullah Shahrani, stated 
“Australia is a model for us,” and had been “very generous to help us with technical capacity 
and give us scholarships for postgraduate programs.”376  
 
 
!Sources: OECD QWIDS and AusAID Budgets 
 
Australia’s aid to Afghanistan indicated a consideration for expectations of reciprocity, as 
well as the potential for moral and material outcomes. This was the case, despite the Middle 
East being an area of neglect in terms of where Australia has traditionally delivered aid.  
Here, Australia’s development assistance to Iraq is also worth further evaluation. Before the 
Gulf War, Australia’s aid relationship with Iraq was even less than it originally was with 
Afghanistan. Australia’s first aid commitment was in 1978 and was a mere $11,000. This 
increased slightly after 1991 when Australia provided emergency relief aid to assist Kurdish 
                                           
376 Amanda Hodge, “Afghans seek mining know-how,” The Australian, 9 April 2012. Available at: 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/afghans-seek-mining-know-how/story-
fn59nm2j-1226321670501 (accessed 5 February 2014).  
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refugees in Northern Iraq and food aid to assist in general shortages.377 There were two 
national interest expectations motivating Australia’s decision to provide humanitarian aid to 
Iraq. The first was strategic: there was a sense of obligation amongst policymakers that 
Australia’s military participation as part of the multinational coalition Operation Desert 
Storm needed to be supported by development assistance.378 The second factor related to 
Australia’s economic interests. Its major military contribution was in supporting trade 
sanctions against the nation in the Persian Gulf, where it provided ships and additional 
support for Operation Damaska.379 By the end of 1990 trade sanctions were starting to have a 
significant financial effect on Australia. At the time, the cost was estimated at up to $1 
billion, the majority of which was lost in wheat sales.380 Hence food aid was given in surplus 
wheat, approximately 5,000 tonnes between 1991 and 1996, as a means of keeping Australia 
in the wheat market without compromising its support for international sanctions.381 And its 
military commitment was guided by the desire to see a timely resolution to the conflict in 
order to restart its trade relationship with Iraq.  
 
Yet having said this, the amount of aid was still relatively small, with only $2.74 million 
being given between 1991 and 1997. This indicates that, in general, Australia’s aid was 
guided by its level of military commitment, which was also fairly limited. This claim is 
further supported by the cessation of direct aid in 1997 when Australia could resume the sale 
of wheat to Iraq through the UNs’ “oil for food” program.382  Following 1997, Australia’s aid 
resumed again in 2003 when it became one of the early supporters of the WoT and joined the 
                                           
377 “Questions without notice: Middle East Kurdish refugees,” HoR, 10 July 1991. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=2;query=Ira
q%20aid%20Decade%3A%221990s%22%20Year%3A%221991%22;rec=8;resCount=Default (accessed 4th 
February 2014).  
378 Alexander Downer, “Australia and the Middle East: Enduring interests,” Speech, 22 May 2003. Available at: 
http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2003/030422_jorda.html (accessed 4 February 2014).  
379 Australia originally sent three ships as part of Operation Damaska in September 1990-December 1990: the 
HMAS Adelaide, HMAS Darwin and HMAS Success. This was followed by further Royal Australian Navy 
(RAN) support for Damaska II (December 1990 – May 1991), Damaska III (June 1991-Sepember 1991), 
Damaska VI (October 1992-April 1993).  
380 Australia was a net exporter of energy and so was less concerned about damages to oil imports. However, 
there was some concern that if the crisis continued it would start to have a more sever impact on global oil 
prices and negatively effect the economies of its major trading partners (the US and Japan). This would have 
added strain to an already depressed global environment (given the 1990s recession) leading to negative effects 
for Australia’s economy.  
381 “Questions without notice: Food sid,” Senate, 5 December 1997. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=foo
d%20aid%20Iraq%20Decade%3A%221990s%22;rec=1;resCount=Default (accessed 6 February 2014).  
382 UN Security Council Resolution 986 established the UN “oil for food” program in December 1996. It 
allowed Iraq to export $US1 billion worth of oil every 90 days with the sales intended to be used to purchase 
food and other necessities for the Iraq population. This program ended in May 2003 when sanctions were lifted 
from the Saddam Hussein regime by Resolution 1483.  
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coalition of willing in the War in Iraq. This time, the strategic and economic expectations 
were much more significant and were reflected in the amount of aid given, which by 2008 
had reached a high of $358.8 million. The majority was given in food aid with Australia 
providing over 100,000 tonnes of wheat.383 This was 20 times the amount given during the 
Gulf War. Aid was also focused on the reconstruction effort with over $200 million going 
towards the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The remaining was incorporated into 
debt relief and in assistance to refugees, Internally Displaced People (IDP) and technical 
training.384 Such a sizeable increase in aid to Iraq was fuelled by an increase in Australia’s 
material commitments and the expected returns flowing from this.   
 
In terms of Australia’s material commitment to the war, this was much larger than in 1991. 
This time, Australia deployed ground troops with 2,200 members of the ADF participating in 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003.385 This corresponded with an initial sum of $100 million of aid 
to Iraq, which had received no aid between 1997 and 2003.386 In announcing the increased 
aid package Foreign Minister Alexander Downer emphasized that it would supplement 
Australia’s reduced capacity to commit to a long-term peacekeeping effort in Iraq.387 Over 
the next 12 years Australian defence personnel were present in Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom until their full withdrawal in November 2013. And during this, Australia’s aid 
commitment was generally inline with its military operation. In 2008, when aid to Iraq was at 
its highest, Australia’s newly elected Labor government announced that it would withdraw its 
combat troops but increase its aid to Iraq as a means of keeping Australia active in Iraq’s 
                                           
383 Tom Allard, “More Australian aid to rebuild Iraq,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 October 2003. Available 
at: http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/10/15/1065917485145.html?from=storyrhs (accessed 10 February 
2014).  
384 DFAT, Australian Aid, “Australia’s overseas aid program,” (May 2006). Available at: 
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/budget/budget06/budget_2006_2007.html#480 (accessed 10 February 2014).  
385This also included three warships and 14 F/A-18 Hornet aircrafts. The majority of these troops had left Iraq 
by the 15th July 2003. 70 were left to protect the Australian embassy, 80 to assist in the operation of the control 
tower at Bagdad airport, 16 to help the search for WMDs and 90 were deployed to positions in the US-Iraq 
administration. In 2005, Australia sent an additional 450 troops for 12 months to protect the Japanese Iraq 
Reconstruction and Support Group in al Muthanna Province. This deployment moved to Camp Terendak at the 
US-operated Tallil airbase and adopted a training role for assistance of Iraqi security forces. All Australian 
combat troops were withdrawn by June 2008. Misha Schubert, “Troops pull out of Iraq.” The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 2 June 2008. Available at: http://www.smh.com.au/national/troops-pull-out-of-iraq-20080601-2kjh.html 
(accessed 10 February 2014).  
386 Mark Forbes, “$20m more aid to Iraq.” The Age, 9 October 2003. Available at: 
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/10/18/1066364539450.html?from=storyrhs (accessed 10 February 
2014).  
387 Ibid. 
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transition to independent governance.388 From 2008, however, aid to Iraq significantly 
declined to just $26.9 million by the time a full drawdown of all military personnel was 
completed in 2013. This is set to further decrease to $11.3 million by the end of 2014.  
 
The connection between Australia’s aid and its military resources indicate that strategic 
factors were important in Australia’s decision to see Iraq as a priority destination for its aid. 
In this regard, Australia’s strategic expectations in giving aid to Iraq were consistent with its 
approach towards Afghanistan. Not only were the strategic expectations similar, the moral 
expectations also fit with Australia’s general view of aid in that Australia’s assistance will, 
“enable the people of Iraq with humanitarian assistance, including food, water and sanitation 
and health care.”389 
 
It is important to note that it is not the intention of this chapter to engage in an in-depth 
evaluation on the merits of Australia’s decision to support the US in the War in Iraq, instead, 
the point is that in the case of Iraq (and for that matter, in Afghanistan), Australia’s decision 
to direct aid to Iraq was guided by the strategic focus of its military engagement. Indeed, 
Australian strategic studies experts have made similar conclusions, one even as recently as 
2014, with Hugh White stating that: “For successive Australian Governments, aid to Iraq was 
primarily an adjunct to our military effort – a (relatively) low cost, low risk way to 
supplement our modest troop numbers and show our credentials as a good ally to 
America.”390  
 
Strategic interests in Iraq corresponded to significant commercial outcomes for Australia. By 
2003 Australia had developed a substantial trading relationship with the Middle East, worth 
around $8 billion a year.391 Its trade with Iraq had also increased to the extent that Australian 
                                           
388 Anne Davies, “Iraq aid boost to follow troop withdrawal,” The Age, 29 January 2008. Available at: 
http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/smith-defends-troop-withdrawal/2008/01/29/1201369081808.html 
(accessed 6 February 2014).  
389 Downer, “Australia supports humanitarian assistance for Iraq,” Press Releases, 19 February 2003. Available 
at:http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=2;query=Iraq%20h
umanitarian%20assistance%20Decade%3A%222000s%22;rec=8;resCount=Default (accessed 23 September 
2015).  
390 Max Chalmers, “Abbott Cannot afford Iraq anymore,” Newmatilda, 24 January 2014. Available at: 
https://newmatilda.com/2014/01/24/abbott-cant-afford-iraq-any-longer (accessed 10th February 2014).  
391 The Middle East was becoming an important destination for motor vehicle exports. In 2002, motor vehicles 
were Australia’s main export worth $1.83 billion. In 2003 General Motors Holden sent exports worth $750m 
while Toyota Motor Corporation Australia LTD exported vehicles worth $1.5billion making the Middle East 
their main export market. David Richardson, “Economics of war with Iraq,” Current Issues Brief Index 2002-
03, Economics, Commerce and Industrial Relations Group, 24 March 2003. Available at: 
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wheat exports on their own were estimated at $829 million, which represented 20% of the 
total Australian wheat exports, making Australia Iraq’s second largest source of wheat. 392 
Based on this evidence, a shock to Australia’s wheat exports in Iraq was of particular 
economic concern and was made even more so in the face of competition from the US wheat 
lobby. Indeed, Downer stated Australia’s commitment of 100,000 tonnes was to rival the US, 
which had committed 500,000 tonnes of wheat, but had suffered delays in distributing it.393 
More specifically, he indicated that it would be good for Australia’s prestige if the “first ship 
to enter Iraq in the wake of hostilities was carrying Australian wheat – particularly if it was 
escorted by HMAS ANZAC.”394 The expectation of economic reciprocity in Australia’s 
humanitarian assistance is made clearer when compared with the ebb and flow of its trade. 
Before 2003, Australia had a growing trade with Iraq after the relaxation of trade sanctions. 
This declined to around $200 million following Australia’s loss of wheat contracts. But by 
2013, trade with Iraq was completely one-sided with Australian exports starting to recover, 
and worth an estimated $593 million, of which $580 million was in wheat.395 
 
Reaping the benefits of reconstruction was also a motivating factor for Australia, and one 
where expectations of material benefits were sought. By January 2004, Australian companies 
had been awarded contracts in agriculture, environmental rehabilitation, electrical 
distribution, finance and economic policy.396 This included a lucrative $1 billion contract for 
Australia’s Worley Group to help rebuild Iraq’s oil infrastructure. A year and a half later, 
when Australia’s reconstruction committed through AusAID was nearly $170 million, over 
                                                                                                                                    
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Arc
hive/CIB/cib0203/03CIB20 (accessed 10th February 2014).  
392 Mark Vale, “ Trade minister discusses war, food aid; US trade negotiations; Quarantine: WTO; and national 
party leadership,” Meet the Press, 13 April 2003. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=5;query=Ira
q%20aid;rec=11;resCount=Default (accessed 22 January 2014).  
393 Richard Baker, “Australia’s other war in Iraq.” The Age, 3 July 2006. Available at: 
http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/australias-other-war-in-iraq/2006/07/02/1151778811475.html 
(accessed 6 February 2014).  
394 Ibid.  
395 DFAT, “Iraq” (2013). Available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/iraq.pdf (accessed 6 February 2014).  
396 Some of these firms included the ANZ Bank which assisted in managing the Trade Bank of Iraq, SAGRI 
International which assisted in rebuilding Iraq’s agricultural industry, the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) 
which won the remaining contracts left under the “oil for food” program, and Multimedia, which provided 
satellite-based internet and communication bandwidth services. Mark Vale, “Australia’s track record of 
achievement in Iraq,” Media Release, 19 January 2004. Available at: 
http://www.trademinister.gove.au/realeases/2004/mvt005_05.html (accessed 6 February 2014).  
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20 Australian companies had won an estimated US$1.9 billion worth of deals.397 The material 
benefits for Australia in contributing to the reconstruction effort and the development 
achievements were therefore not mutually exclusive.  
Australia’s aid to Afghanistan and Iraq was primarily guided by strategic expectations that it 
would support its military commitment, and thus the increase of aid after previously having a 
limited aid program operating in these nations, was the result of a shift in how Australia 
calculated its national interests. Alongside these material expectations was the moral intent 
by policymakers that redirecting aid to these nations would assist their development needs. 
These observations are line with the changes in Australia’s aid towards Africa, which were 
determined by a change in how Australia calculated its national interests at the time. 
Together, these cases emphasise the value of rational choice in understanding that Australia’s 
aid policy is likely to change in response to changes in the calculation of its national interest. 
This does not mean that the moral and material expectations of reciprocity seen to motivate 
Australia’s aid change, nor does it mean that the moral and material outcomes are less likely 
to appear. Indeed strategic expectations of reciprocity were still found to be present, and so 
were the moral outcomes in improving education and employment, particularly in Uruzgan. 
Material outcomes were also consistent and found in the awarding of reconstruction contracts 
and in opening the potential for Australian investment in mining.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter applied the moral realist framework to understand Australia’s foreign aid policy. 
It found that the main theoretical perspectives have approached the moral dimensions in 
foreign aid and development with the view that states should be judged on normative 
standards of whether aid reflects good intentions, and not on whether it achieves any positive 
outcomes, for both the donor and the recipient. Hence I proposed moral realism, with its 
focus on moral and material outcomes, as a tool that can better understand Australia’s foreign 
aid and development policy, and it was found that moral realism shows promise in this 
regard.  
 
                                           
397 Richard Baker, “Iraq: Aussie companies snare $1.9billion in contracts,” The Age, 10 December 2005. 
Available at: http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/aussie-companies-snare-19bn-in-
contracts/2005/12/09/1134086808429.html (accessed 6 February 2014).  
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Specifically, it was found that Australia’s aid was guided by strategic expectations of 
reciprocity that the giving of aid would lead to certain moral and material benefits. This was 
clear in Australia’s push for the Colombo Plan, which was guided by an expectation that it 
would ensure US commitment in the Asia-Pacific, assist in combating the spread of 
communism, as well as act as a springboard for further diplomatic and economic 
relationships in Southeast Asia. These material expectations converged with the moral 
expectations that Australia’s aid would contribute towards the economic and social 
development of recipient states. Expectations of reciprocity were also found in what type of 
aid Australia preferred. Australia preferred to focus on education, agriculture and 
infrastructure development as these were expected to produce both moral and material 
outcomes. Moral outcomes were also produced in stimulating employment, providing 
educational opportunities to study in Australia, as well as skills training in agriculture. 
Material gains were found in expanding Australia’s export markets and in providing 
opportunities in investment. 
 
These sectors remained features of Australia’s foreign aid program. However, it was also 
found that Australia’s aid priorities changed depending on what type of aid would achieve the 
most benefit to its strategic, commercial and diplomatic interests. This was evident in the 
high level of assistance in health to PNG and the focus on reconstruction in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Agriculture became less of a focus as technical assistance expanded to include aspects 
of “good governance” as part of the government’s changing response to issues of regional 
security. This added weight to the moral realist view that aid is determined by both an 
expectation of reciprocity and rational choice as to where a state’s national interests lie. Thus, 
rational choice can explain changes to Australia’s aid policy, which was found when 
Australia decided to increase aid to nations outside of its direct strategic sphere of influence. 
This occurred during its heightened aid program to Iraq and Afghanistan where Australia’s 
aid was used to support its military objectives. Australia’s military presence in the War in 
Iraq (1990-1 and 2003), and in Afghanistan was fairly modest and so ODA was viewed as a 
means to bolster its commitment in the eyes of its allies, while also being a tool for the 
achievement of greater material gains in infrastructure development. Similar patterns were 
found in Australia’s aid to sub-Sahara Africa where its aid became a tool in the government’s 
diplomatic strategy to gain a non-permanent Security Council seat.  
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Overall, the majority of Australia’s aid flowed to states that were geographically close to 
Australia, such as PNG and Indonesia, which represented the greatest potential threat to 
Australia’s security. These nations were also where Australia calculated that it could achieve 
the most in terms of its moral outcomes. This was particularly evident in Australia’s aid to 
Indonesia following the 2004 Tsunami where positive aid results were found in increasing 
educational opportunities and rebuilding infrastructure. Australia’s aid to Indonesia was also 
found to demonstrate that Australia stood to gain from including morality as part of its 
foreign aid and development policy, as this decision produced material benefits in 
Indonesia’s support for Australia’s participation in the EAS and led to further trade and 
investment payoffs from the awarding of Australian business contracts as part of the 
reconstruction.    
 
In sum, this chapter outlined how a moral realist framework is used to interpret the moral and 
material dimensions involved in a state’s foreign aid policy. Yet, having said this, one case 
study is not enough to make a convincing argument for the utility of the moral realist 
approach, nor is it sufficient to properly assess whether Australia actually stood to achieve 
material benefits from including morality as part of its foreign policy choices. Therefore, I 
now turn to the next chapter where I apply moral realism to understand Australia’s foreign 
policy choices towards humanitarian operations.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Australia and humanitarian operations: Morality and interests guiding the use of force 
for humanitarian purposes  
 
This chapter explores Australia’s role in implementing the humanitarian operations in 
Cambodia and Timor Leste. It is organised into two sections. The first section introduces the 
main debates on peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. In doing so it draws out 
normative perspectives on these issues and highlights their limits in understanding the 
motives of states (and outcomes for them) in choosing to act against abuses of human rights. 
This clarifies the moral realist contribution that subsequently follows. The second section 
applies the moral realist framework to Australia’s foreign policy choices in Cambodia and 
Timor Leste. It finds that in both cases Australia was motivated by an expectation of 
reciprocity in achieving broader strategic goals tied to regional security and defence 
capability. An expectation of material returns is strengthened by evidence of rational choice 
in that Australia decided to intervene based on when it could gain the most from its 
commitment.  
 
Evidence of expectation of reciprocity and rational choice indicates the likelihood of moral 
and material outcomes, both of which occurred in Cambodia and Timor Leste. In Cambodia, 
I find moral outcomes from Australia’s proposal for a United Nations (UN) transitional 
authority that led to the withdrawal of Vietnam and the holding of democratic elections. The 
material benefits for Australia were in the closer economic relationship with Vietnam, which 
had been a long-term foreign policy priority. Likewise, Australia’s diplomacy and leadership 
in the peace-enforcement mission in Timor Leste brought security and stability to the 
province, minimising the bloodshed and ensuring Timorese self-determination. Australia 
benefitted in reputational payoffs from leading the mission. It did so materially in signing a 
more favourable oil and gas deal over the Timor Gap, and in resolving a long-running 
obstacle to developing closer relations with Indonesia. In sum, this chapter finds further 
evidence in support of the explanatory potential of moral realism, and this reinforces the 
claims made in the previous chapter on Australia’s aid and development policy.  
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Defining peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention 
Peacekeeping is defined loosely here as the “support of peacemaking between states by 
creating the political space necessary for the belligerent states to negotiate a political 
settlement.”398 Thus, peacekeeping operations (henceforth PKOs) are usually deployed after a 
ceasefire has been negotiated and are not intended to enforce political solutions. They are 
only mandated to use force for the purpose of self-defence. Cambodia was an example of a 
traditional PKO as the peacekeepers were deployed to “supervise” the ceasefire, as well as 
the withdrawal of foreign military assistance. However, it also went further in that the UN 
had transitional administration of Cambodia, temporarily adopting sovereignty over the 
territory. In this regard, Cambodia was also a multidimensional operation that included 
military, police and civilian personnel that took control of the state’s administrative 
structures, such as foreign affairs, defence, finance and communications. The UN also ran the 
elections and ensured the peaceful transition to a new government. For clarity, this thesis 
refers to the UN operation in Cambodia as peacekeeping since the mandate on force 
remained within traditional parameters.399   
 
Defining humanitarian intervention is a little more contentious. Some, such as J. L. 
Holzgrefe, restrict the practice of intervention to the coercive use of force without the consent 
of the recipient state, while others broaden the definition to include acts with the intent to 
punish, as well as those where any outside interference has taken place for the purpose of 
humanitarian assistance.400 This thesis defines humanitarian intervention as “coercive 
interference in the internal affairs of a state, involving the use of armed force, with the 
purpose of addressing massive human rights violations or widespread human suffering.”401 
Using this definition means Timor Leste can be classified as humanitarian intervention or 
“peace enforcement”, as the multinational coalition was an armed military force authorised to 
                                           
398 Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping (Polity Press: Cambridge, 2010), p. 8. 
399 Several studies on Cambodia have shared the same conclusion. See for instance, Michael Doyle, UN 
Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC’s Civil Mandate (Lynee Reinner Publishers: Colorado, 1995); Janet 
Heininger, Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia (Twentieth Century Fund Press: New 
York, 1994); Gareth Evans, “Peacekeeping in Cambodia: lessons learned,” Nato Review 42, no. 4 (1994), pp. 
24-27; and Karl Farris, “Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On balance – a success,” Parameters 24, no. 1 (1998), pp. 
38-50.  
400 J. L. Holzgrefe, “The humanitarian intervention debate,” in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane eds. 
Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2004), p. 18.  
401 Jennifer Welsh, “Introduction,” in Welsh ed., Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004), p. 3 
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use “all necessary means” to enforce peace and address widespread abuses of human 
rights.402 This thesis refers to both cases collectively as humanitarian operations/missions.  
 
The “moral” views of humanitarian operations: Solidarity of human rights 
There is an exhaustive amount of literature on the moral dimension of humanitarian missions. 
And as has been mentioned earlier, proponents of the English School (ES) have tended to 
claim ownership over how to understand morality within these debates. On the one side are 
the solidarists, like Timothy Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler, who follow cosmopolitanism in 
viewing the increase of state interdependence as evidence of the emergence of an 
international society motivated by norms of common humanity.403 From this perspective, the 
state system is morally bound together through the establishment of a global consciousness 
where states are obligated to act in response to human suffering. Mutual consent is then 
formed that justifies the use of force based on a set of agreed upon rules or codes of conduct. 
 
After WWII ideas of pluralism, mutual recognition of sovereignty and individual rights were 
recognised in the UN Charter, which defined sovereignty and human rights as separate moral 
and legal elements of the international order. But for solidarists, this began to change towards 
the end of the Cold War as the effects of globalization increased transnational relations and 
connected individuals across state borders, signalling the potential emergence of a “world 
society.” The end of bipolarity accelerated this process by ushering in a more cooperative 
international environment that opened space for an increased role for Global Civil Society 
(GCS), which was free to promote its human rights agenda. The GCS was joined by evidence 
of states’ willingness to use force against another sovereign for the achievement of 
humanitarian objectives, and these operations were legitimized under Chapter VII of the UN 
                                           
402 Timor Leste has been used as a case of humanitarian intervention in numerous studies. Some like Dunne and 
Wheeler have argued that it represents the evolution of “legitimate” forms of intervention as it achieved the 
consent of the recipient nation. Dunne and Wheeler, “East Timor and the new humanitarian interventionism,” 
International Affairs 77, no. 4 (2001), pp. 805-827. Tania Voon made similar conclusions, looking at the 
differences between legality and legitimacy in invited and coercive intervention using Kosovo and Timor Leste 
as examples. Voon, “Closing the gap between legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention: Lessons for 
Kosovo and East Timor,” Journal of International law and Foreign Affairs, 7, no. 1 (2002), pp. 31-98. Others 
have referred to Timor Leste as an example of operationalizing human security in foreign policy. See Nicholas 
Thomas and William Tow, “The utility of human security: sovereignty and intervention,” Security Dialogue 33, 
no. 2 (2002), pp. 177-192.  Despite the differences on the legality and legitimacy of states in intervening, these 
authors shared a consensus in viewing Timor Leste as an instance of humanitarian intervention.  
403 See Dunne and Wheeler, “Hedley Bull’s pluralism of the intellect and solidarism of the will,” International 
Affairs 72, no. 1 (1996), pp. 91-107 and Dunne “The social construction of international society,” European 
Journal of International Relations 1, no. 3 (1995), pp. 367-389.  
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Charter. As a result, international societal norms evolved to no longer view state sovereignty 
as consistently superior to individual rights. 
 
On the other side of the ES are the pluralists whose views on humanitarian operations tend to 
vary. Some, like Robert Jackson and Robert Vincent, are critical of the practice as it violates 
the central rule of international society: respect for sovereignty and non-intervention.404 
Others, such as Jennifer Welsh, have argued that consensus on what is meant by the norm of 
sovereignty has changed to the extent that in exceptional circumstances (like genocide, ethnic 
cleansing and mass atrocities), it is both just and legal for states to intervene into another 
state’s sovereign territory. 405 This was particularly so after shifts in international perceptions 
on the norm of sovereignty, which made it conditional on the obligation of the state to protect 
its own citizens, and tied this to a “just cause” of international society to react if the state fails 
to uphold its sovereign responsibility.406 Here, the solidarists and the “humanitarian 
pluralists” are similar in melding the moral and legal principles of international order to 
explain the rise of PKOs and humanitarian intervention following the end of the Cold War.   
 
                                           
404 Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000). As has been mentioned in chapter 1, Bull’s views on universal human rights and the use of force 
are difficult to pin down. In the one breath he argued that the best way to ensure international order was in 
respecting the coexistence of equal sovereigns and thus held a position of moral scepticism on the ability of 
norms and rules to transform state behaviour. However, in the same breath, he also argued that this was the best 
way to protect individual freedoms, prompting some such as John Vincent to claim that the purpose of Bull’s 
society was normative and hence solidarist. For more see Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Vincent was also quite critical of military intervention and 
argued that legitimizing the practice through international legal frameworks would lead to more wars and the 
advancement of an imperialist cosmopolitanism. Yet in his later writings, Vincent argued that states had to abide 
by certain standards in order to receive the respect and mutual recognition of sovereignty by others within 
international society. For more see Vincent and Peter Wilson, “Beyond non-intervention”, in Ian Forbes and 
Mark Hoffman, eds, Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1993), p. 125.  
405 Jennifer Welsh, “A normative case for pluralism: reassessing Vincent’s views on humanitarian intervention,” 
International Affairs 87, no. 5 (2011), pp. 1193-1205.  
406 It is not the intention of this thesis to go deeper into debates on the “right” of sovereignty versus sovereignty 
as “responsibility.” This has been done ad nauseam elsewhere. See for instance, Roberta Cohen and Francis M 
Deng, “Exodus within borders: The uprooted who never left home,” Foreign Affairs 77, no.4 (1998), pp. 12-16; 
Tim Allen and David Stayn, “A right to interfere? Bernard Kouchner and the new humanitarianism,” Journal of 
International Development 12, no. 6 (2000), pp. 825-842 and Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: 
Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008). Since 
this thesis takes a realist approach, it defines sovereignty, as “Supreme power over a certain territory.” Hans 
Morgenthau, “The problem of sovereignty reconsidered,” Columbia Law Review 48, no. 3 (1948), pp. 341-365. 
The point made here is that normative perspectives have tended to view sovereignty as a critical component 
when analysing state responses to human rights. For realists, sovereignty just “is” and its consideration in 
foreign policy is based on whether it is relevant at the time. In the case of Timor Leste described below, it was 
part of Australia’s calculation on when was the right time to intervene, with Prime Minister John Howard 
stating that it would be an act of war and a violation of Indonesia’s sovereignty if the humanitarian operation 
went ahead without their consent.  
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Like the ES, constructivists also source their views on PKOs and intervention from the norms 
and rules inherent in international society. Where they claim to be different is in the argument 
that norms governing the use of force, sovereignty and human rights are not necessarily the 
result of rational progress, but are constituted from the normative context in which they are 
created. In other words, norms of sovereignty and human rights are part of the same moral 
discourse. Christian Reus-Smit and Martha Finnemore have been the leading supporters of 
this perspective, stating that the norm of humanitarian intervention reflects the changing 
perceptions and beliefs of international society on the legitimacy of the use of force for 
humanitarian ends.407 Previously, perceptions on the use of force were constructed on the 
dominant belief that violence is destructive, and therefore needed to be avoided for the 
preservation of society. The state had a monopoly on the use of violence and its sovereignty 
afforded it the legitimacy of wielding force to protect the rights and freedoms of its citizens.  
 
This changed during the later half of the 20th Century when ideas of self-determination 
proliferated, and produced a number of new postcolonial states. These societies were not 
necessarily motived by territory or economic gain, and instead were motived by universal 
notions of human rights internationalised in the UN Charter. Therefore, for constructivists, 
sovereignty was constructed on ideas of human rights at both the domestic and international 
level. The use of force underwent a process of “norm cascading” with each case, from 
Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia, to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 
Kosovo, humanitarian intervention gained legitimacy according to international social 
standards, reinforcing the constitutive structure of sovereignty and justifying the use of 
violence against others. Sovereignty defined by human rights then combined with the advent 
of non-traditional security threats after the Cold War, such as the spread of refugees, 
Transnational Organized Crime (TOC), drug and arms trafficking, as well as transnational 
terrorism. This demonstrated that it was no longer accurate to tie the legitimate use of force to 
the supremacy of state sovereignty, especially as the security of the state no longer 
                                           
407 Martha Finnemore, “Constructing norms of humanitarian intervention,” in Peter Katzenstien ed. The Culture 
of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 
153-160 and Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force (London: 
Cornell University Press, 2003). Luke Glanville has also argued that not only does the international society 
allow for humanitarian intervention, it actually constitutes a set of rules and norms which determine when states 
should respond to mass instances of human suffering. In this regard, the norm of humanitarian intervention is 
both permissive and prescriptive. For more see Glanville, “Norms, interests and humanitarian intervention,” 
Global Change, Peace and Security, 18, no. 3 (2006), pp. 153-171.  
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guaranteed the security of the individual.408 This added to the legal authority of humanitarian 
operations by expanding the threshold of threats to international peace and security to include 
threats to human security.  
 
In each perspective a common thread emerges; that is, the focus on linking the moral 
dimension of humanitarian operations to perceptions of legitimacy according to accepted 
rules and standards of international society. There are several problems with this approach. 
This first and most important is that it overlooks the importance of material interest in 
motivating states to use their national resources for the benefit of others, which is key to 
understanding why states include humanitarian missions as part of their foreign policy 
choices. Instead, normative perspectives prefer to focus on the justification of each act, 
prioritizing moral obligation over whether any real outcomes were achieved, for both the 
intervener and recipient. As will be outlined below, a moral realist perspective offers a more 
powerful account as it prioritizes the expectations, calculations and outcomes of foreign 
policy, and can therefore shed light on the reasons why states participate in humanitarian 
missions, and when this is likely to occur.  
 
The reality of intervention: Reciprocity, rational choice and moral and material 
outcomes 
Realist contributions on humanitarian operations have largely been critical and have 
approached the moral dimension with the view of moral scepticism. This is true of both the 
structural realists – like John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt – who are only concerned with 
an international order determined by the balance of power; as well as for those classical 
realists suspicious of the heavy moralising involved in pursuing interventions based on 
ideological concerns for spreading democracy, regime change and the promotion of human 
                                           
408 Notions of “human security” were popularised during the mid-1990s and became part of the constructivist 
lexicon in arguing that material factors of security are constituted by ideas and norms, which can include ideas 
of human rights. As the human rights regime took off following the end of the Cold War, international societal 
perceptions changed to see security as the protection of the individual over the protection of territorial borders. 
For more see, Gary King and Christopher L. J. Murray, “Rethinking human security,” Political Science 
Quarterly 16, no. 4 (2004), pp. 585-600; Dan Henk, “Human security: Relevance and implications,” Parameters 
35 no.2, pp. 92-100 and Pauline Ewan, “Deepening the human security debate,” Politics 27 no. 3, (2007), 
pp.182-189. 
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rights.409 Yet even Hans Morgenthau did not entirely dismiss the practice. Instead he 
cautioned against the use of abstract principles to rationalise the act of intervention:  
 
rules [governing intervention] must be deduced not from abstract 
principles which are incapable of controlling the actions of 
governments, but from the interests of the nations concerned and 
from their practice of foreign policy reflecting those interests.410  
 
Expectations of reciprocity   
A moral realist understanding of humanitarian intervention thus focuses on the material 
motivations of the state committing the act and how the action itself will affect the stability of 
the international system, as well as the resources of the intervener(s). In particular, the moral 
realist is first concerned with separating the act of humanitarian intervention from attempts at 
establishing the moral justification for it. This is important as it allows moral realism to 
identify the moral and material factors present in the expectations of reciprocity seen to 
motivate a state’s decision to use force for humanitarian purposes.  
 
As detailed above, normative approaches to intervention have overwhelmingly been 
concerned with establishing the authority of each case, and in doing so have tended to 
confuse what was the primary motivation, replacing material interests like security and trade, 
with notions of legal legitimacy. The same error can be found in relation to moral 
considerations. In their numerous attempts at tying legitimacy to both moral and legal norms, 
these scholars have also failed to properly consider whether there was in fact any moral 
benefit in performing the act. The intervening state may indeed decide to follow recognised 
standards of international law and achieve some legitimacy in the eyes of others, but evidence 
of a state adhering to normative standards is not enough to claim that a state is being guided 
by moral considerations. Evidence of whether the intervention actually led to moral outcomes 
is needed before making judgements on state behaviour. This is where an expectation of 
reciprocity by the intervening state that intervention will garner beneficial returns better 
accounts for whether it will lead to moral outcomes for the recipient state.  
 
                                           
409 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001), 
pp. 29-55 and Stephen Walt, “Two cheers for Clinton’s foreign policy,” Foreign Affairs, 79 (March/April 
2000), pp. 63-75. 
410 Hans Morgenthau, “To intervene or not to intervene?” Foreign Affairs 45, no. 3 (1967), p. 430.  
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Rational choice 
It is important to not only consider the expectation of reciprocity as the guiding motivation. It 
is also the case that when states do decide to intervene this is based on rational calculations of 
whether it is likely to achieve national interest objectives. In other words, rational choice can 
explain the timing of intervention and why states decide to intervene in some cases and not in 
others. Here, for instance, it is instructive to consider the intervention in Kosovo. At the time, 
the decision was arguably dictated by changes to the geopolitical environment in Europe, 
which for the US and the UK brought attention to potential threats to regional instability, and 
challenged US primacy in the post-Cold War international order. In the case of Australia’s 
intervention into Timor Leste described below, rational choice can also account for why, after 
thirty years of ignoring international calls for action, a policy change was made by the 
Howard government and Australia became the lead nation in implementing the peace-
enforcement operation.  
 
Moral and material outcomes 
Both expectations of reciprocity and rational choice can account for the motives and context 
in which these operations are likely to take place. Moral and material outcomes can explain 
the effects of humanitarian operations. I realise that attempts at determining the moral 
outcomes of both peacekeeping and intervention are fraught with difficulty, given the 
potential for “moral hazard.”411 But for moral realism evidence that the operation had a 
positive effect on the recipient nation is important in connecting the intervening states 
expectations of reciprocity with policy results. Evidence of moral outcomes is not without 
precedent, and can range from the short-term effect of rescuing individuals from oppression, 
as was evident in the PKO in Iraq in 1991, or be more long-term and lead to independence 
and large-scale campaigns of state-building, as was evident in both Kosovo and Timor 
Leste.412 The level of moral benefit, however, will always be relative to the success of the 
operation determined by the intervening state itself. And here, evidence of material outcomes 
is important. This may be found in acquiring strategic gains from reducing the spread of 
                                           
411 The concept of a moral hazard associated with intervention was popularised by Michael Walzer who also 
referred to the “dirty hands” of the interveners in supporting a side that was just as brutal and corrupt as the 
current regime. See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 3rd ed, (New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 20-15.  
412 For a detailed examination of the evolution of UN peacekeeping, the structures involved and the type of 
operations see William J. Dursch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis 
(New York: St Martin Press, 1993). A specific analysis on UN transitional administration and efforts of state-
building can be found in Simon Chesterman, You: The People, the United Nations, Transitional Administration 
and State-Building (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).  
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cross-border security issues, or in increasing the prospect of trade and market opportunities 
by resolving long-standing conflicts. In some instances, the material benefits can go further in 
that the intervening state can stand to gain economic benefits from the awarding of 
reconstruction contracts and business links.  
 
Australia and humanitarian operations: Putting Australia’s national interest into 
perspective 
Now that I have outlined how a moral realist would approach instances of peacekeeping and 
intervention, it is necessary to apply this to a reading of Australia’s foreign policy 
involvement in the two cases of intervention identified in this thesis: Cambodia and Timor 
Leste.  But before I start my analysis, it is useful to present a picture of how Australia has 
traditionally responded to instances of human suffering. When making judgements on this 
policy arena, many are inclined to highlight Australia’s status as a middle power that has the 
capacity to “punch above its weight” when it comes to its level of influence in international 
affairs. The concept of a middle power has largely been associated with a set of normatively 
based prescriptions centred on the use of multilateralism as the preferred mode of diplomacy, 
and the desire to cement Australia’s place in the world through a combination of both 
interests and values – or what former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and others described as 
Good International Citizenship (GIC). 413  
 
As evidence to support claims of Australia as a GIC, scholars have typically pointed towards 
its history as an active member of peacekeeping. Since 1947, Australia has provided some 
65,000 personnel to over 50 UN and multilateral international peace and security 
operations.414 On the surface, this may seem like a significant contribution for a state with the 
size and capacity of Australia, but the bulk of this support was made after the end of the Cold 
War, where changes to the international environment made the commitment of national 
resources a more attractive foreign policy choice. Before then, Australia’s contribution had 
been relatively minor. It sent a small contingent to the UN Good Offices Commission 
(UNGOC) in the Dutch East Indies and to the UN Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) 
between 1947 and 1951. This was alongside Australia’s contribution to the monitoring 
mission in India-Pakistan in 1950, and the ground, air and naval forces sent to Korea during 
                                           
413 Interview with former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, Melbourne 2010.  
414 DFAT, “Peacekeeping and peace-building,” (2013). Available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au/un/peacekeeping-
and-peacebuilding.html (accessed 9 April 2014).  
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the same year. These missions were broadly linked to Australia’s desire to match the 
diplomacy displayed by Dr. H.V. Evatt during the creation of the UN with a certain amount 
of material support.415 Yet, once ANZUS was signed in 1951 Australia’s military resources 
were directed towards its support of its American great and powerful friend. Mutual concern 
with the US over the spread of communism guided its role in both the Korean War and in 
Vietnam. Likewise, a mixture of colonial ties and strategic interests guided Australia’s 
decision to station forces alongside the UK in the Malaya peninsula between 1950-1960, and 
in Borneo between 1963-1966. 416 
 
During this time, then, very few of Australia’s resources were dispatched to PKOs. In fact, 
until the late 1980s, Australia had participated in less than 20 UN sponsored peacekeeping 
missions and had deployed only 13 military personnel.417 A small contingent of military 
observers was sent to the Suez during the 1956 crisis. Australian medical staff were also sent 
to the UN Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea, and a small number of 
police were part of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFIC).418 Here, the context of Australia’s 
security and defence planning was significant. The Nixon Doctrine had signalled the end of 
Australia’s forward defence strategy and left Australian planners in doubt about how to 
ensure its security in the absence of a direct territorial threat. This resulted in ambiguity over 
where Australia’s military resources should be directed, which continued the low level of UN 
commitment. Australia sent a helicopter to the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) II and a small 
number of military observers to the Iraq-Iran Military Observer Group. Other notable (but 
limited) commitments were also made to Zimbabwe in 1979 and to the Multinational Force 
and Observers (MFO) to enforce the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1982.419  By 
                                           
415 For a detailed discussion on Australia’s role in talks at San Francisco and its greater participation in the UN 
during its early years see Norman Harper and David Sissions, Australia and the United Nations (Manhattan 
Publishing Company: New York, 1959), pp. 47-78. A considerable amount of foreign policy analysis has been 
devoted to Evatt’s activism in presenting Australia as a leader amongst smaller powers. Indeed, he is widely 
acknowledged to be the source of claims that Australia has a particular “brand” of foreign policy identified by 
its activism through international institutions and its championing of issues of equal representation. See David 
Lee and Christopher Waters, Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy (Canberra: 
Allen& Unwin, 1997).  
416 Hugh Smith, “The politics of peacekeeping in Australia,” in Smith ed. Australia and Peacekeeping 
(Canberra: Australia Defence Study Center, UNSW, Australian Defence Force Academy, 1990), pp. 30-32.  
417 Australia’s Role in United Nations Reform, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
(Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, June 2001), p. 215.  
418 T.B. Millar produced an excellent little book on Australia’s relationship with the UN, particularly detailing 
its activity from Korea to the early stages of the Konfrontasi. See T.B. Millar, “Threats to international peace 
and security,” in The Commonwealth and the United Nations (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1967), pp. 23-
91. 
419 Roudney Gouttman, Bondi in the Sinai: Australia, the MFO and the politics of participation (University 
Press of America: Maryland, 1996), pp. 1-20.  
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1985, Australia’s contribution to UN PKOs was at one of its lowest points, with deployments 
to the UN mission in India-Pakistan downscaled due to perceptions that Australia had 
overstretched its defence resources.420 
 
Australia’s approach towards humanitarian operations changed towards the end of the 1980s 
when it became clear that it needed to re-focus defence strategies to the protection of 
mainland Australia. This culminated in the 1986 Dibb Report, that stated Australia’s force 
structure should be determined by the independent ability to protect its own vital interests, 
which included the ability to exercise control over land territory, territorial seas and airspace 
vital to Australia’s security.421 An emphasis on Australia’s independent defence capability 
was part of the Hawke government’s overall perception that Australia’s security was too 
interdependent with the US, and needed to focus on building a defence capability that could 
respond to Australia’s unique strategic situation. 422 
 
A key aspect of this was the need to anticipate and respond to threats from its external 
environment, which meant a significant interest was to “seek cooperation with Southeast Asia 
and South Pacific friends in building their defence capabilities.”423 Since the number of direct 
threats to Australia was limited, participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian based 
missions was a means of demonstrating the value of Australia’s military capacity, as well as 
contributing to the goal of cooperation with regional partners through the mutual resolution 
of threats to international peace and security. In 1989, Australia made its largest contribution 
to date to the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia.424 While not 
traditionally in Australia’s direct sphere of influence, the mission was a chance for Australia 
                                           
420 Ibid, p. 4  
421 Paul Dibb, “Review of Australia’s defence capabilities,” Report to the Minister of Defence, Commonwealth 
of Australia, March 1986, p.3. Available at: 
http://www.defence.gov.au/SE/publications/defreview/1986/Review-of-Australias-Defence-Capabilities-
1986_Part1.pdf (accessed 10 April 2014).  
422 See Derek McDougal, “Australia and Asia-Pacific security regionalism: from Hawke and Keating to 
Howard,” Contemporary Southeast Asia (2001), pp. 81-100. 
423 Op. cit. p. 4.  
424Australia sent 300 personnel to assist in the engineering component. Australia’s contribution was targeted to 
assist in the building of roads, bridges, airstrips and camps. Bob Hawke, “Namibia,” HoR, Ministerial 
Statement. 6 March 1989. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=1;query=Uni
ted%20Nations%20Transitional%20Assistance%20Group%20in%20Namibia%20Decade%3A%221980s%22%
20Year%3A%221989%22;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 10 April 2014).  
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to gain international recognition to what Prime Minister Bob Hawke described as “one of the 
United Nations’ most substantial achievements for many years.” 425 
 
The other major humanitarian mission supported by Australia was the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). This mission demonstrated more clearly the 
strategic implications of Australia’s participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian 
intervention. Australia committed significant diplomatic and military resources to the 
operation. Foreign Minister Evans was personally influential in pushing each party to accept 
the terms of the Cambodian peace settlement that created the conditions for a multinational 
UN operation. Its diplomatic role was also not limited to the ministership of Evans, and 
extended back to the time of Foreign Minister Bill Hayden. In terms of its military 
contribution, Australia sent 600 Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel and provided the 
commander of the operation, Lt. Gen. John Sanderson. By the time UNTAC withdrew in 
1993, over 1,200 Australians had served in Cambodia. This was not the largest contingent, 
but Australia’s involvement represented a shift in the level and type of support being 
provided. Australia was more ready to commit combat trained troops to overseas operations, 
and this theme was reiterated in the 1991 and 1993 Strategic Reviews on Australia’s defence 
preparedness.  
  
The end of bipolarity introduced to Australian policymakers the strategic implications of 
peacekeeping and intervention, particularly given Australia’s geographic position in a largely 
underdeveloped, socially dislocated regional environment. The 1991 Force Structure Review 
recognised that Australia’s defence preparedness required a shift in its force structure 
“towards selectively higher levels of readiness so as to have the capacity to deal with the 
lower level military situations that might arise with little warning. This also provides a 
capacity to assist allies and regional friends.” 426 The 1993 Strategic Review tied Australia’s 
changing national strategic policy to its interests in maintaining regional security. 
Specifically, it stated that along with its “defence-in-depth” strategy:  
 
The ADF must be able to undertake a number of other important roles. 
Examples include natural disaster relief, assistance to the civil 
                                           
425 Ibid. 
426 DoD, “Force structure review 1991,” pp. 2-3. Available at: 
http://www.defence.gov.au/SE/publications/ForceStructureReview1991_opt.pdf (accessed 28 April 2014).  
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community, aid to the civil power, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, 
provision of assistance and responding to crises in the nearer region, and 
other activities in support of regional security.427  
 
Along with Cambodia, Australia sent a large military contingent to Somalia in 1993 and 
again to Rwanda in 1994. 428 Five years later, it was the lead nation of the UN-mandated 
International Force for East Timor (INTERFET). Like Cambodia, Australia’s commitment to 
INTERFET represented a turning point in how it understood its role in ensuring international 
peace and security. This time, the operation went further than the traditional peacekeeping 
role of the past and was more accurately described as “peace-enforcement” in that it fell 
under the Chapter VII use of “all necessary means.”429 Australia sent 5,700 ADF personnel to 
the operation, which represented the largest military contribution to the multinational force. 
Australia also contributed a substantial amount to the state-building effort through AusAID, 
estimated at $235 million over the first five-year period.430 Over a decade after Timorese 
independence in 2002, Australia remained the largest bilateral aid donor, providing over $100 
million a year. 431  
 
Much has been made of Australia’s involvement in both Cambodia and Timor Leste in that 
each case seemingly represented a normative shift in how policymakers traditionally 
perceived Australia’s approach to issue’s of human rights, self-determination and security. 432 
Yet the cursory evidence described above suggests that Australia’s foreign policy choices in 
this area have been consistent in being guided by rational calculations of its national interest. 
This is particularly so following the end of the Cold War, when changes to the balance of 
                                           
427 Australia’s strategy of “defence-in-depth” was part of its Defence of Australia (DoA), which sought to 
develop Australia’s military capabilities to a level of preparedness that could perform both defensive and 
offensive operations in the sea-air gap to Australia’s north and to its territorial defence. For more see DoD, “ 
Strategic review 1993,” pp. 44-46. Available at: 
http://www.defence.gov.au/SE/publications/stratreview/1993/1993_Part2.pdf (accessed 9 April 2014).  
428 Hugh Smith, “Australia,” in David Sorenson and Pia Wood eds. The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-
Cold War Era (Great Britain: Frank Coss, 2005), pp. 12-13. 
429 Resolution 1264 stated that the Security Council “acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations […] authorizes the States participating in the multinational force to take all necessary measures to fulfil 
[its] mandate.”  UN, Security Council, “Resolution 1264,” 15 September 1999. Available at: http://daccess-dds 
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/264/81/PDF/N9926481.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 29 May 2014).  
430 Figures compiled from AusAID budget reports from 2001-2005. See DFAT, Australian Aid, “Budgets,” 
(May 2013). Available at: http://aid.dfat.gov.au/budgets/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 29 May 2014).  
431 DFAT, Australian Aid, “ Timor Leste,” (2014). Available at: http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/eastasia/timor-
leste/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 29 May 2014).  
432 James Cotton, East Timor, Australia and Regional Order: Intervention and its Aftermath in Southeast Asia 
(London: Routledge Curzon, 2004).  
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power were arguably important in providing the right conditions for Australia to act. Rather 
than Australia’s approach reflecting foreign policy guided by GIC or normative middle 
power diplomacy, this indicates that its choices were determined by an expectation that it 
would achieve its strategic objectives under the Defence of Australia (DoA) doctrine that 
included greater defence cooperation with Southeast Asia as a major priority. From a moral 
realist perspective, this raises some interesting questions as to what specifically motivated 
Australia’s decision to intervene in each instance and whether this actually led to both moral 
and material outcomes. The rest of the chapter seeks to answer these questions.  
 
Australia and Cambodia: Morality meets interests in Australia’s foreign policy  
To understand Australia’s involvement in the Cambodian peace operation it is important to 
look back at Australia’s diplomatic relationship with the state. Australia’s broad involvement 
in Indochinese politics has been characterized as “dependent ally,” a term which is mostly 
argued in reference to Australia’s participation in the Vietnam War. 433 Its early involvement 
with Cambodia was also certainly guided by Australia’s support for US foreign policy. 
However, as will be discussed below, this does not adequately explain evidence that from the 
1980s Australia’s interests in Cambodia (and Vietnam) did not align with the US, and 
Australia’s diplomacy even led to then Secretary of State, George Schultz, calling Australian 
Foreign Minister Bill Hayden’s Cambodian proposal “Stoopid” at an ASEAN-Plus meeting 
in Bangkok in 1983.434 But during the Vietnam War, Australia’s role in Cambodia was to act 
as a diplomatic intermediary for US communications through Indochina.435 The Australian 
embassy in Cambodia was ideal for this purpose given it was already staffed with US liaison 
officers who had previously developed friendly relations with both South Vietnamese and 
Cambodian elites.  This meant that during the early stages of the Vietnam War it was able to 
act as an interlocutor for the establishment of US-Cambodian intelligence sharing, and related 
operational activity along the Cambodian/South Vietnamese border.436  
                                           
433 Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War as part of its commitment to the ANZUS alliance will be 
discussed in more detail in the chapter that follows on Australia’s security partnership with the US. Briefly, it 
has been commonplace to argue that Australia’s response towards Vietnam was a classic case of alliance 
entrapment where Australia was forced into the war because of its obligations under the ANZUS treaty. For 
more on Australia’s role as a dependent ally during the Vietnam War see Joseph Camilleri, Australian-American 
Relations: The Web of Dependence (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1980) and Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in 
Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988).  
434 Hayden responded to this remark with “Well, Mr Secretary, not as stoopid as your efforts in Vietnam.” For 
more on this entertaining episode of diplomacy see Blanche D’Alpuget Hawke: A Prime Minister (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 2011), p. 181.  
435 NAA, A1364/2/1 “Australian representation of US interests in Cambodia,” November 1965. 
436 NAA, A3016/10/12 “Cambodian/US relations” Brief memo to the Prime Minister, May 1967. 
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Following the end of the Vietnam War, Australia’s diplomacy and involvement in Cambodia 
started to depart from the various multilateral peace negotiations that started after Vietnam’s 
invasion of Cambodia in 1978.437 These negotiations began in 1981 and went for 8 years 
before they were abandoned in 1989 without the parties reaching a resolution. Australia had 
no direct involvement in these negotiations, yet had strategic and economic interests in seeing 
a resolution to the conflict. The most important of these was the reset of previous attempts at 
building strong relations with Vietnam, and Australia immediately set out to achieve this, 
despite condemnation from the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), China 
and the US.438 In 1983, Labor came to power with a Vietnam policy platform that began with 
the restoration of direct aid, which Australia had previously been forced to cut, in line with 
ASEAN and US policies of isolating Hanoi. While under previous governments Australia had 
continued bilateral aid to Laos as an indirect signal of its interests in Vietnam, the Hawke 
government determined that the nation should be given alternatives to dependency on the 
Soviet Union, and since Australia had already established a diplomatic post in Vietnam, it 
was ideally suited for this role. 439  
 
Australia also viewed the conflict in Cambodia as a significant threat to regional peace and 
security. It showed signs of becoming a protracted civil and regional conflict that had the 
potential to exacerbate great power competition in Australia’s strategic sphere of influence. 
Taking steps to resolve the crisis was expected to achieve the economic benefits of improving 
relations with Vietnam described above, as well as represent Australia’s contribution towards 
                                           
437 There were several unsuccessful regional and international attempt’s at resolving the crisis before a 
resolution was achieved at the Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) in 1991.  In 1981, the UN convened an 
International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) to discuss the issue of Vietnamese occupation and the 
Cambodian civil conflict, but Vietnam did not attend as they assumed the Western backed Coalition 
Government of the Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) was being given a platform to declare themselves the 
legitimate government of Cambodia. This Conference was followed by an initiative put forward by Russian 
President Mikael Gorbachev in July 1986. The Gorbachev initiative called for the normalization of Sino-
Vietnamese relations as he saw the divide between the Chinese backed Democratic Kampuchea (DK) and the 
Vietnamese installed Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), as the main obstacle to reaching any resolution to 
the conflict. A regional proposal was put forward in July 1988 and early 1989 when Indonesia proposed the 
Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIMs). The JIMs were the first time that the four Cambodian factions, Vietnam, 
Laos and the six members of ASEAN came together at a neutral setting to discuss the Cambodian problem. 
These meetings were specifically convened to resolve the issue of who would hold government in Cambodia. 
For a detailed account of these initiatives see David Chandler, “Cambodia Since 1979,” A History of Cambodia, 
3rd ed. (Colorado: Westview Press, 2000), pp. 227-246. 
438 For more on the importance of Vietnam to Australia’s diplomacy in Cambodia see Jannika Brostrom, “Re-
evaluating Australia’s ‘Cooperative Security’ in Cambodia,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 60, no. 
4 (2014), pp. 549-563. 
439 Peter Howarth, “Vietnam and Australia: The Cambodian situation and bilateral relations,” Australian 
Foreign Affairs Record 56 no. 3 (1985), p.175.  
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regional peace and security. These expectations were informed by both moral and material 
expectations. For Hawke, Australia’s activism was motivated by a distinct “moral obligation 
to make an effort to alleviate the human suffering arising from that situation” and a belief that 
as one of the only nations with a good relationship with Vietnam, China, ASEAN and 
Thailand, there was a reasonable expectation that Australia could assist in reaching a 
resolution to the crisis.440 
 
Thus, on a four-day visit to Vietnam in July 1983, Hayden announced a series of policy 
initiatives that demonstrated Canberra’s commitment to a warming of bilateral relations. 
These included ministerial exchanges, academic and information seminars, trade promotion 
assistance and English language training for Vietnamese living in Australia.441 In a show of 
support for Australia’s efforts, Vietnamese foreign minister Nguyen Co Thach visited 
Australia in 1984 and Hayden travelled to Vietnam again in 1985. This policy engagement 
was immediately condemned by China and the US, who were against any signs of 
rapprochement with Vietnam during its aggression towards Cambodia.442 In Beijing, leaders 
declared that Australia was being used by Hanoi as a “cats paw” and the US looked on 
Australia’s actions with some concern, having been unsuccessful at blocking Vietnam’s 
request for multilateral aid through UN agencies.443 Disapproval of Australian diplomacy was 
compounded by its decision to withdraw as co-sponsor for ASEAN’s UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) resolution, which called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodia, and 
self-determination for the Cambodian people.444 Hayden argued that Australia could not 
                                           
440 Bob Hawke, “Speech to Washington press club,” Press Releases, 15 June 1983. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=Bob%20Ha
wke%20Cambodia%20Decade%3A%221980s%22%20Year%3A%221983%22;rec=8;resCount=Default 
(accessed 30 September 2015).  
441 Matthew Richardson, “Hayden’s Vietnam aid ‘coup,’” The Sydney Morning Herald, 4 July 1983, p. 3 
442 The federal Liberal opposition was also against Australia’s public diplomacy towards Vietnam, as they 
feared it would alienate Australia from ASEAN and the US. They were also against any action that could be 
viewed as Australia’s accepting or condoning Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia. Partisan policy differences 
can be an important factor in determining what variables, like the perception of elites on foreign policy 
decisions, can intervene at the domestic level and explain how parties sell policy. However, as this thesis is 
primarily concerned with evaluating foreign policy outcomes, a discussion of party differences in policy would 
not add much in the way of understanding how national policy decisions lead to specific outcomes. For more on 
the domestic debates on Australia’s rapprochement with Vietnam, see “Australia and Indo-China,” HoR, 7 
December 1983. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=Diplomatic
%20relations%20Vietnam%20Decade%3A%221980s%22%20Year%3A%221983%22;rec=0;resCount=Default 
(accessed 20 April 2014).  
443 Ian Davis, “China calls Hayden a “‘cat’s paw’ for Hanoi,” The Age, 14 March 1985, p.1  
444 Australia still voted in support of the bill, but was unwilling to have their name attached to the bill itself.  
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support a bill that sought to further marginalize Vietnam, and did nothing to halt the 
influence of the Pol Pot regime. 445 
 
The issue of bilateral aid to Vietnam continued until 1984 and generated several debates in 
the Australian House of Representatives.446 Australia continued to follow the US and 
ASEAN in refusing to restore direct bilateral aid to Vietnam until 1991, as did the rest of 
international society. However, Australia did provide some assistance. To appease 
international concerns Australia changed how its aid policy was described, outlining a 
distinction between humanitarian and developmental assistance. The aid provided to Vietnam 
was described as “humanitarian,” and therefore not tied to any conditions of support for the 
Vietnamese government. This was accepted as a less overt form of bilateral aid delivery, 
even though it led to the development of a joint Australian NGO office in Phnom Penh, and 
other joint projects in agriculture, education and health, as well as the awarding of a contract 
to the government owned Overseas Telecommunications Cooperation (OTC) to build a radio 
satellite station in Ho Chi Minh City.447 Australia’s actions in pursuing this approach 
demonstrated signs of reciprocity when Vietnam singled out Australia as the only non-
fraternal state with which it would be interested in developing stronger diplomatic relations 
with.448 Canberra’s commitment to providing humanitarian aid continued through the 
Cambodian negotiations, to the extent that by 1990 it was providing nearly $20 million 
annually in assistance. 449 
 
Alongside pursuing bilateral ties with Vietnam, Hayden, under the direction of Hawke, 
started to initiate dialogue amongst the key players involved in the conflict (ASEAN, China, 
the Soviet Union, Cambodia, Vietnam and the US), on reaching a peaceful solution. 450 
                                           
445 Bill Hayden, “Questions without notice: Kampuchea,” HoR, no. 13, 18 October 1983, pp. 1813-1814.  
446 These debates occurred in the Senate in response to the Labor Government canvassing with regional and 
international partners whether it should resume foreign aid to Vietnam. The opposition was of the view that 
bilateral aid should not resume until Vietnam withdrew its forces from Cambodia and Laos. For the senate 
debate see “Australian aid to Vietnam,” Senate, 26 May 1983. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=2;query=foreign%20
aid%20Vietnam%201983%20Decade%3A%221980s%22%20Year%3A%221983%22;rec=0;resCount=Default 
(accessed 15 May 2014).  
447 Carlyle Thayer, “Australia and Southeast Asia,” in Fred Mediansky ed Australia in a Changing World: New 
Directions in Foreign Policy (Maxwell Macmillan: NSW, 1992), p.276. 
448 Ibid, p. 276.  
449 Gareth Evans, “Australia, Vietnam and the region,” Opening address by Senator Gareth Evans, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, to the Conference on Vietnam’s Economic Renovation, Research School of Pacific 
Studies, ANU, Canberra, 18 September 1990. Available at: 
http://www.gevans.org/speeches/old/1990/180990_fm_ausvietnam.pdf (accessed 15 May 2014).  
450 Hayden, Hayden: An Autobiography (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1996), p. 378.  
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Australia’s role at this point was to only act as a dialogue facilitator to encourage all parties 
to come to a resolution. The reasons for Australia’s diplomacy were clearly guided by an 
expectation of reciprocity of material returns. Hayden explained that Australia had a specific 
interest in the Cambodian problem as “the greatest unresolved source of tension in the 
Southeast Asian region,” which affected its ties with Vietnam and contributed to security 
concerns in refugee flows.451 In the series of individual talks conducted in 1985 between 
Hayden, who was sometimes accompanied by Michael Costello, and Vietnamese Foreign 
Minister Nguyen Co Thach and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, there was some 
discussion on the features of a peace settlement. These features included a ceasefire; the 
removal of Pol Pot; an international observer role for the UN; and the phased withdrawal of 
Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. During these discussions, Hayden made some progress 
on getting Hun Sen to make concessions towards Prince Sihanouk in exchange for his 
support in removing the Pol Pot regime.452 Hayden viewed justice for the victims of the 
Khmer Rouge as one of the main impediments towards reaching any resolution on Cambodia 
and attempted to resolve the issue by suggesting the establishment of an international tribunal 
to try the regime for its crimes. This was proposed at another ASEAN-Plus meeting in 
Manilla in 1986, but was immediately dismissed by Schultz and failed to achieve consensus 
amongst ASEAN members.453 By the end of 1986, Hayden’s efforts had proved unsuccessful 
at gathering support for any further dialogue on a Cambodian peace settlement, and as a 
result Australia’s diplomacy on the issue was discontinued. However, these government-to-
government links did act as a precursor to the “shuttle diplomacy” that followed and helped 
to achieve wider approval of the Australian peace proposal put forward between 1989 and 
1991.  
 
The above evidence demonstrates that Australia had specific moral and material expectations 
of reciprocity driving its activism towards resolving the Cambodian problem. The first, and 
most obvious, was the strategic interests in resolving an ongoing regional conflict that had 
dominated Southeast Asian politics for decades. The second, and less discussed, was the 
warming of relations with Vietnam. These motivations were pursued despite risks to 
Australia’s international reputation and damage to its relationships with ASEAN states, 
particularly Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. This indicates that Australia determined the 
                                           
451 Hayden, “Australia and Indochina,” Australian Foreign Affairs Record 56, no. 12 (1983), p. 799.  
452 David Jenkins, “Hun Sen in praise of Hayden’s peace initiative,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 28 October 
1991, p. 2.  
453 Peter Hastings, “Hayden takes on Pol Pot,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 September 1986, p. 10.  
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benefits from pursuing a resolution to outweigh the potential costs in doing so. Yet, in stating 
this, when it was clear that Hayden’s diplomacy was not achieving the expected returns, 
Australia cooled its efforts. In this regard, Australia was exercising rational choice in that the 
pursuit of a resolution was not worth the national capital required to continue to push for a 
resolution. This changed two years later when external conditions shifted and a resolution to 
the Cambodian problem became a central feature of Australia’s foreign and security policy. 
The next section will focus on the expectations of reciprocity combined with rational choice 
that characterized Australia’s response to this issue.  
 
Australia’s Cambodian peace proposal: Expectations of reciprocity and rational choice 
The second Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) held in July 1989 remained deadlocked 
over the contentious issue of power sharing between the four Cambodian parties: the 
Vietnamese-installed People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and the three factions that 
formed the Coalition Government Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK).454 From 1989 
Australia’s contribution towards international efforts to resolve the crisis was to gather 
support for its own peace proposal that would push past this stalemate.455  
 
The expectations of reciprocity guiding Australia’s decision to become involved in the crisis 
were again twofold. The first and most important was the significant material interests that 
were consistent with Australia’s previous diplomacy. The crisis was having a prolonged 
impact on Australia’s regional security, which was now also having an affect on Australia’s 
ability to develop relationships with key regional nations, during a time where the Labor 
government identified Asia-Pacific engagement as a priority. As stated by Evan’s in 
reference to the problem of Cambodia:  
 
“It is the single greatest source of instability in the region. It feeds tensions 
and hostility between regional countries who could and should be friends. It 
                                           
454 The CGDK consisted of the three coalition factions competing against the Vietnamese installed PRK. They 
included the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia 
(FUNCINPEC); the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) or the Khmer Rouge; and the Khmer People’s 
National Liberation Front (KPNLF).  
455 “Australian and United Nations representatives are playing a key role in peace negotiations in Cambodia.” 
Transcript of Dateline interview with Gareth Evans, Saturday 19 October 1991. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Australian%20and%20United%20
Nations%20representatives%20are%20playing%20a%20key%20role%20in%20peace%20negotiations%20in%
20Cambodia;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 15 May 2014). 
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draws in the great powers and perpetuates divisions between them, and 
those who support them.”456 
 
Aside from the clear strategic expectations sought by pushing for a resolution to the crisis, 
Australia also expected that its involvement would contribute towards achieving relative 
peace in Cambodia. Evan’s highlighted this moral expectation when he stated that, “Australia 
has a humanitarian obligation to help resolve the tragedy that has engulfed Cambodia.”457 In 
this regard, the expectations and diplomatic approach where in line with a moral realist 
reading of the evidence. Evans proposed a peace initiative that included conditions made by 
Hayden during his previous diplomatic efforts, such as a negotiated ceasefire and withdrawal 
of foreign forces, except this time he made an important inclusion: a new role for the UN as a 
transitional administration that would have sovereignty authority over Cambodia’s internal 
organization during its transition to democracy.458 This proposal was important because it 
allowed for the heated issue of who would govern Cambodia to be left off the negotiating 
table, making it easier to achieve consensus for a peace plan. Australia’s strategy to achieve 
consensus on its plan was to engage in an intense process of “shuttle-diplomacy.”  Now 
Secretary of DFAT, Michael Costello, conducted 29 meetings between 1989 and 1990 where 
he met with representatives from 13 different states (some of which included the Soviet 
Union, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia Japan and China), over 21 days.459 In anticipation of a 
UN presence, Australia also sent a technical mission to Cambodia, Thailand and the 
Thai/Cambodian border to gain knowledge on the conflict, and on the administrative and 
social structures of the Cambodian state.460 The end result of these efforts was international 
acceptance of the Australian peace proposal. The exact details of the plan was expanded into 
a working paper series “Cambodia: An Australian Proposal,” which was presented to all four 
Cambodian parties, ASEAN, Vietnam and Laos, at the Jakarta Informal Meeting on 
Cambodia (IMC) in February 1990.461  
 
                                           
456 Gareth Evans, “Australia, Indo-China and the Australian Peace Initiative,” Address by the Minister for 
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459 Anna Grutzner, “Australia paves way for peace,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 15 January 1990, p. 7.  
460 Gareth Evans, “Cambodia: the peace process – and after,” Speech, Cambodia Roundtable, Monash 
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The Australian proposal outlined the establishment of a Supreme National Council (SNC) 
that would have authority over Cambodian sovereignty. The UN would supervise the 
withdrawal of foreign forces, have direct control of the civil and political administration 
during the transition to Cambodian governance, and ensure free and fair elections.462 By the 
end of 1991, Indonesia, France, the UN Security Council and the four Cambodian parties had 
agreed to a SNC to oversee Cambodian sovereignty during the transition towards 
democracy.463 The SNC was chaired by Prince Sihanouk, and included representatives from 
the PRK and the three parties from the CGDK. International acceptance of the SNC created 
the conditions for a UN resolution on a PKO to be implemented in Cambodia. This occurred 
in 1991 when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 717, which formed the 268 
member’s United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC).464 This peacekeeping 
mission led to the creation of UNTAC, which supervised the Cambodian elections and was in 
charge of implementing the “Agreements on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the 
Cambodia Conflict signed in Paris.”465 
 
It is important to note that the timing of the end of the Cold War was critical in getting all of 
the Cambodian parties to support the Paris Agreements and in Australia’s decision to commit 
to finding a resolution. Previously, influence from external parties had made this impossible, 
as each political faction was supported by the interests of a separate competing great power. 
Following the end of the Vietnam War, and the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine, 
Beijing was both wary of Moscow’s intentions in filling the hegemonic vacuum, and 
threatened by Vietnam’s emergence as a regional power.466 China originally courted the 
support of Hanoi and put pressure on the nation to abandon its policy of neutrality during the 
Sino-Soviet rivalry. But Chinese conditions on economic assistance and US-ASEAN arms 
and goods embargos pushed Vietnam closer to Moscow. In the background, Sino-Soviet 
competition continued and intensified as the US developed closer relations with China. 
Vietnam was also fearful of policies of encirclement as China openly declared support for the 
                                           
462 The idea for the UN to have transitional authority over Cambodia originally came from an America senator 
Stephen Solarz who was in close contact with Evans.  
463 “Cambodia agrees to UN controlled election.” Special to The New York Times, Thursday 14 December 1989, 
p. 17.  
464 UN, “Resolution 717.” 16 October 1991. Available at: http://daccess-dds-
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Khmer Rouge, supplying arms to the regime. 467 In November 1978, Vietnam signed a 
“Treaty of Friendship” with the Soviet Union and on the 25th of December 1978 Vietnam 
invaded Cambodia.468 
 
Meanwhile, Cambodia itself was undergoing a massive civil and humanitarian crisis. 
Between 1975 and 1979, the political party of the Khmer rouge, the Democratic Kampuchea 
(DK), governed Cambodia under the leadership of Pol Pot. The DK promoted a particularly 
extreme form of xenophobic Khmer nationalism that led to the implementation of “Year 
Zero”: a purification strategy that was largely responsible for the estimated death of 1.5 
million people and the forceful displacement of 270,000 Cambodians, many of whom sought 
asylum at the Cambodian/Thai border.469 At the same time, a regional conflict with Vietnam 
was also waging, threatening the security and stability of Indochina. The DK was fearful of 
communist Vietnam and its potential for regional hegemony, and had been engaging in 
border clashes since 1975.470 International attempts at resolving the border disputes failed 
largely as a result of Chinese Security Council veto. The Chinese publically supported the 
DK and had been supplying arms to the regime as part of its strategy to marginalise Vietnam 
(and the influence of the Soviet Union) from mainland Southeast Asia.471 The Soviet Union 
had also been supplying arms, economic aid and fuel to Vietnam since 1978 and was in 
support of the continued rule of the Vietnamese installed PRK. On the other side, the CGDK, 
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Vietnamese. For more on the policies of the DK, see Francois Ponchuad, Cambodia Year Zero (New York: 
Holts Rinehart and Winston, 1978).  
470 The Khmer Rouge and the communist forces in Vietnam had been loosely aligned during the Vietnam War. 
However, following unification, the DK became increasingly concerned about the rising dominance of a Soviet 
backed Vietnam. As well as the border clashes, which lasted up until invasion, the DK purged Vietnamese 
trained military personnel and attacked the disputed Phu Quoc Island. For more on Cambodian-Vietnamese 
relations during the lead up to Vietnam’s invasion see Joseph R. Pouvatchy, “Cambodian-Vietnamese 
relations,” Asian Survey 26, no. 4 (1986), pp. 440-451.  
471 The Vietnamese made a proposal to the UN in February 1978 that would allow for the international 
supervised withdrawal of forces from border areas, but the proposal was refused by the Khmer Rouge and 
lacked the key support of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). For an extended investigation into the history of 
border clashes between Vietnam and Cambodia see Ramses Amer, “Cambodia and Vietnam: A troubled 
relationship,” in N Ganesen and Rames Amer eds. International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between 
Bilateralism and Multilateralism (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia, 2010), pp. 92-117.  
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as the non-communist resistance, was supported by ASEAN and the US, both of which 
provided non-lethal assistance to the coalition.472  
 
Thus, the conflict in Cambodia was essentially operating at three levels: the political and 
humanitarian crisis at the domestic level, the Indochinese disputes at the regional level, and 
the international competition between the great powers at the international level. Australia’s 
proposal for the UN to act as custodian for Cambodia’s sovereignty was critical in that it 
sidestepped the important issue of who would govern the country. It also provided China a 
way to save face in stopping its support for the Khmer Rouge, which had been a major 
impediment to previous peace agreements.473 While this proposal was important, it was made 
possible by the events leading to the end of the Cold War.  
 
The Soviet Union, as part of its economic reforms, began reducing its economic and military 
assistance to Vietnam, which had been undergoing its own period of economic 
transformation. Vietnam had been receiving $US1.8 billion in economic aid annually and an 
estimated $US1.4 billion in military assistance. On top of its direct aid, the Soviet Union was 
also the recipient of 90% of Vietnam’s raw materials and 70% of its grain imports.474 The 
Soviet Union’s declaration of reducing aid in 1986 resulted in a 20% loss to Vietnam’s 
economic aid and a 30% reduction in its military budget.475 This inevitably hastened 
Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia, which occurred in 1989. Likewise, the political and 
economic reforms occurring in the Soviet Union at the time meant that it was more willing to 
support a peace agreement. Indeed, the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had already put 
forward a proposal for peace in 1986, but this had failed because of Sino-Vietnamese rivalry. 
Chinese-Vietnamese relations were also showing signs of rapprochement, with border clashes 
                                           
472 As mentioned previously, the CGDK consisted of three different parties: FUNCINPEC, the DK (Khmer 
Rouge) and the KPNLF. The FUNCINPEC was made up of supporters loyal to the leadership of exiled Prince 
Sihanouk while the KPNLF consisted of supporters that were split between their loyalty to General Dien Del 
who formed the party after the Vietnamese invasion, and former Buddhist Prime Mister Son Sann. Before the 
formation of CGDK in 1982, the KPNLF and FUNCINPEC aligned to form the non-communist resistance 
against the Khmer Rouge. These three parties were then loosely aligned in their resistance to the PRK. 
However, the Chinese supported DK were in opposition to the Western backed KPNLF and FUNCINPEC, 
which added another layer of competition to the crisis. For a more detailed political history of Cambodia see 
Justin Corfield, The History of Cambodia (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2009). 
473 Interview with former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, Melbourne 2010. 
474  V. Largo, ed., Vietnam: Current Issues and Historical Background (New York: Nova Publishers, 2002), p. 
177.  
475 Carlyle A. Thayer, The Vietnam People’s Army under Doi Moi (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1994), pp. 21-24. 
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having ended by 1988.476  A combination of these external factors meant the timing was right 
for a renewed push for a peace plan, and between 1989 and 1991, Australia’s diplomacy on 
Cambodia was at its peak. This demonstrates that rational choice was present in that Australia 
expected to receive significant material benefits in return for its efforts in resolving the crisis.  
 
A rational calculation of expected returns was particularly important given the level of 
resource commitment. The diplomatic initiative described above was met with material costs. 
The overall cost of the mission was $US1.7 billion and Australia’s contribution was $28.7 
million, which represented 1.51% of the total expenditure for the operation.477 Australia also 
made a significant military contribution. When the United Nations Advance Mission in 
Cambodia (UNAMIC) was established in October 1991 to create a neutral environment for 
the disarmament effort, Australia provided the signallers unit with 65 personnel.478 Its 
commitment then increased with the established of UNTAC in 1992. Australian Lt General 
John Sanderson was in charge of the UNTAC force and Australia provided the first 
contingent of 500 personnel through the Force Communications Unit.479 Australia also 
provided Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) personnel 
to the second contingent, as well as 14 personnel to serve on the UNTAC headquarters staff, 
and 10 police offers dispatched for the UNTAC’s civilian component. In response to a 
request for further assistance in May 1992, Australia provided a movement control unit of 30 
personnel to assist with the deployment of UTAC’s forces. It also provided an additional 115 
troops and six Blackhawk helicopters.480 
 
Immediate returns from Australia’s diplomacy were found in international prestige. 
Canberra’s petitioning for Australia to be the leader of the peacekeeping operation was 
                                           
476 Carlyle A. Thayer, “Sino-Vietnamese relations: The interplay of ideology and national interest,” Asian 
Survey 35, no. 6 (1994), pp. 517-518.  
477 Paul Keating, “Cambodia,” HoR, 1 April 1992. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=UNTAC%2
0costs;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 20 May 2014).  
478 Australian War Memorial, “United Nations transitional authority in Cambodia, 1992-1993” (2014). 
Available at: https://www.awm.gov.au/unit/U60642/ (accessed16 May 2014).  
479 Gareth Evans, “Ministerial Statement – Cambodia,” Senate, 1 April 1992. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Australian%20contribution%20to
wards%20UNTAC;rec=10;resCount=Default (accessed 16 May 2014).  
480 Robert Ray, “UN request for further UNTAC contribution,” Media Release, no. 119, 5 May 1992. Available 
at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/2940463/upload_binary/2940463.pdf;fileType=app
lication%2Fpdf#search=%22Robert%20Ray%20Cambodia%201990s%201992%20media%2005%22 (accessed 
20 May 2014).  
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determined by the expectation that it would solidify the initial reputational benefits.481 But it 
was not just expected returns in reputation that motivated Australia’s level of military 
commitment: there were also significant strategic benefits in that Australia was provided with 
an opportunity to achieve its long-term policy of “comprehensive engagement” in Southeast 
Asia. This was the overarching policy motivation guiding Australia’s decision to participate 
in the PKO, which led to material payoffs in inter-operability training with Southeast Asian 
forces.  
 
The end of the Cold War meant Australia had to adapt to the end of its forward defence 
strategy and consider issues of regional security not determined by the bipolar system, as 
intra-state conflict had the potential to threaten the balance of regional stability. Following 
the release of DoA and in response to a changing security environment, Evans made a major 
speech in 1989 redefining Australia’s regional security and defence strategy. It emphasized 
the relationship between national defence and Australia’s need to exert a more confident role 
in the Asia-Pacific, where the capability of Australia’s armed forces had a relevance for both 
the defence of Australia and for the defence of the region, otherwise it was at risk of being 
left with “a secondary role in the region.”482 Of particular interest was greater defence 
participation in Southeast Asia, which was identified as a means for Australia to have a role 
in shaping issues of international strategic importance “in ways which are not open to us 
elsewhere.”483 
 
Yet, despite Evan’s identifying Southeast Asia as a priority for Australian security and 
defence policy, the extent to which Australia could legitimately use force in the pursuit of 
interests outside the defence of its national territory was severely limited. The differences in 
culture, population size and relative diplomatic influence between Australia and states of 
Southeast Asia (particularly Indonesia) made defence cooperation difficult to pursue.484 In 
Evans’ own words:  
 
                                           
481 This point has also been made by Derek McDougall who argued that the combination of Australia’s 
diplomacy under Evans and Sanderson’s leadership of UNTAC increased Australia’s international standing. See 
Derek McDougall, “Australia’s peacekeeping role in the post-cold war era,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 
(2002), p. 596. 
482 Gareth Evans, “Australia’s regional security,” Ministerial Statement by Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, 
Senate, 6 December 1989. Available at: 
http://www.gevans.org/speeches/old/1989/061289_fm_regionalsecurity.pdf (accessed 30 May 2014). 
483 Ibid. 
484 DoD, The Defence of Australia 1987 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1987), p. 31.  
 159 
In considering this issue [the use of force] we are effectively looking 
only at the South Pacific, where our military power is disproportionally 
large: our ability to undertake such initiatives in the countries of 
Southeast Asia will be very limited.485  
 
The ability to excise military resources to help resolve the Cambodian conflict represented an 
opportunity for Australia to achieve this more elusive strategic goal without jeopardising its 
diplomatic standing in the region. And assuming leadership in the military operation also 
meant Australia could gain operational experience and inter-operability with Southeast Asian 
militaries without having to negotiate individual defence cooperation agreements. In fact, the 
effort placed in building a consensus on Australia’s role in implementing the PKO 
strengthened its standing among Southeast Asian states, and led to further reciprocal benefits 
when Indonesia’s public support for the Australian proposals led to an invitation to 
participate in the IMC.486 This was a step forward for Australia’s policy of regional 
engagement, as it had previously been shut out of direct talks on issues affecting Southeast 
Asian security and stability.  
 
The wider acceptance of Australia’s actions in Cambodia also carried weight when it came to 
presenting its proposals for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum where 
Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas agreed to cooperate with Australia at the preliminary 
meetings on APEC and assisted in convincing the other ASEAN states to accept its initiative 
with the first forum meeting being held in Canberra in November, 1989.487 Indonesia’s 
support was especially important given the heavy opposition from Malaysia, which attempted 
to squash Australia’s APEC initiative by putting forward a proposal for an East Asian 
Economic Caucus. Indeed, Evans noted the centrality of Australia’s relationship with 
Indonesia as recently as November 2012: “steady diplomatic progress was made in the 
                                           
485 Gareth Evans, Australia’s Regional Security (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1989), pp. 
21-22.  
486 Gareth Evans, “Prospects for a Cambodian peace settlement,” Ministerial Statement by Senator Gareth 
Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senate, 6 December 1990. Available at: 
http://www.gevans.org/speeches/old/1990/061290_fm_prospectsforcambodiapeace.pdf (accessed 22 October 
2015).  
487 Gareth Evans, “Australia and Indonesia: A developing relationship,” Speech, to the Conference on 
Indonesia’s New Order: Past, Prese and Future, 4 December 1989. Available at: 
http://www.gevans.org/speeches/old/1989/041289_fm_australiaandindones.pdf (accessed 25 May 2014).  
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refinement and development of the Australian-initiated plan […] largely because of the close 
personal relationship I had developed with Al Alatas.”488 
 
Moral and material outcomes: Self-determination and Australia’s strategic and economic 
interests 
The expectation of reciprocity motivating Australia’s decision to propose and support a 
Cambodian peace settlement does not detract from the moral outcomes achieved. Despite 
resistance from the Khmer Rouge in cooperating with the disarmament and demobilization 
process, UN sponsored elections were held between the 23rd and 27th of May 1993. 89.6% of 
the eligible population turned out to vote and the National United Front for an Independent, 
Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) party won 45.5% of the 
vote.489 Following the results, the elected Constituent Assembly enacted the constitution three 
months later. This body was then transformed into the Legislative Assembly as per the 
requirements of the Paris Agreements. UNTAC’s mandate formally ended on 24th September, 
the same day the constitution was promulgated.490 Cambodia was declared a constitutional 
monarchy and a new power-sharing government was formed between Prince Norondom 
Ranariddh (son of Sihanouk) and Hun Sen under the reign of King Sihanouk. In effect, the 
peace settlement and UNTAC achieved their primary objective of returning sovereign control 
to the Cambodian people who were able to determine their own government. 491   
 
                                           
488  Gareth Evans, “Cambodia: the peace process – and after,” Speech, Cambodia Roundtable, Monash 
University, 2 November 2012. Available at: http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech498.html (accessed 25 May 
2014). 
489 45.5% of the vote reflected 58 out of 120 Assembly seats while the other main winner the Cambodian 
Peoples Party (CPP) won 38.2% and 51 seats. The FUNCINPEC dominated the vote but had little 
administrative resources and a small military. The CCP, on the other hand, controlled more of the administrative 
structures and a larger share of the armed forces. A new constitution had to be ratified by two-thirds majority in 
the Assembly, which meant some form of power sharing had to be made between the two parties. An astute 
analysis of the election and its aftermath can be found in Amitav Acharya, “Cambodia, the United Nations and 
the problems of peace,” The Pacific Review 7, no. 3 (1994), pp. 297-308. 
490 The ADF completed their withdrawal as part of UNTAC on 15 November 1993.  
491 While it was the case that UNTAC achieved its goals of overseeing a relatively free and fair election, and the 
power-sharing agreement between Prince Norondom Ranariddh and Hun Sen was recognized by both parties as 
well as the Legislative Assembly, in 1997 Prime Minister Hun Sen instigated a coup d'état and sacked Prince 
Ranariddh as co-Prime Minister. Since then, Hun Sen has reigned over Cambodia as its sole Prime Minister for 
over 20 years. The events that occurred after the withdrawal of UNTAC and the continued reign of Hun Sen has 
led to criticisms of the process of democratization and the strength of Cambodia’s democracy. For more on 
these points see Joakim Öjenda and Mona Lilja eds. Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political Reconstruction 
in a Post-Conflict Society (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2009) and Simon Springer, 
Cambodia’s Neoliberal Order: Violence, Authoritarianism and the Contest for Public Space (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2010). These arguments are important, but they do not detract from the fact that UNTAC did achieve 
its mandate and Australia’s efforts demonstrate that an expectation of reciprocity, combined with rational 
choice, can lead to a moral outcome. In any case, moral realism does not claim to make predictions about how 
future events will play out, it only claims to describe the factors involved when they do.  
 161 
Apart from the moral outcomes of democratic elections, Cambodia also benefited from 
relative social stability. The Paris Agreements ensured that all external patrons withdrew their 
material support of the competing political groups, significantly reducing the prospect of an 
endless civil war. The withdrawal of foreign support was particularly important in dealing 
with the Khmer Rouge, who, without Chinese backing, was diminished in capacity and 
size.492 Normalization of Cambodia’s internal politics also meant that it was no longer 
considered a pariah state and was allowed to re-join regional architecture such as the Mekong 
Committee, which Cambodia had been unable to participate in since 1976.493 Stability also 
allowed for the safe return of over 370,000 Cambodian refugees and the international 
reconstruction effort contributed significantly to infrastructure development and the delivery 
of essential services.494 The International Committee for the Reconstruction of Cambodia 
(ICRC) rose over $US1 billion, of which Australia contributed an initial estimated $52 
million.495 This increased to $92 million (and included civilian aid and military assistance 
under the Defence Cooperation program), over four years between 1994 and 1998. 
Australia’s assistance went towards education, de-mining, health, agriculture and 
rehabilitation of infrastructure.496 
 
The initial support for Cambodian reconstruction led to some material benefits in closer 
defence cooperation and investment in communication technologies primarily by Telstra, 
                                           
492 The corrupting influence of the Khmer Rouge in implemented the Paris Accords has been well documented. 
See for instance, Benny Widyono, Dancing in the Shadows: Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge and the United Nations 
in Cambodia (Plymouth: Roman Littlefield Publishers, 2008). They refused to cooperate in disarmament and 
demobilization and were resistant towards UNTAC’s administration and supervision of the May 1993 elections. 
The Khmer Rouge even went so far as attacking UNTAC, Cambodian officials and the Vietnamese. They also 
refused to participate in the elections and continued their antagonism during the rehabilitation stage. Criticism 
has been made against UNTAC for their inability to manage the Khmer Rouge and the UN’s failure to bring 
about redistributive justice in a timely manner. Yet, having said this, it has also been argued that despite the 
non-cooperation of the Khmer Rouge, UNTAC was able to implement the Peace Accords. See in particular 
Michael Wesley, “The Cambodian waltz: The Khmer Rouge and the United Nations intervention,” Terrorism 
and Political Violence, 7, no. 4 (1995), pp. 60-81.  
493 Mya Than and George Abonyi, “The greater Mekong subregion,” in Caroline L. Gates and Mya Than eds 
ASEAN Enlargement: Issues and Implications (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), p. 131. 
494“Australian parliamentary delegation to Laos, Vietnam,” Senate, Report, 14 December 1993. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Cambodia%20peace%20settlemen
t%20Decade%3A%221990s%22%20Year%3A%221993%22;rec=2;resCount=Default (accessed 27 May 2014).  
495 Gareth Evans,“ Assisting Cambodia,” Speech, Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction of Cambodia, Tokyo, 22 June 1992, Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/2947228/upload_binary/2947228.pdf;fileType=app
lication%2Fpdf#search=%22Cambodia%20reconstruction%22 (accessed 28 May 2014).  
496 Gareth Evans and Robert Ray, “Additional assistance to Cambodia,” Joint announcement by the Foreign 
Minister and the Minister for Defence, Press Releases, 29 November 1994. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=Cambodia%
20reconstruction%20Decade%3A%221990s%22;rec=10;resCount=Default (accessed 28 May 2014).  
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which did not profit from its $16 million investment made in 1995, until 1997.497 The 
investment and business returns in Cambodia were minimal in comparison to the material 
benefits found in the development of closer ties with Vietnam. As has been explained above, 
it is impossible to properly assess Australia’s motives and expected policy outcomes in 
resolving the Cambodian problem without considering its actions towards Vietnam. This was 
the determining factor in its initial policy of early diplomatic recognition of the state in 1973 
and why it broke with regional and international practice in its policy of re-engagement, well 
before Vietnam was accepted back into international society in 1989. Evans clearly 
highlighted these intentions in pushing for a Cambodian peace settlement: 
 
We have seen it as important to assist as best we can in the commercial and 
economic recovery of the country, and we are taking steps accordingly to 
upgrade our presence in Vietnam at a trade representation level to ensure 
that that occurs. There is a consistency about our position in this respect. 
We are trying in a number of ways to ensure that enough of an environment 
is created where there is still pressure to proceed towards a settlement of the 
unresolved questions in Cambodia.498 
 
As well as its early diplomatic recognition of Vietnam, Australia signed a trade and 
investment agreement in 1974, which further demonstrates the importance of Vietnam to 
Australia’s regional foreign policy. This agreement was replaced in 1991 with the Agreement 
on Trade and Economic Co-operation and the Investment Protection Agreement.499 By late 
1992 two-way trade between Vietnam and Australia had reached $252 million, which 
represented a 227% increase from 1990.500 Investment between the two countries also 
increased with the establishment of the Australia-Vietnam Ministerial-level Joint Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Committee, which focused on investment projects in rail and road 
construction, telecommunications and services, agro-forestry and fisheries, mineral 
exploration and processing, as well as education and training.501 As a result, Australia 
                                           
497 Frank Frost, “Cambodia’s troubled path to recovery,” Research paper no. 34 (1994-1994). Available at: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/RP9596/
96rp34 (accessed 30th May 2014). 
498 Gareth Evans, “Questions without notice: Vietnam aid,” Senate, no. 137, 21 November 1989 p. 2869. 
499 UN, “Australian and Vietnam Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation,” UN Treaty Series no. 1598 
(1991), pp. 242-259.  
500 Statistics found in table “Australian trade with Vietnam.” 
501 Peter Cook, “Opening statement at the Australia- Vietnam ministerial-level joint trade and economic 
cooperation committee,” Speech, Canberra, 6 October 1993. Available at: 
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became one of the top five investing countries in Vietnam, with two-way trade rising from $8 
million in 1980 to $402 million in 1994. Australia also gained access to Vietnam’s evolving 
market in timber, rubber and fishing resources where previously it had struggled against 
heavy competition from North and Southeast Asian nations. 502  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: DFAT and ABS 
 
Specific economic benefits resulting from the warming of relations with Vietnam were found 
in infrastructure development and mining. BHP Engineering was involved in the 
development and rehabilitation of Vietnam’s steel industry and BHP Petroleum also had a 
role in oil exploration. In fact, Evans himself stated that Australia’s efforts in forming a 
diplomatic relationship with Vietnam were central to BHP being awarded the multi-billion 
contracts to develop the Dai Hung offshore oilfield.503 Previous work by OTC Australia 
placed it in a good position to liaise with OTC International’s search for earth satellite 
stations in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi.504 Infrastructure development opened further market 
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502 Bill Hayden, “Indo-Chinese Economic Cooperation,” HoR, no. 150, 19 August 1986, p. 58.   
503 Gareth Evans,“The challenge of Asia for Australian foreign policy,” The 1993 Heindorff Memorial Lecture, 
Speech, Queensland Branch of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Brisbane, 15 September 1993 
Available at: http://www.gevans.org/speeches/old/1993/150593_fm_thechallengeofasia.pdf (accessed 20 May 
2014).  
504 These projects were part of the Australia-Vietnam Joint Trade and Economic Cooperation Committee. For 
more see, Bob McMullan, “Australian-Vietnam relations,” Speech, JTECC Dinner, Hanoi, 6 September 1995. 
Available at: http://www.trademinister.gov.au/speeches/1995/jetccdnr.html (accessed 20 May 2014).  
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opportunities with Australian exports in ships, banking and financial services, specialized 
machinery, telecommunication and iron and steal reaching $80.9 million by 1994. 505 
 
In comparison, Cambodia’s economic development has been relatively stagnant and 
Australia’s trade relationship with Phnom Pen was – and still is – minimal. It is largely 
underdeveloped in terms of infrastructure and civil service, with not much interest in the way 
of primary commodities (its main exports are foodstuffs and timber). The structural 
difficulties and lack of effective political administration meant it had little to offer as a source 
of labour, investment or manufactured goods. By 2013, the total amount of Australian 
imports from Cambodia was only $58 million, and Australia ranked 18th in two-way trade 
with Cambodia while two-way trade with Vietnam had reached $7.6 billion, representing 
1.2% of Australia’s total bilateral trade, with Vietnam a key importer of Australian wheat, 
cooper and aluminium.506 
 
The normalization of Vietnamese and Cambodian relations with Southeast Asia following a 
resolution to the Cambodian conflict also expanded the market potential of ASEAN, as both 
states were members by 1999.507 Greater regional engagement between Indochina and 
ASEAN was a major foreign policy aim for Australia, and was part of Evans’ framework for 
achieving regional security. By 1986, 4 of Australia’s top 10 market export destinations were 
in Asia, and by 1996 this number had increased to 7.508 ASEAN states were particularly 
attractive because Australia’s skill in agriculture, agri-business, medical training, 
biotechnology, and mining were suited to Southeast Asian investment. The addition of 
Vietnam especially increased the market potential of ASEAN, which between 1975 and 1995 
grew at an annual rate of 7%, and by 1995 had a regional GDP of US$650 billion.509 By 1997 
Australia’s exports to ASEAN had grown at a rate of 18.5%, and as a group it represented 
                                           
505 DFAT, “Interests in South and South East Asia,” Annual Report Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
1993-94 (1997). Available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/annual_reports/93_94/1_2.html (accessed 25 May 
2014).  
506DFAT, “Vietnam country brief,” (2014). Available at: 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/vietnam/vietnam_brief.html (accessed 20 May 2014).  
507 Vietnam was fully admitted into ASEAN in July 1995 and Cambodia in April 1999.  
508 “Australia-ASEAN economic relationship,” HoR Joint Committee Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, 1998. 
Available at: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=jfadt/ase
an/aseanch5.pdf (accessed 25 May 2014). 
509 ASEAN, “Economic achievement,” (2014). Available at: http://www.asean.org/asean/about-
asean/history/item/economic-achievement (accessed 20 May 2014).  
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Australia’s second largest export destination.510 It is clear that the stabilization of Indochina 
led to significant economic gains for Australia and was one of the factors driving Australia’s 
resolution of the Cambodian problem. And Australia’s previous establishment of a reciprocal 
relationship with Vietnam increased the chances that its long-standing trade interests there 
would be achieved, while also helping to convince Vietnam to sign-on to the Australian 
peace proposal.   
 
This section has shown that moral and material expectations of reciprocity were the key 
motivators for Australia’s foreign policy towards finding a resolution to the Cambodian 
conflict. At the time, Australia’s defence strategy and military preparedness had been 
reframed to include both “defence-in-depth” and a capacity to contribute towards regional 
defence operations. Participation in a multinational peacekeeping mission allowed Australia 
to achieve this, as well as gain military experience in small offshore operations. Its 
diplomatic leadership also led to material benefits in interoperability with Southeast Asian 
states and in boosting the success of its APEC proposal.  
 
Even though Australia had been quietly campaigning for a resolution to the Cambodia 
conflict for nearly a decade, it did not devote significant diplomatic and military resources 
until it became clear it was likely to achieve the expected results, which occurred after the 
end of the Cold War. This demonstrates the importance of rational choice in calculations of 
Australia’s decision making. Together, the expectations of reciprocity and rational choice 
indicate a convergence of moral and material factors in Australia’s foreign policy, which also 
led to moral and material outcomes. Moral outcomes were present in Australia’s proposal for 
a UN transitional authority that smoothed the way for the international PKO and created 
space for the holding of democratic elections. These moral outcomes coincided with material 
benefits for Australia in achieving its long-term goal of economic cooperation with Vietnam, 
as well as leading to expanded economic and financial opportunities within ASEAN.  
 
But one case is not enough to fully understand Australia’s policy towards humanitarian 
operations. It would be useful to look at where Australia has engaged in the use of force for 
the purpose of ensuring international peace and stability. This would give a broader picture of 
Australia’s foreign policy in this area, particularly as its involvement and expected returns 
                                           
510 Op cit, “Australia-ASEAN economic relationship,” 1998.  
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were significantly greater in Timor Leste. Such a case will add weight to the moral realist 
argument that a state’s commitment to moral claims is based on rational calculation of 
material interests and not on a commitment to prescriptive norms. To illustrate this point, the 
remainder of this chapter applies the moral realist framework to understand Australia’s 
foreign policy towards Timor Leste.  
 
Timor Leste: Geopolitical and geostrategic calculations informing Australia’s foreign 
policy choices 
Australia’s actions towards Timor Leste show similarities to how it responded to Cambodia. 
In the first instance, the immediate concern was not the safety and protection of the Timorese. 
Like its relationship with Cambodia, Australia tended to shy away from being actively 
involved in resolving the tension between Indonesia and Timor Leste. The Labor government 
under Gough Whitlam was indifferent to the annexation of Timor Leste by Indonesia. In fact, 
government documents released later indicated that Australia had knowledge of the planned 
invasion in October 1975, some three days before Indonesian forces began their assault.511 
Support for Indonesia’s control over Timor Leste continued under the Fraser government. On 
November 22 1979 the UNGA voted in favour of Timor Leste’s right to self-determination 
and independence. Australia was one of the 31 states (and the only western nation) that voted 
against the Resolution, instead accepting de jure recognition of Timor Leste as part of 
Indonesia.512  
 
This decision did not necessarily demonstrate Canberra’s support for the use of force, and 
was tied to the view that it would place Australia in a better position to remain on good terms 
with Indonesia, as well as to negotiate terms for the entry of aid and relief efforts into the 
province. In this regard, Australia did not entirely abandon Timor Leste, providing $3.185 
million of the $7 million contributed towards the joint aid projects implemented by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Indonesian Red Cross (IRC).513 
                                           
511 On the 28th November 1975, the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (FRETLIN) declared East 
Timor independent from Portugal, and on December 7th Indonesia invaded and annexed the province. Andrea 
Hopkins, “Australia let Indonesia invade East Timor in 1975,” The Guardian, 13 September 2000. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/sep/13/indonesia.easttimor (accessed 30 April 2014). 
512 Australia was the only nation to accept both defacto and dejure recognition of East Timor’s incorporation 
into Indonesia. The resolution was passed with 63 in favour, 31 against and 45 abstentions. “The question of 
East Timor: General assembly,” HoR, 22 November 1979. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=2;query=Eas
t%20Timor%20Decade%3A%221970s%22;rec=3;resCount=Default (accessed 30 April 2014). 
513 NAA, A12909, “Humanitarian aid for East Timor,” Cabinet submission no. 3598, 5 November 1979, p. 1.  
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This commitment had two motives. Alongside the humanitarian concerns, it did much to 
alleviate domestic criticisms made in Parliament and by private aid organizations that the 
government was ignoring the plight of the Timorese. As Andrew Peacock stated “while 
Australia’s contribution has been large in relation to others, it is justified by the proximity of 
Indonesia to Australia and the intense interest the Australian community has in developments 
in East Timor.”514  
 
Unlike the diplomatic activity pursued by the Hawke government during the early stages of 
the Cambodian conflict, the response to Timor Leste was fairly muted. At the time, there 
were significant concerns for the stability of Indonesia. The government saw the “New 
Order” under President Suharto as a stabilising influence that could govern more effectively 
than the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (FRETLIN) rebel group. The Labor 
government came under heavy criticism for its support of Indonesia with many seeing it as 
tacit approval of the human rights abuses perpetrated by the Suharto regime. In response to 
these criticisms, Hayden argued that:  
 
People who follow a one-dimensional perception of moral values in 
foreign relations pursue a misleading caricature of reality… they are free 
to denounce and criticize publicly without having to worry about the 
consequences of their actions on the foreign, political and external 
commercial relations of their country. 515  
 
Australia’s acceptance of Indonesia’s annexation of Timor Leste was also well known, and it 
was thought that a public reversal of this policy position would result in retaliatory action by 
Indonesia.516 Concerns over any punitive response were significant given Australia relied on 
friendly relations with Indonesia for cooperation on refugees, shipping and air rights, and 
continued negotiations on the Timor Sea.517 It was also thought that any push for 
                                           
514 NAA, A12909  “Humanitarian aid for East Timor,” Cabinet submission no. 3998, 12 May 1980, p. 6.  
515 Bill Hayden, Hayden: An Autobiography (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1996), pp. 410-411.  
516 International acceptance of Indonesia’s control over Timor Leste had also increased. A vote of the General 
Assembly in 1982 was supported by nearly all nations in the Pacific region, including the US and India. The 
result was 50-46-50.  
517 Bill Hayden, in a submission to Cabinet on the benefits versus consequences of Australia taking a more 
hardened stance on East Timor, also included the potential for the conflict to spread to PNG where Australia and 
Indonesia shared a border; further stalling of negotiations on Australian property rights in East Timor; possible 
suspension of travel of RAN warships through Indonesian waters; and Indonesia could use its influence on 
Islamic Council Conference nation to take measures hostile to the interests of Australia. NAA, A13977/12, 
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independence by Australia would have little to no benefit for Timor Leste, with Indonesia 
threatening to suspend its cooperation on the Timorese Family Reunion Program and refusing 
to grant entry of journalists and parliamentary delegations. In this regard, the significance of 
Indonesia to any potential plans for Australian involvement in resolving the Timor issue was 
blatantly clear: “the issue [of East Timor] was inseparable from Australia’s relations with 
Indonesia and, to a lesser extent, Australian relations with the rest of South East Asia.” 518  
 
During the rest of the 1980s, Australia maintained its policy of indifference on Timor Leste 
as the issue fell off the international agenda. The new Foreign Minister, Evans, focused the 
majority of Australia’s diplomatic attention on reaching a peaceful settlement in Cambodia 
and in growing ties with Indonesia. Australia continued to give aid and lobby for access of 
the ICRC, as well as push for talks on the issue of human rights during ministerial exchanges. 
519 These policies were consistent with those of previous governments and were intended to 
keep Indonesia on side for negotiations on bilateral trade, the Timor Gap and security. As I 
mentioned in the previous chapter on foreign aid and development, the Hawke/Evans period 
was characterized by an expansion of Australian foreign policy into Asia and a distinct focus 
on regional security. Indonesia, as the largest and nearest nation, was the main recipient of 
this policy agenda with an explosion of diplomatic activity occurring between the two 
countries. Of particular note, and one that perhaps received the greatest amount of critical 
attention, was the Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty signed with Indonesia in December 
1989.520 The Timor Gap Treaty re-ignited internal debates on the legitimacy of Australia’s 
                                                                                                                                    
“Relations with Indonesia: East Timor,” Cabinet Submission no. 12 Australia’s policy on Indonesia – East 
Timor, 23 March 1983, p. 4-6. 
518 Ibid, p. 3.  
519 By 1985 Australia had provided $9m to East Timor for food and humanitarian relief. “Questions without 
notice: East Timor,” Senate, 12 September 1985, p. 509. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=Ev
ans%20East%20Timor%20Decade%3A%221980s%22;rec=2;resCount=Default (accessed 8 May 2014).  
520 The “Timor Gap Treaty” or Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of 
Cooperation in an Area between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia was entered into 
force on February 9, 1991. Australia had been made aware of the oil and gas reserves under the Timor Sea 
during the 1960s when the Portuguese administration of Timor allowed US Oceanic Exploration to explore 
areas of the Timor Sea that went beyond the median line between Australia and Timor. In 1972 Australia 
negotiated a seabed boundary with Indonesia that was largely in Australia’s favour as it secured agreement that 
went nearly two-thirds towards the island of Timor. At the time, Australia argued that this boundary represented 
the end of its continental shelf. The negotiations were conducted between Indonesia and Australia and 
Australia’s insistence that negotiations be based on its continental shelf left a “gap” opposite Portuguese Timor 
that became known as the “Timor Gap.” The 1972 sea boundary allowed for a greater area of exploration and in 
1974 Australian oil and gas company Woodside Petroleum discovered the Greater Sunrise gas field in 1974. 
This seabed boundary continued until 1989 when Australia and Indonesia negotiated the Timor Gap Treaty. 
This treaty divided the area into three different “zones of cooperation” that distributed the revenue between the 
two nations on a 50-50 split. A copy of the treaty can be found at DFAT, Australia Treaty Series, “Treaty 
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1979 policy of recognizing Indonesia’s claim over Timor Leste. Evans, in response to 
criticism that Australia had again shirked its human rights responsibilities for material gain 
argued that: 
 
There is no binding legal obligation not to recognize the acquisition of 
territory that was acquired by force. Such recognition does not, of 
course, imply approval of the circumstances of the acquisition. In 
international law the legality of the original acquisition of territory by a 
state has to be distinguished in subsequent dealings between the state 
acquiring that new territory and other states – in this instance, 
Australia.521 
 
Australia effectively viewed the status of Timor Leste as being separate to its policies of 
cooperation with Indonesia, and this approach continued until 1999. And the consistency of 
Australia’s attitude towards the issue of self-determination since Indonesia’s annexation of 
Timor has been guided by a rational calculation of whether a push for independence would 
lead to any beneficial outcomes. There were several conditional factors informing this 
decision. First, Australia did not have the military capacity to unilaterally implement any 
peacekeeping force and, without the consent of the Indonesian government, it would have 
been perceived as an act of war. In the event that Australia did intervene, there was no 
guarantee that it would receive the support of the US, which was one of the deciding factors 
in implementing the 1999 INTERFET mission. As former Prime Minister Malcom Fraser 
later stated: “The US never would have chosen Australia over Indonesia – the largest Islamic 
country. What we did would have been immaterial.”522 At the time, Timor Leste was 
considered a resource-poor nation of little concern to international society apart from its 
strategic importance to neighbouring Australia and Indonesia. On the other hand, Indonesia 
was far more important to Western defence planning: not only is it the largest Islamic nation 
in the world, the sea lanes that transit the Indonesian archipelago are central to US naval 
                                                                                                                                    
between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of cooperation in an area between the Indonesian 
province of East Timor and northern Australia,” No. 9, 9 February 1991. Available at: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1991/9.html (accessed 8 May 2014).  
521 “Questions without notice: Timor Gap Treaty,” Senate, 1 November 1989, p. 2709. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=Ev
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522 Rose Iser, “Cables point to Australia’s indifference to plight of starving Timorese thousands,” The Citizen, 2 
October 2013. Available at: http://www.thecitizen.org.au/news/cables-point-australian-indifference-plight-
starving-timorese-thousands (accessed 2 May 2014).  
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presence in the Pacific and the Gulf, which also sit in the middle of important trade routes for 
its main ally in Northeast Asia, Japan. 523 
 
Alongside the capability gap and lack of allied support, Australia also understood that its 
relationship with Indonesia was still too frail to survive any diplomatic backlash. This 
concern was tied to Australia’s need for Indonesia’s cooperation in maintaining a stable 
regional order, particularly in the “Inner Arc” surrounding its northern approaches. As the 
1997 White Paper noted two years before the intervention, Australia’s relationship with 
Indonesia will always be strategically important as the archipelago is located “astride 
Australia’s northern approaches through which 60% of Australia’s exports pass.”524 
Australia’s offshore oil and natural gas installations on the Northwest Shelf, where energy 
and mineral exports to Japan and China pass through the straights in the Indonesian 
archipelago, meant a mutually responsive Indonesia acted as a strategic shield to Australia’s 
immediate north, whereas a hostile and isolationist Indonesia could use the advantage of 
geographical proximity to the Straits of Malacca for area denial.525  
 
And yet, by 1998, the Howard government had indicated that it was prepared to alter 
Australia’s policy on Indonesian sovereignty of Timor Leste and take on a greater role in 
ensuring peace and security in the region. This leads to interesting questions as to what 
influenced this policy change and whether it was guided by an expectation of reciprocity, 
which resulted in specific moral and material outcomes. Much of the literature on this has 
preferred to emphasize the normative shift in Australia’s overall policy of sovereignty and 
self-determination, but the above evidence shows that material considerations and contextual 
factors were arguably more central to explaining a change in Australia’s policy towards 
Timorese independence.526 A further examination of the motivations and outcomes that 
precipitated this event is needed to demonstrate the validity of the moral realist claim. The 
next section of the chapter sets out to achieve this objective.  
                                           
523 Australia strategic studies expert Coral Bell made the same point a year after the intervention. For more see 
Coral Bell, “East Timor, Canberra and Washington: A case study in crisis management,” The Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 2 (2000), pp. 171-176. 
524 DFAT, In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy (Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1997), p. 61.  
525 Paul Dibb, “Indonesia in Australian defence planning,” Security Challenges 3 no. 4 (2007), p. 68.  
526 See in particular Timothy Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler, “East Timor and the new humanitarian 
interventionism,” International Affairs 77, no. 4 (2001), pp. 805-827 and Alex Bellamy, “Power, rules and 
argument: new approaches to humanitarian intervention,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 57, no. 3 
(2003), pp. 499-512. 
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Fall of Suharto and the Asian Financial Crisis: The importance of expectations of reciprocity 
and rational choice in understanding foreign policy change 
The initial factor leading to a change in policy was the fall of the Suharto regime. Suharto 
had been in power since 1966 and had maintained a strict policy of law and order by splitting 
control of the nation between his Golongan Karya (Golkar) party and the military.527 
Economically, the nation had done well under the Suharto era. The political stability meant 
Indonesia was presented as a safe-heaven for foreign investment and the economy had 
consistently grown at an annual rate of 7.5%. Exports had also reached over $US50 billion by 
1996 and unemployment was steady at 4.4% amongst a growing middle class.528 Indonesia 
was perceived by international society as a model developing nation for growth and 
prosperity.529 Its size and status as a potential economic powerhouse translated into increased 
influence on the world stage, and Indonesia wielded considerable weight within ASEAN and 
was viewed as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). 530 
 
Yet despite this, rumblings of dissatisfaction began to emerge in the lead up to the Asian 
Financial Crisis (AFC), which accelerated the environment of political discontent. Suharto’s 
New Order that transformed Indonesia from a dysfunctional and fractious nation under threat 
from communist insurgency and failed state status had come at a cost to certain individual 
freedoms. Campaigns of protest began in 1996 in response to the government organized 
ousting of Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Sukarno and popular leader of the 
Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI).531 Civil unrest continued during the May 1997 
parliamentary elections as members of Indonesian society voiced concern over the lack of 
opposition parties and free public debate.532 Political ambiguity on who would be the next 
                                           
527 Suharto expanded the role of the military in Indonesian society by placing military officials into government 
and civil service positions. 75 of the 500 seats in parliament were reserved for members of the Indonesian 
military. For more on the Suharto regime, see Michael RJ Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto Vol. 69 
(London: Routledge, 1993). 
528 Thee Kian Wie, “Introduction,” in Thee Kian Wie ed. Recollections: The Indonesian Economy, 1950s-1990s 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 25-26. 
529 This claim has been made by Michael Dove and Daniel Kammen. For more see, Michael Dove and Daniel 
Kammen, “Vernacular models of development: an analysis of Indonesia under the “New Order”,” World 
Development 29, no. 4 (2001), pp. 619-639. 
530 Leo Suryadinata, Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership 
(Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996). 
531 Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 177. 
532 Only two opposition parties were allowed: the Indonesian Democratic Party and the Muslim based United 
Development Party (PPP). The two parties were originally a collection of independent groups, but were forced 
to merge by electoral rules emplace between 1973 and 1998. The four main Muslim parties became the PPP and 
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leader of Indonesia added to anxieties on the future stability of the nation. There were 
increasing debates on the ability of Suharto to remain President for another five-year term in 
1998, at the end of which he would be 82 years old.533 
 
Against the background of political dissent, by the end of 1997 Indonesia was beginning to 
feel the effects of the AFC.534 The state had already accumulated an alarming amount of debt, 
approximately US$110 billion, a substantial amount of which was perceived as bad debts.535 
The thirty-year period of industrialization had led to substantial job growth, but had also led 
to a doubling of real wages to about 25 cents an hour. Population growth and wage increases 
resulted in an influx of rural workers to urban centres where employment and housing were 
not guaranteed. Many of these were young Indonesia’s who represented around 20% of the 
workforce and 70% of the unemployed. 536 
 
The financial structure of Indonesia did not help the crisis. The fixed exchange rate of the 
rupiah to the US dollar and a current account deficit of 4% created downward pressure on the 
nation’s economy and encouraged speculative attacks where large amounts of Indonesia’s 
reserve currency was sold to protect the rupiah. High domestic interest rates also meant that 
                                                                                                                                    
the five major secular parties became the PDI. Following the ousting of Megawati, the military took control of 
the PDI and organized the re-election of former party head Suryadi. Government disapproval of Megawati 
actually began a few years earlier with her appointment as chairperson in 1993. The government refused to 
recognise Megawati’s appointment and orchestrated a failed attempt to replace her with Budi Harjono. The 
instalment of Suryadi led to a split in the PDI amongst Megawati and Suryadi supporters. The storming of PDI 
headquarters by Suryadi supporters prompted the June 1996 riots and government crackdown. In the 1997 
legislative elections, Megawati’s faction threw their votes behind the PPP while the government backed Suryadi 
only managed 3% of the vote. In terms of press and individual freedom, the PDI and PPP were forbidden from 
speaking out against the government, and government approval was required before the release of any campaign 
slogan or advertisement. The government vetted all candidates and nearly half of all members of the 500-seat 
parliament were appointed by the regime. Only the President’s Golkar party were allowed to campaign for 
supporters at the district and local level, and all government employees were mandated to support the 
governments Golkar party. An in-depth account of politics under the Suharto regime can be found in Michael 
RJ. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order  3rd ed. Vol. 5 (New 
York: Routledge, 1998).  
533 The government’s near monopoly over the political system meant any potential leader needed to be “tapped” 
by Suharto as part of a plan of succession. Two-years from the 1998 presidential elections, it was not yet clear 
that Suharto would step-down and nominate his deputy and future Vice-President B.J. Habibie who was not 
popular with the Indonesia military. In the end Suharto stood (and won) another five-year term. Ibid. pp.206-
210. 
534 Indonesia was not the only Asian country demonstrating signs of an economic downturn. Between 1993 and 
1996, the total debt to GDP of ASEAN had increased from 100% to around 167%. During the worst stages of 
the crisis, this reached over 180%. For more on the effects of the AFC see Morris Goldstein, The Asian 
Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures, and Systemic Implications. Vol. 55 (Washington DC: Peterson Institute, 1998). 
535 Bad debts were state-owned bank loans given to Suharto’s family and inner circle, which were unlikely to be 
re-cooped. These were estimated at around $US3billion.  
536 Jonathan Pincus, and Rizal Ramli, “Indonesia: from showcase to basket case,” Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 22, no. 6 (1998), pp. 723. 
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Indonesian investors borrowed and held money offshore contributing to a hollow market. The 
social and economic conditions combined created a “perfect storm” and meant that when the 
AFC fully hit Indonesia in 1998, it became one of the worst affected states.537 It suffered a 
dramatic drop in the exchange rate and stock prices plummeted. No longer able to control 
speculative attacks, Indonesia was forced to float its currency, the rupiah fell from Rp2, 342 
to Rp12, 014 against the US dollar between 1996 and 1998 respectively.538 The currency 
depreciation led to a major episode of capital flight as foreign investors were forced to face 
high debt repayments in Indonesia’s domestic currency terms.  
 
During this time, Indonesia was undergoing negotiations for its first instalment of 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailouts, worth a total of US$43 billion. The initial US$3 
billion did little to ameliorate the worsening economic crisis, and the rupiah reached its 
lowest point of Rp12, 000 in January 1998, forcing President Suharto to sign a new loan deal 
with the IMF that included a commitment to end government monopolies on investment and 
eliminate state subsidies.539 As a result, the price of food staples increased by 80%, 
prompting street riots and student protests over fears of food shortages. Social discontent 
intensified following the halting of an IMF loan instalment and the re-election of Suharto on 
March 11, 1998.540 In a late attempt to quell the crisis, Suharto agreed to close more insolvent 
banks in exchange for a relaxation of the IMF’s condition to dismantle food and energy 
subsidies.541 But the damage had already been done. The price of food had increased by 30% 
and the end to energy subsidies had increased the price of kerosene by 25%, petrol by 71% 
and diesel fuel by 60%.542 
 
The week of May 12th to 19th was the worst week of protests against the Suharto regime and 
eventually led to his resignation on May 21st. On May 12th six students were shot dead at 
Trisakti University in Jakarta, which triggered a week of violent protests resulting in the 
                                           
537 David C. Cole and Betty F. Slade, “Why has Indonesia’s financial crisis been so bad?,” Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies 34, no. 2 (1998), pp. 61-66. 
538 “Ten years on: How Asia shrugged off its currency crisis,” The Economist, 4 July 2007. Available at: 
http://www.economist.com/node/9432495 (accessed 12 May 2014).  
539 A detailed timeline of the IMF’s involvement in Indonesia can be found at “Timeline of the crash,” PBS, 
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International Institute for Sustainable Development, October 2010, p. 5. Available at: 
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death of nearly 500 people. 543 Two days later, Suharto resigned and Bacharuddin Jusuf (B.J.) 
Habibie was installed as President, ending Suharto’s 32-year rule. The change of leadership 
was essential to Australia’s decision to push for Indonesia’s acceptance of a resolution to 
Timor Leste. As former Foreign Minister Alexander Downer stated: “There is simply no 
doubt that, were President Suharto still in power, the resolution of the East Timor problem 
would not today be a real possibility.” 544  
 
Habibie came into office with a view to resolving the issue of Timor Leste and was prepared 
to re-examine Indonesia’s stance on the province. In June 1998, he announced that Indonesia 
was ready to accept a “special status” of autonomy for Timor Leste. Australian Prime 
Minister, John Howard, wrote a letter to Habibie in December 1998 urging a long-term path 
of self-determination that would eventually lead to independence.545 It is important to note 
that Australia (and some cabinet members in Indonesia, particularly Foreign Minister Ali 
Alitas), were not in favour of referendum with a straight vote between autonomy and 
independence.546 Australia preferred to pursue a path of self-determination that occurred over 
                                           
543 Speaker of the House, Harmoko called for the resignation of Suharto and was joined by several leading 
parliamentarians. Suharto also lost the support of key intellectuals such as Nurchoish Madjid and on his last 
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both indicated that it was Howard’s aggressiveness in pushing for independence that led to the referendum being 
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suggests it.” ABC, “Howard pushed me on E Timor referendum,” ABC News, 16 November 2008. Available at: 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-11-16/howard-pushed-me-on-e-timor-referendum-habibie/207044 (accessed 
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interview with former Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alitas, 19 November 2007. Available at: 
http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2007/s1851651.htm (accessed 14 May 2014).  
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a ten-year period and allowed for a process of reconciliation between FRETLIN, the pro-
integrationists and the Indonesians.547 This policy proposal mirrored the successful 
Mantignon Accords that had enabled the former French Polynesian colony of New Caledonia 
to peacefully negotiate a framework for independent statehood.548 
 
Australia’s position on interim autonomy was guided by a concern for the stability of a 
territory that was on its doorstep and a reasonable calculation that Indonesia, at this stage, 
was unwilling to accept a forcible move to self-determination. Timor Leste was also largely 
ill-equipped to deal with immediate statehood. Therefore a delayed process of independence 
had the advantage of allowing time for the necessary institutional and social structures to be 
built to increase the prospects of Timor Leste as a viable state. This would also have the 
related benefit of keeping Indonesia on side for future negotiations on reconciliation and a 
possible international humanitarian presence.  
 
With these concerns in mind, Habibie’s request to the UN Security General on the 27th 
January 1999 for the UN to hold a referendum on a vote between greater autonomy and 
independence came as somewhat of a surprise to Australia and has contributed to debates on 
whether self-determination was ever part of the foreign policy goals pursued by both Howard 
and Downer. 549 Habibie’s decision to hold a referendum was motivated by several domestic 
and international factors. The economic situation in Indonesia had worsened towards the end 
of 1998. Real GDP growth had shrunk another 16.5% and oil prices remained high at US$10-
$12 per barrel. A declining economy meant it was becoming harder for Indonesia to maintain 
its monetary subsidies to Timor Leste, and greater international and domestic attention to 
plight of the Timorese also meant it was no longer in Indonesia’s interest to continue to 
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French President Lionel Jospin, which scheduled the transfer of sovereignty to New Caledonia by 2018.  
549 Ian Henry, “Unintended consequences: an examination of Australia’s “historic policy shift” on East Timor,” 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 1 (2014), pp. 52-69.  
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justify its control over the territory.550 Indonesia had already suffered penalties for its actions 
in Timor following the Dili massacre in 1992 and was in a comparatively weaker position in 
1998-99 to shrug off a threat of military, economic or political sanctions.551 The rushed ballot 
was a way for Habibie to boost Indonesia’s international standing in the eyes of the West by 
being seen to resolve the crisis, while at the same time presenting himself as a leader on 
deciding domestic issues in the lead up to the Presidential election.552 This decision came as 
an initial surprise as Howard had preferred an alternative policy outcome for Timor, as 
outlined in his letter to Habibie. However, Australia did come to support the referendum.  
 
Here, Australia’s response was the result of a “window of opportunity” in determining 
whether it could successfully navigate a resolution to what had become a “regional sore” in 
the nations direct strategic environment. As Downer stated:  
 
The main issue informing this policy change was security and tranquillity 
in the region. Human rights were a factor and it is always good to make a 
contribution to human rights issues when you can, but this was not the 
driving force.553  
 
The Timorese also followed Australia in supporting the ballot. For them, it was becoming 
evident that the violence would continue without a definitive resolution that had either the 
                                           
550 Indonesia had spent a considerable amount on the development of Timor and arguably did more to progress 
the territory than Portugal.  The international solidarity movement was given a boost in 1996 with the awarding 
of the joint Nobel Peace Prize to Romas Horta and Carlos Bello. Romas Horta and Carlos Bello jointly received 
the Nobel Peace Prize “for their work towards a just and peaceful solution to the conflict in East Timor.” The 
Nobel Peace Prize, “The Nobel peace prize 1996.” Available at: 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1996/ (accessed 13 May 2014).  
551 On November 21, 1991 Indonesian military opened fire on a group of mourners commemorating the death of 
two pro-independence fighters at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili. The original estimates of those killed were 
between 50 and 100. This was increased to between 250 and 270.  Philip Shenon, “Indonesia seeks to atone for 
a massacre in Timor,” The New York Times, 17 September 1992. Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/17/world/indonesia-seeks-to-atone-for-a-massacre-in-timor.html (accessed 13 
May 2014).  During the 1990s, the US took a number of actions against the Indonesian’s in response to the 
ongoing violence in East Timor. The most significant was the suspension of the International Military Education 
Training (IMET) program in 1992, which was cited in the previous chapter as evidence of Australia’s concern 
for a marginalisation of Indonesia by Western states and the effects this would have on its policy of 
“comprehensive engagement.” The US also suspended the sale of light arms and crowd control items and 
Congress blocked the sale of a F-16 aircraft that was up for sale in both 1996 and 1998.  
552 Despite his intentions, Habibie received significant opposition criticism for this decision, particularly by his 
main presidential opponent Megawati Sukarnoputri who accused him of breaching the People’s Consultative 
Assembly (MPR) decree that East Timor remain integrated into Indonesia. “Criticism mount over Habibie’s 
East Timor decision,” The Jakarta Post, 7 September 1999. Available at: 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/1999/09/07/criticisms-mount-over-habibie039s-east-timor-decision.html 
(accessed 13 May 2014).  
553 Interview with former Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, Sydney 2011.  
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Timorese accepting integration with Indonesia, or both parties agreeing to hold a vote on the 
territories future status. Here again, statements made by Downer are instructive:  
 
I spoke to Ramos Horta about it when the violence was growing and 
growing. I told him that if you don’t take this ballot now it may not come 
again for another 10 or 20 years. And he said, “We need the ballot 
now.”554  
 
In the lead-up to the ballot, Australia’s main involvement was in continuing to lobby 
Indonesia, alongside Portugal, on allowing an international peacekeeping presence on the 
ground during the process, and for the disarmament of all parties.555  It had some success in 
achieving this with the signing of the May 5th Agreement. This outlined the conditions of the 
vote, which included the presence of UN civil police advisers as part of the establishment of 
the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) and recognition by 
Indonesia that it would unequivocally accept the results of the vote.556 Australia later faced 
some criticism on why it did not push harder for a greater UN presence before the ballot, 
given what many predicted would be a massive outbreak of violence following the 
referendum.557 The reasons for this are similar to those of previous governments. It was quite 
clear that Habibie was unwilling to make any real concessions on this point, and without 
Indonesian’s consent Australia’s participation in any peace-enforcement operation would be 
“tantamount to a military attack.” As well as this, there was also the view that if a vote were 
made conditional on any peacekeeping force, then it would not have taken place prolonging 
                                           
554 Paul Kelly, “John Howard’s covert East Timor independence plan,” The Australian, 5 September 2009. 
Available at: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/john-howards-covert-east-timor-independence-plan/story-
e6frg6n6-1225769697553 (accessed 13 May 2014).  
555 Howard and Downer both attended the Bali meeting on the 27th of April and discussed an international 
peacekeeping force. “Foreign Minister explains how Timor will be brought to a situation where a ballot is 
possible,” ABC AM, Transcript of interview with foreign minister Alexander Downer, 28 April 1999. Available 
at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=2;query=East%20Timor%20Decade%3A%
221990s%22%20Year%3A%221999%22%20Month%3A%2204%22;rec=5;resCount=Default (accessed 15 
May 2014).  
556 The agreement was the “Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the 
question of East Timor.” The document was split into three parts: one section outlined the autonomy package 
that would establish a “Special Autonomous Region of East Timor (SARET) within Indonesia;” one on the 
conditions of the consultation with the East Timorese; and one on the security arrangements which placed 
primary responsibility of security on both the Indonesian military and police. 
557 These criticisms were focused on the perceived naivety of Howard and Downer that holding a ballot would 
lead to further bloodshed and this meant they did not do enough to push Indonesia into accepting a PKO before 
the election. For more see William Maley, “Australia and the East Timor crisis: some critical comments,” 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 2 (2000), pp. 151-161. 
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what had already been a twenty-four year conflict.558 In this regard, there was an expectation 
of reciprocity guiding Australia’s diplomacy and a rational calculation of what action would 
result in the best outcome for Australia and for Timor Leste.  
 
After a two-week delay due to security concerns, 98.6% of registered Timorese went to the 
ballot box on the 30th August, 1999. The vote was considered a success in that the majority of 
Timorese were able to exercise their right to self-determination. And the result was 
overwhelming, with 78.5% in favour of independence.559 Australia made a substantial 
contribution to the original UN mission. It committed US$10 million to the UN Trust Fund 
for East Timor (UNTFET), pledging a further US$10 million in logistical support to help the 
establishment of the UN team. This meant that overall Australia was the largest donor to 
UNAMET, contributing US$20 million from a total of US$46 million.560 Australian staff and 
resources also made a significant contribution to the missions programme with Australia 
providing 38 AFP officers as civil police advisers, including the Commissioner, Alan 
Mills.561 In areas of human development, such as health, education and employment, 
Australia provided an initial contribution of US$3 million.562  
 
Yet, as mentioned above, what occurred afterwards cast doubt on any initial moral claim 
Australia had in its involvement in the process. Despite the UN urging all parties to accept 
the result, the election incited Indonesian-backed militia forces to launch a “scorched earth 
campaign,” destroying over 80% of Dili’s infrastructure, which led to the estimated deaths of 
                                           
558 “Questions without notice: East Timor: Peacekeeping,” HoR, 2 September 1999. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=East%20Timor%20Decade%3A%
221990s%22%20Year%3A%221999%22%20Month%3A%2209%22%20Day%3A%2202%22;rec=0;resCount
=Default (accessed 13 May 2014).  
559 Alexander Downer, “Announcement of the referendum result in East Timor,” Press Releases, doorstop 
interview Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, 4 September 2014. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=1;query=East%20Ti
mor%20results%20of%20independence;rec=11;resCount=Default (accessed 31 May 2014).  
560 Alexander Downer, “Australia and Asia - traders and partners,” Speech, Asia Society, AustralAsia Centre, 
Parmelia Hilton, Perth, 19 August 1999. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Australia%20and%20Asia%20-
%20traders%20and%20partners;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 31 May 2014). 
561Two Australian Election Commission (AEC) officials also assisted in electoral planning and the processing of 
electoral data. Alexander Downer, “Australian to head UNAMET civilian police contingent for East Timor,” 
Press Releases, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, 14 June 1999. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=1;query=UNAMET;r
ec=8;resCount=Default (accessed 31 May 2014).  
562 Australia also provided a further US$5 million to assist the initiatives of the ICRC, which focused on 
bringing medical supplies and refuge to Internally Displaced People (IDP). John Howard, “Urgent Humanitarian 
Assistance for Timorese,” Press Releases, Prime Minister John Howard, 10 September 1999. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=Urgent%20
Humanitarian%20Assistance%20for%20Timorese;rec=0;resCount=Default  (accessed 31 May 2014).  
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nearly 1,400 people and forcibly displaced nearly 300,000 Timorese.563 The crisis also spread 
to West Timor, with evidence that the Indonesian backed pro-integrationist forces were 
complicit in orchestrating attacks against the Timorese refugees seeking asylum there.  
 
Australia actually reacted quite quickly to the post-election violence given the initial 
constraints of having to wait for the MPR, the Indonesian People’s Assembly, to meet in 
early November and endorse the outcome of the ballot before any action regarding a security 
presence was made. In fact Australia was instrumental in getting an international force on the 
ground before this occurred, even though Habibie had repeatedly refused to give Indonesia’s 
consent until the MPR met. This does much to counter potential criticism that some moral 
considerations for the safety and security of Timor Leste were not present. Of course, this 
was not the only factor, nor was it the most overwhelming.  
 
An expectation of reciprocity and a rational calculation that Australia’s military and 
diplomatic efforts would achieve beneficial outcomes account for Australia’s decision to 
intervene in Timor Leste. One of the early calculations was Australia’s willingness to take the 
lead on any military operation and its readiness to deploy the necessary forces. The UN 
indicated that it would be “almost impossible” to have a full international force ready inside 
of two months. Meanwhile, Australia had been “planning for months” for the possibility that 
it might need to make a significant contribution, placing 2 brigades (2000 troops) on 24-hour 
defence readiness in early September.564 Diplomatically, Downer had been lobbying for a UN 
consensus on an alternative security presence made up of a “coalition of the willing” that 
would reinforce the civil police and Military Liaison Officers (MLO) already on the ground 
as part of UNAMET. Downer announced this proposal on the 4th of September (the day the 
outcome of the ballot was made public) and argued that it could be done “with Indonesian 
                                           
563 The number of deaths is difficult to accurately present. The deaths following the plebiscite were relatively 
modest. However, Indonesian occupation between 1975 and 1999 were estimated to have led to the death of 
between 120,000 and 200,000 Timorese.  Out of a population of 700,000 this puts the death toll comparable in 
scale to the number of deaths recorded in Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge regime. For more see Susan 
Harris Rimmer and Juli Effi Tomaras, “Aftermath Timor Leste: Reconciling competing notions of justice, 
Analysis and Policy Law and Bills Digest Section, 21 May 2007. Available at: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Arc
hive/archive/TimorLeste (accessed 15 May 2014) and Paul Daley, “Evidence of organised killing campaigns 
grows,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 12 November 1999, p.10.  
564 John Howard, “Prime Minister discusses East Timor,” Transcript of radio interview with John Miller, 4BC, 7 
September 1999. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=2;query=East%20Ti
mor%20Indonesia%20IMF%20Howard%20Decade%3A%221990s%22;rec=2;resCount=Default (accessed 15 
May 2014).  
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agreement and with the passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution in a much 
shorter period of time.  And that is one of the proposals which we are working on at the 
moment.”565  
 
Australia relied heavily on the support of the US in wielding the stick needed to achieve 
Jakarta’s approval for an international peacekeeping force. Greater involvement from the US 
allowed Australia to maintain some leverage with Indonesia without having to risk taking 
action that could damage its bilateral relationship. Downer neatly indicated Australia’s 
hesitancy to act on its own in this regard: 
 
You know, if we were to scrap the military to military links, that is 
one of the stays of the relationship, then, obviously the relationship 
would turn down very rapidly and I think there’d be a lot more closed 
doors in Jakarta, even at the political level than would otherwise be 
the case.566 
 
As it became more obvious that the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) was responsible for 
much of the violence, Australia was eventually forced to downgrade its defence cooperation 
with Indonesia on the 10th September, cancelling three scheduled joint training missions and 
putting under review $7.8 million worth of defence assistance. Yet Australia was not fully 
willing to sever its security ties and continued its healthy aid commitment, even increasing it 
by $24.14 million between 1998 and 1999. 567 It was also reluctant to support more coercive 
economic action with Howard stating just 6 days before the APEC meeting with Clinton that 
“cutting off an IMF loan is not necessarily going to bring in the requisite short period of time 
                                           
565 Alexander Downer, “Announcement of the referendum result in East Timor,” Press Releases, doorstop 
interview Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, 4 September 2014. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=1;query=East%20Ti
mor%20results%20of%20independence;rec=11;resCount=Default (accessed 31 May 2014).   
566 “Discussion about the situation in East Timor after the ballot and Australia’s relationship with China,” 
Transcript of interview with Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer, Meet the Press, Channel Ten, 5 
September 1999. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=East%20Timor%20Decade%3A%
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=Default (accessed 15 May 2014).  
567 In the end it was the Indonesia’s that famously “tore up” the 1995 agreement made between Suharto and 
Keating in response to what they viewed as Australia’s aggressive action in their leadership and support for the 
peacekeeping operation. Alexander Downer, “Development cooperation program,” Ministerial Statements, 
HoR, 9 December 1999. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/chamber/hansardr/1999-12-
09/0093/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf (accessed 15 May 2014).  
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the sort of outcome we want.”568 Delaying much needed economic assistance would further 
destabilize an already fragile social and political environment that had significant security 
implications for Australia.  To work around this, Australia made the calculated decision to 
hedge with the US.  
 
The US had indicated earlier that with 14,000 troops in Kosovo, it was unable to play a large 
material role but was willing to put diplomatic pressure on the Indonesians to accept the 
mission.569 At the annual APEC meeting in Auckland, Howard met on the sidelines with 
Clinton and various members of ASEAN to discuss the issue of Timor Leste. The outcome of 
this was important. In a series of bilateral talks Howard reached agreement with Thailand, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore on their participation in a peacekeeping coalition.570 
And after talks with Clinton, the US announced that it would again suspend the joint military 
training program and threatened a freeze of IMF and World Bank assistance packages now 
worth nearly US$70 billion. The US also cut off the sale of small-arms weapons and 
threatened further economic sanctions if the Indonesian government and military failed to 
cooperate with the force, and agreed to provide logistical support to the operation.571 
 
On the same day that Australia achieved support for its coalition and the US announced its 
series of sanctions, President Habibie, along with Ali Alitas and General Wiranto, made a 
televised address announcing Indonesia’s readiness to accept an international peacekeeping 
force.572 Resolution 1264 (1999) established the non-UN INTERFET, which was authorized 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to restore peace and stability in Timor, support 
                                           
568 “Prime Minister discusses East Timor,” Transcript of the Prime Minister John Howard radio interview with 
John Miller, 4BC, 7 September 1999. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=2;query=East%20Ti
mor%20Indonesia%20IMF%20Howard%20Decade%3A%221990s%22;rec=2;resCount=Default (accessed 15 
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569 The reluctance by the US to militarily commit to East Timor has been recorded elsewhere. See for 
instance David Dickens, “The United Nations in East Timor: Intervention at the Military Operational Level,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia (2001), pp. 213-232. 
570 John Howard, “East Timor, UN peacekeeping force and Indonesia,” Press Release, Transcript of press 
conference with John Howard at the Hyatt Regency Hotel, Auckland New Zealand, 13 September 1999. 
Available at: 
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571 The US stationed 235 troops in Dili and 353 in Darwin, and marine expeditionary unit off-shore. The US 
provided airlift, intelligence, communication and civilian-military operation centre. Eric Schwartz, “The 
intervention in East Timor,” Report for the National Intelligence Committee, December 2001. Available at: 
http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/schwartz.pdf (accessed 28 May 2014).  
572 BBC, “Habibie accepts Timor peacekeepers,” BBC News, 12 September 1999. Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/445189.stm (accessed 16 May 2014).  
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UNAMET and assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid.573 Australia fulfilled its promise of 
leading the multinational force and contributed over 5,500 of the 12,600 troops.574 The 
commander of the force was Australian Major-General, Peter Cosgrove who was in charge of 
a multinational coalition that included significant contributions from states in Australia’s 
region, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and South Korea. 
 
The Australian deployment to INTERFET represented its largest military commitment in 
over thirty years, and encompassed three infantry battalion groups, defence headquarters, as 
well as support units. This was joined by maritime and air operations.575 Its involvement in 
Timor Leste did not stop with the withdrawal of INTERFET. In March 2000, INTERET was 
replaced with the United Nations Transitional Authority of East Timor (UNTAET), which 
oversaw the civil administration of Timor Leste until its independence and included the 
deployment of a UN PKO. Australia contributed the largest number of personnel to the UN 
PKO, an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 personnel, as well as a landing aircraft and Blackhawk 
helicopters.576 
 
Australia’s diplomacy and military resources: Moral and material outcomes of foreign policy 
On the 20th May 2002, the territory of East Timor was declared the new nation of Timor 
Leste signaling the final result of self-determination for the Timorese. Much has been made 
about the merits of Australia’s actions in the lead up to INTERFET, but there is a general 
consensus that it did contribute to Timor Leste becoming a relatively stable and independent 
state. In fact, some, like James Cotton and Alan Dupont, have argued that without Australia’s 
diplomacy and leadership in building an international coalition, this outcome was unlikely.577 
As has been mentioned earlier, Australia’s commitment was guided by an overarching 
expectation that its support for a vote of independence, and subsequent humanitarian 
operation, would contribute to regional security. There were also specific moral and material 
                                           
573 UN, Security Council, “Resolution 1264,” 15 September 1999. Available at: http://daccess-dds 
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/264/81/PDF/N9926481.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 29 May 2014). 
574 The deployment of military personnel was followed by federal police, MLOs and consular officials. 
575 This was designated Operation Warden as part of the wider UN efforts designated Operation Stabilise.  
576 Australia also contributed personnel to the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), which was 
established to keep the peace after independence between 2002-2005. In 2006, the sacking of rebel military 
personnel led to outbreaks of civil unrest and violence in Dili prompting the UNs Integration Mission in Timor 
Leste (UNMIT) to be deployed. ADFs personnel were sent as part of Operation ASTUTE and continued until 
December 2012 when the UN formally withdrew its PKO from Timor.   
577 See James Cotton, “The emergence of an independent East Timor: National and regional challenges,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 1 (2000), pp. 1-22 and Alan Dupont, “ASEAN’s response to the East 
Timor crisis,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 2 (2000), pp.163-170. 
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outcomes that allowed Australia to gain benefits in prestige, economic investment and closer 
ties with Indonesia.  
 
The proposal for a coalition instead of a UN blue-helmet operation was a way to have a 
security force on the ground to stop the bloodshed, but it was also a means for Australia to 
gain leadership credentials in the region while also having other states shoulder some of the 
operational burden.578 This led to reputational benefits and also satisfied domestic concerns 
that Australia had not done enough to resolve the crisis. As Eric Schwartz, Presidential 
Assistant on multilateral and humanitarian affairs, commented: 
 
There is enormous appreciation in Washington for the leadership that 
the Government of Australia has shown in this undertaking. Australian 
diplomats did a masterful job in pulling together an international 
coalition. The Australian military has acted with professionalism, has 
been highly effective, and General Cosgrove has proven to be an 
absolutely excellent leader.579 
 
As well as its commitment to securing the conditions for Timor’s independence, Australia 
contributed significantly to the reconstruction process. At the time, Australia’s contribution 
of $74 million (to the UN estimated $300 million needed for the first three years of 
reconstruction) represented the largest it had ever made to a single humanitarian crisis.580 
Such a large donation was partly motivated by a concern that Timor make the transition to a 
secure and thriving state, and partly inline with expectations that Australia would continue its 
leadership role during the nation-building process. As Howard noted before the operation: 
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580 Alexander Downer, “East Timor – the way ahead,” Speech, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer at the 
Rotary Club, Sydney, 30 November 1999. Available at: 
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I have said all along that if independence for East Timor means that 
Australia must accept a greater burden than would otherwise be the 
case and that will be a burden in aid, a burden in other respects 
because it will be a fragile, fledgling country.  There’ll be fewer than a 
million people, it will have a very low standard of living, it will have 
virtually no infrastructure.581 
 
This expectation was also met with the desire to achieve material outcomes in business 
contracts and investment. And here again, Australia acted quickly to achieve this goal. In 
preparation, it established an AusAID office in Dili less than one month after INTERFET 
was deployed and convened a reconstruction forum in Canberra on 19th of October where 
over 450 business and government representatives were provided an overview of the 
requirements and opportunities for re-building. 582 This gave Australian businesses a head 
start on lobbying for operations in road repair, building refurbishment, transport 
infrastructure and water supply.583 Howard also took the unusual step of writing to various 
business heads and CEOs in December 1999, inviting them to contribute to Timor’s 
development.584 This meant that by the time that Timor Leste was “open for business” in 
June 2002, Australia had established an Australian-East Timor Business Council and had 
reaped significant financial benefit with some 347 Australian businesses operating in Timor 
Leste. Some of the more lucrative contracts went to ANZ for banking and finance; Multiplex 
for the construction of public offices; Ortech Industries for housing construction and the 
RMS Engineering and Construction PTY Ltd for the construction of commercial buildings.585 
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These outcomes were not just localized to Australia. The influx of investment and 
development meant Timor Leste achieved impressive annual growth of 15% between 1999 
and 2001.586 The most significant economic effect of independence was the royalties 
achieved from the singing of a new oil and gas agreement. For Australia, it meant that it 
could successfully re-negotiate a better agreement on the Timor Gap – a concern that had 
been tied to Australia’s actions over Timor Leste since the 1960s. The terms of the Timor Sea 
Treaty were concluded on the 19th of May, singed on the day of Timor Leste’s independence 
and entered into force in April 2003. 587 The treaty split the revenue 90%-10% in Timor’s 
favor and on the surface this may seem like a deal that goes against the actions of previous 
governments in their pursuit of a relative advantage. However, the area known as the Joint 
Petroleum Development Area (JPDA), formerly the “Timor Gap” where the 90%-10% was 
enforced, did not include the large and profitable Greater Sunrise field, of which Australia 
claimed 79.9% lay within its seabed boundary signed with Indonesia in 1972.588  
 
During the preliminary negotiations Timor Leste repeatedly disputed the legitimacy of this 
boundary, arguing that it contravened the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, which 
placed the field within Timor’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In response, Australia 
withdrew from recognizing this Convention before negotiations officially started and refused 
to reach a deal that did not recognize this boundary.589 The initial result was the signing of 
the Sunrise International Unitisation Agreement that accompanied the Timor Sea Treaty and 
overwhelming advantaged Australia in leaving only 20.1% of the field within the JPDA 
where Timor would receive 18.1% of the revenue.590 This treaty was amended in 2006 in 
                                                                                                                                    
Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/summary/summary.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=East%2
0Timor%20reconstruction%20business;resCount=Default (accessed 19 May 20014). 
586 Luis M. Valdivieso and Alejandro López-Mejía, “East Timor: Marcroeconomic management on the road to 
independence,” IMF: Finance and Development 38, no. 1 (2001). Available at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/03/valdivie.htm (accessed 29 May 2014).  
587 DFAT, Australian Treaty Series, “Timor Sea Treaty between the Government of East Timor and the 
Government of Australia,” (2 April 2003). Available at: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2003/13.html (accessed 29 May 2014).  
588 Brendan Bailey, “Petroleum (Timor Sea Treaty) bill 2003,” Bills Digest, Information and Research Services, 
23 July 2003. Available 
at:http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/bd/bd0304/04bd006 (accessed 29 May 
2014).  
589 For more on Australia’s withdrawal from the Convention on the Law of the Sea, see Gillian Triggs, and 
Dean Bialek, “The New Timor Sea Treaty and interim arrangements for joint development of petroleum 
resources of the Timor Gap,” Melbourne Journal of International Law 3 (2002), pp. 322-364. 
590 DFAT, Australian Treaty Series, “Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of 
the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste relating to the Unitisation of the Sunrise Troubador Fields,” (23 
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recognition that the original agreement was markedly unreasonable for a new and developing 
state that could use the revenue to become less aid-dependent. The Certain Maritime 
Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS) was entered info force in February 2007 (the same 
day as the SIU) and divided the upstream revenue from the field on a 50%-50% basis. 591 
 
It is difficult to fully quantify the benefits of this agreement to Timor Leste given that large 
amounts of the projected revenue from the oil and gas fields are yet to be exploited. 
However, an estimated 90% of Timor Leste’s economy is generated from oil and gas, which 
has been deposited into a sovereign wealth fund that increased from $370 million in 2005 to 
$11.78 billion in 2012.592 Australia’s expected economic benefit is obviously much larger. 
The Greater Sunrise field is estimated to contain 8.4 trillion cubic feet of gas and 295 million 
barrels of hydrocarbon, worth over $40 billion. Australia’s Woodside Energy Ltd holds the 
right to develop the field with a project cost of $6.6 billion. Timor Leste gained 90% share of 
the Bayu-Undan field, but Australia built the only natural gas pipeline connecting the field to 
a processing plant in Darwin harbour, and has benefited from the construction and 
processing.593 The pipeline was complete in 2005 and is estimated to produce $2 billion in 
direct revenue on top of the $1.6 billion already achieved in combined construction of the 
LNG plant. It also led to the creation of over 1,500 jobs and increased trade opportunities 
with Japan as Australia’s share (approximately 3 million tonnes of LNG a year) was 
contracted to the Tokyo Electric Power Company and Tokyo Gas.594 These outcomes were 
reciprocal. Australian investors in the project, Phillips Petroleum, Inpex Sahul, Santos and 
Petroz made substantial contributions to Timor Leste. Nearly US$13m was spent on project 
training and infrastructure development, including airport, education and health facilities. 
                                                                                                                                    
February 2007). Available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2007/11.html (accessed 20 May 
2014).  
591DFAT, Australian Treaty Series, “Treaty between Australia and the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste on 
Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea,” (23 February 2003). Available at: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2007/12.html (accessed 20 May 2014). 
592 The majority of this has come from the Bayu-Undan field, which reached peak in 2013-14 earlier than 
previous estimates, sparking fears that Timor’s sovereign wealth fund will be unable to fund future 
infrastructure projects. For more see David Winning, “East Timor’s economic engine maybe low on gas,” The 
Wall Street Journal, 14 February 2014. Available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303636404579396361782040576 (accessed 19 May 
2014).  
593 Tom Allard, “Australia accused of playing dirty with East Timor over oil and gas reserves,” The Sydney 
Morning Herald, 28 December 2013. Available at: http://www.smh.com.au/national/australia-accused-of-
playing-dirty-in-battle-with-east-timor-over-oil-and-gas-reserves-20131227-2zzmi.html (accessed 19 May 
2014).  
594 ABC, “Japanese companies buy into Bayu-Undan gas project,” ABC Radio Australia, 29 March 2012. 
Available at: http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/2003-07-01/japanese-companies-buy-into-bayu-
undan-gas-project/692526 (accessed 19 May 2014).  
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Over $US44 million was spent on running costs and for the supply of Liquefied Petroleum 
Gas (LPG) at a concessional rate which was predicted to be worth $20 million. Discounted 
LPG was expected to assist Timor in replacing expensive and imported diesel fuel for 
domestic power generators.595 
 
In a similar way to the case of Cambodia, perhaps one of the less well-known benefits to 
Australia’s actions in Timor Leste was the strengthening of its relationship with Indonesia. 
Indeed, some, like Hugh White, have argued that INTERFET was a strategic failure in the 
short-term effect it had on Australia’s relationship with Indonesia.596 Yet, what I have shown 
demonstrates that at every step the government was acutely aware of how this would affect 
its most important bilateral relationship outside of the US. It was the main reason why 
successive Prime Minister’s were wary of any proactive policy over the Timor issue and why 
John Howard was steadfast in his commitment to gaining Habibie’s consent before any PKOs 
were sent. Not only does this uncover the centrality of rational choice, it also indicates that 
Australia would not have made a move without an expectation that a resolution to the “thorn 
in the side” of its relationship with Indonesia would lead to some benefits in return.  
 
                                           
595 “The Timor Sea Treaty,” HoR, Report of the Treaties Committee to the House of Representatives, Chapter 4, 
pp. 20-36. Report, 11 November 2002. Available at: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=jsct/timo
r/report.htm (accessed 20 May 2014).  
596 It was the case that Indonesia initially reacted badly to Australia’s diplomacy and leadership of the 
multinational coalition, which was demonstrated in Indonesia’s scrapping of the 1996 security agreement. This 
was a calculated risk for the Australian government and, as mentioned, it was the main consideration affecting 
previous action over the Timor issue during the Suharto era. But by September 1999, both the internal situation 
in Indonesia, and the regional environment, had changed to the extent that the risk in intervening was 
outweighed by the benefits expected in return. For more see Hugh White, “The road to independence: 
reflections on Australia’s strategic decisions concerning East Timor December 1998-September 1999,” Security 
Challenges 4, no. 1 (2008), pp. 69-87. 
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Source: DFAT  
 
Trade between the two countries actually increased after 1999 and has more or less been on a 
steady growth path worth over $14.1 billion in 2013.597 Of course, some of this can be 
attributed to Indonesia’s political and economic transformation, as well as its recovery from 
the AFC, but a resolution to the Timor issue also increased market confidence in Indonesia, 
which had been labelled a pariah over its human rights abuses. Business-to-business links and 
FDI between the two nations increased, particularly in the area of mining, textiles and 
agriculture. During the height of the crisis in 1999, Australia had gained approval for 54 new 
investment projects. A year later, 34 new projects were approved worth US$32 million.598 
Alongside the economic benefits, greater outcomes were also had in the signing of a new 
security agreement in 2006 that was wider in its scope of cooperation and consultation. The 
“Lombok Treaty” included the areas of defence and defence technology, law enforcement, 
transnational crime, people smuggling, counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, maritime and 
aviation security, as well as nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes. 599 
                                           
597 Statistical information can be found in the table “Australian trade with Indonesia.” 
598 DFAT, “Indonesia – Facing the challenge,” (2014), p.135. Available at: http://dfat.gov.au/about-
us/publications/Documents/ind_challenge.pdf (accessed 19 May 2014).  
599 DFAT, “Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and Australia on a framework for security 
cooperation,” (2006). Available at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/ind-aus-sec06.html (accessed 29 May 
2014).  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has applied a moral realist framework to understand Australia’s foreign policy 
choices in Cambodia and Timor Leste. It found that Australia’s record as an active middle 
power in this policy area is better explained by reference to expectations of reciprocity, 
rational choice and moral and material outcomes than supporters of Australia acting as a GIC 
would acknowledge. This is particularly the case given that in both Cambodia and Timor 
Leste Australia waited to act until the conditions were right for it to reap the maximum 
national interest benefits in return, which indicates that moral and material considerations 
converged in Australia’s decision to use force for humanitarian purposes.  
 
In Cambodia, the end of the Cold War provided Australia with an opportunity to present its 
Cambodian peace plan with the expectation that an agreement on UN transitional 
administration of Cambodia would break the deadlock on international negotiations. This 
also produced some moral outcomes in the withdrawal of foreign forces, partial 
demobilization and the holding of relatively free and fair elections. Australia’s support of 
UNTAC was consistent with its regional strategic interests. It provided an opportunity for 
Australia to military contribute towards regional stability in a changed environment where 
non-traditional security threats were more prevalent. Resolution to the Indochina conflict also 
led to economic gains as a result of the normalization of relations with Vietnam, which had 
been a long-term foreign policy goal for Australia.  
 
Similar evidence was found in Australia’s use of force in Timor Leste. Australia’s 
commitment was more significant and so were the material benefits. Like in Cambodia, 
Australia waited until the conditions were ripe for it to receive the maximum outcomes. This 
occurred after the fall of the Suharto regime, which provided the opportunity for Howard to 
propose a path of self-determination for the Timorese. Rather than representing a normative 
shift, this policy change was motived by a rational calculation that it would achieve some 
beneficial outcomes, for both Australia and for the Timorese. It provided a further 
opportunity for Australia to adopt a leadership role in resolving issues of regional security, 
which led to specific reputational payoffs. Economic benefits were also gained in Australia’s 
commitment to the reconstruction process and more importantly in the signing of the new 
Timor Sea Treaty.  
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This thesis has now applied the moral realist framework to two of the three empirical cases 
and found that the perspective shows potential in understanding the position of morality in 
Australia’s policy choices in the arenas of foreign aid and humanitarian operations. However, 
this is only two thirds of the full story. The presence of moral and material calculations as 
part of Australia’s foreign policy choices in these policy arenas was not wholly unexpected. 
Hence, the next chapter will complete my case investigation by applying moral realism to a 
policy arena where only strategic factors are likely to be present. Hence I now turn to the case 
of the Australian-US security partnership.  
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Chapter Four 
 
 
Australia and the US security partnership: Morality and interests in Australia’s 
strategic alliances 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 1, much of the realist literature has treated the potential for moral 
considerations in state foreign policy choices with a high level of scepticism, while normative 
perspectives have over-emphasized the role played by shared norms, values and ideas. Thus, 
this chapter seeks to offer an alternative by examining the Australian-US security partnership 
from a moral realist perspective. It is organized into two parts. It begins with an evaluation of 
the main theoretical debates on strategic alliances. Within this discussion I identify the 
limitations of normative understandings of security, and specifically their pre-occupation 
with the inherent cooperative benefits of multilateral strategic alliances. I then provide an 
overview of a moral realist approach to alliances, which is broadly informed by the moral and 
material consequences of states choosing to form security partnerships underpinned by 
common interests.  
 
The next section forms the bulk of the chapter and is where I apply the moral realist 
framework to the Australia-US security partnership. It finds that in originally forming the tie 
Australia was motivated by an expectation of reciprocity in having security assurances from a 
great power, as well as access to US defence planning, intelligence and technology. The 
decision to align with the US was also guided by moral calculations in that Australia 
understood the US to be the best security partner that could assist in maintaining regional 
peace and security, which had benefits to other states outside of the relationship. Evidence of 
continued expectations of reciprocity over the life of the partnership is strengthened by 
evidence of rational choice as Australia sought to maintain close cooperation with the US, 
despite instances where doing so appeared to compromise Australia’s national interests.  
 
The presence of expectations of reciprocity and rational choice demonstrates the likelihood of 
moral and material outcomes, which I argue have been evident in the flow-on benefits to 
states in Australia’s regional environment – especially in the areas of counter-terrorism and 
joint law enforcement. This has led to material benefits for Australia in bringing stability to 
its area of direct strategic importance and contributed to its regional interests in developing 
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closer security and defence ties with states in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific Islands.  
In sum, this chapter finds further evidence in support of moral realism as a useful framework 
for understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices, and in doing so completes the 
application of moral realism to the empirical cases.  
 
Defining alliances: The Australian-US security partnership 
While alliances obviously vary in their specific details they are generally considered a type of 
security cooperation defined by mutual agreements to defend against a common external 
threat.600 This can appear in two forms: formal and informal. In a formal alliance 
commitments are enshrined in written agreements (like Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) Charter, for instance). In comparison, an informal alliance is one made 
up of ad-hoc agreements founded on “either tacit understandings or some tangible form of 
commitment, such as verbal assurances or joint military exercises.”601 The US-Australian 
security partnership, under the Australian New Zealand United States (ANZUS) treaty has 
both formal and informal aspects.602 The treaty itself does not include an explicit mutual 
guarantee that each party will come to the aid of the other. Instead Article 3 specifies that 
“Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, 
political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.”603 The 
promise to consult in the event of a security threat is then followed by recognition that this 
would also constitute a mutual security threat under Article 4, which states that:  
 
                                           
600 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the security dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978), pp. 167-214. 
601 Stephen Walt, “Why alliances endure of collapse,” Survival 39, no. 1 (1997), pp. 156-179.  
602 ANZUS is often used in the literature to refer to both the treaty and the various dialogues, institutions and 
exchanges between the US and Australia as part of the security partnership. This thesis takes a broader approach 
and focuses on the US-Australia security partnership that extends outside of the ANZUS treaty. This allows the 
thesis to keep within the parameters of examining the bilateral relationship between the US and Australia given 
that ANZUS was originally a tri-lateral security agreement that included New Zealand up until the mid-1980s. 
In 1984 the new New Zealand Labor government came to power with the promise of banning the docking of 
ships carrying nuclear weapons at New Zealand ports. The US then sent the conventionally powered destroyer 
USS Buchanan to dock in New Zealand in 1985. Prime Minister Lange sought assurances that it did not carry 
nuclear weapons and in response the US argued that it was long-standing policy to refuse to confirm or deny 
whether vessels are carrying nuclear weapons. Negotiations to resolve the dispute broke down and New Zealand 
enforced the ban barring the ship from docking. The US implemented several measures in retaliation. The first 
was to cancel all joint military training exercises. This was followed by a restriction of intelligence exchange 
and flow of information. And in 1986, it suspended its pledge to aid New Zealand in the event of a security 
threat. New Zealand was technically still part of ANZUS as it refused to formally withdraw, but without the 
defence assurances of the US and access to intelligence gathering in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, it was no 
longer considered part of the security alliance. For more see Ted Galen Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: 
America’s Alliances after the Cold War (Washington DC: CATO institute, 1992), pp. 96-97.  
603 DFAT, Australian Treaty Series, “Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of 
America,” (29 April 1952). Available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1952/2.html (accessed 
12 June 2014).  
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Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any 
of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and 
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance 
with its constitutional processes.604 
 
The agreement – albeit codified in a treaty – is therefore more of a tacit understanding that 
relies on the close consultation and dialogue between the parties. This is an important feature 
of the partnership also described later in this chapter. But how have alliances been interpreted 
in the literature? What specific benefits might be argued to flow from an alliance? And what 
– if anything – is moral about alliances? Below I focus on normative explanations for 
alliances in order to differentiate them from the moral realist perspective that follows 
subsequently. 
 
Common, collective, comprehensive and cooperative: The normative view of alliances 
The literature on the nature of morality in strategic alliances is fairly limited compared to aid 
and humanitarian intervention. As has been mentioned previously, normative perspectives 
have tended to focus on the potential for moral outcomes in collective or multilateral alliance 
groupings. The assumption here is that agreements made between larger groups are more 
moral because they require a greater level of sacrifice of the national interest to achieve 
compromise. A greater compromise to reach a common interest increases the likelihood of 
benefits to the society of states as a whole. The overall purpose of an alliance is then security 
defined by cooperation, rather than security defined by self-interest.  
 
Notions of cooperative security in particular were popularized following the end of the Cold 
War, when George Bush Snr heralded a “New World Order” of cooperative and peaceful 
international relations.605 Cooperative security was part of a new wave of efforts to 
reconceptualize security alongside other variants such as common, comprehensive and 
                                           
604 Ibid. 
605 George Bush made his “Towards a New World Order” speech in front of a joint session of Congress in 1991. 
He argued that increased diplomacy and cooperation between the developed and developing world, Muslim and 
non-Muslim, and Arab and non-Arab over condemnation of Iraq in Kuwait, as well as greater compromise 
between himself and Gorbachev, demonstrated that “a new world order -- could emerge: a new era -- freer from 
the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace.” George Bush, 
“Address before a joint session of the congress on the Persian Gulf crisis and the federal budget deficit,” 
Speech, George Bush Presidential Library and Museum, Public Papers 1990. Available at: 
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2217&year=1990&month=9 (accessed 16 April 
2014). 
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collective security.606 Australia’s own Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, was part of this trend. 
He argued that states had become more interdependent, and thus issues of security required 
multilateral or regionally-coordinated responses to resolve them.607 Previously, normative 
conceptions of security had been scarce, with only a few contributions from cosmopolitan 
perspectives that emphasized the growing effects of globalization, and the need to consider a 
definition of security that transcended state borders.608 Likewise, the British Committee on 
the Theory of International Politics made similar observations as part of its quest to build an 
empirical approach to understanding inter-state cooperation. For the majority of the early 
English School (ES), ideas of security and strategic planning were viewed through the prism 
of international rules and laws.609  
 
Alliances were a product of international society that reinforced cooperation between states, 
and further cemented the normative principles of international order. But since the 
superpower rivalry of the Cold War made cooperation scarce, these scholars were fairly 
limited in finding evidence to support their assumptions. NATO was quite obviously a 
mechanism of US hegemony in Europe designed to maintain the strategic balance in the 
West’s favour, which meant they were left with informal security “groupings” and 
organizations like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the 
multilateral Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). Both of these organizations were 
considered moribund: the former because of a lack of consensus on the purpose of the 
                                           
606 David Dewitt, “Common, comprehensive and cooperative security,” The Pacific Review 7, no. 1 (1994), pp. 
1-5.  
607 Gareth Evans placed particular importance on the role of the UN in implementing preventative diplomacy 
through peacekeeping and the just use of force. However, he also argued for cooperative diplomacy amongst 
states that utilized multilateralism and multilateral frameworks. For more see Gareth Evans, Cooperating for 
Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1993); and Evans 
“Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict,” Foreign Policy 96 (1994), pp.3-20. 
608 Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) 
609 The literature on security and strategic studies within the English School is difficult to summarize. As I have 
mentioned in the literature review chapter, evidence of the school’s claim to empiricism is contested with the 
majority of scholars advancing a normative bent that goes beyond the bounds of a state based international 
society. Yet, Bull himself maintained a more realist take on security and international order. He argued that 
international order was determined by the balance of power, and the rules, norms and laws of international 
society were created and maintained in response to that balance. Specifically, Bull argued that during the Cold 
War international societal order rested on the ability of the super-powers to “accommodate their interests.” This 
accommodation extended further than bipolarity and also encompassed the rise of other great powers with 
nuclear weapons capability. Thus, for Bull, international order reflected the strategic balance of power, which 
precluded states’ ability to exercise mutual restraint in their interactions with each other. Complimentary 
interests amongst the great powers could then be found in the rules that limited the actions of others states, but 
this only occurred in situations where the relative power balance was maintained. In this regard, he was very 
much inline with classical realist assumptions on the balance of power and international law. For more on Bull’s 
often overlooked views on security and strategic studies see Robert Ayson’s very informative and timely book 
Bull and the Accommodation of Power (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).  
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institution (the Soviet Union seeing it as a way to maintain influence in Eastern Europe, and 
the West seeing it as an extension of its desire to promote economic integration), while the 
later failed to achieve much material and diplomatic support, and was disbanded in 1977.610 
 
Yet after the Cold War, normative scholars were given space to consider new ideas about 
security, and of particular importance here was the deepening and broadening of the concept 
to include non-traditional threats that cut across state borders. The rise of transnational 
security threats demanded new ways of responding to them that recognized the growing 
interdependent nature of international relations, and the limits of unilateral defence measures. 
Hence, cooperative security became popular as it denoted “consultation rather than 
confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, 
prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism.”611 In this 
regard, cooperative security incorporated elements of common security, where responses to 
threats are constructed “in common” with others instead of against them, and comprehensive 
security where security is multidimensional and includes issues such as human development, 
trade and damage to the environment.  
 
                                           
610 The CSCE was the result of the Helsinki Accords, which were aimed at improving contact between the West 
and the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe. It achieved very little. The position of the Soviet Socialist Republics 
remained unchanged and it was the economic downfall of the Soviet Union over 20 years later that created the 
conditions for independence and movements towards the West. The CSCE morphed into the Organization of 
Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which has maintained the same track record in promoting international 
cooperation. Again, this can be attributed to the divergent interests of the participating parties, particularly the 
US and Russia. The US has seen it as a forum for the promotion of domestic institutional reform, while Russia 
has viewed it as a mechanism to keep control over its traditional sphere of influence. Disagreements over the 
purpose of the institution, as well as the consensus based decision making model it employs, has led many to 
note its irrelevance in international politics. See Ondrej Ditrych, “Security community: A future for a troubled 
concept?,” International Relations 28, no. 3 (2014), pp. 350-366 and Elana Kropatcheva, “Russia and the role of 
the OSCE in European security: a ‘Forum’ for dialog or a ‘Battlefield’ of interests?,” European Security 21, no. 
3 (2012), pp. 370-394. SEATO was arguably set to fail before it was even properly established. As I will 
describe in more detail below, the US, Australia, Britain and France all had differing views of what a Southeast 
Asian security pact should look like. The US was torn between the view of John Foster Dulles, who saw a 
security pact as a means of deterring communist insurgency in Southeast Asia, and the Pentagon that was 
hesitant to commit to any treaty that would embroil Americans into a land-war in Asia. The UK and France 
were in the midst of recovering from WWII and were against any treaty that committed their defence forces to 
another war, and Australia was concerned that it was too provocative against the Chinese and would embroil 
them in conflict without the guarantee of protection. The Treaty was eventually signed in 1954 and came into 
force in 1955. Over the next twenty years, the participating members struggled to agree on what was meant by 
communist insurgency and subversion, with the Communist Party being legal in Australia while communists 
were routinely shot in Thailand. The treaty ended in 1977 after the main contributing members in terms of 
economic assistance and technical cooperation, the US, France and Britain, ceased to provide their support. For 
more on the creation of the treaty see Roger Dingman, “John Foster Dulles and the creation of the Southeast 
Asian Treaty Organization,” The International History Review 11, no. 3 (1989), pp. 457-477. Information on the 
various problem inherent within SEATO can be found in Ronald C. Nairn, “SEATO: A critique,” Pacific Affairs 
41, no. 1 (1968), pp. 5-18. 
611 Evans, “Cooperative security and intrastate conflict,” Foreign Affairs 96 (1994), p. 4.  
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These new security typologies were the start of an explosion of interest by normative 
perspectives in security studies. The “securitization” agenda was introduced in the early 
1990s, popularized by the Copenhagen School and supported by Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver 
and Jaap De Wilde.612 The Copenhagen School borrowed from aspects of comprehensive 
security to argue for a widening of security beyond military threats. But these scholars also 
went further, and challenged the way security was determined. Instead of referring to material 
interests, the Copenhagen School argued that it was more appropriate to conceptualize 
security as a speech act. In other words, security issues were given meaning through the 
dialogue of elites and states responded to them as a security threat when they were selected – 
and then communicated – as threats through a process of securitization. As well as widening 
the scope of security issues, Buzan argued that security was highly interdependent and 
localized to specific regions or “mini-systems.”613 From this perspective, states form alliances 
in response to common security threats that are tied to their geographic location, and these 
threats are determined by a dialogical consensus that they will affect all parties involved.  
 
In addition to the Copenhagen School one can also refer to the Welsh School of Critical 
Security Studies (CSS). Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones have been its key supporters, and 
they advanced an emancipatory concept of “world security” that shifted the referent object of 
security from the state to the individual, seeing the state as the means to ensure security, and 
not an end.614 For them, security was the freedom of the individual to determine their own 
life and therefore the Welsh School was concerned with deepening security to encompass 
more than just physical protection. This contribution was closely related to critical 
cosmopolitanism that determined security to be an instrumental value, which individuals and 
groups pursued for the betterment of society.615 The state was thus an obstacle to the kind of 
transformation that would allow individuals to achieve their own security.  
 
                                           
612 Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2007). 
613 Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
614 Ken Booth, “Security as emancipation” Review of International Studies 17, no. 4 (1991), pp.313-326; Booth, 
Theory of World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Richard Wyn Jones, “‘Message 
in a bottle’ theory and praxis in critical security studies,” Contemporary Security Policy 16, no. 3 (1995), pp. 
299-319.  
615 See Andrew Linklater, Critical Theory and World Politics: Citizenship, Sovereignty and Humanity (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2007). 
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While contributions from CSS are interesting, they fail to consider how security would be 
achieved in the absence of the state as its main guarantor. Inevitably, the rejection of 
problem-solving methods meant these scholars have provided no foreign policy alternatives 
outside of the normal practices of international politics, and overlooked the importance of 
state interaction (such as alliances, conflict resolution and international diplomacy) in 
contributing to international peace and stability. The Copenhagen School, with its focus on 
the dialogical process in operationalizing security, is equally problematic. There is simply not 
enough space to cover the myriad conceptual and methodological critiques that can be 
levelled at securitization scholars.616 The most relevant one to this chapter is the removal of 
security from its material source, which is important for understanding why, and for what 
purpose, states form alliances. The material structure of security tied to the national interest 
provides consistency in measuring the success of an alliance, which a rhetorical structure is 
unable to achieve, as there is no guarantee that the recipient state will always view the same 
threat in the same way, making a dialogical consensus difficult. This uncertainty also brings 
to light the challenges of identifying when a security threat comes to be recognized as one. 
For a realist, this is obviously guided by strategic factors – threats to physical territory, to Sea 
Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) and to broader geopolitical interests. The securitization 
agenda, on the other hand, has no such reference point, meaning threats to national security 
can be whatever political elites decide at a particular time, making it almost impossible for 
the state to prioritize which security threat requires the attention of the state’s resources.  
 
CSS and securitization scholarship has also been joined by a wave of constructivist scholars 
eager to highlight the deficiencies of realism and its positivist assumptions of anarchy, the 
                                           
616 The securitization agenda is open to much criticism. The immediate conceptual problem is the expansion of 
security into sectors (political, societal, military, economic and environmental), which makes it difficult to 
determine what threat is classified as falling under which sector, and what national resources are needed to solve 
it. The classification of these sectors is also vague, particularly the “societal” security sector, which refers to the 
ability of the society to adapt to changing security threats. This could mean a number of things, like social 
organization, civil and political administration, demographics, strength of judicial system and social mobility. 
Some of these also crossover with other sectors, like political security, adding another layer of complexity in 
identifying what threat is being securitized at what time. This is both a conceptual and methodological problem 
of the Copenhagen School that links into how securitization scholars conceive of security. For them, 
securitization is an intersubjective process as security is determined by a “speech act” that must be accepted by 
the others before resources are mobilized to resolve it. But if security is contingent on consensus, what happens 
when this fails to be achieved? The threat of terrorism in Indonesia, for instance, is a threat to Australia’s 
security even if the wider Australian public does not know or accept this to be true. There are also problems 
with confining security threats to specific regions. The rise of China, for example, originates in Northeast Asia, 
but has security implications for a number of states, including Australia, that are outside this region. For more of 
these criticisms see Bill McSweeney who is the Copenhagen School’s most vocal critic. Bill McSweeney, 
“Identity and security: Buzan and the Copenhagen school,” Review of International Studies 22, no. 1 (1996), pp. 
81-93. 
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balance of power and state security. Constructivist approaches to security and strategic 
studies have been focused on demonstrating the existence and importance of ideational 
factors on behavioural outcomes. Ted Hopf has argued that ideas and identity could be used 
to discern the intentions of actors in forming alliances. Specifically, he stated that realism 
(and particularly defensive realists) could only explain alliance partners that balanced against 
a mutual threat based on geographic proximity and offensive military capability, and could 
not account for the perceived intentions of states because this relied on a posteriori 
knowledge. For Hopf, identity is a useful lens to understand the difference in how states 
perceived the same threat: for example, why the US viewed the Third World as an arena for 
competition against the Soviet Union while Western Europe perceived it as former colonies 
and economic resources. 617  
 
Other constructivists, like Martha Finnemore and Thomas Risse-Kappen, also took issue with 
the utility of realism, and especially the inability of the perspective to assess change in the 
purpose of alliances. Its faith in the determining power of systemic forces meant realism 
always dictated that alliances were formed in response to the balance of power, forcing states 
to either balance or bandwagon. The persistence of some alliances (especially NATO) after a 
shift in the balance of power was thus an anomaly for realists, as it would suggest a 
transformation in systemic forces that made cooperation, rather than competition, more 
likely. Hence constructivists have turned towards the fluid nature of identity to understand 
how NATO had moved from a collective defence organization to one that implemented large 
scale humanitarian operations, effectively joining the UN as an institution mandated to use 
force for international peace and security. 618 For these scholars, the end of the Cold War was 
the result of ideational factors and the triumph of liberal-democratic values meant 
communism, and consequently Soviet aggression, were no longer a threat. But NATO 
continued, indicating that states could be motivated to form alliances for reasons other than 
blind material interests – in this case, value-rational motivations of maintaining and 
promoting norms of democracy, human rights and cooperation.619 
                                           
617 Ted Hopf, “The promise of constructivism in International Relations,” International Security 23, no. 1 
(1998), pp. 187-188. 
618 Martha Finnemore and Katherine Sikkink, “International norm dynamics and political change,” International 
Organization 52, no. 4 (1998), pp. 887-917; and Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective identity in democratic 
community: the case of NATO,” in P.J. Katzenstien ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms an Identity in 
World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 357-399.  
619 Frank Schimmelfenng has also argued that constructivism can account for NATO expansion into Eastern 
Europe. Realism holds that states will rationally prefer fewer participants rather than more as this increases the 
likelihood that each member will share the burden of maintaining the alliance. But not only did NATO not 
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Yet there are several assumptions made in error here by constructivists. The first is that they 
assume alliances are in a constant state of flux, and are contingent on the mutual constitution 
of ideas and interest, all the way down and all the way up. In a similar way to critical 
scholars, this means they overlook the need for material interests in identifying the factors 
present when an alliance is formed. And these factors are important in judging the success of 
an alliance in contributing to any moral outcomes of international peace and stability. This 
limitation is also apparent in the constructivist claim that it can better account for change in 
the structure and function of alliances. The main target for constructivism has been the 
parsimony of structural realism, but as I demonstrate in more detail below, a moral realist 
explanation of interest defined as power that allows for greater flexibility in the type of 
interests, as well as the threats perceived, can accommodate these changes without 
socializing structural forces or relying on the causal power of ideational factors.  
 
If we look briefly at NATO, for instance, the fall of the Soviet Union led to changes in the 
relative distribution of power in the West’s favour, and therefore removed the threat of Soviet 
expansion. But it did not transform the member states’ motivations in maintaining the 
alliance. For the US there was a need to consolidate hegemony over Europe, and expanding 
the alliance decreased the likelihood that Russia would make future claims on Eastern 
Europe. Likewise, for the former Socialist Republics, signing up to NATO provided security 
assurances against Russian interference, which also reinforced their move from 
authoritarianism towards sovereign independence. In this regard, while the underlying 
material power altered, the alliance was still motivated by individual calculations of the 
national interest.  
 
This strongly resembles an expectation of reciprocity in alliances, and hence suggests a moral 
realist examination might be useful. Not only can this potentially explain NATO expansion, 
but it might also shed light on the perceived change in the purpose of the alliance. Read from 
a moral realist perspective, NATO’s actions in Kosovo indicated that rather than representing 
an act of cooperative security and a new direction for NATO as a humanitarian organization, 
members were motivated by specific expectations of receiving material benefits in return, 
                                                                                                                                    
disband following the end of the Cold War; it actually increased with more states willing to adopt the 
organizations principles of “democracy, individual freedoms and rule of law’ into their own domestic practices. 
For more see “NATO expansion: A constructivist explanation,” Security Studies 8, no. 2-3 (1998), pp. 198-234.  
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such as maintaining regional stability. This also suggests that alliances change when the 
material interests do, emphasizing the presence of rational choice. Yet when it comes to the 
moral dimension, this is much harder to determine. As described above, normative 
perspectives focused on the morality found in multilateral alliances that reflected notions of 
cooperative security, while securitization and critical scholars generally overlooked how 
security was achieved, and instead focused on the concept itself, locating morality in the 
process of consensus (in the case of the securitization school), and as an instrumental value 
(in the case of the Welsh school).  
 
Constructivists have not engaged directly with questions of morality in their writings on 
security and alliances, however they have broadly adopted the cooperative security agenda in 
that they have viewed multilateral groupings as repositories for promoting certain ideas of 
freedom and human rights. What is common, then, amongst normative perspectives is the 
conflation of multilateral cooperation with morality, which disregards the reciprocal benefits 
that hold security partnerships together. From a moral realist perspective, the decision for a 
state to align with country X over country Y is guided by an expectation of reciprocity that 
there are moral and material benefits to mutual security that are quite apart from the 
normative good of entering into alliances. The moral expectations might be found in 
strengthening the sovereignty of “new” states, as with the expansion of NATO post-Cold 
War, or maintaining regional peace and security, which arguably informed Australia’s 
calculated decision to align with the US post-WWII. In this regard, assisting “others” as part 
of expectations of reciprocity is tied to a calculation of whether it will achieve the security 
interests of the alliance partners. The presence of reciprocity and rational choice are 
important as they suggest a functional dimension to alliances, whereby moral and material 
outcomes might be possible. Below I provide a taste of how a moral realist perspective would 
conduct an analysis of alliances before applying this to a study of the Australian-US security 
partnership.  
 
Moral realism and strategic alliances: Expectations of reciprocity, rational choice and 
moral and material outcomes 
Expectations of reciprocity 
As argued above, the main problem with normative perspectives lies in how they understand 
security. Since moral realism takes a classical realist view, it defines security as the 
protection and defence of the national interest, which naturally falls within the strategic 
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domain of interstate relations. The best way to defend against threats to the national interest 
is for states to ally with others in order to maximize their power, and whom a state chooses to 
align with will depend in the first instance on the balance of power. In the case of the 
Australian-US security partnership the balance of power arguably determined Australia’s 
decision to align with the US and characterized the asymmetrical nature of the alliance, but 
the motivation was guided by an expectation of reciprocity that aligning with the US would 
lead to fewer risks, and substantially more security benefits, relative to other alliance partners 
such as the UK. Evidence of an expectation of reciprocity demonstrates that alliances of 
cooperative security are unlikely, as it would require the state to consider the interests of 
others at an equal level to the national interest. If this were true, then states would devote 
fewer resources to maintaining an alliance and it would be useless as a tool for the defence of 
national security. A moral realist would therefore expect that states would naturally 
preference bilateral security partnerships that operate under a framework of common 
interests.  
 
This does not mean that deep cooperation in alliances without clear threats is impossible; 
rather, it means that it must be guided by the state’s own understanding of the security 
interests involved and hence part of the process of alliances rather than the end goal of them. 
In this regard, it is possible to find a set of common interests within the workings of an 
alliance if both parties demonstrate enough self-interest in maintaining it. Indeed, according 
to Morgenthau: “An alliance adds precision, especially in the form of limitation, to an 
existing community of interests and to the general policies and concrete measures serving 
them.”620 The presence of complimentary interests is also not always limited to what would 
exclusively achieve the self-interest of the alliance partners. It may be the case that concerns 
for regional peace and security form part of the expectations in aligning with country X, 
which can benefit other states outside of the alliance partners. The focus, then, is not on 
whether two or more states share a common history, identity or cultural background, although 
this can sometimes help to strengthen the material commitment to the alliance, instead it is on 
whether there are complimentary interests that all parties are motivated to pursue.  
 
 
 
                                           
620 Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Thompson and David Clinton, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power 
and Peace 7th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill Education, 2005), p. 103.   
 202 
Rational choice 
Rational choice follows expectations of reciprocity in that it can account for the process of 
rational calculation that occurs when states choose to form an alliance. In Australia’s case, 
the US was the alliance partner least likely to make excessive demands of Australia, and that 
would contribute the most to its national security. This calculation continues as both states 
consider the benefits of maintaining the security partnership. The process of rational choice is 
thus not static, allowing for changes to the nature of alliance partnerships according to timing 
and context. In fact, the test of a successful alliance is often measured on its flexibility and 
capacity to adapt to changing international realities. The US-Australian security partnership 
has maintained the same basic purpose since its inception; this is despite changes to the 
nature of perceived threats, going from primarily a defence against the spread of communist 
governments in Southeast Asia, to a defence against a more profuse range of threats that 
include the spread of fundamental Islamism, spillover issues from failed states and cyber-
security. But what has remained consistent is the motivation to deal with them: the protection 
of the national interest. Hence the inclusion of rational choice means that moral realism can 
also explain instances where states demonstrate miscalculations in determining the national 
interest benefits from pursuing a particular alliance policy. As I demonstrate later in this 
chapter, this was particularly noteworthy in Australia’s participation in the Vietnam War.  
 
Moral and material outcomes 
An expectation of reciprocity explains the motivation of states forming a security partnership 
and the process of rational choice allows moral realism to account for the changes in the 
types of security interests pursued, as well as the structure of the partnership itself. What is 
left is evidence that strategic alliance policy can lead to moral and material outcomes. The 
pursuit of the national interest that forms the expectation of reciprocity is likely to produce 
material outcomes in increased security, international and regional stability, inter-operability 
and access to intelligence, as well as defence technology. In some instances the diplomatic 
collaborations can also help to achieve goals in other policy areas, such as the US agreeing to 
join the East Asia Summit (EAS), in part because of Australia’s urging.  
 
Moral outcomes, on the other hand, are not so easily identified. This is especially so given 
that moral realism still abides by assumptions about the balance of power and relative gains. 
Yet the existence of relative gains does not necessarily preclude the possibly that others 
outside of the alliance partners might also achieve some benefit. In looking at the Australian-
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US security partnership, for example, the expectation of regional peace and security in the 
Asia-Pacific also led to moral outcomes where states outside the US and Australia benefited 
from their security cooperation. Southeast Asian states, in particular, have benefited from the 
close cooperation on military training and joint efforts in counter-terrorism. This has also led 
to material benefits for Australia in defence cooperation with nations in its direct sphere of 
influence, as well as achieving Australia’s strategic interests in contributing towards its 
northern approaches. Thus, it is expected that when moral and material interests converge as 
part of an expectation of reciprocity in Australia’s strategic alliance policy, this will lead to 
moral and material outcomes.  
 
Now that I have provided an introduction on how a moral realist would approach the study of 
strategic alliances, it is time to examine whether this framework is of further use in 
understanding the US-Australian security partnership. The remainder of the chapter will be 
concerned with achieving this objective.  
 
Australia-US security ties: the bedrock of Australian security policy 
The most appropriate way to begin an analysis of the US-Australian security partnership is to 
identify the interests of the partners in forming the alliance. Much of the conventional 
scholarship begins with the signing of the ANZUS treaty itself, but Australia’s motives in 
aligning with the US actually appeared well before 1951, with the arrival of the Great White 
Fleet to Australian ports. At the time, Australia was still part of the British Empire, and was 
considered a land of British subjects.621 Australia’s foreign policy was dictated by the 
Foreign Office of the UK and the Empire’s Royal Navy, which had a small Imperial 
Squadron stationed in Sydney, guaranteed its security. Having said this, Australia was 
generally unhappy with the lack of strategic interest shown by the UK in maintaining its 
naval presence. Australia was providing £200,000 a year for its upkeep, and had no 
assurances (either written or tacit) that London was willing to aid in its defence.622 In fact, 
under the Naval Agreement Act of 1903, the ships could be withdrawn at anytime for the 
protection of Commonwealth interests, which left Australian ports potentially exposed. 623  
                                           
621 Thomas Bruce Millar, Australia in Peace and War: External Relations 1788-1977 (South Yara: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1978), pp. 69-72.  
622 Ibid. p. 69-72.  
623 Insecurities around the commitment and capacity of the British to assist in protecting Australia’s interest 
were not helped by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance first signed in 1902 and renewed in 1905 and 1911, which 
allowed Britain to reduce its naval presence in the Pacific. The treaty outlined British recognition of Japanese 
claims over Korea, and Japanese recognition of British claims over India without committing either side to 
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The decision to invite the US fleet, the first modern and full flotilla to dock at Australian 
ports, was calculated in showing its recognition of the US as a rising naval power. The 
Australian Prime Minister at the time, Alfred Deakin, also hoped that it would lift national 
support for an independent Australian navy:  
 
We live in hope that from our own shores some day a fleet will go out 
not unworthy to be compared in quality, if not in numbers, with the 
magnificent fleet now in Australian waters.624 
 
While this was important in introducing Australia to the US as a potential ally, it still 
remained firmly in step with its colonial master. The US declared that it would continue its 
policy of isolation after a brief departure during WWI, and Australia was not yet ready to 
exercise an independent foreign policy that involved replacing Britain with the US. It took 
over thirty years before Australia developed a formal diplomatic relationship with the US, 
establishing an Ambassadorship to Washington in 1940.625 The security partnership 
developed shortly after, and was largely shaped by the events of WWII.  
 
The war left Britain diplomatically and militarily devastated. Indeed, the rumblings of British 
decline that were evident as early as 1908 were made abundantly clear by the end of 1941. 
The British had failed to fend off Japanese assaults on British Singapore and on December 
10, 1941 Japanese air forces sunk the British ships the Prince of Wales and Repulse, cutting 
off their defences against a further Japanese offensive into Southeast Asia. Two months later, 
the Japanese conquered Singapore and took control of the British naval base, marking the end 
                                                                                                                                    
mutual defence in the event of a Russian offensive. Both parties were concerned about further Russian 
aggression, particularly the Japanese after the Japanese-Russian war of 1904. And the treaty was meant to 
represent a loose form of cooperation between the two potential rivals over a common threat. Yet the treaty did 
not last long and was terminated in 1923 following the Imperial Conference where Britain lost the support of 
Commonwealth governments who were concerned that it placed them at risk of being dragged into a conflict 
between the US and Japan. For more see Joseph Ferguson, Japanese-Russian Relations, 1907–2007 (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), pp. 12-13.  
624Senator Sampson referenced this passage during a debate on whether Australia should devote more resources 
towards establishing its own military, and particularly its own navy. The original speech by Alfred Deakin was 
made in 1908 in a welcome to the American Great White Fleet.  “APPROPRIATION BILL 1931-32 First 
Reading,” Senate, 4 August 1931. Available at:  
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=%22We%20
live%20in%20HOPES%20that%20from%20our%20own%20shores%20some%20day%20a%20fleet%20will%
20go%20out%20not%20unworthy%20to%20be%20compared%20in%20quality,%20if%20not%20in%20numb
ers,%20with%20the%20magnificent%20fleet%20now%20in%20Australian%20waters%22;rec=0;resCount=De
fault (accessed 5 August 2014).  
625 Richard Casey was Australia’s first Ambassador to the US.  
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of the “Singapore Strategy.”626 This had substantial consequences on the defence and security 
of Australia, as the Singapore Strategy was its only means of deterring Japanese imperialism 
– one that had already suffered significant setbacks with their conquering of Northern French 
Indochina a year earlier.  
 
Three days before the Japanese assault on Singapore, Imperial Japanese air forces conducted 
a surprise attack on US naval bases in Pearl Habour, forcing the US to abandon its policy of 
isolation. At the same time, Japan started its invasion of the US-controlled Philippines, and 
the islands of Wake and Guam. A declaration of war on Japan followed a day later, which 
pulled the US into the Pacific War.627 The US awakening altered the dynamics of the Pacific 
Theatre and consequently Australian foreign and security policy. This time there was a more 
pressing need for close defence cooperation with the US, and Australia was clearer about its 
desire for this to occur. Australian Prime Minister John Curtin made his now-famous “look to 
America” speech shortly after Pearl Harbour on December 27, 1941, where he re-framed 
Australia’s strategic outlook on the Pacific War. For him, it was a mutual fight involving the 
US and Australia as developed and democratic nations, against a common enemy threatening 
regional security and stability:  
 
The Australian Government, therefore, regards the Pacific struggle as 
primarily  one in which the United States and Australia must have the 
fullest say in the  direction of the democracies’ fighting plan. Without 
any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks  to 
America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the 
 United Kingdom.628 
 
In stating this, Curtin was acknowledging that the balance of power had shifted and Australia 
could no longer place expectations of reciprocity on the UK, which had calculated its own 
cost-benefit analysis on the defence of the Pacific versus Europe in its “Europe First” war 
                                           
626 The Singapore Strategy was a British foreign defence policy implemented between 1919-1941 and designed 
to deter Japanese advances southward to Australia and Indonesia. Ian Hamill, The Strategic Illusion: The 
Singapore Strategy and the Defence of Australia and New Zealand, 1919-1942 (Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 1981). 
627 Scott Sagan, “The origins of the Pacific War,” Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 18, no. 4 (1988), pp. 893-
922.  
628 John Curtain, “The task ahead,” The Melbourne Herald, 27 December 1941. Available at: 
http://john.curtin.edu.au/pmportal/text/00468.html (accessed 23 June 2014).  
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strategy.629 Australia’s own defences were stretched between its support of the 
Commonwealth efforts in the war in Europe, and the protection of Australian interests closer 
to home. After the fall of Singapore, Curtin asked Churchill for Australian forces sailing to 
defend British interests in the Dutch East Indies to be returned to help defend against 
Japanese advances into Australian New Guinea and Borneo. Churchill initially rebuffed this 
request and instead ordered the re-routing of the forces to support the defence of Burma, all 
without Curtin’s knowledge.630 This added weight to perceptions that Britain had abandoned 
its commitment to Australia and placed secondary importance on the Pacific Theatre of war. 
For Australia these perceptions increased and had significant reciprocal effects on its national 
interests after the first Japanese air raid on Darwin Harbour on February 19, 1942. Australia 
was left unprotected and feared full invasion: and in this context, Australia “looked to 
America” as the nation that shared the same interests in the face of a mutual threat. In other 
words, it aligned with the US over the UK because of an expectation of reciprocity that this 
was the best way to protect its national security. 631 
 
Roosevelt was not entirely pleased with Curtin’s speech, claiming that it showed “panic and 
disloyalty” amongst Allied partners, but regardless, the US did come to Australia’s aid. US 
General Douglas MacArthur was appointed Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific 
region and arrived in Australia on March 17, 1942.632 This was not done out of a sense of 
mutual identity or historical kinship. The US viewed Australia as a secure rear base for the 
Allied counter-offense against the Japanese “defence belt strategy,” which was intended to 
                                           
629 Churchill had been active in getting US assurances that if it joined WWII, it would direct the majority of its 
military resources to defeating Nazi Germany. The Pacific would be regarded as a secondary Theatre of war 
where the US would only implement a defence posture and seek to take back the Philippines when Germany 
was defeated. The two leaders met several times during December 1941 and early January in what became 
known as the Arcadia Conference where Churchill and Roosevelt agreed on a “European First” strategy and 
developed a European Theatre of Operations (ETOs) for coordination of military resources. Keith Sainsbury, 
“‘Second front in 1942’—a strategic controversy revisited,” British Journal of International Studies 4, no. 01 
(1978), pp. 47-58. 
630 John Gooch, “The politics of strategy: Great Britain, Australia and the war against Japan, 1939-1945,” War 
in History 10, no. 4 (2003), pp. 437-438. 
631 This explanation appears to share some similarity to Stephen Walt’s “balance of threat” thesis, which argues 
that states form alliances to balance against a common threat. Walt followed Waltz in arguing that states are 
primarily concerned with survival, which is determined by the structural conditions of anarchy. However, he 
argued that perceptions of threat matter in whether states will balance or bandwagon, and in doing so Walt 
expanded the capacity of states as rational actors. Moral realism, as an approach that derives its assumptions 
from human nature, argues that the balance of power is induced from the state of nature, which naturally allows 
for more variation in how states conceive of their interests and what choices they make to achieve them. Moral 
realism also argues that the choices states make in aligning with one state over another is determined by an 
expectation that it will lead to reciprocal benefits in return.  
632 Glen Barclay St. J., “Australia looks to America: The wartime relationship, 1939-1942,” The Pacific 
Historical Review 46, no. 2 (1977), pp. 261.  
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cut the lines of communication and supply between Hawaii and Australia. Over the next 18 
months nearly 250,000 US troops were variously stationed in Australia.633 These forces, the 
US Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA), were based in Brisbane for coordination of Allied 
operations in New Guinea and the Central Pacific. In March 1943, Japanese forces were 
defeated in New Guinea, removing Australia from direct threat of invasion. Two years later, 
after the success of the Allied “island hopping,” and the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, the Japanese surrendered on September 2, 1945.634 
 
Hence from the outset the US-Australian security partnership demonstrated signs of being 
guided by an expectation of reciprocity in that the US saw Australia as a convenient location 
to coordinate its Pacific War operations, while Australia saw the US as its best defence 
against territorial invasion and further attacks on its interests in the Southwest Pacific. The 
geostrategic implications of Australia’s location were the most important indicators of the 
expectation of reciprocity underpinning their cooperation, and have arguably contributed 
towards the longevity of the partnership. Evidence of rational choice was also present when 
Australian decision makers waited until the timing was right before they openly supported the 
US. Yet this is only a limited evaluation of how a moral realist would approach the 
development of Australia’s security partnership with the US. What is left is to discover 
whether both moral and material calculations have converged, which also points towards the 
existence of moral and material outcomes. The rest of the chapter set outs to achieve this aim.  
 
The ANZUS alliance: Common interests, communism and national security  
As mentioned in Chapter 2 on Australia’s foreign aid and development policy, Canberra’s 
strategy post-WWII was two-fold: first, sign a security deal with the US that increased its 
national security in an area of regional instability; and second, develop some form of regional 
economic arrangement that would improve living standards and contribute to Southeast Asian 
security. It was therefore no coincidence that ANZUS and the Colombo Plan were enacted in 
the same year. And like the Colombo Plan, ANZUS was a major accomplishment for Foreign 
Minister Percy Spender, who saw the establishment of a “Pacific Pact” that included a 
declaration of mutual aid from the US an essential part of Australia’s security. Originally, 
draft proposals for this security agreement were conducted in consultation with the UK over 
                                           
633 United State Strategic Bombing Survey, “The New Guinea Campaign,” The Campaigns of the Pacific War 
(Washington: US Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) Naval Analysis, 1946), pp. 173-175.  
634 William Hopkins, The Pacific War: The Strategy, Politics and Players that Won the War (Minnesota: Zenith 
Press, 2008), pp. 194-196.  
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concerns that it would further retreat from its commitment to Singapore and Malaya if it were 
seen to be left out of negotiations. However, it was quickly made clear that the UK showed 
little interest in participating in any regional security architecture:  
 
We have never had the slightest indication from London that it was 
prepared to consider favourably any mutual obligations or that London 
would favour the establishment of definite machinery in the Pacific that 
would keep Australia, America and New Zealand in close and regular 
contact.635 
 
The US had similar reservations about the involvement of the UK, preferring to establish 
bilateral contacts with Pacific nations as part of its desire for regional hegemony. At the time, 
the US was working on a peace treaty with Japan, “the Treaty of San Francisco” that would 
lay the framework for the hub-and-spokes alliance system. In exchange for Australia’s (and 
New Zealand’s) cooperation on Japanese reconciliation, the US agreed to a mutual defence 
pact that provided Australia with a security assurance it came to view as the “bedrock” of its 
foreign security policy. Indeed, Australia was quite insistent about its expectations of 
reciprocity in this area:  
 
The Australian Government wishes to make it quite clear that it could 
not give any consideration to a Japanese peace treaty that the US 
Government has in mind unless at least effective arrangements 
regarding the future of Australia and its territories can be agreed upon. 
In other words unless a defence agreement along the lines of the one 
agreed upon in consultation with Mr Dulles can be concluded.636 
 
Australia achieved this objective on September 1, 1951 when the ANZUS treaty was signed 
and entered into force on the 29th of April 1952, the same time as the Security Agreement 
                                           
635 NAA, A6768 EATS 77 Part 2, “Pacific pact (ANZUS treaty),” Cablegram to Harrison from Spender, 
Australian High Commissioner Office, London, 12 March 1951.  
636 Australia and the US had conducted a series of meetings in February 1951 on the feasibility of a security 
agreement. They had reached a tentative agreement on the basic principles, but had not as yet agreed on 
potential members. NAA, A6768 EATS 77 Part 2, “Pacific pact (ANZUS treaty),” Japanese Peace Treaty, 
Memorandum to Mr Dulles, The Australian Embassy, Washington, 5 March 1951. 
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was signed between Japan and the US.637 Despite the quid pro quo underpinning the ANZUS 
negotiations, both states had an interest in forming a security partnership. Australia was 
concerned about the potential for Japanese re-armament and that it could ally with communist 
China, threatening regional security and stability, while the US was interested in extending its 
policy of containment to the Asia-Pacific.638 These initial policy differences did not detract 
from Australia’s acceptance that aligning with the US was the best way to ensure national 
security in the face of the rising threats posed by communism and Soviet aggression. In fact, 
Australia was quick to signal its recognition of US strategy over Japan, and signed a trade 
and commerce treaty with Tokyo in 1957.639  
 
The spread of communism and the extension of Soviet sphere of influence were the common 
security concerns that shaped the workings of the alliance for the next 40 years. For 
Australia, these concerns were directly tied to its defence, as it was a relatively rich Western 
state situated amongst politically and socially unstable neighbours susceptible to great power 
influence and communist insurgency. Australia was particularly concerned about instability 
in Indonesia and PNG as these states formed Australia’s northern approaches.640 Indonesia 
represented the most significant security threat in terms of SLOCs and security spillover, 
while PNG to the northwest formed its defensive line against physical invasion.  
 
Australia was also geographically distant from the centre of international politics, and there 
was a fear that the US and the UK would leave Australia out of its post-war defence 
planning, which had already occurred with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, a 
mutual defence agreement that included Canada and the other Western European states, but 
not Australia. Australia thus sought an independent security assurance as a means to protect 
                                           
637 DFAT, Australian Treaty Series, “Security treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of 
America,” (29 April 1952). Available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1952/2.html (accessed 
12 June 2014). 
638 David McLean, “From British colony to American satellite? Australia and the USA during the cold war,” 
Australian Journal of Politics & History 52, no. 1 (2006), pp. 64-79. 
639 This Treaty facilitated a dramatic increase in trade between Australia and Japan to the extent that Japan 
became Australia’s second largest trading partner with a trade surplus in Australia’s favour. DFAT, “Japan 
Country Brief,” (2014). Available at: http://dfat.gov.au/geo/japan/Pages/japan-country-brief.aspx (accessed 20 
June 2014).  
640 Paul Dibb has written extensively on the importance of Indonesia and PNG to Australia’s strategic and 
defence policy, and during the Cold War Dibb identified Soviet influence in Southeast Asia and the Pacific as 
one of the most significant threats to Australia’s northern approaches. For a select sample, see Paul Dibb, 
“Soviet influence in East Asia and the Pacific in the coming decade: Part II,” Adelphi Papers 27, no. 217 
(1987), pp. 43-55; Dibb, “Soviet strategy towards Australia, New Zealand and the South!West 
Pacific,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 39, no. 2 (1985), pp. 69-76 and Dibb, “Issues in Australian 
defence,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 37, no. 3 (1983), pp. 160-166.  
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itself from potential threats “and enable it to effectively plan the use of its resources and 
military power in the interests of peace in the geographical area of the world in which it 
lives.”641 The mutual defence arrangement was viewed as a deterrent against attacks to the 
Australian mainland and to wider threats in the region. And the strength of this deterrence 
was increased with the potential extension of the US nuclear umbrella as a result of the 
partnership.  
 
Outside of halting the spread of communism, the US was concerned about the freedom of 
trade routes, the Malacca and Sunda straits being the primary throughway for oil and other 
resources. An alliance network with Australia, New Zealand and Japan created a strategic 
triangle that acted as a deterrent against any potential threat to deny US air and naval access. 
As Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara later remarked in reference to the defence of the 
straits through Singapore and Indonesia: 
 
The strategic importance of the Malacca Strait area derives from its 
controlling position with respect to passage between the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans and its proximity to the western approaches to Southeast 
Asia through Thailand. Freedom to transit the Malacca and Sunda 
Straits, both of which can be controlled effectively from the 
Malaysian/Singapore area, is axiomatic in principle and necessary in 
practice. Continuation of the present high volume of military and 
commercial transits would require circumnavigation of the Indonesian 
Archipelago if control of the Straits areas were denied the United States 
or its allies. Such a detour of over 2,000 miles would be comparable to 
placing an additional ocean, the size of the Atlantic, in the path of 
seaborne traffic.642 
 
These expectations of reciprocity were determined by the bilateral consultations, agreements 
and ministerial meetings, between Australia and the US. Both nations were reluctant to 
                                           
641 NAA, A1838, 532/11 “The 1951 ANZUS treaty,” Cablegram from Embassy in Washington to Department of 
External Affairs. Draft of Statement to be made to the Australian Parliament by Mr. P. C. Spender K.C. M.P., 
Minister for External Affairs after arrival in Australia, 8 November 1950.  
642 “Memorandum from the Joint Chief’s of Staff to Secretary of Defence McNamara” on Australian Request 
for Consultations Regarding Future Security Arrangements in Malaysia/Singapore held at the Washington 
National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2467, Malaysia 381, 8 November 1967. Top Secret. 
Available at: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v27/d33 (accessed 4 July 2014).  
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extend the security commitment beyond the trilateral agreement. They were particularly 
hesitant to have proposals for the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) supersede 
ANZUS military machinery. 643 At the time, there were multiple debates on whether the UK 
should be admitted to the Military Committee as a way to extend military cooperation in the 
region, but this was rejected out of concerns that it would raise objections by the French, who 
would demand inclusion because of their territorial occupancy in the Pacific. The US was 
particularly blunt about its objections to replacing ANZUS with a multilateral alliance 
structure, highlighting the lack of “teeth” amongst the Anglo-New Zealand-Australia-Malaya 
(ANZAM) partners in contributing to regional peace and security.644 Australia’s interest in 
restricting the number of participants was also tied to its limited military capacity in 
responding to regional conflict. The inclusion of Asian nations such as the Philippines and 
Indonesia would have increased the costs of the security assurance and reduced the expected 
returns, in that “any extension of security agreement will increase Australia’s obligation 
without equivalent compensation.”645 
 
Regional peace and security: The potential for moral considerations as a part of the 
Australia-US security partnership 
The preference for restricted membership does not negate the presence of moral expectations 
of reciprocity within the security partnership. Certainly, bilateral and trilateral security 
commitments are principally guided by straightforward strategic calculations of maximum 
return for minimum cost, which naturally increases the expectations of reciprocity in favour 
of the member states. Normative perspectives have taken this to mean that moral 
considerations are more important in multilateral security arrangements because they reduce 
the likelihood of relative gains and increase the chances that states will compromise over 
policy that is in the common good. As a result, they have largely overlooked the possibility of 
a moral dimension within bilateral security cooperation. This is where moral realism can 
arguably account for both strategic and moral factors in examining the Australian-US 
security partnership.  
 
                                           
643 NAA, A4311 943, “ANZUS,” Australian mission to the UN Outward telegram, 14 September 1953.  
644This being said, the US did use Australia’s participation in such regional infrastructure as a source for 
information on British foreign and security intentions. NAA, A5954 1465/1 “Review of ANZAM planning by 
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. File no. 4 from Mr. Casey’s discussions in Washington at ANZUS Council 
meeting,” Draft letter to UK High Commissioner, Canberra, September 1955.  
645 NAA, A1838 277/2 Part 5 “Pacific security arrangements,” Cablegram, Department of External Affairs, 13 
November 1951. 
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To begin with, the moral dimension is tied to a concern for assisting the US as part of the 
expectations of reciprocity, as well as a concern for upholding regional peace and security. 
For Australia, this fit alongside its material interests in reducing the potential threats to its 
geostrategic sphere of influence. The treaty itself stated that a principle desire of the parties 
was to “strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area.”646 Yet even before the signing of 
ANZUS, Australia’s decision to ally with the US showed evidence of moral expectations. 
This was most notable during WWII when Australia and the US cooperated to halt the spread 
of Japanese imperialism. As demonstrated above, this was guided by specific strategic 
expectations, but it was also guided by a moral concern in resisting Japanese attempts “to not 
so much control Southeast Asia as a plan to dominate the whole of the illimitable Pacific.”647 
This led to certain moral outcomes in removing a threat to the territorial integrity of several 
Southeast Asian and Pacific nations. And such concerns for regional stability appeared again 
in the signing of the mutual security agreement.  
 
The threat of communism was not so much fuelled by a concern for insurgency on mainland 
Australia, as it was determined by a fear of communism penetrating the social and political 
institutions of Southeast Asia and subsequently upsetting regional order. It is no coincidence, 
then, that the Colombo Plan and ANZUS were created around the same time. The plan was a 
policy of economic development tied to moral and strategic considerations in providing a 
practical contribution, or “hand up,” in assisting individual nations. And in this regard, it was 
reminiscent of the Marshall Plan in that it was concerned with helping states so they were 
less susceptible to communism.648 The security alliance was initially less obvious in its moral 
considerations, primarily viewed as the material insurance Australia needed to devise its 
forward defence strategy of fighting communism in the near abroad. But this strategy also 
included moral expectations of assisting neighbouring states in fighting communism. Indeed, 
Australia anticipated that ANZUS would lead to this outcome: 
 
                                           
646 DFAT, Australian Treaty Series, “Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of 
America,” (29 April 1952). Available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1952/2.html (accessed 
12 June 2014). 
647 Herbert V. Evatt, “International affairs: Review of the war situation,” HoR, Ministerial Statement, 25 
February 1942. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/hansard80/hansardr80/1942-02-
25/0129/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf (accessed 21 August 2014). 
648 B Kunz, “Marshall Plan commemorative section: the Marshall Plan reconsidered: a complex of 
motives,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 3 (1997), pp. 162-170. 
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“Military commitments in a programme of peace through strength will 
give satisfaction to all free peoples and encouragement to our many 
friends in South-East Asia.”649 
 
This security assurance meant Australia was less restricted in its response to regional crises 
and could pursue cooperative defence relations with Southeast Asia. Such an expectation of 
reciprocity in exchange for Australia’s alliance loyalty was emphasised by Minister of 
External Affairs Richard Casey when he commented that: “important countries of South-East 
Asia could be overrun and destroyed if we waited until war broke out before we in Australia 
began to raise, train, equip and despatch forces to that part of the world.”650  
 
An expectation of reciprocity in regional peace and security has emerged in other major 
events in the development of the Australian-US security partnership and as I will demonstrate 
below, this expectation has led to certain moral and material payoffs. But before I elaborate 
further, it is important to clarify that I am not implying that these moral calculations will 
always be present, nor am I stating that they will naturally override the pursuit of the national 
interest in balancing the costs versus the benefits of acting within the partnership. Instead, the 
US-Australian security partnership can be viewed as an instrument that has, at various times, 
sought to promote and maintain regional peace and security to the benefit of other states, and 
this moral dimension rested on the presence of common material interests.   
 
These interests reflected the framework of the alliance, but what about the functioning of the 
relationship itself? This is an important question, as the partnership is much greater than the 
initial security agreement. It includes Australia’s actions in maintaining the alliance and the 
benefits gained from its loyalty to it. Thus, an examination of Australia’s policy choices 
within the partnership is needed to demonstrate the existence of rational choice in Australia’s 
decision to continue to align with the US, despite claims that this has, at various times, 
damaged its ability to exercise an independent foreign policy. The next section will discuss 
this aspect of the alliance and, once completed, evidence of both expectations of reciprocity 
and rational choice will be found that indicate the potential for moral and material outcomes.  
                                           
649 “Question: International Affairs,” HoR, 11 August 1954. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=1;query=ANZUS%20regional%20peace%2
0security%20Decade%3A%221950s%22;rec=12;resCount=Default (accessed 26 September 2015).  
650 Richard Casey, “Question – Foreign affairs and defence,” HoR, Speech, 27 April 1955. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/hansard80/hansardr80/1955-
0427/0164/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf (accessed 22 August 2014). 
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The development of the US-Australian security partnership: Expectations of reciprocity 
and rational choice informing Australia’s foreign policy choices 
Outside of the mutual defence arrangement, the annual consultative meetings have arguably 
been the most important feature of the alliance for achieving Australia’s interests, given the 
vague parameters of the defence commitment. The treaty only states that parties should “act 
to meet the common danger” and was not an explicit guarantee equal to Article 5 of 
NATO.651 The area classified as being under the umbrella of the agreement was also left 
unclear, only referring to the “island territories under [the parties’] jurisdiction in the Pacific 
or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.”652 Diplomatic relations were 
thus a priority for Australia, and this was guided by moral and strategic expectations of 
reciprocity.  
 
When the treaty was under negotiation, it was agreed that a mechanism for automatic 
consultation would be useful in tackling regional and international crises. Australia and the 
US had already cooperated on how to respond to the unfolding conflict on the Korean 
Peninsula, with Menzies agreeing to make Royal Australian Navy (RAN) ships and Royal 
Australian Air Force (RAAF) Mustangs in Japan available to US authorities as part of the 
UN’s 21- nation peacekeeping force.653 Later, Australia also sent an infantry battalion from 
the Australian contingent of the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces in Japan 
(BCOF).654  
 
Australia’s participation in the Korean War was guided by both moral and material 
expectations. The first and most important was a show of material support for US foreign 
policy. In fact, Australia’s eagerness to commit troops in Korea (it was the first nation after 
                                           
651 Ibid.  
652 Clarifications on what parts of the Pacific would be covered by the agreement was sought during the 
Konfrontasi. At the time, Australia was concerned about attacks on its forces in Malaya and Singapore and 
sought greater assurances that the US would respond with military support even after UK’s withdrawal. This 
was achieved in 1967 when the US agreed that the terms of the ANZUS Treaty would apply to Australian armed 
forces, public vessels, and aircraft in Malaya/Singapore. “Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 
Secretary of Defence McNamara” on Australian Request for Consultations Regarding Future Security 
Arrangements in Malaysia/Singapore, held at the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: 
FRC 72 A 2467, Malaysia 381, 8 November 1967. Top Secret. Available at: 
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653 NAA, A1838 532/11 “The 1951 ANZUS treaty.” Cablegram from Embassy in Washington to Department of 
External Affairs, Washington, 29 June 1950.  
654 Australian War Memorial, “Australia commits to Korea,”  (2014). Available at: 
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the US to deploy personnel from all three services) was motivated in large part by an 
expectation that it would demonstrate Australia’s willingness to support the interests of the 
US, and therefore further negotiations of the ANZUS treaty.655 Apart from this material 
expectation, Australia’s response to the Korean crisis was also consistent with the mutual 
moral and material expectation of halting Sino/Soviet aggression and the spread of 
communism. Following Korea, Canberra was especially keen to have cooperation on military 
matters continue, and pressed the US to have both representatives from the State Department 
and Department of Defence (DoD) be part of the alliance machinery.656 It was also important 
that this body be relatively fluid in terms of its agenda in order to allow for greater flexibility 
on what issues would be discussed. This suited Australia because the strategic and political 
environment was such that security priorities had the potential to change suddenly, and for 
the US it provided the State Department with more room to negotiate a consensus with a 
reluctant Pentagon. 657  
 
The first meeting of ANZUS laid the foundation of the modern Australia-US Ministerial 
Consultations (AUSMIN). The parties agreed to create an ANZUS “Council” that was 
centred on cooperation on military matters (including interoperability, technology exchange, 
and training), as well as intelligence.658 Closer links in these two areas were the main priority 
for both states and led to considerable reciprocal benefits. Australia was eventually able to 
gain access to US standards and specifications for bases and airfields, which increased its 
interoperative capability with US air, naval and defence forces. This was also in line with US 
Pacific strategy in the Far East, which was to “retain its system of peripheral bases in the 
Pacific Island chain stretching from Japan to the Philippines.” 659 Access to US military 
intelligence and the operation of these defence facilities was a major expectation of 
reciprocity in Australia’s commitment to the partnership and this led to significant material 
payoffs. 
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Intelligence sharing and joint defence facilities 
Indeed, one of the main purposes of the consultative meetings was to gain insight into US 
military thinking on the Asia-Pacific, and develop cooperation on intelligence. Australia 
viewed US knowledge on potential Pacific threats essential to its own defence: 
 
It would be difficult for the Australian government to proceed with the 
preparing and planning for any “Hot” war without access to the 
relevant American knowledge and planning in the Pacific, will 
therefore try to bring the Americans to agree that adequate machinery 
will be provided.660  
 
To this end, a particular concern for Australian defence planners was the security of Malaya 
as it was the only land route leading from Asia to the island area north of Australia, while the 
Allied powers were concerned about freedom of the air route from Australia to the Indian 
Ocean and Middle East. These common interests led to the establishment of a closer 
intelligence partnership that has been guided by both moral and material expectations that 
have remained important to the present day. Intelligence was considered a prominent feature 
of national security following the central role it had played in the Allied victory during 
WWII. The US and the UK signed the USA-UK Security Agreement, which was formalized 
as part of the Atlantic Charter. This involved the sharing of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) 
and was extended to the three other English- speaking nations of Canada, New Zealand and 
Australia.661 This became known as the “Five Eyes” Agreement under which each nation was 
in charge of signals collection in a specific geographical area. For the US and Australia, this 
meant the US turned their attention to Northern China, Latin America and Eastern Russia 
while Australia surveyed Southeast Asia, Indochina, Mainland China and the South 
Pacific.662  
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The first expectation was obviously material. The US placed importance on coordination with 
stations in Australia because the disruption from atmospheric phenomena meant there was no 
other alternative to the monitoring space satellites watching China, Southern Russia and the 
Indian Ocean.663 This agreement led to the creation of two joint intelligence and defence 
facilities: the satellite research station Pine Gap664 in the Northern Territory and the Joint 
Defence Facility Nurrungar (JDFN) located on the Island Lagoon in South Australia. The 
station in Nurrungar specialized in space-based surveillance and particularly early detection 
of missiles and nuclear detonations using US geostationary satellites. It was the first such 
facility outside of the US that could detect “launch on warning” in response to ICBM 
launches. The site was in operation between 1968 and 1999665, and was used during Vietnam 
and the first Gulf War to detect Iraqi Scud missile attacks. 666 
 
Pine Gap worked in coordination with the RAF facility at Menwith Hill in both signals 
collection and missile launch detection as part of the Defence Support Program (DSP) and 
Space Based Infra Red Satellite (SBIRS) systems.667 The development of Pine Gap was 
followed by ECHELON, which formed the operational agreement on collection and analysis 
of data within the Five Eyes. ECHELON was the global tracking software system that 
allowed Pine Gap to gather information from telephones, mobiles, faxes, and eventually e-
mails and text messages. During the Cold War it was mainly used to monitor the diplomatic 
and military activity of the Soviet Union, and after 9/11 was directed towards intelligence 
gathering in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as wider operations in counter-terrorism as part of 
the global WoT. 668 
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Alongside the missile detection and surveillance operations, a naval communication centre 
was established. The US Naval Communication Station located at North West Cape in 
Western Australia was originally a US-operated facility that enabled the US Navy to 
communicate with submerged submarines and surface vessels in the Indian Ocean and 
western Pacific Ocean.669 Australia’s location meant it was ideal for a naval communication 
facility that could stay in contact with the US naval presence acting as a deterrent to Soviet 
control over an important trading route for both the US and Australia. 670 
 
During this time, joint operations were also extended to science and space exploration and 
Australia continued to reap benefits in access to US technology and expertise. A Joint 
Geological and Geophysical Research Station at Alice Springs was established to monitor the 
testing of nuclear devices in the atmosphere, on the surface and underground.671 Australia 
gained access to both the products of these installations and the wider assessments to 
disarmament to which they contribute.672 This facility was originally established in 1955 and 
is still in operation as part of the contributing stations to the International Monitoring System 
(IMS) of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).673 In this regard, the station was an 
important apparatus in fulfilling Australia’s international treaty obligations. Australia also 
exhibited expectations of reciprocity in the area of space research. It gained access to space 
vehicle tracing and the construction of communication facilitators managed by the Australia 
Department of Supply on behalf of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA). This agreement was initially contracted to last 10 years and was extended in 1970 
for a further decade. The Australian facilitators were the largest concentration of NASA 
facilitators outside of the US and represented over $US70 million in technology and 
funding.674 
 
These facilities were developed in response to the mutual threat of the Soviet Union and were 
guided by a moral and material expectation that Australia (and the region) would benefit 
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from having access to advanced military and defence technology, as well as intelligence and 
communications. Australia viewed the US as the only power that could balance against the 
Soviet Union and maintain peace and stability in both Indo-China and the Pacific. In Fraser’s 
own words: 
“A confident exercise of American policy is the cause of peace and 
stability. America is the only power that can balance the might of the 
Soviet Union. If America does not undertake that task it will not be 
done. If it is not done the whole basis of peace and stability is 
unsupported.675 
Yet despite the governments positive rhetoric on closer cooperation between the US and 
Australia, at the time, there was considerable debate as to whether it was in Australia’s 
interest to allow an expanded US presence on its soil. Some analysts, like Desmond Ball, 
argued that it placed Australia higher on the list of potential targets of attack (including 
nuclear) by the Soviet Union.676 Ball was particularly critical of the level of US control over 
these facilities, which represented an infringement on Australia’s ability to exercise its own 
sovereignty.677 Others, like Paul Dibb, have stressed the importance of these bases to 
Australia’s strategic and defence policy.678 Indeed, the intelligence gathering function of Pine 
Gap was essential to Australia’s ability to monitor potential threats in Indonesia and greater 
Southeast Asia. The operations covered in Pine Gap were unique in their ability to intercept 
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microwave emissions coming from the interior of a state, which could not be collected by 
other means, such as ground stations, ships or aircrafts.  
 
Along with the geological research station in Alice Springs, the telemetry of these satellites 
meant they have been essential to the monitoring of various arms control agreements.679 
During the Cold War this capability was particularly useful for the US as it provided an 
efficient means to monitor Soviet compliance with the various Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT) Agreements. This was not limited to the Soviet Union and extended to 
monitoring arms and nuclear activity from India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, the greater Middle East 
and the western Pacific. 680 
 
For Australia, the facility was essential to its missile defence, as it monitored and detected 
missile launches from states with the capacity to reach mainland territory. The most 
important of these states was China as its DF-5A, developed in 1971 and with an estimated 
range of 12,000km, had the capacity to reach Australia.681 Since then, China’s capabilities 
have continued to grow, and as of August 2014, its successful testing of the Dong Feng 31A 
and Dong Feng 5A meant it had the ability to reach the US with missiles carrying multiple 
nuclear warheads.682 Australia’s participation in missile defence was therefore anticipated to 
increase US deterrence and was part of the moral and material expectations motivating its 
decision to continue cooperation through the joint intelligence installations. As the Defence 
Minister Stephen Smith stated: 
The intelligence collection capabilities of both countries provide 
Australia with information on priority intelligence such as terrorism, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and military and weapons 
developments. The Pine Gap facility also supports monitoring of 
compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements, and 
                                           
679 Coral Bell made this point during debates on the utility of the ANZUS alliance. See Coral Bell, “Managing 
to Survive,” The National Interest no. 2 (1985), pp. 36-45. 
680 Andrew Mack, “US ‘bases’ in Australia: The debate continues,” Australian Outlook 42, no. 2 (1988), pp. 77-
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682 Zachary Keck, “Is China Preparing MIRVed Ballistic Missiles?” The Diplomat, 8 August 2014. Available at: 
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underpins global strategic stability by providing ballistic missile early 
warning information to the United States.683 
 
In an evolving strategic environment where US primacy over the Asia-Pacific is increasingly 
challenged, the operations at Pine Gap contribute to Australia’s security and defence policy, 
which has shifted focus towards the threat posed by great power competition in its own 
backyard. This is particularly so as the number of states with medium to long range ballistic 
missile capacity has increased. India successfully tested the Agni-II ballistic missile in 1999 
(a year after its nuclear tests) and by December 2014 had developed and launched the long-
range ICBMs Agni-V and Agni-IV, which have the suitable range to reach several cities in 
Mainland China.684 In Northeast Asia, North Korea has been attempting to launch the 
Taepodong missiles which, if ever successful, will have the capacity to strike the US and 
northern Australia. Based on these developments the Asia-Pacific region represents greater 
proliferation of these capabilities, than any other area in the world. As Dibb stated in 1999, 
well before the 21st Century US pivot towards the Asia-Pacific:  
 
When you look at parts of the world, particularly in our own region 
where we need to be well informed, I would argue that in recent years 
we face a strategic environment that is much more uncertain than in the 
past…we clearly need to be as well informed as we can, whether it is 
from this facility [Pine Gap] or some other facilities, about the 
generality of military developments.685 
 
The benefits of this facility (and Nurrangur when in operation) have clearly outweighed the 
perceived costs involved in accommodating an increased US presence. Indeed, similar 
calculations and long-term benefits can be found when looking at the decision to allow the 
                                           
683Stephen Smith, “Speech to the 3rd Annual Curtin University National Security and Strategy,” Press Releases, 
11 November 2010). Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=1;query=monitoring
%20missiles%20Decade%3A%222010s%22;rec=4;resCount=Default (accessed 29 September 2015).  
684 “India successfully tests N-capable Agni-IV missile,” The Times of India, 2 December 2014. Available at:  
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-successfully-tests-N-capable-Agni-IV-
missile/articleshow/45344723.cms (accessed 3 December 2014).  
685 Paul Dibb, “Joint Standing Committee on Treaties: Reference Pine Gap,” Joint Committees, 9 August 1999. 
Available at: 
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establishment of North West Cape. When the agreement was signed in 1963,686 and after the 
facility was operational in 1967, there was substantially more opposition, as Australia had no 
control over the operation and no access to the communication collected. This began to 
change during the 1980s when the facility moved to reflect a joint operation. The Whitlam 
Labor government in 1974 renegotiated the original treaty to remove the “US” from the name 
of the station in order to reflect the increased Australian presence.687 Yet real cooperation did 
not eventuate until later when Australia could use the facility for communication between its 
own ships and submarines in the Indian Ocean and western Pacific.688  
 
In 1999, Australia gained full control over the facility, but continued to benefit from US 
funding and expertise, which was rapidly increased following the signing of the new Harold 
E. Holt Treaty at the 2008 AUSMIN. The treaty committed Australia and the US to jointly 
operate the facility for the next twenty-five years and came into effect in 2010.689 The new 
treaty added Space Situational Awareness to the facility that enabled Australia to gain access 
to US space radar and surveillance technology to monitor satellite and anti-satellite military 
activity in space. This was done following the successful anti-satellite missile test conducted 
by China in 2007 to shoot down one of its defunct weather satellites, which led to concern 
about the strategic intentions of China’s space program.690 Thus, despite the original concerns 
over US control of North West Cape, and the other joint defence facilities, Australia 
benefited greatly from US cooperation. And the persistence and extension of these 
                                           
686 The agreement establishing the base was the Agreement with the Government of the United States of 
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intelligence agreements over time and through different governments demonstrate Australia’s 
consistent support for these benefits, which reinforces the claim that expectations of 
reciprocity have guided Australia’s policy choices in aligning with the US.  
 
Australia and the US in Vietnam: Inflated expectations and miscalculations of foreign policy 
The majority of these facilities were established during the 1960s when Australia was 
fighting alongside the US in the Vietnam War. It is difficult to examine the US-Australian 
security partnership during the Cold War without discussing this conflict. Until Australia’s 
involvement in Afghanistan, Vietnam was the longest war Australia had participated in. 
During the ten years of combat operations between 1962 and 1972, over 60,000 ADF 
personnel were involved. This included 30 military advisers, a full battalion in 1965 and a 
task force in 1966.691 It has been common amongst Australian scholars to argue that 
Australia’s decision to commit troops to Vietnam was the result of its “dependency” on the 
security partnership with US, and its overall support for the US domino theory of communist 
insurgency in Southeast Asia.692 But alliance dependence does not properly capture the 
rational calculations (or miscalculations) involved in Australia’s decision to participate in the 
Vietnam War.  
 
Australia’s views about the spread of communism had been consistent with those of the US 
since its involvement in the Korean War, but this does not mean that Australia did not have 
specific strategic interests in supporting US intentions in Vietnam.693 Communist insurgency 
in Southeast Asia was of particular security concern for Australia as it was thought by 
Menzies that if communism gained a foothold in one country, like Vietnam, it would lead to 
a “domino effect,” and the adoption of communist governments across the region (in this 
case, the major concern was communist governments in Laos, Cambodia, Malaya and 
                                           
691 Following 1972 a limited number of ADF personnel remained and a small group of the RAAF were deployed 
in 1975 to assist refugees and evacuations.  
692 The literature on Australia’s participation in Vietnam is extensive. Some of the more instructive on 
Australia’s foreign policy choices during this time can be found in Norman Harper, A Great and Powerful 
Friend: A Study of Australian-American Relations Between 1900 and 1975 (St. Lucia: University of Queensland 
Press, 1987); and Joseph Camilleri, Australian-American Relations: The Web of Dependence (Melbourne: 
Macmillan, 1980). These contributions have followed the typical “entrapment versus abandonment” argument to 
state that Australia’s participation in the Vietnam War was an example of alliance entrapment and provides 
considerable evidence that Australia is a dependent ally beholden to the interests of the US as the dominant 
power in the relationship. 
693 Paul Dibb has also made this claim, see in particular, US-Australia Alliance Relations: An Australian View 
(Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, 2005). 
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Thailand).694 These states were underdeveloped and relatively unstable, making them ideal 
targets.  
 
The strength of communism in Indochina also led to significant fears that it would eventually 
take hold in states more important to Australia’s security and defence, namely Indonesia.695 
During the Indonesian Konfrontasi, which began just a year before Australia sent troops into 
Vietnam, Australia was in conflict with Indonesia in the Malaya peninsula and Borneo. A 
year earlier in 1963, the UN had given control of Dutch West New Guinea to Indonesia, 
which bordered the Australian Territories of Papua and New Guinea. A communist controlled 
Indonesia thus represented a threat to Australia’s national defence, as well as its security 
interests in maintaining regional stability in Southeast Asia. 696 
 
Rather than representing Australia’s blind following of US foreign policy, Australia had 
certain expectations of reciprocity from its participation in the Vietnam War. This point has 
been made by others, like Llyod Cox and Brendan O’Connor, who as recently as 2012 argued 
that Australia saw the conflict in Vietnam as an opportunity to draw the US into military 
engagement in Southeast Asia.697 Indeed, Cabinet papers released after the 30-year rule 
demonstrate that Menzies saw US intervention into Vietnam to be motivated partly by a 
desire to stop Southeast Asia from falling under the grips of communism and “partly because 
they were conscious that the security of Australia would be at stake if South Vietnam fell.”698 
From his perspective, Australia “arguably had a livelier interest than the [US] in the success 
of their Vietnam efforts” and should look for ways to encourage and support the military 
mission of the US.699 In Menzies own words: “We would be prepared to put in a battalion 
and were looking for a way in and not a way out.”700  
 
                                           
694 Robert Menzies, “Vietnam – ministerial statement,” HoR, no.17, 29 April 1965, pp. 1060-1061.  
695 By the early 1960s, the Sukarno regime’s closeness to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was of concern 
to Australia and represented a significant threat to its strategic and economic policy in Southeast Asia. For more 
see Thomas Bruce Millar, “Problems of Australian foreign policy January-June 1965,” Australian Journal of 
Politics & History 11, no. 3 (December 1965), pp. 267-276. 
696  For more on Australia’s involvement in the Konfrontasi see Garry Woodard, “Best Practice in Australia’s 
Foreign Policy:’Konfrontasi’(1963-66),” Australian Journal of Political Science 33, no. 1 (1998), pp.  85-99. 
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Australian Journal of Political Science, 47, no. 2 (2012), p. 173    
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699 NAA, A4940 C3811 “Foreign affairs and defence committee,” 7 April 1965.  
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Australia’s participation in the war was motivated by a dual expectation that it would 
strengthen the US’ commitment towards Australia and Southeast Asia, as well as counter the 
spread of communism in Asia-Pacific. As will be shown in the analysis that follows this 
chapter, these expectations were based on a number of miscalculations in how Australia 
perceived US strategy in Southeast Asia, as well as the spread of communism as a monolithic 
ideology supported by the governments in both the Soviet Union and China. The point made 
here is that it was not necessarily expectations of alliance loyalty that motivated Australia 
decision to enter into Vietnam, and these abovementioned factors contributed to a 
miscalculation in the benefits achieved from pursuing this policy option.  
 
The Nixon Doctrine, Australia’s policy of defence self-reliance and the end of the Cold War 
The Vietnam War represented a period where Australia lent material support to its 
partnership with the US and where the bulk of its cooperation in defence, intelligence, inter-
operability, science and technology exchange was developed. It was also a time where 
Australia’s own defence strategy was momentarily revised in light of the Nixon Doctrine. In 
1969, US President Richard Nixon announced that the US expected its alliance partners to 
bear the primary responsibility for their own defence. 701 Australia perceived this declaration 
to mean that the US was pulling out of Asia, and therefore it could no longer count on 
regional security underpinned by US military might.702 Anxieties over the strength of the 
alliance were also momentarily increased with the election of the Whitlam government that 
ran on a policy platform of removing Australian troops from Vietnam (which began in 1972), 
and had made public its criticisms of US policy in Vietnam and its secret military 
installations in Australia, which caused the US to state that the new Australian government 
represented “a completely new period in Australian-American relations”703 However, 
irrespective of these initial reservations, the Whitlam government remained firmly committed 
to ANZUS, with Whitlam himself taking measures to reduce the activism of his Labor 
colleagues against the US, by, in one instance, not allowing them access to information on 
                                           
701 Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam,” Speech, PBS: American Experience, 3 
November 1969. Available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-resources/nixon-
vietnam/ (accessed 19 December 2014).  
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the Pine Gap signals intelligence base.704 The Whitlam government even sought direct 
assurances in 1974 that the US would maintain its air and navy presence in the Asia-Pacific, 
which Australia received when Washington stated that it needed to “lend substance to the 
commitments made to US allies in the region” and “American allies needed to count on not 
only the nuclear umbrella but also conventional support.”705 
 
Nevertheless, Australia’s anxiety over a perceived change in US defence policy continued. It 
increased after the fall of Saigon and the withdrawal of US combat troops from Southeast 
Asia in 1975. In response, the new Fraser government commissioned a Defence White Paper 
that focused more on building Australia’s capacity for self-defence, which signalled the end 
of Australia’s forward defence strategy.706 Maintaining a policy of defence self-reliance 
meant a significant increase in defence spending, and a restructure of the ADF into a force 
that could be deployed independently of allied coalitions. This proved difficult as budgetary 
constraints restricted defence spending to 2.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).707 So 
instead of this policy representing a shift away from the importance placed on the alliance in 
defence planning, it actually reflected further continuity. Australia relied on its reciprocal 
partnership with the US to modernize its own defence force and obtain the technological 
advantage over Southeast Asian military capabilities needed to implement defence self-
reliance.708 And this fuelled Australia’s rational calculation to remain part of the ANZUS 
Treaty following the withdrawal of New Zealand in 1985.709  
 
Debate about the threat posed to Australia in being associated with the US, and in being seen 
to support nuclear proliferation, resurfaced again in 1985.710 But such concerns were 
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dismissed in the face of wider security interests in maintaining the alliance. Australia relied 
on a US naval presence to protect against Soviet competition in the Pacific. This was 
particularly so given the stationing of a Soviet naval base in Cam Ranh Bay, the largest naval 
base outside the Soviet Union.711 Australia’s commitment to the alliance thus had security 
implications for its trade routes, and in contributing to its policy of defence self-reliance, 
which required an estimated budget of nearly 3% of GDP, or $6.353 billion.712 Training of 
personnel was estimated to cost a third of the budget, approximately $2.832 billion, leaving 
the remaining two thirds for defence equipment, operational costs and industries. Australia 
required continued US assistance in training, technology transfer and intelligence to 
implement this policy. As Defence Minister Kim Beazley stated:  
 
The alliance does assist the development of defence self-reliance. What 
the alliance relationship in fact does, on a day-to-day basis, is 
substantially to advance our technical capabilities and our 
understanding of events in our area of strategic concern. Partly as a 
result of the latter contribution it also enables us to limit the cost of our 
insurance. Without it, our defence budget would become the victim of a 
shopping list of requirements to deal with worst-case scenarios. The 
technical improvements assist in ensuring the ability to secure and 
sustain a technological solution for the problems posed by our strategic 
geography.713 
 
The trilateral structure was effectively replaced with a bilateral one without any costs to the 
US or Australia. The strong military and diplomatic ties between the two states in the 
creation of AUSMIN meant the ejection of New Zealand had no effect on the deterrent 
function of the alliance.714 In fact, for Australia, its commitment led to significant returns in 
                                                                                                                                    
0alliance%20Decade%3A%221980s%22%20Year%3A%221985%22;rec=2;resCount=Default (accessed 1 
August 2014).  
711 Amitav Acharya, “The United States versus the USSR in the Pacific: Trends in the military balance,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 9, no. 4 (1988), pp. 282-299. 
712 Kim Beazly, “Defence statement,” HoR, no. 144, 19 September 1985, p. 1093. 
713 Ibid, p. 1093.  
714Bob Hawke, “Hawke Government – notice of motion,” HoR, 19 March 1985. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Australia%20United%20States%2
0alliance%20Decade%3A%221980s%22%20Year%3A%221985%22;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 1 
August 2014).  
 228 
closer government-to-government cooperation.  This was made clear following the events of 
9/11 where arguably the partnership went through its greatest expansion.  
 
But before I turn to Australia’s foreign policy decisions in the aftermath of 9/11, it is prudent 
to first briefly discuss Australia’s role in the First Gulf War, as it was partly guided by 
Australia’s security partnership with the US. The chapter on aid and development highlighted 
that Australia’s material commitment to the Gulf War was part of the multinational coalition 
Operation Desert Storm, which consisted of three RAN warships, two frigates and one 
supply ship.715 These were primarily involved in enforcing international trade sanctions 
against the Saddam regime in response to its invasion of Kuwait. Australia’s decision to 
respond to the crisis was a combination of moral expectations in supporting the principles of 
non-intervention and liberation of Kuwait, and material factors in supporting the allied 
coalition led by the US.  Prime Minister Bob Hawke emphasised a convergence of these 
moral and material factors in motiving Australia’s decision to support the coalition when he 
stated that: “Humanitarian concerns do not stand alone. They stand alongside, and reinforce, 
important Australian interests which are deeply engaged in the Gulf.” 716  
 
While the alliance itself was not specifically invoked, as was the case in 2003, Australia’s 
participation can still be read as being determined by expectations of reciprocity in 
strengthening the security commitment of the alliance by showing support for US foreign 
policy. Australia’s decision also reflected a straightforward rational calculation. Its 
commitment was fairly limited. The Hawke government was quick to respond to the US’ 
request for states to join the international coalition and its early enthusiasm meant that 
Australia was spared having to contribute ground troops or air support.717 The level of 
support was not surprising given that it was outside Australia’s traditional strategic sphere of 
influence, but was still considered important in the context of the security partnership and to 
the stability of the Middle East, which was a source of Australian imports, particularly oil.  
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The operation was also relatively successful in that the allies had pushed Iraqi forces out of 
Kuwait by February 1991, six months after Saddam declared victory over Kuwait.718 In this 
regard, the decision to joint the coalition produced a moral outcome in that Australia’s 
participation assisted the liberation of Kuwait, while also providing an opportunity for 
Australia to fulfil expectations of contributing to the new post-Cold War international order. 
Similar expectations and calculations were made following 9/11. However, this time, they 
were arguably more substantial and the outcomes more directly affected the peace and 
security of the Asia-Pacific.  
 
Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on Terror: The free trade agreement, counter-terrorism 
cooperation and intelligence sharing  
The events of 9/11 and Australia’s response were thought to represent a significant turning 
point in the alliance, as it was the first time the mutual defence clause was enacted. Whilst I 
would not argue that the pay-offs Australia received as a result of participating in the Iraq 
War, as well as other conflicts stemming from the War on Terror (WoT) necessarily justify 
the reasons for the war itself, it is nonetheless the case that alliance loyalty, underpinned by 
moral and strategic calculations, subsequently led to significant material gains. In this 
instance, the moral and material calculations were not directly tied to Australia’s participation 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, and instead can be viewed in the broader context of its commitment 
to the global WoT, which was focused on combating the threat of terrorism in the Asia-
Pacific. Here, the expectations of reciprocity underpinning its commitment to the alliance did 
lead to moral and material outcomes.  
 
One of the expectations of reciprocity flowing from Australia’s participation was the signing 
of a US-Australia FTA, which had been under negotiation for several years. The then-Foreign 
Minister Alexander Downer admitted to this, noting, “the Australian-US FTA was a direct 
result of Australia’s participation in Iraq and the War on Terror.”719 Australia had been eager 
to gain access to US markets in areas where it had become globally competitive, such as the 
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building of high-speed catamarans, and in the more lucrative areas of agriculture, such as 
beef and sugar. After the agreement came into effect on January 1, 2005 Australia’s trade 
with the US increased from $13.848 billion to $15.533 billion, with a high point of $17.966 
billion reached in 2008.720  
 
While both Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and Prime Minister John Howard considered 
this deal a political gain at the time, it was also highly criticised due to its preference for US 
goods, services and investment, which threatened to divert Australian suppliers away from 
more efficient and competitive international markets.721 The diversion of trade from other 
markets was a particular concern for Australia given the economic rise of East Asia. 
Evidence to support this concern came to fruition 10 years later with an estimated $53.1 
billion of trade being diverted from the rest of the world.722 Despite these negative 
consequences that came to light some time after the agreement was set in force, at the time of 
signing it was certainly considered a material advantage flowing from Australia’s support for 
the war in Iraq. 
 
Desert to tropics: Intelligence, inter-operability and counter-terrorism  
The other, and more important, material benefit was closer cooperation in intelligence 
sharing. This was immediately found during joint ADF and United States Forces - Iraq and 
Afghanistan operations where Australia was given unprecedented access to US intelligence 
gathering and intelligence systems. Previously, strict US National Disclosure Policies (NDP) 
meant Australia was only privy to select pieces of US intelligence.723 This changed with 
Australia’s participation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Australia’s participation in Afghanistan was 
through Operation Slipper as part of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF). It was the largest non-NATO contributor to the operation with up to 1550 troops 
stationed there between 2001 and 2010. The original contingent included 300 Special 
Australian Service (SAS) troops, 4 F/A-18 Hornets, tanker transport aircraft and two Orion 
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electronic intelligence gathering aircraft.724 Australia’s commitment in Iraq was also 
considerable. Australia deployed ground troops with 2,200 members of the ADF participating 
in the 2003 invasion, as well as three Hercules transport aircraft, two Orion maritime 
surveillance planes and 14 F/A-18 Hornets.725   
 
At the time there was extensive debate as to whether Australia’s loyalty had once again 
forced it into a conflict that it had little interest in fighting, and lacked the necessary 
capabilities to fully commit.726 Yet these concerns were also disputed by security experts 
such as William Tow, who argued that Australia’s contribution was in line with its policy of 
using niche capabilities as part of coalition military operations, which the US found 
particularly valuable, and which for Australia produced significant material outcomes.727 
Others, like O’Connor and Cox, have also stated that claims of Australia being a dependent 
ally that followed the US into unnecessary wars were mistaken. In a similar way to their 
views on Australia’s decision to participate in the Vietnam War, they have argued that 
Australia made a calculated and independent choice to strengthen ties with the US by joining 
the coalition, and that the long-term benefits of doing so outweighed the potential short-term 
consequences.728      
 
In Operation Iraqi Freedom joint military operations were merged with counter-terrorism 
operations, which made it difficult for the US to continue its secrecy on sharing American 
                                           
724 For more information on Australia’s contribution to Afghanistan see Nicole Brangwin and Ann Rann, 
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(accessed 31 July 2014).  
728 Some of the short-term risks were calculated to be damage to Australia’s reputation in Asia-Pacific and 
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military procedures. In some instances, the ADF was excluded from participating in briefings 
where it had been involved in gathering the intelligence used for further operations. Given 
Australia’s early support for the Coalition of the Willing (CoW) and the success of the 
Australian SAS in taking control of key territory from Iraqi air forces, this was an issue 
affecting continued cooperation.729 As a result, the US altered its laws preventing foreign 
nations from seeing or hearing classified intelligence, and granted Australia and Britain 
access to US planning for combat missions and counter-terrorism activities. Australia was 
effectively upgraded to the status of “Intelligence Partner,” which meant from 2004 onwards 
it would have access to all US information on international terrorism and future joint military 
operations stored on the intelligence data system SIPRNET.730 
 
The opening of US intelligence and military information meant there were fewer restrictions 
on closer US and Australia defence cooperation. After the 2004 AUSMIN meeting, Howard 
and US President George W. Bush agreed that Australia and the US needed to strengthen 
interoperability through the Joint Combined Training Centre (JCTC). The JCTC was 
codenamed Operation Talisman Sabre and included exercises in amphibious assault, air 
raids, and live fire.731 Talisman Sabre is conducted every two years and represented an 
important part of Australia’s strategic and defence planning as it allowed for continued access 
to US military doctrine even as its commitment in Afghanistan and Iraq reduced. In 2013, it 
became the second largest maritime training exercise in the world, with over 30,000 US and 
Australian troops operating out of Shoalwater Bay Queensland.732  
 
The intelligence relationship had direct material benefits for Australia’s own counter-terrorist 
strategies, which were revised in the face of changing security threats. Australia moved to an 
intelligence gathering approach that utilized the technology and procedures of the US. 
Specifically, Australia adopted the American model of having civilians in charge of counter-
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terrorism efforts and focused on intelligence-led strategies of prevention rather than ex-post 
facto arrests and captures.733 This move corresponded with a new intelligence deal covering 
geospatial intelligence obtained from imagery, surveillance satellites and reconnaissance 
aircraft known as GEOINT.734 It had been a long-term priority for Australia to acquire space-
based imagery for intelligence gathering in South and Southeast Asia. Indeed, the 1994 
Defence White Paper stated that: 
 
As a significant new measure, the government places a high priority 
on assured access to high-quality, space-based imagery to meet 
Defence’s needs for mapping, charting, and navigation and targeting 
data.735 
 
Australia was concerned about threats to its interests from Al Qaeda offshoot Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) whose acts of terrorism in Bali in 2002 led to Australian causalities. Australia 
also suffered an attack on its embassy in Jakarta in 2004.736 Following the Bali bombing, 
Australia joined the US, Canada and the UK in discussions on international counter-terrorism 
efforts that had ramifications for Australia’s efforts in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. 737 
Australia was an enthusiastic supporter of the global fight to stop the spread of terrorism, but 
it obviously placed a different level of importance on the Southeast Asian region. Whereas 
the US viewed the region as the “second front”, Australia viewed Southeast Asia as the major 
theatre of the WoT. Apart from the direct attacks on Australians in Indonesia, there was 
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recorded evidence of Islamic fundamentalists in Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and 
Singapore, as well as signs of a JI cell operating in Australia. 738  
 
Australia had been tracking the rise of JI and other potential terrorist organizations in 
Southeast Asia for some time before the events of 9/11, but by 2003 Canberra’s perception of 
terrorism as a threat to a strategic area already described as an “arc of instability” had 
increased significantly. Australia was especially concerned about the rise of terrorism in 
Indonesia.739 And its previous terrorist cooperation with the US produced both moral and 
material outcomes in helping to combat this mutual threat. In this instance, the expectations 
of reciprocity motivating Australia’s contribution to the WoT led to moral outcomes in that it 
assisted Indonesia’s ability to combat the threat of terrorism, and was linked to broader 
concerns of maintaining security and stability across Southeast Asia. An expectation that 
Australia’s participation in the WoT would contribute towards regional security was 
highlighted by Foreign Minister Downer when he stated that:  
 
There must be great unity in the international effort to counter-terrorism 
and terrorists, wherever they may be—Afghanistan, Iraq, Europe, as we 
saw in Madrid, or in South-East Asia. The only way to deal with these 
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terrorists internationally is from a position of unity, and we all have to be 
prepared to make a contribution. 740 
 
Australia’s most significant contribution was in Indonesia and broader Southeast Asia. It 
signed 9 bilateral Memoranda’s of Understanding (MOUs) on counterterrorism with 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Fiji, Cambodia, East Timor, India and Papua 
New Guinea. The US and Australia also helped train and establish the elite Indonesian 
terrorist force, the Densus 88, which at its peak trained over 400 personnel. 741 Australia also 
provided US$35 million to develop the Densus training centre as part of the Jakarta Centre 
for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), while the US contributed an initial US$12 
million that reached US$16 million by 2006.742 The Indonesian forces had a high success rate 
and were responsible for nearly 500 arrests and 250 convictions, which markedly reduced the 
influence of JI as an effective terrorist organization.743  
 
The Pacific defence: Intelligence cooperation meets transnational crime 
Australia’s moral and material expectations from US cooperation on terrorism extended to 
achieving Australia’s strategic objectives in the South Pacific, and this also led to moral and 
material outcomes. At the same time as revising its intelligence gathering, Australia 
implemented a new policing network in the South Pacific that drew on US intelligence 
cooperation. As I mentioned in Chapter 2 on aid and development, by the early 2000s 
Australia’s approach to regional security had shifted to focus on the threats of weak and 
failing states that had the potential to become breeding grounds for terrorism and other forms 
of transnational crime. Instead of viewing these security concerns as strictly belonging to 
military affairs, the Howard government understood them to be linked to a break down of law 
and order, and hence an issue of policing. By 1997 Australia had already developed a 
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regional framework for cooperation on transnational crime called the Law Enforcement 
Cooperation Program (LECP), which had established police training operations across the 
Pacific, and in Indonesia. 744 However, they were short on collecting information on where 
and when instances of crime were likely to take place.  
 
In 2002, this gap was filled by the establishment of the Transnational Crime Units (TCU) in 
Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, PNG, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands. These units were tasked to deal 
with dispersed crimes such as human trafficking, drug smuggling, arms trafficking, 
counterfeiting, identity theft, money laundering and terrorism.745 The TCUs worked in 
combination with the Australian Secret Intelligence Organization (ASIO) to identify, 
investigate and analyse criminal activity. This led to the creation of the Pacific Transnational 
Crime Coordination Centre (PTCCC), which provided twenty-four hour contact between 
Australia, overseas police forces and the intelligence service. The involvement of the US 
came in 2004 with the development of cooperation between the AFP and the DoD Joint 
Interagency Task Force West (JIATF West) in Hawaii. These organizations had success in 
dismantling the largest methamphetamine drug operation in the southern hemisphere based in 
Fiji.746 The Pacific Transnational Crime Network led to the creation of the Pacific Financial 
Intelligence Unit Project (PFIU) in 2005 and the Australian Financial Intelligence Unit 
(AFIU), which increased Australia’s capacity to track criminal financial activity between the 
mainland and the Pacific Islands. An expectation that US-Australian cooperation would 
achieve Australia’s unique security interests in the South-Pacific was re-iterated in 2004 
when Downer stressed at an AUSMIN meeting that the alliance is important, “not just for 
Australia’s security but for the broader security of the western Pacific region.”747 
Material outcomes were also to be found in adding criminal intelligence gathering to the 
security partnership. Australia benefited from the advanced training of JIATF West, as well 
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as additional $450,000 in US funding for TCUs.748 The US took advantage of the criminal 
intelligence-monitoring network established by Australia to achieve its goals of halting the 
financing of terrorism and money laundering. Following 9/11, the US announced that it 
viewed the global reach of terrorist organizations as a significant threat to international and 
regional stability and “would encourage our regional partners to take up a coordinated effort 
that isolates the terrorists” by working with its “allies to disrupt the financing of 
terrorism…and deny access to the international financial system.” 749  
 
The number of weak states in the Pacific also made it a potential hot spot for terrorist-related 
criminal activity, even though there was yet to be a recorded case of terrorism in the 
Pacific.750 This did not mean that Australia was not in a position to benefit from the 
involvement of the US. In fact, Australia was arguably able to gain by following the US 
narrative on global terrorism. The reasons for this are relatively clear. The Pacific Islands, 
which includes PNG, are the closest territories to mainland Australia. Breakdowns in law and 
order represent a significant threat to its sea line of defence. This was the primary expectation 
motivating Australia’s intervention into Solomon Islands in 2003, and formed the basis of 
Australia’s aid and development program to the South Pacific during the Howard 
government. Criminal intelligence gathering, as well as training and funding by the US, was 
useful for Australia in achieving its own unique strategic interests in the region.  
 
Apart from the material outcomes described above, there were also moral outcomes 
stemming from Australia’s expectations of reciprocity to capitalize on the resources of the 
US. The Pacific Islands are largely under-developed and suffer from decentralized and 
corrupt governments that have traditionally struggled to maintain law and order.751 
Cooperation between the US and Australia on counter-terrorism and criminal intelligence 
was anticipated to assist the Pacific Islands in developing and strengthening their own 
policing capabilities. In 2003, Australia had an estimated 8,500 AFP across the Pacific 
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Islands.752 Its commitment to this area has remained. Since 2010, Australia and the US have 
conducted operations to capture organized crime syndicates using the South Pacific as a 
transit point between the US and Australia.753 This included donating patrol boats, training of 
local police in law enforcement intelligence, surveillance and operations security, as well as 
construction of TCU facilities.754  
 
Bilateral bridge to the collective: Expanded participation in NATO 
Along with state-to-state increases in intelligence cooperation, Australia’s growing 
partnership with the US following 9/11 also enabled it to gain greater access to NATO’s 
collective intelligence apparatus. Here again, this was tied to efforts of maintaining regional 
security, and participation in NATO had been a long-term foreign policy goal for Australia 
that dated back to the first US-Australia security meeting. At the time, Australia had a limited 
relationship with NATO, but considered European politics significant to its approach to 
world affairs:  
 
Means should be found to enable Australia to receive information 
regarding NATO developments, particularly those that have a direct 
bearing upon Australian interests. Consideration might also be given to 
the best way to enable Australia, when NATO is dealing with matters 
affects interests of Australia, to express its views to NATO. 755 
 
In 2004, Downer pushed for more Australian involvement in NATO and emphasized the 
mutual interests both Australia and the US have in severing the links between failed states, 
terrorism and transnational crime. He argued that NATO’s new Partnership for Peace and 
Mediterranean dialogue did not go far enough in recognizing the global nature of terrorist 
threats and Australia was well placed to extend its reach by acting as a bridge between the 
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North Atlantic and South Pacific. 756  In the same way that Australia was fearful of being left 
out of decisions of international security during the early days of the partnership, it was 
concerned again about being excluded from security planning that would directly benefit its 
own strategic sphere of influence. Australia expected that in finalizing the Information 
Security Agreement (ISA); it would stand to gain closer cooperation on counter-terrorism, 
counter-proliferation, crisis management and peacekeeping. Such measures were realized the 
following year when Australia and NATO agreed to exchange classified information under 
the ISA and to cooperate on the newly established Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU) - 
all during a visit by then NATO Secretary General Mr de Hoop Scheffe.757  
 
Intelligence and trade relations were accompanied by the signing of the Treaty on Defence 
Trade Cooperation, which made it easier for Australia to gain access to sensitive defence 
technology and compete for defence-related global supply chain contracts. This deal had a 
security and economic benefit in that it led to improvements in interoperability between 
Australia and the US, and reduced the bureaucracy involved in defence exports by providing 
license-free access to US defence equipment. At the time the treaty was signed in September 
2007, Australia was the only other nation outside of the UK to achieve such a deal.758 
 
Prominent Australian foreign policy scholars have regard the Howard years as the “golden 
age” of alliance cooperation.759 These scholars highlighted the close personal relationship 
between Prime Minister Howard and President George Bush as a major contributor to the 
growth of the alliance and a catalyst for Australia’s support of US foreign policy in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet what I have demonstrated above is that an expectation of 
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reciprocity was the primary motivation. This involved both moral and material calculations in 
combating the spread of terrorism and bringing stability and security to the Asia-Pacific, 
which had been a long-term foreign policy goal for both the US and Australia. National 
interest calculations were also important in that Australia’s support of the alliance was 
determined by a rational choice of how it could benefit in return. The returns were 
considerable, and included unprecedented access to US intelligence and the successful 
signing of the US-Australian FTA. As well as the material benefits, closer cooperation 
between the US and Australia in intelligence led to moral outcomes in assisting the 
developing states of Southeast Asia and the Pacific to achieve their own security. This was 
found in assisting Indonesia in stopping the threat of JI and in combating transnational crime 
in the Pacific Islands by improving policing. This also produced material benefits for 
Australia in achieving its security interest in Southeast Asia and its strategic interest in the 
Pacific.  
 
The rise of China and the US pivot to Asia-Pacific: Expectations of defence cooperation 
and regional security 
So far I have demonstrated that there is a case to be made for a moral realist reading of the 
US-Australian security partnership by examining significant turning points in the 
development of the relationship. But in order to present a well-rounded picture of how a 
moral realist would approach Australia’s policy choices in strategic alliances, an examination 
of the contemporary US-Australian partnership is needed. This is particularly important for 
understanding Australia’s support for a US troop presence in Australia and Asia-Pacific, 
despite anxieties that this would complicate its growing economic and diplomatic relationship 
with China.  
 
In 2007, China surpassed the US as Australia’s largest trading partner, which meant that for 
the first time in Australia’s history, its main security partner was not its main trading 
partner.760 This reality has the potential to complicate Australia’s strategic position, as China 
emerges to challenge US hegemony in the Pacific. Indeed, much has been made of the 
potential for both alliance entrapment and abandonment as a result of what Hugh White (and 
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others) have characterized as Australia’s “China choice.” 761 For Australia, the choice has 
always been between its loyalty to the US as its most important security partner and its 
economic dependence on China in the event that the US and China come into conflict.762 It is 
not the intention of this thesis to make any definitive argument on which side Australia 
should choose, it is only to demonstrate that within the US-Australian security partnership, 
common interests in responding to the rise of China, as part of an expectation of reciprocity, 
have led to specific moral and material outcomes.  
 
The rise of China reflected a shift in the international balance of power and altered the focus 
of the US-Australian security partnership, from one that prioritized cooperation on counter-
terrorism and intelligence, to one that prioritizes greater defence cooperation. This has largely 
been the result of the US “pivot” or “rebalance” of its strategic posture towards the Asia-
Pacific.763 During the early 1990s, the US significantly reduced its military presence in the 
region, going from a high of 135,000 personnel, to an average of 100,000.764 In the aftermath 
of 9/11 US military resources were focused on securing its interests in the Middle East and 
the defence of the Asia-Pacific was narrowly located to its key partners in the WoT, of which 
the South Asian nations of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India were the main recipients. As 
previously mentioned, Australia benefited greatly from intelligence, inter-operability and 
trade in the Post/911 period, yet the defence relationship remained the same. This changed 
following the 2011 announcement that US troops would be stationed at Australian facilities 
                                           
761 Hugh White has written extensively on this subject. For more see Hugh White, “Australian defence policy 
and the possibility of war,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 2 (2002), pp. 253-264; “The 
limits to optimism: Australia and the rise of China,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 59, no. 4 (2005), 
pp. 469-480;  “Why war in Asia remains thinkable,” Survival 50, no. 6 (2008), pp. 85-104; and “Power shift 
rethinking Australia’s place in the Asian Century,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 1 (2011), 
pp. 81-93. Several others have also discussed the possible policy options for Australia in the event that a choice 
must be made. See, for instance, Tow and Leisa Hay, “Australia, the United States and a China growing strong: 
Managing conflict avoidance,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 55, no. 1 (2001), pp. 37-54; Tow, 
“Sino-American relations and the ‘Australian factor:’ inflated expectations or discriminate engagement,” 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 59, no. 4 (2005), pp. 451-467; James Manicom and Andrew O’Neil, 
“Accommodation, realignment or business as usual? Australia’s response to a rising China,” The Pacifica 
Review 23, no. 1 (2010), pp. 23-44 and Baogong He, “Politics of accommodation of the rise of China: the case 
of Australia,” Journal of Contemporary China 21, no. 73 (2012), pp. 53-70.  
762 Alexander Downer as foreign minister was the first public official to vocalize Taiwan as an issue where 
Australia would be forced into making this choice. Downer stated that Australia was not obligated to assist the 
US, under ANZUS and would remain “neutral” if China tried to regain full sovereignty over Taiwan. Tom 
Allard and Hamish McDonald, “ANZUS loyalties fall under China’s shadow,” The Age, 18 August 2004. 
Available at: http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/08/17/1092508475915.html (accessed 20 July 2014). 
763 US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton first made reference to a US pivot towards Asia in an article for 
Foreign Policy. Even though Secretary Clinton only referred to the word “pivot” 4 times, from this point on it 
has been used to explain the US’ refocus of diplomatic and military attention towards the Asia-Pacific. For 
more, see Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific century,” Foreign Policy 189, no. 1 (2011), pp. 56-63. 
764 The US also closed its largest military base in Manila.  
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in the Northern Territory. The decision was labelled the biggest development in US-
Australian military relations in the past 30 years.765 Previously, Australia and the US had 
agreed to conduct joint training exercises like Operation Talisman Saber, but there had not 
been any move to rotate US troops on the continent.  
 
This policy change was the result of Australia and the US’ common interests in responding to 
potential threats from a rising China, which could challenge US primacy and threaten the 
stability of Australia’s strategic interests in Asia-Pacific, namely the security of its trade 
routes, as well as its freedom to exercise a policy of comprehensive and constructive regional 
engagement. Thus, Australia agreed to the rotation of US troops in Darwin because of an 
expectation of reciprocity that this would increase its defence position, which would also 
contribute to regional peace and security. It started with the 2009 announcement by the 
Obama Administration of the “strategic pivot,” which identified several shifts in US foreign 
policy priorities. For Australia, the most important was the recognition that the centre of 
international politics had moved to its own strategic backyard.  
 
We see this very much as responding and reflecting the fact that the 
world is moving into our part of the world, the world is moving to the 
Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean. We need to respond to that. The 
world needs to essentially come to grips with the rise of China, the rise 
of India, the move of strategic and political and economic influence to 
our part of the world.766 
 
Acceptance of the changing power dynamics brought with it the desire by the US to re-stamp 
its hegemony over the area in the event of potential competition from China. In 2012, former 
US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta announced a departure from the US’ 50/50 split 
between the Atlantic and the Pacific; and instead planned to have 60% of its navy deployed 
                                           
765 Stephen Smith, “2013 Defence White Paper,” Speech, Lowy Institute, 9 August 2012. Available at: 
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/paper-presented-stephen-smith-mp-minister-defence-lowy-institute-
2013-defence-white (accessed 20 July 2014).  
766 Foreign Minister Stephen Smith commenting on the new US-Australia deal for US marines in Darwin. See 
Matt Seigal, “As part of pact, U.S. marines arrive in Australia, in China’s strategic backyard,” The New York 
Times, 4 April 2014. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/world/asia/us-marines-arrive-darwin-
australia.html?_r=0 (accessed 24 June 2014). 
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to the Pacific by 2020.767 Washington’s strategy was thus centred on strengthening its 
alliance structures by increasing its military presence in the region. Australia benefited 
greatly from this in a number of ways. In fact, not only did Australia benefit, it actively 
encouraged US rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific with an expectation that it will 
contribute to greater regional security. This was best illustrated in then Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton stating that US participation in the EAS was influenced by the diplomacy of 
Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd.768 In terms of defence planning Australia’s decision 
to accept US troop presence had an economic benefit in that Australia was again grappling 
with a limited defence budget, despite the initial increase of $146.1 billion of defence 
spending announced by the Rudd government in 2009 – a projected rise that was considered 
more “aspirational” than a firm commitment.769 By 2013 the Labor government, led by Prime 
Minister Julia Gillard, announced a new defence funding model that reduced defence 
spending to 1.5% of GDP, the lowest since before WWII.770 The increased military presence 
was thus a way for Australia to help secure its defence without having to over-stretch its 
budget spending.  
 
Over 2,500 US troops were to be in Darwin on a rotating basis. By 2012, Australia had a full 
company of 200-250 marines in the Northern Territory with a predicted 2,500 by 2017. This 
would incorporate a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) that included command, 
logistics and ground combat, as well as aviation combat with up to 25 aircraft.771 In 
exchange, the US received greater access to Australian bombing ranges and remote training 
                                           
767 Leon E. Panetta, “Shangri-La Security Dialogue,” Speech, Secretary of Defence Leon E. Panetta, Shangri-La 
Hotel, Singapore, 2 June 2012. Available at: http://www.defence.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1681 
(accessed 26 June 2014).  
768 Agence France-Presse (AFP), “Clinton to attend East Asia Summit,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 18 
September 2010. Available at: http://www.smh.com.au//breaking-news-world/clinton-to-attend-east-asia-
summit-20100918-15glu.html (accessed 21 July 2014).  
769 DoD, “Budget,” Portfolio Budget Statements 2009-2010, Defence Portfolio, May 2009, p. 15. Available at: 
http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/09-10/pbs/2009-2010_Defence_PBS_07_pbs_full.pdf (accessed 21 July 
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770 The new Coalition government announced in February 2014 that it would pursue a defence budget increase 
of 2% of GDP by 2030. This would place Australia’s defence budget at $25billion and more inline with the 
average defence spending of NATO allies. However, this would still fall short of achieving the defence force 
outlined in the 2013 White Paper. Greg Sheridan, “New white paper urges doubling of defence to $50 billion,” 
The Australian, 27 February 2014. Available at: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/new-
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771 Gordon Arthur, “US marine deployment in Darwin – bordered on remarkable,” Asia-Pacific Defence 
Reporter, 31 October 2012. Available at: http://www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com/articles/266/US-MARINE-
DEPLOYMENT-IN-DARWIN-BORDERING-ON-THE-REMARKABLE (accessed 24 July 2014). 
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facilities, particularly the Bradshaw Field Training Area at the Top End.772 The US Marine 
Corps (USMC) was looking to develop better (and closer) training with regional militaries, 
and the placement of troops in Darwin was useful because of its proximity to Southeast Asia 
and the Indian Ocean.773 The new pact also included increased use of Australian Air Force 
bases for the American Air Command and the potential for increased ship and submarine 
visits through the Indian Ocean docking at a naval base in Perth. Indeed, closer defence 
relations that covered the Indian Ocean had been a long-term foreign policy goal for 
Australia that dated back to the 1960s.774 
 
As well as the material benefits, moral anticipated in strengthening US military commitments 
in the region. This is in line with previous calculations of Australia’s alliance loyalty in that 
its continued support for US supremacy in the Asia-Pacific would lead to moral and material 
outcomes of regional peace and stability. Encouraging US engagement in the region also had 
the potential to produce greater trilateral and multilateral defence relationships that would 
enable a better response to any regional contingency, such as coordinated responses to natural 
disasters and humanitarian assistance.775 Such a policy goal reflected the continuation of 
common interests between the US and Australia in maintaining regional peace and security 
by increasing the sovereign ability of Asia-Pacific states to defend against potential threats. 
As made clear in the previous section, a particular focus for Australia had been the 
development of closer defence ties with Indonesia. In fact, Minister for Defence Stephen 
Smith highlighted this expectation of reciprocity as part of Australia’s commitment to the 
alliance when he stated that: 
 
 The United States’ presence in the Asia-Pacific has been a force for 
stability and investment and prosperity since the end of World War II, so 
                                           
772 Ibid. 
773 Donna Miles, “Rotation force in Australia paves way for big growth in 2014,” DoD News, 24 September 
2014. Available at: http://www.defence.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120844 (accessed 20 August 2014).  
774 During the 1960s Australia had sought to add threats to joint interests in the Indian Ocean to the mutual 
defence pact, but was rebuffed by a US administration hesitant to beholden itself to any commitment that would 
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Indian Ocean. For more see, “Australia in the Asian Century,” (September 2011), p. 74-75. Available at: 
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775 ABC, “Gillard-Obama detail US troop deployment,” ABC News, 16 April 2013. Available at: 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-11-16/gillard2c-obama-announce-darwin-troop-deployment/3675596 
(accessed 23 July 2014).  
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what we’re doing is enhancing our practical cooperation. And already, that’s 
had good regional impacts, because with the rotation of a small number of 
Marines through Darwin, we’ve already agreed with the President of 
Indonesia that we’ll have a regional exercise, Australia, the United States 
and Indonesia on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. So there are 
very good regional implications.776 
 
In 2013, Australia and the US also emphasized the importance of working with Indonesia as 
a regional leader and identified defence and intelligence cooperation as a priority.777 
Australia’s material interests in pursuing this policy goal was tied to the increased capacity of 
Indonesia to realize its strategic potential within ASEAN, which would allow for greater 
strategic depth in Canberra’s defence planning. Security of the Indonesian archipelago was 
also vital for freedom of SLOCs and for continued prosperity in trade and investment. 
Australia’s ability to contribute to these policy goals was greatly increased by its support of 
US re-engagement with Indonesia and broader Southeast Asia. The US had already funded 
Indonesia’s Integrated Maritime Surveillance System (IMMS), which covered activity over 
the important Malacca Strait, as well as the Sulawesi Sea and Molucca Sea. 778  
 
This demonstrates that common interests – as part of an expectation of reciprocity – have 
remained central to the longevity and durability of the US-Australian security partnership, 
and this has continued to show evidence of leading to both moral and material outcomes. In 
this instance, Australia and the US were united in viewing the rise of China as a potential 
strategic threat to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Australia’s concerns have been tied 
to the possibility of conflict between the US and China. The former Australia’s main security 
ally and the latter its largest trading partner. In comparison, the US has been nervous about 
any action from China that could challenge its hegemony over a region of strategic and 
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economic importance. But regardless of these variations in how the US and Australia have 
calculated their interests, both states have shown a mutual desire to maintain the regional 
status quo, which has included moral considerations in maintaining peace and security. This 
has led to moral outcomes in strengthening the defence capacity of regional allies through 
trilateral defence cooperation, which has also led to further material pay-offs for Australia, as 
greater US engagement in regional defence and security was identified by policymakers as a 
key strategic goal. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has applied a moral realist framework to the Australian-US security partnership. 
It did so by first outlining some of the problems with normative approaches to understanding 
alliances, namely that these contributions have over-stated the shared norms and values that 
can sometimes drive alliances, particularly multilateral alliance groupings. At the opposite 
end of the spectrum, it also found that realist examinations have largely dismissed the 
potential for moral considerations in alliance partnerships. This represents a gap in the 
literature, and an area where a moral realist view might be useful in understanding Australia’s 
strategic alliances.  
 
Indeed, it was found that moral realism could explain the US-Australian security partnership. 
Expectations of reciprocity were found in the common security interests that solidified the 
relationship during WWII and were found to motivate Australia’s support for US foreign and 
security policy. The moral calculations as part of this reciprocity were difficult to determine, 
but were found in both Australia’s and the US’ mutual desire to see the partnership as a 
mechanism that could deter conflict and promote stability in Asia-Pacific. These expectations 
were found to continue during the partnership, and informed Australia’s decision to allow 
joint defence and intelligence facilities, and its willingness to commit material support 
towards various US-driven international coalitions. These decisions were made despite fears 
that it could lead to alliance entrapment and limit Australia’s ability to exercise an 
independent foreign policy. This demonstrated rational choice in that Australian decision-
makers calculated that the benefits of maintaining the alliance far outweighed the costs 
involved. This was certainly true in terms of access to US intelligence, military technology 
and training.  
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Expectations of reciprocity and rational choice together indicate the likelihood of moral and 
material outcomes. The moral outcomes can be found in the security flow-on effects to 
nations in the Pacific, which have benefited from cooperation between Australia and the US 
in areas of counter-terrorism, policing and disaster relief. This also produced material 
benefits in bringing stability to Australia’s area of direct strategic importance and contributed 
to its regional interests in developing closer security and defence ties with the South Pacific 
and Southeast Asia. Thus, this chapter demonstrated evidence of a convergence between 
moral and material considerations in Australia strategic alliance policy that, in some 
instances, led to moral and material outcomes.  
 
This completes the application of moral realism to the three arenas of Australian foreign 
policy, which means it is now time to bring the case study chapters together to more 
comprehensively analyse whether moral realism stands up against potential criticisms, and 
assess whether it represents a valuable tool for understanding Australia’s foreign policy 
choices. I undertake this task in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Five 
 
Morality and material interests: The case for moral realism in understanding 
Australia’s foreign policy choices 
 
So far this thesis has mapped out the framework of moral realism and how it might be applied 
to three arenas of Australian foreign policy. A preliminary examination of the data indicated 
that a moral realist perspective that incorporates the presence of both moral and material 
calculations has the potential to sharpen our understanding of the motives, choices and 
outcomes of a state’s foreign policy. However, this is not enough to make a definitive 
conclusion. Before this can be done, the evidence must be further analysed and alternative 
explanations concerning the place of morality in Australia’s foreign policy choices evaluated.  
 
To do this, the chapter is organized into three sections, which serve in combination as the 
crux of this thesis. The first briefly refreshes the reader’s memory by highlighting how the 
dominance of normative and critical contributions to the classical realist revival has 
engendered a flawed understanding of how classical realists understood morality. The second 
section then presents English School (ES) and constructivist assessments of Australian 
foreign policy as potential alternatives to moral realism. I find that these perspectives are 
limited in their ability to account for the motives, choices and outcomes of the position of 
morality in Australia’s foreign policy. Specifically, I find that the ES and constructivist 
normative understanding of morality downplays the strategic interests that determine why 
(and when) Australia chooses to include morality as part of its choices. Finally, the third 
section conducts an analysis of moral realism’s explanatory utility in the Australian case by 
drawing together the three themes of expectations of reciprocity between states; rational 
choice in calculations of foreign policy decisions; and moral and material outcomes of 
foreign policy. In doing so, I answer my primary research question (“is moral realism an 
appropriate analytical tool for understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices?”) in the 
affirmative.  
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Understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices: Reintroducing the academic 
landscape of morality in classical realism 
This thesis began with an examination of the most prominent approaches to the revival of 
classical realism in International Relations (IR) theory. There has been recent scholarly 
interest on how best to theorize morality in international politics and the return to classical 
realism has been directed towards gathering insights on how classical realists, and 
specifically Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr and George Kennan, understood the 
position of morality in IR. But rather than this revival adding clarity to how classical realists 
primarily adopted a consequentialist view of morality, it has instead led to a 
misrepresentation of classical realism’s core methodological and theoretical principles. The 
examination of the classical realist revival in Chapter 1 found that the majority of these 
contributions came from cosmopolitan, constructivist and critical theoretical perspectives that 
have fundamentally different views to classical realism on how to theorize morality in 
international politics.  
 
A cosmopolitan perspective, like the one put forward by Richard Beardsworth, understands 
morality to be a categorical imperative, and therefore applied to international politics by 
assessing states’ adherence to a universal set of rules and laws.779 This is at variance to the 
views of Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Kennan, who all saw morality as deriving from the 
consequences of rational thought, and contingent on time and place. Constructivists have also 
conceived of morality differently to classical realists, by arguing that it is intersubjective, and 
part of how actors and structures are socially constructed. For constructivists like Reus-Smit, 
morality is a social product guiding states about the “right” way to act.780 Similarly, critical 
theoretical perspectives view morality in terms of positivist and post-positivist critiques, 
which means – as Campbell Craig and Chris Brown have attempted to claim – that the 
classical realists’ own values and perceptions informed their views on morality as either 
“good” or “bad.”781 Yet while these perspectives have approached the study of morality from 
different theoretical positions, they nonetheless each regard morality as a normative resource, 
                                           
779 Richard Beardsworth, “Cosmopolitanism and realism: towards a theoretical convergence?,” Millennium 37, 
no. 1 (2003), pp. 69-96.  
780 Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: Cultural, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality 
in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
781 Campbell Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz 
(New York: Columbian University Press, 2003); and Chris Brown, “The ‘practice turn,’ phronesis and classical 
realism: towards a phronetic international political theory?” Millennium 40, no. 3 (2012), pp. 439-456. 
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rather than one linked to power and interests (which is the key conceptual proposition of 
classical realism in respect to morality).  
 
As noted in Chapter 1, this similarity can also be found when examining the contributions 
from perspectives that one would expect to share more in common with classical realists.  ES 
scholars, whether solidarist or pluralist, generally argue in favour of the potential for a rules-
based international society independently influencing state behaviour.782 Even neo-classical 
realism, classical realism’s most contemporary incarnation, still understands morality to be 
normative, and has thus viewed it with a certain level of scepticism; seeing it as only 
important insofar as it can be a tool for elites to manipulate, sell or coerce policy.783  
 
Yet these normative understandings of morality are in contrast to how the classical realists 
theorized morality as part of a state’s calculation of the national interest, and evaluated 
according to the consequences of states choosing to include morality as part of their rational 
decision-making processes. This is why I have positioned moral realism as a perspective that 
seeks to properly incorporate the classical realist view of morality, and thus represent an 
original contribution towards the classical realist revival. Moral realism adopts the notion of 
an “ethic of consequence” which has a long history in classical realism as a form of prudence 
whereby states must weigh decisions, including ones dealing with morality, according to 
whether they achieve any benefit to the national interest.   
 
The moral realist approach I have articulated here also tries to extend the work of 
Morgenthau et al, by proposing that for act to be evaluated as “moral” it must also 
demonstrate a benefit to both the initiating state as well as the target recipient. Hence I 
connect motives with outcomes, by understanding morality to be tied to the classical realists’ 
consideration of the “other” in human nature. Indeed, classical realists accepted that states do 
not exist alone in international politics and must interact with others in order to survive. 
Therefore, states have the capacity to reason that, in certain contexts and under certain 
                                           
782 For more on the pluralist and solidarist literature see Dunne, “The social construction of international 
society,” European Journal of International Relations 1, no. 3 (1995), pp. 367-389; Dunne, “Sociological 
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487.  
783 Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Realist environment, liberal process and domestic-level variables,” International 
Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (1997), pp. 1-25.  
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conditions, they can actually stand to benefit from choosing to include expectations of 
reciprocity as part of rational decision-making. By combining these assumptions, a moral 
realist stance anticipates that morality is more likely to be visible in states’ decisions  when it 
converges with national interests. Together this can actually lead to gains for the state in 
question.  
 
As well as developing its moral realist framework, this thesis has also examined how the 
academic literature has treated morality with respect to Australia’s foreign policy. I found 
that it was commonplace for scholars to examine Australian policy choices within the context 
of its middle-power status. This has been true of those in support of Australia as a “Good 
International Citizen (GIC),” as well as those who have primarily focused on hard power 
calculations – such as defence spending, military capabilities, and alliance partnerships.784 
This in turn has tended to produce quite specific foreign policy conclusions that I argued have 
fallen short in accounting for both moral and material factors in Australia’s policy choices. 
Not only does this represent a gap in the literature, it also uncovers a divide in Australian IR 
between the ES and realism.785 Australia’s academic landscape is unique in that it has 
remained outside traditional debates on morality in international politics, which tend to 
approach this through the prism of an epistemological struggle between liberalism and 
classical realism. Against this backdrop, Australia represents an excellent case for the 
application of moral realism because there has not yet been a systematic examination of the 
potential for morality in Australia’s foreign policy choices. 
 
The limited assessments about morality in Australian foreign policy that do exist have 
primarily come from normative scholars from the ES and constructivist approaches. A brief 
explanation of how these perspectives have seen morality in Australia’s foreign policy 
calculations in the areas of aid and development, humanitarian operations and strategic 
alliances, is instructive in this context. First, it allows for alternative explanations to be 
considered. If they are found wanting, this will strengthen my case for positioning moral 
realism as a more appropriate tool for understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices.    
                                           
784 See in particular Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australian Foreign Relations (Melbourne: Melbourne 
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My initial survey of the literature on morality in international politics deliberately included 
cosmopolitanism and critical theoretical scholarship, but since contributions from these 
perspectives have been minimal when referring to Australia, a discussion of them would not 
produce much in the way of clarifying the moral realist position I have advanced. Nor would 
it present a viable alternative to understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices: indeed, 
doing so is a matter for a different thesis. In any case, as I have argued previously, these 
perspectives are similar in that they see morality as a prescriptive force capable of shaping 
policy decisions independently of material interests. And in discussing ES and constructivist 
views below, I am also mindful of potential criticisms that I have taken moral realism too far, 
to the extent that it is no longer possible to identify it as falling within the classical realist 
camp. Thus, in examining the potential alternatives to moral realism, I am also reinforcing 
the claim that it is still grounded in empiricism and material interests.  
 
The English School and Australian foreign policy: The norm of international society 
I begin with contributions made by the ES with respect to understanding morality in 
Australian foreign policy. There are several ways that this can be achieved from an ES 
perspective, but its methodological and epistemological pluralism represents one of the major 
forms of criticisms of this School.786 To avoid potential confusion on this, I focus on the 
middle-ground empiricism most commonly associated with Hedley Bull.787 The main 
assumption of this perspective has been that in abiding by the laws, norms and rules of 
international society, Australia has stood to benefit by playing a role in upholding the 
maintenance of international order.788 The logic here is that a stable rules-based society is of 
                                           
786 Roy Jones identified the methodological and conceptual problems of Wight’s adoption of the three traditions 
as part of his forceful critique of the ES. Jones also pointed out the difficulties of using international society as 
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see the edited volume: Alex Bellamy ed., International Society and its Critics (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005). A constructivist view on Australia’s moral foreign policy will be discussed later. In this chapter, I 
will restrict my discussion to the ES perspective identified by practitioner and scholar Gareth Evan’s who has 
featured heavily in this thesis and has described Australia’s foreign policy as a mixture of “idealist-
pragmatism.” See Evans and Grant, Australia’s foreign relations in the world of the 1990s, pp. 41-44.  
788 Ibid. 
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material benefit for all states involved, as the alternative is an unrestrained anarchical 
environment where cooperation is severely limited. Gareth Evans incorporated this view into 
his ideas on GIC and “cooperative security,” which also argued that an increasingly 
interconnected world produced threats to state sovereignty that transcended national 
boundaries, and required a collective or multilateral response to resolve.789 Evans also argued 
that notions of reciprocity guided Australia’s policy of GIC, as greater interdependency 
motivated states to address common security threats.790  
 
Thus, an international societal approach does not necessarily dismiss the role of interests in 
motivating states to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices. And in this 
regard, the middle-ground perspective shows some promise on the issue of morality in 
Australian foreign policy. If we look at Australia’s foreign aid and development policy, the 
Colombo Plan was a multilateral economic development program that brought together a 
number of nations from the North Atlantic, West and Southeast Asia, to discuss a strategy for 
development that was predicted to benefit both recipient and donor states. There was also a 
sense that Australia’s diplomacy in promoting this plan was motivated by a desire to do the 
“right thing” by improving the living standards of impoverished countries, while also seeking 
to garner some reputational payoffs in doing so. At the time of the signing of the Colombo 
Plan, the global aid regime was still in its infancy – and yet the Plan was consistent with 
liberal ideas on the promotion of human rights laid out in the recently signed and adopted (at 
the time) United Nations (UN) Charter, of which Australia was a founding signatory. 791  
 
Aid policy is often associated with the promotion of universal human rights, and from an ES 
perspective Australia’s relatively prosperous position meant it had an obligation to assist 
others in need within international society. This also benefited Australia by contributing to a 
more secure and ordered regional environment, since the Colombo Plan was a mechanism 
                                           
789 Gareth Evans “Cooperative security and intrastate conflict,” Foreign Policy 96 (1994), pp.3-20 and Evans, 
“Australian foreign policy: Priorities in a changing world,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 43, no. 2 
(1989), pp. 1-15. 
790 Gareth Evans, “No power? No influence? Australia’s middle power diplomacy in the Asian Century,” 
Speech, Australian Institute of International Affairs, Sydney Branch, 6 September 2012. Available at: 
http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech472.html (accessed 20 December 2014).  
791 I have purposely not spent much time engaging with Australia’s relationship with the UN or Non State 
Actors (NSA). There are several reasons for this, but the most important is that from a moral realist perspective, 
it is difficult to assess the role of the UN in producing moral and material outcomes. This is because these 
actor’s have no independent explanatory power and are only relevant as tools used by the state to further their 
own interests. Therefore, they are of little value when considering the motives and outcomes of policy, and as 
will be discussed in more detail, this is where moral realism can better account for both the motives and the 
consequences of Australia’s moral behaviour.  
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that sought to deter the destabilizing threat of communist insurgencies. When Australia’s aid 
policy developed to focus on its immediate region, with the majority of its aid flowing to 
Indonesia and PNG, one could argue that this also reflected its desire to contribute to the 
order of international society.  
 
Not only does a rules-based international society underpins the explanatory power of the ES, 
but it can also potentially be applied to understand Australia’s role in humanitarian 
operations, as well as its security partnership with the US. In the case of Cambodia and 
Timor Leste, it could be claimed that Australia’s response reflected a moral obligation to 
uphold the principles of the normative order by reinforcing the right of sovereign 
independence. ES perspectives have also stated that Australia’s intervention in these two 
cases was justified according to international law, which allows for the use of force when 
international peace and security is being threatened.792 In this regard, Australia was motivated 
by both necessity and morality, as keeping order was beneficial to its national interest and to 
international society as a whole. And while a coherent ES view of the Australian-US security 
partnership is more difficult to discern (since scholars within the School writing on 
Australian foreign policy, like Timothy Dunne and Andrew Linklater, have tended to 
overlook this policy arena),793 one can nonetheless sketch its outline. In this case, an ES 
perspective would likely argue that the US-Australian security partnership was an example of 
security cooperation primarily in pursuit of maintaining international order. The assumption 
here is that both states recognize – and accept – their moral duty in achieving this aim.  
 
From the above description, a combination of humanitarianism and self-interest informed 
Australia’s decision-making. This seems on the surface to strengthen the ES characterization 
of “idealist pragmatism” when referring to the inclusion of morality in Australia’s foreign 
policy choices. But, in stating this, ES perspectives typically fall short in identifying whether 
                                           
792 Timothy Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler, “East Timor and the new humanitarian interventionism,” 
International Affairs 77, no. 4 (2001), pp. 805-827. 
793 Dunne and Andrew Linklater generally restrict their scholarship on Australia to explaining its role as a good 
international citizen and how its policy reflects adherence to the rules and norms of international society. See 
Andrew Linklater, “What is a good international citizen?” in Paul Keale ed Ethics and Foreign Policy (St 
Leonards: Allen, 1992), pp. 60-92; Wheeler and Dunne, “Good international citizenship: A third way for British 
foreign policy,” International Affairs 74, no. 4 (1998), pp. 847-870; Dunne and Jess Gifkins, “Libya and the 
state of intervention,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 5 (2011), pp. 515-529.The lack of ES 
scholarship on the Australian-US security partnership is reflective of the general lack of interest by ES scholars 
on strategic alliances. As I have mentioned elsewhere, ES scholars have prioritized multilateral relationships 
between states as these are viewed as inherently more cooperative and thus more likely to uphold the shared 
norms of international society.  
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it was self-interest or moral obligation that really motivated Australia’s actions in upholding 
the norms of international society. The inability to make this judgement stems from the 
tendency of the ES to treat the pursuit of international order as an end in itself, and therefore 
as a separate interest, rather than one that is pursued as part of a state’s broader strategic, 
economic and diplomatic goals. As a result, the ES conflates morality with states’ material 
interests. This is because whether or not a state is acting morally is evaluated on the basis of 
whether it follows the norms of international society, and not on whether it led to any moral 
and material results. This conceptual and methodological difference is also what separates a 
moral realist view of reciprocity from an ES one. Moral realism understands morality to be 
part of a state’s material expectations of reciprocity; while the ES sees this as a separate 
testable variable that is linked to greater interdependency and a state’s pursuit of absolute 
gains. In this regard, the ES also disregards the important causal role played by state interests, 
which determines why, and in what context, states do choose to include morality as part of 
their foreign policy choices.  
 
Given these problems with ES explanations about morality in Australian foreign policy, it is 
worth turning to evaluate how constructivist scholarship has treated the issue. There are, in 
fact, a number of similarities between the ES and constructivism. Perhaps the most prominent 
is an analytical focus on norms as factors that directly shape policy. The key difference, 
though, is in constructivism’s insistence on the mutual constitution of norms and interests in 
the construction of Australia’s identity, which then affects its foreign policy choices. 
Therefore, constructivists argue that evidence of morality in Australia’s decision-making can 
be attributed to the process of social intersubjectivity. And in making a case for these 
socialization processes constructivism also has the potential to account for the role of 
morality in Australian foreign policy choices.  
 
Constructivism: Mutual constitution in Australia’s foreign policy? 
 Australian IR and foreign policy scholarship witnessed an explosion of interest in 
constructivism during the mid-1990s and early 2000s. Scholars such as Reus-Smit, Anthony 
Burke and Alex Bellamy have been major contributors towards a constructivist turn that 
placed norms and identity politics at the centre of many academic understandings of 
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Australia’s foreign policy.794 For them, Australia emerged from the end of the Cold War 
uncertain of where it “fit” in the post-bipolar international environment. It was no longer 
acceptable for Australian decision makers to construct policy on the assumption of a constant 
state of anarchy. Likewise, it was also no longer accurate for Australia to conduct its foreign 
relations exclusively through the prism of fixed material interests. Instead, they argued that 
much of Australia’s foreign policy could be explained by its constructed identity as a 
developed, western nation in a culturally and politically diverse region of developing states. 
 
This identity could notionally explain a number of policy choices. Burke, in particular, has 
argued that Australia’s identity has contributed to its view of security.795 According to his 
view, Australia is an anxious country that has constructed its security through an historical 
fear of invasion, which has prompted a heightened sense of insecurity, not to mention past 
antagonistic relations with surrounding Asia-Pacific nations. To overcome this, Australia has 
needed to adopt a more inclusive and cosmopolitan national identity to accommodate 
differences in culture and religion. This would then lead to a change in how Australia 
traditionally identified with regional partners, and result in more cooperative and productive 
relationships. Constructivists therefore argue that Australia’s policy of regional engagement, 
as part of the Hawke-Keating governments’ foreign policies, was reflective of a change in 
how Australia perceived of its identity.  
 
Norms and identity are the key causative forces in constructivism that can potentially explain 
the inclusion of morality in Australia’s foreign policy choices across the three different policy 
arenas. According to constructivists, Australia’s foreign aid and development policy can be 
understood by referring to its history as a participant in the global aid regime, which has 
contributed towards its constitutive identity as a member of international society that abides 
by the society’s agreed norms on aid-giving. In this regard, constructivist understandings of 
Australian foreign aid are similar to those of the ES, and can be summarized as a developed 
state’s moral obligation in maintaining a liberal order.  
 
                                           
794 Christian Reus-Smit, The Constructivist Turn: Critical Theory after the Cold War (ANU: Research School of 
Asia-Pacific Studies, 1996); Anthony Burke, Fear of Security: Australia’s invasion anxiety (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Alex Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End 
Mass Atrocities (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009). 
795 Burke, Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety, pp. 15-83 
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Constructivism has a little more explanatory weight when dealing with the use of force for 
humanitarian ends. In this context, Australia’s response to Cambodia and Timor Leste 
reflected the effects of norm cascades with respect to changing perceptions on the use of 
force and sovereignty. Indeed, Australia could be seen as a norm entrepreneur in this area. In 
1980 it was one of a handful of nations that refused to recognize the ousted Khmer Rouge as 
the legitimate and sovereign representative of the Cambodian people. In doing so, Australia 
signalled that it saw sovereignty linked to the legitimacy of a specific governing authority: 
and for this to be restored to Cambodia, international society needed to ensure the holding of 
free and fair elections.  
 
Constructivism can also potentially offer a legitimate alternative to moral realism in 
examining Australia’s choices within the US-Australian security partnership. For instance, 
Australia’s decision to align with the US could be read as a shared commitment to upholding 
international peace and security following the end of World War II. Identity was important in 
shaping Australia’s perception as the only western democratic nation in the Pacific, which 
had an interest in aligning with the US. These two states had a shared historical experience as 
former British colonies, and both had similar values dealing with individual freedoms and the 
rule of law. These factors might be said to have informed Australia’s decision to view the US 
as a friend and approach their partnership through the prism of cooperation rather than 
competition.  
 
Factors relating to identity might also explain the continued viability of the security 
partnership with Washington in a way that speaks to the success of the alliance and creates 
links to the potential for moral and material outcomes flowing from it. For a number of 
constructivists, a common worldview between Australia and the US has produced a mutual 
understanding that peace and cooperation are worthwhile foreign policy goals. And this has 
been evident through the length of the partnership. During the Cold War, Australia and the 
US cooperated in areas of intelligence, technology exchange and military training for the 
purpose of maintaining regional stability in the face of communist threats to their shared 
identities. When the Cold War ended, Australia and the US were in agreement on recognizing 
the change in the strategic environment – to one that focused on cooperation to resolve non-
traditional security threats.  
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From this discussion, it might appear that constructivism can explain Australia’s foreign 
policy choices quite well. One might even suggest that it adds more than a traditional ES 
understanding given that constructivism can assess how states respond to changing 
international realities with reference to a corresponding change in their identities. This said, 
what constructivism cannot do, and where it generally falls down as a tool for foreign policy 
analysis, is to account for Australia’s motives in choosing to act morally. This is a persistent 
and thorny problem, since constructivism offers few insights on why states act without 
turning towards the reflexivity of mutual constitution. And doing so makes it hard to discern 
whether, for example, it was an interest that motivated Australia to respond in Cambodia and 
Timor Leste, or its acceptance of international norms.  
 
Similarly, when dealing with the US-Australian security partnership, even if we accept that it 
was shared identity that compelled Australia to form an alliance with the US, this still does 
nothing to resolve whether this was due to material calculations or qualitative ones relating to 
common values, similar regimes and shared cultural history. This inability to distinguish 
norms from interests also means that constructivism has trouble identifying the factors 
present when a state does decide to act morally, and the consequences that can occur as a 
result.  
 
Critically, the shortcomings of both the ES and constructivism can be traced to how they 
understand morality, which has meant that they each overlook the importance of material 
interests as central drivers in any Australian decision to include morality as part of its foreign 
policy choices. In comparison, a morality seen as directly connected to calculations of the 
national interest, and assessed on its consequences, can deliver a more accurate account. 
More than this, and as demonstrated in previous chapters, it can also potentially offer the 
ability to examine whether choices lead to moral and material outcomes through motives: an 
area where the ES and constructivism are both weak.  
 
Hence, the rest of this chapter is devoted to demonstrating that moral realism provides for a 
superior explanatory framework in the case of Australia. This is important not only to counter 
claims that moral realism is falling into the same normative trap of previous contributions 
towards the classical realist revival, but to also counter criticism that it offers little outside of 
a conventional realist reading of Australian foreign policy. This is where an emphasis on 
evidence of moral consequentialism in classical realism identified in Chapter 1 is important 
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and why a further look at whether Australia’s expectation of reciprocity in acting morally did 
in fact lead to moral and material outcomes is useful.  I proceed using the same three themes 
assessed in previous chapters: expectations of reciprocity, rational choice, and moral and 
material outcomes. 
 
Strategic considerations of the “other:” Expectations of reciprocity between states 
The expectation of reciprocity central to moral realism is informed by the classical realist 
conception of the “other” in international politics. This theme captures the strategic and 
moral considerations necessary for understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices by tying 
the motivation to act morally with rational calculations that it will lead to material benefits in 
return. Expectations of reciprocity can thus account for situations where a state is most likely 
to act morality, and moral realism would expect this to occur towards others that are 
strategically important, as the expected returns are likely to be greater. This means that moral 
realism can explain the central role of geography in Australia’s decision-making without 
needing to rely on empirically slippery concepts like norms and identity.  
 
As has already been demonstrated in this thesis, geostrategic factors relating to Australia’s 
security and diplomacy have been important in understanding the position of morality in its 
aid and development policy, in its participation in humanitarian operations, and in its 
strategic alliances. The connection between expectations of reciprocity and geography are 
relatively clear. Strategically, Australia’s position as an island continent in the Asia-Pacific 
has meant its security concerns have been derived from threats to its land borders from the 
northeast and northwest. This historic sense of insecurity has been compounded by the 
general instability of Australia’s regional environment. The Indonesian archipelago that sits 
directly above Australia has been a source of tension since it gained independence in 1945. 
Likewise, conflicts in Indochina, Southeast Asia and the South-Pacific have in the past been a 
continuing cause for concern in Australia’s security and defence policy. Given this traditional 
level of insecurity in Australia’s strategic environment, it is likely that evidence of Australia 
acting morally might be found as being directed towards those states in Australia’s immediate 
sphere of influence, where there is an increased capacity to achieve beneficial returns. In this 
regard, moral motivations are to be expected alongside strategic ones, and have been present 
as part of Australia’s expectations of reciprocity.  
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Expectations of reciprocity in Australia’s foreign aid and development policy 
Expectations of reciprocity are clearly visible in Australia’s foreign aid and development 
policy. Of course, this is the policy arena one would be most likely to find evidence of moral 
expectations. This in itself is also not necessarily a new claim. Hans Morgenthau made 
similar observations about the nature of aid when he stated that: 
 
Much of what goes by the name of foreign aid today is in the nature 
of… bribes… [It] preforms the function of price paid by the donor to 
the recipient for political services rendered or to be rendered by the 
latter to the former.796 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, Lieven’s and Hulsman’s “developmental realism” is partly a call for 
scholars to recognise the reciprocal benefits of aid.797 But where moral realism differs is that 
evidence of expectations of reciprocity in this case indicates the likelihood of moral and 
material outcomes. Together with rational choice, these led to national interest benefits to 
Australia as a donor state. Before I elaborate on these claims further, it is prudent to first 
demonstrate where these expectations of reciprocity were found and how both geostrategic 
and moral calculations converged in Australia’s foreign policy decision-making.  
 
My examination of Australia’s foreign aid and development policy showed definite 
indications that it has been guided by expectations of reciprocity. The Colombo Plan enacted 
after the end of WWII was explicitly expected to advance Australia’s broader economic and 
strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific.798 The decision to focus specifically on South Asia was 
originally informed by colonial ties to the British Commonwealth where infrastructure and 
administrative processes were more compatible with Australian practice. The expected 
returns were thus greater than if Australia’s resources had been directed towards states that 
were ill-equipped to receive its assistance. This changed, however, when Australia began to 
                                           
796 Hans Morgenthau, “Preface to a political theory of foreign aid,” in Hans Morgenthau The Restoration of 
American Politics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962), p. 302.  
797 Lieven, Anatol and John Huslam, “Developmental realism,” Harvard Law and Policy Review (16 January 
2007) Available at: http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/developmental_realism_4876 
(accessed 12 January 2014). 
798 Richard Casey made this clear in a ministerial speech upon creation of the Plan. See Richard Casey, 
“International affairs,” Ministerial Statement, HoR, 21 June 1951. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=1;query=Colombo%2
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lt (accessed 10 January 2014). 
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develop its own bilateral aid program. Here, Australia decided to direct its aid towards states 
that were important to achieving its security and defence objectives: namely, PNG and 
Indonesia.  
 
PNG’s location directly affects Australia’s sea line of defence to the Pacific, and combined 
with Australia’s colonial history to it, made PNG an obvious destination for Australia to 
extract beneficial returns from its aid policy. But PNG is also interesting in that after nearly 
40 years of being one of Australia’s primary recipients of aid, there has been little to indicate 
that Australia’s efforts have led to much improvement in its overall development. In fact, in 
some areas, like health, there is evidence of a marked decline in development standards as 
tuberculosis (TB) and HIV infection rates have increased.799 Yet despite this, Australia’s aid 
to PNG has increased at a steady rate since 1975, and by 2014 was over half a billion dollars, 
making it the largest recipient of Australian aid.800 This prompts the question: why has 
Australia continued to provide aid to PNG if it was not achieving any real moral or material 
benefits? The answer can be found in the weight Australia has placed on the moral dimension 
involved in its aid delivery. In the case of PNG (and its aid policy more generally), the moral 
expectations linked to considerations of the other were not the primary motivating force. 
Instead, it was the material expectations linked to PNG’s geographic position, which was 
high enough to outweigh the costs of Australia continuing its aid.  
 
Similarly, Indonesia’s location as an archipelago sitting directly to the north of Australia, 
coupled to its domestic instability, has made it an attractive aid recipient. Australia’s aid 
approach to Indonesia has been informed by a combination of mistrust and insecurity, and a 
concomitant desire to develop friendly and cooperative relations. These dual (perhaps even 
countervailing) concerns have contributed towards the view that Indonesia falls within the 
“arc of instability”, with multiple problematic security implications for Australia.801 These 
have included potential spillover from state weakness, drug and weapons trafficking, TOC, 
money laundering, people smuggling and transnational terrorism. These security concerns 
                                           
799 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), “Human development report 2013- the rise of the South: 
Human progress in a diverse world,” Human Development Index, p. 154. Available 
at:http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/14/hdr2013_en_complete.pdf (accessed 19 February 2014). 
800 DFAT, Australian Aid, “Papua New Guinea,” (2014). Available at: 
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/pacific/png/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 14 February 2014). 
801 Robert Ayson, “The Arc of instability and Australia’s strategic policy,” Australian Journal of International 
Relations 61, no. 2 (2007), pp. 215-231 and Paul Dibb, David D. Hale and Peter Prince, “Asia’s insecurity,” 
Survival 41, no. 3 (1999), pp. 5-20.  
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mean that Indonesia has been a key aid priority for Australia. Indeed, it has been the recipient 
of Australia’s single largest aid program: the Australian Indonesian Partnership for 
Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD), given in response to the 2004 Boxing Day 
tsunami.802 As a result, the size of Australia’s aid program to Indonesia, coupled to its 
strategic importance make it a good example to illustrate both the moral and material 
motivations present in expectations of reciprocity over foreign aid and development policy.  
 
So far I have emphasized strategic expectations, but this does not imply that a moral 
dimension has been completely absent. Indeed, moral considerations as part of the 
expectation of reciprocity have been significant, and related to Australia’s commitment to 
reduce poverty and increase standards of living – motivations often associated with the 
delivery of aid. As mentioned previously, Australia has already shown evidence of such 
behaviour. Previous studies by Rukmani Gounder and Kunal Sen have identified the presence 
of Recipient Need (RN) and Donor Interest (DI) in the construction of Australia’s aid 
policy.803 But there have not yet been any investigations into what these interests were, and to 
what extent the needs of the recipient have played a part in Australian calculations. In the 
case of Indonesia, quite apart from strategic and economic interests, the giving of aid was 
also a way for Australia to achieve humanitarian objectives revolving around poverty 
reduction and assisting in creating an upward trajectory on other development indicators. In 
2013, more than 32 million Indonesians were found to live below the poverty line and the 
nation ranked 121 out of 187 on the Human Development Index (HDI).804 Giving generously 
to Indonesia has had the twin expectation of achieving Australia’s national interests, and also 
allowing it to achieve its intended development outcomes for Indonesia.  
 
Expectations of reciprocity have also guided what type of aid Australia has delivered. The 
bulk of Australia’s aid efforts have been directed toward areas of development where both 
Australia and the recipient state could benefit. During the Colombo Plan Australia’s aid was 
tied to education, technical cooperation, agriculture and the construction of infrastructure, as 
                                           
802 DFAT, Australian Aid, “Australian-Indonesian partnership for reconstruction and development: Partnership 
framework,” (2005). Available at: http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Documents/partnership_framework.pdf 
(accessed 3 February 2014). 
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progress in a diverse world,” p. 203. Available at: 
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these were areas where Australia identified a material advantage for supporting.805 This was 
particularly the case in relation to education and technical cooperation. Alongside the 
strategic expectations, the Colombo Plan was a mechanism by which Australia could develop 
diplomatic relations in a region where it was perceived as a colonial outlier. This was 
exercised through the most successful part of the Colombo Plan: the student scholarship and 
exchange program. It allowed students from participating Colombo Plan countries to study on 
government-funded scholarships, which were supplied at limited expense to Australia, with 
expected returns in greater people-to-people links that also went some way towards 
ameliorating the negative reputation of the White Australia Policy. 806 
 
In this way, Australia’s preference for education was not limited to material motivations: 
indeed, it was also consistent with the overall view that the best way to target poverty was to 
implement programs of social and economic development.807 These expectations determined 
other key development areas, like agriculture assistance and food security where Australia 
has had an advantage through its role as a primary producer with similar climate conditions to 
its aid recipients. And this has also led to material payoffs in opening commercial and 
business opportunities. Of course, there was some deviation from these expectations, such as 
the focus on good governance during the Howard years. But here again, this was guided by 
an expectation of reciprocal benefits, as the policy change was complementary to the 
government’s approach towards nation building and counter-terrorism.808  
 
This view of development has had implications for how Australia delivers its aid, which has 
been heavily typified by grants. Grant aid allows a recipient nation the freedom to chart its 
own development course, while at the same time increasing the prestige returns for Australia 
in being seen as a generous donor.809 As well as a identifying a preference for grant aid, my 
                                           
805 NAA, A1838 708/13/4. “Colombo plan for cooperative economic development, reports, publications, 
printing etc,” Department of External Affairs, Departmental Notes on the London Meeting of the 
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analysis of expectations of reciprocity indicates that Australia has preferred to conduct its aid 
policy bilaterally. This is because bilateral links allow for greater flexibility in developing 
closer diplomatic relationships, which reinforces Australia’s ability to reap maximum 
prestige gains.810  
 
In sum, an analysis of expectations of reciprocity demonstrates that strategic factors have the 
primary determinants of its aid policy. These have guided Australia’s aid towards states in the 
Asia-Pacific for the overriding reason that it has increased the expected material returns. But 
moral considerations have also been present, chiefly in the expectation that the giving of aid 
increases the economic and social development of the recipient state. When viewed in 
combination, this shows how moral and material factors converged to shape what type of 
foreign aid Australia has preferred, and where it was likely to be delivered.  
 
Expectations of reciprocity in Australia’s participation in humanitarian operations: 
Cambodia and Timor Leste 
Expectations of reciprocity can also be seen guiding Australia’s participation in humanitarian 
operations. And here again, strategic factors tied to the security of the Asia-Pacific have also 
meant that its response to humanitarian crises has been localized to this specific geographical 
area, with the exception of the need to participate in assistance missions as a result of post-
conflict requirements stemming from US choices (such as in Iraq and Afghanistan). 
Australia’s participation in humanitarian operations has been part of its broader strategic 
agenda (rather than separate to it), and has thus been dictated primarily by strategic factors. 
This was certainly clear when examining Australian responses to the conflicts in Cambodia 
and Timor Leste, where national interest expectations motivated Australia to use force for 
humanitarian purposes.  
 
The best evidence to support this can be found in the recognition that Australia has had to re-
focus its strategic priorities on the defence of its territory and maritime approaches. In a 
potentially unstable regional environment, this has meant that Australia has needed to be 
focused on increasing the ability of its defence force to respond to mainland threats, but that 
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 265 
it has also found it necessary to seek to develop defence relationships with other nations in 
Southeast Asia and the Pacific. As the 1987 Dibb Report noted, Australia’s ability to achieve 
this was limited given the low number of direct threats to its national security.811 Thus, 
participation in peacekeeping and other humanitarian operations has been one of the most 
appropriate ways for Australia to contribute to the security of its regional environment, as 
well as to advance its interests in defence and trade cooperation. These policy goals were re-
iterated in the 1991 and 1993 Strategic Reviews and were clearly associated with material 
expectations of reciprocity that informed Australia’s response towards Cambodia between 
1988-1994.812 
 
The conflict in Cambodia was one that involved multiple domestic, regional and international 
players, which contributed to the instability of wider Indochina. But there were also moral 
expectations that reinforce a moral realist claim that expectations of reciprocity can lead to 
both moral and material outcomes. These were linked to the diplomatic and operational 
efforts of Australia in pushing for a resolution to the conflict. Australia expected that – in 
presenting a peace proposal – it would lead to an agreement on the withdrawal of foreign 
forces from Cambodia and allow the UN to conduct relatively free and fair elections, which 
occurred in May 1993.813 In this regard, moral expectations existed alongside the strategic 
ones, and both were part of Australia’s decision to expend diplomatic and military resources 
on resolving the Cambodian crisis.  
 
The expectation of reciprocity guiding Australia’s response toward Timor Leste was much 
greater, linked to the increased threat a long-term conflict between the Timorese militia and 
the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) posed to Australia’s interests. The conflict in 
Cambodia had taken place on the outer ring of Australia’s direct sphere of influence, but was 
still important enough to its strategy of regional security that it had a strong interest in 
responding. Cambodia also represented an instance where the costs were relatively low if 
Australia’s efforts were unsuccessful. In Timor Leste the potential costs were much higher, 
                                           
811 DoD, The Defence of Australia 1987 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1987). 
812 These reviews can be found at DoD, “Force structure review 1991.” Available at: 
http://www.defence.gov.au/SE/publications/ForceStructureReview1991_opt.pdf (accessed 28 April 2014) and 
DoD, “ Strategic review 1993.” Available at: 
http://www.defence.gov.au/SE/publications/stratreview/1993/1993_Part2.pdf (accessed 9 April 2014). 
813 Empirical results of the election, as well as analysis can be found in Amitav Acharya, “Cambodia, the United 
Nations and the problems of peace,” The Pacific Review 7, no. 3 (1994), pp. 297-308. 
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and as Chapter 3 demonstrated, these corresponded to the increased expectations of 
reciprocity motivating Australia’s decision to respond.  
 
Timor is strategically close to Australia and is part of the arc of instability. This meant that 
security spillover from a prolonged conflict represented significant threats to Australia’s 
northern approaches. These were articulated in the 1997 White Paper that identified failing 
and weak states as major security issues shaping Australia’s regional security and defence 
policies.814 Alongside the strategic expectations was also the effect a continuation of the 
Timor issue would have on Australia’s diplomatic relationship with Indonesia, which for 
some time has been the most important of Australia’s bilateral relationships outside of the 
US-Australian tie. Chapter 3 also demonstrated that moral considerations were present in 
Australia’s diplomacy in pushing for a resolution to the Timor issue, and once Indonesian 
consent was obtained, allowed for UN-hosted elections and the restoration of law and 
order.815 These moral and material considerations were expected to yield significant results, 
and as will be shown in more detail below, could be found both in the immediate prestige 
benefits gained from leading the operation, as well as in the re-negotiation of the Timor Gap 
Treaty heavily in Australia’s favour. 
 
Evidence from both Cambodia and Timor Leste also indicates that Australia’s participation in 
humanitarian operations has been motivated by an expectation of reciprocity, and not by 
factors of international society and identity, as commonly claimed in alternative readings by 
normative scholars.816 These expectations were informed by both material and moral factors 
and were consistent with the evidence from my analysis of Australia’s foreign and 
development policy. Strategic expectations linked to Australia’s geographical position 
motivated its decision to intervene, indicating that Australia’s willingness to use force for 
humanitarian purposes increased when the conflicts were in its direct sphere of influence.  
 
 
 
                                           
814 DFAT, In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy (Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1997), p. 61. 
815 Alexander Downer alluded to these moral and material factors in an interview in 2011. Interview with 
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, Sydney 2011. 
816Dunne and Wheeler, “East Timor and the new humanitarian interventionism,” International Affairs 77, no. 4 
(2001), pp. 805-827; and Alex Bellamy, “The responsibility to protect and Australian foreign policy,” 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 4 (2010): 432-448. 
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Expectations of reciprocity in the US-Australian security partnership 
It was expected that strategic factors would be present in the US-Australian security 
partnership. Indeed, the strategic importance of security cooperation has been a central 
research area for realist scholarship.817 What has been less commonly discussed is the 
presence of moral factors in security cooperation, which is where moral realism holds some 
promise concerning whether moral and material factors have been present in Australia’s 
strategic politics. Chapter 4 showed that this was in fact the case, although the moral 
dimension was less significant than in the other two policy arenas. This is not a wholly 
surprising result given that national interest goals are much higher when dealing with 
strategic alliances. This also means that the costs involved are much greater, and thus states 
are less likely to consider moral factors as part of their rational calculations. And in the US-
Australian partnership the asymmetrical structure of the alliance has also reduced the scope 
for Australia to act morally.   
 
In spite of this, the expectations of reciprocity found to motivate Australia in the previous 
policy arenas were also discernible in its security partnership with the US. Australia’s 
expectations in aligning with the US has been informed by a calculation that it would assist in 
achieving regional stability and act as a security buffer in the event of threats to Australia and 
its strategic interests.818 These strategic expectations have underpinned Australia’s 
willingness to militarily participate in US-led coalitions. In return, Australia has received 
material benefits, particularly in gaining access to information on US military strategy, 
intelligence, and hardware. Australia’s commitment to the partnership has also been a way 
for it to have a role in shaping regional and international affairs above its middle power 
status, as can be seen via Australia obtaining a seat at the table in NATO discussions as a 
dialogue partner, and in participation in various trilateral military exercises with China and 
Indonesia.819 
 
These strategic expectations have been specific to Australia achieving its regional and 
national security objectives, but included in this has also been the moral expectation that 
aligning with the US would lead to benefits for other states in the Asia-Pacific. This is 
                                           
817 See in particular, Stephen Walt  “Why alliances endure of collapse,” Survival 39, no. 1 (1997), pp. 156-179 
and Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).  
818  NAA, A1838 277/2 Part 5 “Pacific security arrangements,” Cablegram, Department of External Affairs, 13 
November 1951. 
819 Greater engagement with NATO was identified as a priority for Australia in 1952. See NAA, A5461 1/4/2/A 
“ANZUS council – first meeting,” Savingram DEA, Australian Embassy Washington, 16 July 1952.  
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apparent in the efforts Australia has placed on keeping the US engaged in the Pacific as the 
best guarantor of regional security. This was first identified in former Prime Minister John 
Curtin’s “Look to America” speech, which signalled Australia’s shift from aligning with the 
UK, to aligning with the US.820  A concern for regional security was also identified in the 
ANZUS Treaty, in which both the US and Australia emphasised that the agreement included 
a commitment to “strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area.” 821 As will be explained 
below, this decision led to specific moral outcomes in mutual efforts to strengthen the 
sovereign integrity and independence of regional states, particularly during the Cold War. In 
this regard, the morality involved in considering the interests of the other was not as 
important in constructing Australia’s expectations of the partnership, however they were still 
present in how Australia determined the purpose of the alliance – that is, to ensure Pacific 
security.  
 
Choosing morality: Rational choice in the calculation of foreign policy decisions 
I have demonstrated that Australia’s foreign policy has been guided by expectations of 
reciprocity given that its consideration of the other has been tied to whether it had a 
reasonable expectation of receiving material benefits in return. But while expectations of 
reciprocity explain the motives of Australia in choosing to include morality as part of its 
foreign policy choices, they cannot alone account for why states will chose to act morally in 
one instance, and then decide not to in another. This is where rational choice is important as it 
distinguishes moral realism from other approaches that see morality in normative terms – as a 
factor that describes how states ought to develop their foreign policy. 
 
Timing and context are central to how moral realism sees rational choice. Since it is 
grounded in the principles of classical realism and is a tool for understanding the position of 
morality in state foreign policy choices, it must be able to account for the factors involved 
when states do decided to include morality in the process of rational decision-making. In this 
                                           
820 John Curtain, “The task ahead,” The Melbourne Herald, 27 December 1941. Available at: 
http://john.curtin.edu.au/pmportal/text/00468.html (accessed 23 June 2014). Trilateral cooperation between the 
US, Australia and regional nations was identified in 2013. See DFAT, “AUSMIN 2013 joint communiqué,” 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Julie Bishop, (20 November 2013). Available at: 
http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2013/jb_mr_131120.aspx?ministerid=4 (accessed 11 August 2014). 
821 DFAT, Australian Treaty Series, “Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of 
America,” (29 April 1952). Available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1952/2.html (accessed 
12 June 2014). 
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regard, rational choice is closely linked to expectations of reciprocity, as when states include 
these expectations, they are also making a rational calculation to do so.  
 
Rational choice and Australia’s foreign aid and development policy 
Rational calculations of the national interest can account for how expectations of reciprocity 
are determined by a simple cost-benefit analysis of where these expectations lie, which also 
means that rational choice can explain shifts in Australia’s foreign aid and development 
policy as the factors influencing this calculation change. It has generally been the case that 
Australia has localized its aid delivery to specific states in Southeast Asia and the Pacific as 
outlined under the expectations of reciprocity, which is supported by the process of rational 
choice in calculating Australia’s foreign policy decisions. Strategically, providing aid to 
Southeast Asia and the Pacific has allowed for a greater return when calculating what was 
best for Australia’s national interest.  
 
Yet, there are some instances where Australia has appeared to deviate from this process, by 
increasing its aid to the Middle East and Africa, for instance. On the surface, this may appear 
as though Australia has altered how it calculated the delivery of its aid by placing the national 
interest behind a concern for addressing absolute poverty, as HDI for target states in Africa 
and the Middle East have been significantly lower than those in the Asia-Pacific.822 However, 
the closer examination of the factors involved in making these decisions in Chapter 2 
uncovered that Australia has still been determining its foreign aid policy via rational 
calculations of the national interest. Therefore this policy change can more accurately be 
analysed by looking at timing and context.  
 
This was apparent in respect to my examination of Australia’s sharp increase of aid to Africa 
between 2008 and 2013. During these five years Australia quadrupled the amount of aid to 
Africa, from $100 million to $436.348 million, which came to represent around 9% of the 
overall aid budget.823 But this policy change occurred within the context of the discovery of 
                                           
822 Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Afghanistan ranked 172, 173 and 175 respectively, compared to Indonesia at 121 
and PNG at 156. See UNDP, Human Development Index, “Human development report 2013- the rise of the 
South: Human progress in a diverse world,” p. 56-157. Available at: 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/14/hdr2013_en_complete.pdf (accessed 27 February 2014). 
823 Statistics from Development Policy Center, “Australian aid overtime,” (2012) Available at: 
https://sites.google.com/site/australianaidovertime/home/australian-aid-recipients-over-time (accessed 15 
January 2014) and DFAT, Australian Aid, “Budgets,” (May 2013). Available at: 
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/budgets/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 29 May 2014). 
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significant mining opportunities for Australia across the Eastern side of the African continent. 
An expectation that Australia would receive economic returns from its aid to Africa is also 
consistent with evidence that Australia preferred to deliver its aid through mining-related 
development programs, such as the Australian M4D initiative, which focused on technical 
assistance and training in mining for local populations.824 The implementation of these 
development programs corresponded with a significant increase in the presence of Australian 
resource companies eager to capitalize on Africa’s mineral wealth. Over 200 Australian 
companies were estimated to be operating across 42 African states by the end of 2013, which 
amounted to $62 billion worth of investment.825  
 
Alongside the economic expectations, it was also the case that Australia’s aid agenda in 
Africa was influenced by the timing of its desire to gain a seat at the UN Security Council as 
a rotating non-permanent member. This informed Australia’s expectation that boosting aid to 
Africa would lead to certain national interests benefits and this observation is reinforced by 
the decline in aid following the end of Australia’s five-year term on the UNSC.826 Thus, the 
same expectations of reciprocity found to traditionally motivate Australia’s foreign aid and 
development policy were also consistent with Australia’s foreign aid policy towards Africa. 
Instead of being strategically informed, these motivations were economic and political.  
 
Similar evidence of the role of rational choice can be found in Australia’s increase of aid to 
Iraq and Afghanistan. This decision was determined by a re-calculation of the strategic 
priorities in its aid policy in the wake of Australia’s participation in the War on Terror 
(WoT). Prior to this, Australia’s aid to the Middle East had been less than it had given to 
Africa. In fact, apart from a small donation to Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion, and a 
minor one to Iraq after the first Gulf War, Australia’s aid to both states had been non-
                                           
824 DFAT, Australian Aid, “Sub-Saharan Africa: Mining for development in Africa,” (2013). Available at: 
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/sub-saharan-africa/Pages/mining.aspx (accessed 13 January 2014) 
825 Andrew Burrell, “Investing in Africa via Oz miners,” The Australian, 9 November 2013. Available at: 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/investing-in-africa-via-oz-miners/story-e6frg9df-
1226756151439#sthash.sJbcumrp.dpuf (accessed 24 January 2014). 
826 Foreign aid and development to Africa decreased from 436.348m to 155.2m. See Bianca Hall, 
“Government’s $650m foreign aid cuts slammed,” The Age, 8 January 2014. Available at: 
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/governments-650m-foreign-aid-cuts-slammed-
20140118-311c5.html (accessed 31 January 2014). 
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existent.827 Unsurprisingly, this suddenly changed following its decision to commit military 
forces to the conflicts with both nations.  
 
In Afghanistan, Australia’s aid footprint became quite significant, to the point where by 2012 
it was the fourth highest recipient of Australian aid.828 This sharp increase was due to the 
context of the global WoT and Australia’s military participation as part of the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Australia’s commitment towards this international 
coalition was relatively modest, and a large aid presence was timed to increase the perception 
of Australia’s influence in resolving the overall conflict. Such an observation is further 
supported by the fact that the bulk of Australia’s aid has been directed towards Uruzgan 
province, where Australia had its largest military presence.  
 
The same rational calculations were behind Australia’s aid commitment to Iraq, which saw a 
dramatic increase in aid funding, going from no aid between 1997 and 2003, to a lump sum 
of $100 million at the start of the Iraq War. This then increased again to $358 million in 
2008.829 As with Afghanistan, Australia’s aid was timed to coincide with its military 
commitment, except in this case aid was used to supplement Australia’s limited capacity to 
engage in long-term peacekeeping efforts.830 This indicates that Australia’s shift in aid to 
Afghanistan and Iraq was rationally contingent – an observation that is further supported by 
the decline in aid following the ADF’s withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan in 2013 and 
2014 respectively.   
                                           
827 Before 2001, a small $20m relief and aid package was delivered to Afghanistan in 1989 and an additional 
$4m was provided in 1993.  See Gareth Evans, “Questions without notice: Afghanistan aid,” Senate, 5 May 
1989, p. 1921. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Questions%20Without%20Notice
%3A%20Afghanistan%20Aid%20Decade%3A%221980s%22;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed February 
2014) and Evans, “Australian wheat in $4m aid package for Afghanistan,” Media Release, 20 December 1993. 
Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=“Australian
%20Wheat%20in%20$4m%20aid%20package%20for%20Afghanistan.”;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 2 
February 2014).  
828  In 2012, aid to Afghanistan was $198.3m. Statistics from “Australian aid overtime,” Development Policy 
Center (2012) Available at: https://sites.google.com/site/australianaidovertime/home/australian-aid-recipients-
over-time (accessed 15 January 2014) and DFAT, Australian Aid, “Budgets,” (May 2013). Available at: 
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/budgets/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 29 May 2014). 
829 Before 2003, Australia gave a token $11,000 to Iraq in 1978 and $2.74m in 1991. “Questions without notice: 
Middle East Kurdish refugees,” HoR, 10 July 1991. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=2;query=Ira
q%20aid%20Decade%3A%221990s%22%20Year%3A%221991%22;rec=8;resCount=Default (accessed 4th 
February 2014). 
830 This point was made by security expert Hugh White, cited in Max Chalmers, “Abbott Cannot afford Iraq 
anymore,” Newmatilda, 24 Janruary 2014. Available at: https://newmatilda.com/2014/01/24/abbott-cant-afford-
iraq-any-longer (accessed 10th February 2014). 
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Rational choice and Australia’s participation in humanitarian operations: Cambodia and 
Timor Leste 
Evidence for rational choice is relatively straightforward in Australia’s decision to participate 
in the humanitarian operations in Cambodia and Timor Leste, and this does much to counter 
conventional readings of Australian foreign policy that have over-estimated the moral 
commitment involved in its activism during instances of conflict resolution. This was 
particularly evident during the Cold War, where Australia’s participation in peacekeeping 
was relatively low-level, despite its early diplomatic leadership at the San Francisco 
Conference.831 It is important to note that in making this claim, I am not passing any moral 
judgment on the valuable assistance Australia provided to these some 20 peacekeeping 
missions. Instead I am only highlighting that its material commitment corresponded with its 
willingness to participate, as well as its capacity to do so at that time. 832 
 
In both Cambodia and Timor Leste,  a change in the external environment was central to why 
Australia decided to intervene. These changes opened space for Australia to recalculate the 
costs versus the benefits of responding, and this increased the likelihood that the expectations 
of reciprocity would be achieved. The appearance of timing and context is therefore 
significant in understanding Australia’s participation in Cambodia and Timor Leste, and here 
Australia’s response can be seen as abiding by the principle of rational choice. As well as 
challenging the extent of Australia’s commitment to humanitarianism, evidence of rational 
choice also reinforces the moral realist claim that action was taken primarily for instrumental 
reasons.   
 
If we revisit Australia’s diplomacy towards Cambodia, before 1989 successive governments 
had shown little interest, apart from Hayden’s limited attempts during the early 1980s, in 
resolving the long-standing Indochinese conflict.833 This changed following the end of the 
Cold War, which provided the context for Australia to re-evaluate the benefits to be gained 
                                           
831 For a detailed account of Australia’s participation in the San Francisco Conference see Norman Harper and 
David Sissions, Australia and the United Nations (Manhattan Publishing Company: New York, 1959), pp. 47-
78. 
832 Until the late 1980s, Australia had participated in less than 20 UN sponsored peacekeeping missions and had 
deployed only 13 military personnel. Australia’s Role in United Nations Reform, Joint Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, June 2001), p. 215. 
833 Between 1983 and 1986 Foreign Minister Bill Hayden attempted to put forward a peace plan on Cambodia 
and met with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen. For 
more see Hayden, Hayden: An Autobiography, (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1996), pp. 378.  
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from pushing for a resolution. Prior to its collapse the Soviet Union had reduced its economic 
support for Vietnam, and this hastened the withdrawal of Hanoi from Cambodia.834 Likewise, 
the political and economic reforms occurring in the Soviet Union meant it was more likely to 
accept an international peace proposal, and by 1988 Chinese-Vietnamese relations were also 
showing limited signs of rapprochement. 835  
 
Hence by 1989 the timing was right for Australia to begin gathering support for its peace 
proposal. Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (DFAT) Michael Costello were heavily involved in the negotiating process 
between the major parties involved in the conflict, and Australia’s DFAT was responsible for 
the development of the Red Book, which laid out the details of the Cambodian peace plan.836 
Significant national resources were also devoted to the peacekeeping mission, and at the time 
it was the largest PKO Australia had participated in. Ultimately, the amount of diplomatic 
and military involvement would not have occurred without a conclusion that specific gains 
relating to regional and economic security were possible as a result of Australia’s 
involvement.  
 
A similar picture was evident in Australia’s involvement in Timor Leste. Debates on 
Australia’s support for self-determination in Timor Leste had occupied popular and academic 
discourse since the mid-1970s. Yet Australia did not take decisive action until the end of 
1998. For nearly twenty-five years, successive Australian governments had accepted 
Indonesia’s sovereignty over the province of Timor Leste, but in late 1998 Howard 
announced that Australia would support a path of autonomy eventually leading to full 
independence.837 Then, in February 1999, Australia led an international peacekeeping force 
after violence broke out following the result on Timorese independence. The change in policy 
and Australia’s lead role in the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) came as a 
                                           
834 V. Largo, ed., Vietnam: Current Issues and Historical Background (New York: Nova Publishers, 2002), p. 
177. 
835 Carlyle A. Thayer, “Sino-Vietnamese relations: The interplay of ideology and national interest,” Asian 
Survey 35, no. 6 (1994), pp. 517-518. 
836 The “Red Book” was the nickname given to the series of working papers “Cambodia: An Australian Peace 
Proposal. See DFAT, Cambodia: An Australian Peace Proposal. Working Papers Prepared for the Informal 
Meeting on Cambodia, Jakarta, 26-28 February 1990 (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
1990). 
837 Text reprinted at John Howard, “Appendix: Text of Prime Minister Howard’s Letter to President Habibie,” in 
David Connery ed Crisis Policy Making: Australia and East Timor Crisis of 1999. Available at: 
http://press.anu.edu.au//apps/bookworm/view/Crisis+Policymaking:+Australia+and+East+Timor+Crisis+of+19
99/7091/appedix.xhtml (accessed 15 May 2014).  
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surprise, and was seen by many as proof that Australia had come to accept changing norms 
on sovereignty and self-determination.838  
 
However, these views do not stand up against the empirical record. The end of the Cold War 
provided Australia the context in which it was beneficial to campaign for peace in Cambodia, 
but in Timor Leste there were numerous factors that contributed to the decision, and had they 
not occurred, it was unlikely that Australia would have acted. The first was the effects of the 
Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), which were devastating to the Indonesian economy. The AFC 
contributed towards the second factor prompting Australia’s involvement – the downfall of 
the Suharto regime. By the end of 1998, Indonesia’s economy had shrunk by 16.5% and food 
prices had increased by 80%.839 This incited a series of public riots that contributed to 
growing discontent with Suharto, whose regime was already under threat from endemic 
corruption and mismanagement.840 The downfall of Suharto in May 1998 created internal 
weakness, and it is not surprising that B.J Habibie was more receptive towards a ballot on 
independence.  
 
After the ballot, Habibie was originally hesitant to agree to the entry of an international PKO 
to enforce the peace and ensure a safe democratic election. And Howard made clear that 
Indonesia’s consent was central to Australia’s leadership of any intervening force, and would 
not have taken place without it. This strengthens an argument in favour of rational choice. In 
the event, of course, Habibie did finally agree after the US provided the motivation by 
threatening to freeze a much-needed International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout worth 
US$70 billion, as well as severing military cooperation between the US and Indonesia.841  
 
The context was thus conducive for Australian intervention. The timing was also right, in that 
it had the operational readiness to carry out the peace-enforcement mission, and had acquired 
a regional consensus from key Southeast Asian states, as well as logistical support from the 
                                           
838 See in particular Timothy Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler, “East Timor and the new humanitarian 
interventionism,” International Affairs 77, no. 4 (2001), pp. 805-827 and Alex Bellamy, “Power, rules and 
argument: new approaches to humanitarian intervention,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 57, no. 3 
(2003), pp. 499-512. 
839 Jonathan Pincus, and Rizal Ramli, “Indonesia: from showcase to basket case,” Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 22, no. 6 (1998), pp. 723. 
840 RJ. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order  3rd ed. Vol. 5 (New 
York: Routledge, 1998). 
841 Eric Schwartz, “The intervention in East Timor,” Report for the National Intelligence Committee, December 
2001. Available at: http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/schwartz.pdf (accessed 28 May 2014).  
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US, which was another crucial factor in Australia’s decision to push for a PKO. All of these 
factors meant that even though there was some cost in terms of Australia’s relationship with 
Indonesia were to be expected, this was calculated as an acceptable risk given the material 
outcomes in contributing to regional security and a renegotiation of the Timor Gap Treaty 
that were anticipated in return.   
 
Rational choice in the US-Australia security partnership 
Rational choice in the US-Australian security partnership helps to account for the flexibility 
and longevity of the relationship without having to fall back on the mutual constitution of 
norms and identity to explain it. It is also an important factor in demonstrating how moral 
realism can account for the nature of alliance relationships from the perspective of the weaker 
partner. As a result, moral realism might actually add to the literature on alliances in a way 
that goes beyond balance of power theory, as well as those perspectives put forward by 
Stephen Walt and Randall Schweller, which open the “black box” and incorporate the state’s 
perception of threats when analysing their strategic choices.842 
 
In looking at the US-Australia security partnership, timing and context linked to rational 
choice was apparent from the outset of the relationship. As part of a calculated decision to 
“look to America,” as the state with the capacity and willingness to contribute towards 
Australia’s national security, Australia was not only motivated by self-interested factors 
dealing with Australia’s need to maintain a territorial defence against the Japanese. More to 
the point, aligning with the US was also the best way to ensure regional peace and security in 
the war’s aftermath. These twin goals have remained part of Australia’s desire to maintain 
(and, most recently, extend) its partnership with the US, despite times where the costs in 
doing so appeared to outweigh the benefits. So while a rational choice assumption can 
account for the longevity of the US-Australian security partnership, it also extends 
neoclassical realist scholarship. It does so because rational choice links with expectations of 
reciprocity to show that moral and material outcomes can result from Australia’s strategic 
alliance policies.  
 
There have been clear calculated benefits to Australia in having ongoing communication with 
a great power that was central in shaping international politics during the 20th Century, and 
                                           
842 Walt, Origins of Alliances and Randall Schweller, “Unanswered threats: a neoclassical realist theory of 
underbalancing," International Security 29, no. 2 (2004), pp. 159-201. 
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the infrastructure of the alliance was established to achieve this goal. The ANZUS treaty 
itself was purposively vague in its definition of what would trigger mutual defence as a 
policy option, which placed an emphasis on the ability of both parties to consult on common 
security interests.843 It also placed Australia in a position to bargain for various payoffs for its 
support of the US. A particular example of this was the elevation of Australia to “Intelligence 
Partner,” which allow it to gain access to US intelligence on military and counter-terrorism 
operations stored on SIPRNET. 844 
 
The emphasis on diplomatic contact has been reinforced through the annual Australia-United 
States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN), which have allowed for greater flexibility in 
discussing mutual threats and concerns, and formed part of Australia’s original rationale to 
limit the number of its alliance partners.845 The ability to discuss common security threats 
meant that both nations were better able to consult and respond to changes in the international 
environment when they occurred. This was an important aspect of the alliance that also 
increased Australia’s ability to bargain for greater access to US technology, and military 
planning resources. Not only did this provide Australia with superior capabilities that it was 
unlikely to achieve independently, but it also provided an economic benefit in limiting the 
domestic cost of defence without jeopardizing Australia’s security.846  
 
The overall benefits outlined above indicate that Australia’s rational calculation worked in its 
favour. This does not mean, however, that in some instances, Australia miscalculated the cost 
versus benefit ratio in its commitment to the alliance and the moral and material outcomes 
did not occur as expected. Moral realism can account for this in a similar way to classical 
realism by referring to the dangers of constructing policy on ideological grounds. This was 
most obvious in the decision to enter the Vietnam War. As I have pointed out elsewhere, 
alliance loyalty was not the single motivating factor. Indeed, subsequent Cabinet documents 
                                           
843 Text of the treaty can be found at DFAT, Australian Treaty Series, “Security Treaty between Australia, New 
Zealand and the United States of America,” (29 April 1952). Available at: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1952/2.html (accessed 12 June 2014). 
844 DoD, “ Australia’s defence relations with the US,” Joint Standing Committee On Foreign Affairs, Defence 
And Trade, 26 March 2004. Available at: 
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00s%22%20Year%3A%222004%22;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 2 August 2014).  
845 NAA, A1838 277/2 Part 5 “Pacific security arrangements,” Cablegram, Department of External Affairs, 13 
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846 This benefit was made clear by Kim Beazley in 1987 during debates on global disarmaments and the 
viability of the alliance after the withdrawal of New Zealand. See Kim Beazly, “Defence statement,” HoR, no. 
144, 19 September 1985, p. 1093. 
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from the Menzies government demonstrate that Australia sought the help of the US to 
pressure South Vietnam to invite Australia into the war.847 The point here is that it was also 
Australian priorities driving the bargaining in the partnership, which demonstrates that 
Australia’s involvement in Vietnam is not so easily explained by simple references to alliance 
dependence.  
 
Australia did take the view that its participation in Vietnam would strengthen its commitment 
to the alliance and in turn would increase the importance of Australia as a reliable ally.848 
However, this decision was informed by Australia’s perception of the threat of communism, 
and its forward defence strategy that involved stopping foreign threats before they reach the 
mainland.849 Australian decision-makers generally understood communism to be a monolithic 
ideology emanating from the Soviet Union, which, left unchecked, had the potential to spread 
across Indochina and eventually affect Australia’s national security. Joining the fight against 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was a way for Australia to exercise its policy of 
forward defence while also doing some good by assisting in the defence of South Vietnam.  
 
There were several policy miscalculations resulting from Australia’s decision to participate in 
the Vietnam War. Australia failed to fully recognize the territorial ambitions of the DRV and 
the greater geopolitical landscape of Southeast Asian politics, which indicated that the 
adoption of communist governments was not so inevitable.850 It also misjudged the capacity 
of the US military, in terms of Menzies’ unswerving faith that overwhelming force would 
win the war. In this regard, moral realism can indeed account for when rational calculations 
are not carried out with clear national interests in mind. Yet it can also go further in linking 
this to unexpected outcomes. In the case of Vietnam, self-determination for the Vietnamese 
was not forthcoming, and nor did Australia benefit much considering the costs involved in its 
nearly decade-long commitment to the war. This reinforces the moral realist claim that moral 
and material calculations based on ideological descriptors are rarely good predictors of 
foreign policy outcomes.  
                                           
847 See NAA, A4940 C3811 “Foreign affairs and defence committee,” 7 April 1965 and NAA, A4940/1 C4643 
Part 2 “Australian military aid to South Vietnam,” 7 April 1965. 
848 This observation has also been made by Llyod Cox and Brendan O’Connor. See “Australia, the US, and the 
Vietnam War: ‘hound dog,’ not ‘Lapdog,’” Australian Journal of Political Science, 47, no. 2 (2012), p. 173.  
849 Robert Menzies outlined this rationale in his ministerial statement on Vietnam in 1965. Robert Menzies, 
“Vietnam – ministerial statement,” HoR, no.17, 29 April 1965, pp. 1060-1061. 
850 Australian war historian Peter Edwards has made similar statements on the misreading of communism in 
Southeast Asia by Robert Menzies. For more see Peter Edwards, The Essential History: Australia and the 
Vietnam War (Sydney: NewsSouth, 2014), pp. 116-125.  
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The material benefits of choosing to include morality as a part of foreign policy choice: 
Moral and material outcomes of foreign policy 
Moral realism also argues that expectations of reciprocity and rational choice can lead to both 
moral and material outcomes. In other words, states can actually benefit materially from 
choosing to include morality as part of rational decision-making. The inclusion of moral and 
material outcomes is therefore significant as this theme defends moral realism from criticisms 
that it is still treating morality normatively, and as a factor that can determine state behaviour 
across time and space. Specifically, evidence of moral and material outcomes connects the 
motives incorporated in the expectations of reciprocity with policy outcomes, making moral 
realism a tool for understanding foreign policy choices, rather than one that prescribes how 
states ought to act. 
 
A look at whether these policy choices have led to both moral and material outcomes is also 
important as it shows how this thesis presents moral realism as an extension of classical 
realism. This is the crux of where I seek to make an original contribution to the current 
literature on how the classical realists understood morality in international politics. The 
classical realists under examination did not explicitly refer to moral and material outcomes, 
but this does not mean that they were indifferent to the consequences of states acting morally. 
Indeed, as I noted in Chapter 1, one can detect support for a consequentialist ethic amongst 
classical realist scholarship, which was viewed by Morgenthau et al as the best guide for 
identifying morality in state foreign policy choices.  
 
For Morgenthau, this was tied to considerations of what are the likely consequences flowing 
from a rational calculation of the interests involved in acting morally.851 Niebuhr was less 
straightforward in his views on consequentialism, and it was often evident that he was torn 
between his desire to present a Christian ethic based on principles of faith and reason, and his 
concern for the practical constraints produced by an imperfect human nature that a 
deontological morality finds difficult to overcome.852 Nevertheless he was fairly clear in his 
concern for the ability to assess the likely consequences of including morality as part of 
                                           
851 See Hans Morgenthau Morgenthau, “A realist theory of international politics,” in Politics Among Nations 4th 
ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 10 and Morgenthau, Scientific Man versus Power Politics (Chicago, 
Chicago University Press, 1946), pp. 202-203.  
852 For more on this see Mark Hass, “Reinhold Niebuhr’s “Christian pragmatism”: A principled alternative to 
consequentialism,” The Review of Politics 61, no. 4 (1999), pp. 605-635.  
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rational decision-making.853 Kennan held similar views to Morgenthau and tied his 
discussion of morality to the concept of prudence. He argued that political leaders must 
weigh the trade-offs of certain policy choices guided by a determination of the national 
interest.854 Leaders must do this because there is no universal moral standard that can be 
applied to the myriad circumstances states are presented with when making policy decisions. 
Therefore, the appearance of morality in state foreign policy must be assessed according to 
the consequences these policy choices are likely to produce.  
 
The above neatly lays out the validity of including moral and material outcomes as it 
incorporates the classical realist concern for the effects of rational policy, while also 
representing a revision of classical realism in that it can account for evidence of where states 
have sought to gain material benefits by choosing to include morality as part of their foreign 
policy choices. Here it is necessary to clarify that this policy arena must be analysed with 
relevant consideration awarded to both parts. It is not enough to simply demonstrate where 
there have been national interest benefits: a moral realist approach must also show whether 
there were any moral outcomes flowing from the motives identified under the expectations of 
reciprocity. In doing so, moral and material outcomes represent the next logical step in the 
moral realist framework. Once this analysis is completed I will have provided enough 
evidence to successfully address the primary thesis research question: is moral realism an 
appropriate analytical tool for understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices? 
 
The moral and material outcomes of Australia’s foreign aid and development policy  
It has already been shown that Australia’s foreign aid and development policy has been 
primarily guided by strategic considerations as part of an expectation of reciprocity. 
Alongside these strategic motivations there is also evidence of a concern for the effect 
Australia’s policy choices have had on the interests of other states. These expectations 
dictated that Australia direct the majority of its aid to states within its own region, as the 
expected returns were greater. When Australia deviated from this expectation, which was 
evident in its increased aid commitments to parts of Africa and the Middle East, this was also 
guided by material expectations linked to new investment opportunities and Australia’s 
military commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. These changes were explained by referring to 
                                           
853 Reinhold Niebuhr, “Foreign policy and moral problems,” in Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics: His Political 
Philosophy and its Application to Our Age as Expressed in his Writing, pp. 332-334. 
854 George Kennan, “Morality and foreign policy,” Foreign Affairs 64, no. 2 (1985), pp. 205-218. 
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rational choice, which demonstrated that the giving of aid was contingent on calculations of 
the national interest and not on absolute moral obligations. These two factors illuminate the 
purpose of Australia’s aid, and which states are most likely to benefit from it. Yet it does not 
show whether Australia’s aid achieved any real moral and material outcomes.  
 
I now assess this claim, starting with evidence of moral outcomes. It was expected that 
Australia’s aid would generate significant moral outcomes and these were found in assisting 
the development of the recipient state. As previously mentioned, it is important to note that a 
moral realist view of aid is not arguing that the giving of aid on its own can pull developing 
countries out of poverty. Nor does it argue that a focus on a particular type of development 
area, such as education, will solve the problem of school availability, lack of trained teachers 
or access to proper learning materials. It is merely stating that aid can produce some positive 
outcomes in building a school where previously there was none, or by providing curriculum 
support where previously this was based on fundamentalist religious doctrine. These 
outcomes are relative to the aid provided by Australia and reinforce the assumption of moral 
realism that the giving of aid is not an absolute moral foreign policy goal. Indeed, the 
material outcomes are arguably much greater, which follows the strategic motivations of aid 
that formed the expectations of reciprocity guiding Australia’s foreign aid and development 
policy.  
 
Aid to Indonesia, for example, has produced quite substantial outcomes. This was especially 
so in the outcomes flowing from Australia’s education program, which was the largest sector 
of funding to Indonesia. The Australian Indonesian Building Education Partnership (AIBEP) 
was part of Australia’s counter-terrorism strategies and was implemented as a way to combat 
the spread of fundamentalist Islam.855 The AIBEP is a good example to demonstrate the 
moral and material outcomes that flowed from Australia’s expectations of its aid policy as it 
demonstrated clear strategic and moral considerations. The program was directed towards 
Eastern Indonesia as this included the Islands and provinces closest to Australia and where it 
                                           
855 Foreign Minister Bob Carr argued for the importance of Australia’s aid to Indonesia as a means to combat 
Islamic fundamentalism during public commentary questioning the legitimacy of Australia’s aid program to 
Indonesia. Bob Carr cited in APP, “No Aussie funds going to radicals: Jakarta,” The Australian, 5 April 2013. 
Available at: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/no-aussie-funds-going-to-radicals-jakarta/story-
e6frgcjx-1226612677940 (accessed 27 February 2014). 
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saw economic opportunities in resource partnerships. That said, these provinces also ranked 
the lowest on the HDI.856  
 
The AIBEP directly assisted in the creation of over 330,000 school places and in the building 
of over 2,074 schools.857 In keeping with Australia’s preference for student exchange, this 
program also included the awarding of scholarships, which had a material advantage in 
stimulating trade. Over half of Australia’s trade in service exports to Indonesia was in 
international student education. In fact, overall, the international student market was worth 
over $18 billion by the end of 2014, making education Australia’s third largest export 
sector.858 
 
This economic advantage was also consistent in other areas of Australia’s aid program. A less 
obvious but important example was in agriculture development and particularly the 
Australian Centre for International Agriculture Research (ACIAR), which engaged with 
Southeast Asian states to assist in improving production difficulties in livestock, aquiculture, 
fisheries and horticulture.859 This program followed the successful delivery framework of the 
Colombo Plan in that the bulk of the projects were delivered in the recipient states and 
utilized Australia’s expertise in agribusiness and agricultural science. Quite apart from the 
moral outcomes, this has also led to significant economic gains for Australia. Wheat is by far 
Australia’s largest agricultural export, and the majority of ACIAR’s work has been done in 
improving wheat production. A report on a sample of 48 of 600 bilateral projects 
administered by the ACIAR calculated the financial return to be estimated at around $2.5 
billion, with the potential to be much greater if the remaining 452 projects are included.860  
 
                                           
856 UNDP, “Indonesian human development report,” (2013). Available at: 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/IDN.pdf (accessed 20 February 2014).  
857 DFAT, Australian Aid, “Australian Indonesian basic education program – small in-depth study of early 
impact of AIBEP on school management and finance,” (December 2009), p. 3-5. Available at:  
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Documents/aibep-early-impact.pdf (accessed 20 January 2014). 
858 Council of Australian Governments, “International Student Strategy for Australia 2010-2014.” Available at: 
https://www.coag.gov.au/sites/default/files/International%20Students%20Strategy%20-%20PDF.pdf (accessed 
12 November 2014). 
859 The Crawford Fund, “Doing well by doing good task force report,” (2013) Available at 
http://www.crawfordfund.org/assets/files/publications/task_force_report_4_page_summary.pdf ( accessed 9 
January 2014). 
860 ABC, “Foreign aid spending benefiting Australian farmers,” Australian Network News (2013). Available at: 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-12-17/an-foreign-aid-spending-benefiting-australian-farmers/5161858 
(accessed 9 January 2014). 
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From this there have certainly been reputational pay-offs for Australia in being seen to act as 
a GIC, and diplomatic ties between Australia and its aid partners have been strengthened as a 
result. But while these were part of the benefits, they were not the most significant. As 
detailed above, the most significant benefit was commercial. This is not an unusual finding as 
aid is often viewed as part of a donors state’s larger trade objectives.861 From a moral realist 
perspective, what is different is that this material outcome does not detract from the moral 
ones. On the contrary, it was through choosing to act morally that Australia was able to make 
subsequent material gains from its foreign aid and development policy.  
 
The moral and material outcomes of Australia’s participation in humanitarian operations: 
Cambodia and Timor Leste 
The presence of both moral and material outcomes as a result of humanitarian operations is 
perhaps more difficult to assess than in foreign aid and development policy, as it is often the 
case that these policy decisions fall well short of meeting the desired expectations. This is 
true of the expected returns for the intervening state that can end up spending more resources 
on the operation than what was gained in returned, and for the recipient of the operation that 
can be left in a worse condition than before an intervention. If this were the case when 
examining Australia’s actions in Cambodia and Timor Leste, then it would be very difficult 
for a moral realist to make any positive evaluation about the benefits, either moral or 
material, of intervening. This means that investigating whether there was any moral and 
material outcomes is essential in order to defend moral realism from claims that it makes no 
greater observations than reducing the use of force to narrow self-interest calculations, or that 
it falls into the same trap of normative perspectives in prescribing how Australia should have 
acted according to universal moral standards.  
 
As with the evidence from Australia’s foreign aid and development policy, a focus on 
expectations of reciprocity show that its decision to intervene was guided mainly by strategic 
factors. This also meant that the two major operations under review were located in 
Australia’s direct sphere of influence, demonstrating once again that its decision-making was 
influenced by a calculation of greater strategic returns. Australia’s decision also showed 
                                           
861 The trade benefits to the donor state from giving aid have been well documented. For more see Rick Travis 
and Nikolaos Zahariadis, “A multiple streams model of US foreign aid policy,” Policy Studies Journal 30, no. 4 
(2002), pp. 495-514; Peter J. Schraider, Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor, “Clarifying the foreign aid puzzle: 
A comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish aid flows,” World Politics 50, no. 02 (1998), pp. 
294-323; and Alfred Maizels and Machiko K. Nissanke, “Motivations for aid to developing countries,” World 
Development 12, no. 9 (1984), pp. 879-900. 
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evidence of rational choice in that it waited until the circumstances were ripe before it chose 
to act. Together, this indicated that moral and material outcomes were likely.  
 
But before this conclusion can be made it is necessary to analyse these outcomes in more 
detail. To begin with, there is evidence of moral outcomes resulting from the operations in 
both Cambodia and Timor Leste. For consistency I commence with the operation in 
Cambodia. Australia’s Cambodian peace proposal was put forward as a way to break the 
long-standing roadblock in international negotiations over the conflict.862 Previous attempts 
at reaching a resolution had been unsuccessful, and Australia’s proposal laid the groundwork 
for an international peacekeeping mission in Cambodia, which Australia was subsequently a 
leading participant. Thus, the moral outcomes in this instance were two-fold. The first was a 
peace plan that was agreeable to all four main parties, particularly the Chinese who had been 
resistant to any plan that opened them to criticism of their support for the Khmer Rouge.863 
The second was the peacekeeping mission itself.  
 
The United Nations Advanced Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) and the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) had two functions that led to moral outcomes. 
It was the first UN mission that adopted an administrative role, taking responsibility for 
governing the country until elections could be held.864 The second UN mission adopted a 
traditional peacekeeping role that included various goals relating to maintaining law and 
order, as well as adopting transitional authority of Cambodia. Some of the more important 
functions of UNTAC were the monitoring of the ceasefire; demobilization and disarmament 
of warring parties; the supervision of withdrawal of foreign forces; de-mining and military 
training in de-mining; and the rehabilitation and repatriation of refugees and displaced 
persons.865  
 
These aspects of the operation met with varying levels of success, but before I elaborate 
further it is important to briefly state that it is not the intention of this thesis to engage in 
                                           
862 Gareth Evans, “Questions without notice – Cambodia,” Senate, no. 142, 24 November 1989, pp. 3298-3300. 
863 Foreign Minister Gareth Evans stated in an interview that the proposal for a Supreme National Council 
(SNC) created the conditions for China to accept an international agreement on Cambodia. Interview with 
former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, Melbourne 2010. 
864 Australian War Memorial, “United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia,” (2009). Available at: 
http://www.awm.gov.au/units/unit_15664.asp (accessed16 May 2014). 
865 Gareth Evans, “Ministerial Statement – Cambodia,” Senate, 1 April 1992. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Australian%20contribution%20to
wards%20UNTAC;rec=10;resCount=Default (accessed 16 May 2014). 
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debates on the extent to which the operation fulfilled its goal: it is only to demonstrate that 
Australia’s diplomacy in pushing for a resolution, and its leadership of UNTAC, did achieve 
some moral benefit. The operation managed to take custody of over 50,000 weapons and 
cantoned over 52,000 troops amongst the participating groups.866  
 
The Khmer Rouge was not part of the cooperating parties as outlined in Phase II of the 
operation, and this led to significant concern over whether UNTAC could ensure peace and 
security during the holding of elections.867 But despite this, the operation continued and was 
successful in organizing and conducting the first free and relatively fair elections in 42 years. 
The holding of democratic elections was regarded as the single most successful aspect of the 
operation with 89.6% of eligible voters registered, and representatives of 20 political parties 
on the ballot.868 Ensuring an ordered process of self-determination was part of the 
expectations of reciprocity that guided Australia’s involvement, and this did in fact produce 
moral outcomes in the withdrawal of foreign forces and the holding of democratic elections.  
 
Similarly, Australia also calculated that its participation would stabilize Indochina and 
resolve a long-term conflict that had led to a regional refugee problem that threatened to 
reach Australia’s borders. The UN operation in Cambodia was unusually effective in this area 
and by March 1992, 360,000 refugees along the Thai-Cambodian border had been 
repatriated.869 This meant that not only were there moral outcomes for Cambodia itself, there 
were also benefits flowing from achieving greater regional stability as a result of a resolution 
to the conflict. As I explained earlier, the conflict in Cambodia had an impact on three levels 
– the civil war, the Indochinese regional security problem and the Cold War competition 
between the great powers. Australia’s peace proposal was presented as a means to combat 
these problems. The agreement of the UNSC, as well as ASEAN, on the goals of the peace 
plan allowed for the removal of all foreign forces and military assistance (apart from 
                                           
866 Peter Bartu and Neil Wilford, “Transitional justice and DDR: The case of Cambodia,” Research Unit, 
International Centre Transitional Justice (January 2009), p. 9. Available at: 
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Cambodia-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf (accessed 15 October 
2014).  
867 For more on the cooperation of the Khmer Rouge and UNTAC see Benny Widyono, Dancing in the 
Shadows: Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge and the United Nations in Cambodia (Plymouth: Roman Littlefield 
Publishers, 2008) 
868 Amitav Acharya, “Cambodia, the United Nations and the problems of peace,” The Pacific Review 7, no. 3 
(1994), pp. 297-308. 
869 Australian parliamentary delegation to Laos, Vietnam,” Senate, Report, 14 December 1993. Available at: 
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UNTAC) from Cambodia.870 This was a critical component involved in the resolution to the 
conflict.  
 
It is clear from the above discussion that there were significant moral outcomes found in 
Australia’s participation in the Cambodian peace process. I will now turn to the material 
outcomes for Australia. Here, Australia’s largest material gain from its involvement was the 
strengthening of ties with Vietnam. This had been a long-term policy goal for Australia and 
one that has been frequently overlooked in previous investigations on Australia’s role in 
Cambodia. This is somewhat surprising as the economic benefits were significant, and would 
not have eventuated without a resolution to the conflict. Australian-Vietnamese trade 
increased from $8 million in 1980 to $402 million in 1994 as a result of thawing of relations 
with Vietnam and the wider international community.871 This also led to flow-on benefits in 
increasing the size and potential of ASEAN as market for Australian investment and trade. 
The interference of Vietnam into Cambodia’s domestic affairs had been an obstacle to 
Vietnamese admission into ASEAN. Likewise, the isolation of the regime in Cambodia had 
affected its position in Southeast Asian and delayed its own entry into ASEAN. Australia’s 
participation in Cambodia was unique in that, apart from Namibia, it had previously made 
modest contributions to international PKOs. This changed with its active role in both the 
diplomatic and operational component of the Cambodian mission. Yet while this was 
unprecedented, it was still consistent with the traditional parameters of PKOs, particularly in 
the use of force for self-defence only.  
 
Australia’s involvement in Timor Leste, in comparison, went further in that its peacekeepers 
were authorized to enforce peace. The moral outcomes were perhaps greater in Timor Leste 
and this corresponds with the increased level of expectations guiding Australia’s decision to 
intervene. Like Cambodia, the moral outcomes were found in the stabilization of the territory 
and in an ordered process of self-determination. Where this differs is in the agreement by 
Indonesia to allow for a referendum on independence, after it had vigorously defended its 
sovereign control over the territory for nearly twenty-five years. This act of self-
                                           
870 UN, “Cambodia-UNTAC,” (2014). Available at: 
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determination paved the way for the holding of democratic elections and the creation of 
Timor Leste as a sovereign state.  
 
Here again, the moral outcomes stemming from Australia’s involvement were twofold. The 
first outcome was the diplomacy of John Howard and Alexander Downer in negotiating an 
agreement with Habibie for an independence vote. Before 1999, Indonesia had been resistant 
to any change in the status of Timor Leste and the Indonesian military, the TNI, had been 
actively participating in violence against the Timorese population and the pro-independence 
forces.872 The process also included a negotiated agreement for the Indonesians to accept an 
UN-mandated international force to enforce peace and security following the referendum and 
in the lead-up to the elections. This was another course of action Habibie was reluctant to 
accept, and came about largely because of Australian diplomacy in persuading the US to 
apply economic pressure to Jakarta. 873 
 
The second moral outcome was the implementation of INTERFET and Timor Leste’s 
eventual transition to a sovereign and democratic state. Australia led the multinational 
international force that was widely successful in ensuring law and order in Timor Leste. At 
the time it was Australia’s largest defence deployment since Vietnam. It achieved its goals by 
confiscating weapons from the anti-independence militias, and by implementing information 
campaigns that reassured local populations about their security.874 As well as its military 
operations, INTERFET performed a number of humanitarian roles. It provided logistical 
support to civilian agencies and protected aid convoys. It also rebuilt roads and public 
utilities, which allowed greater access for humanitarian assistance in health, food relief and 
sanitation. 875 
                                           
872 Susan Harris Rimmer and Juli Effi Tomaras, “Aftermath Timor Leste: Reconciling competing notions of 
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In October 1999 the Security Council declared that INTERFET had achieved its mission and 
it was safe for UNTAET to take over the civil, military and administrative operations of 
Timor Leste. A year later, over 91% of eligible voters went to the polls again and elected 88 
members to the new Constitutive Assembly that was tasked with establishing a new 
Constitution. In April 2002 Presidential elections were held, with pro-independence leader 
Xanana Gusmão elected. 876Timor Leste thus had a functioning legislature and executive, and 
on the 20th May 2002 it was declared independent – just three years after the referendum. The 
relative peace and security of Timor allowed for over 205,000 refugees to be repatriated and 
the extensive reconstruction effort, of which Australia was the largest contributor, meant that 
it received much needed assistance in priority state-building areas of water supply and 
sanitation, agriculture and rural development, health and education, and administration and 
governance.877  
 
Meanwhile, Australia’s gains were significant. Australia benefited greatly in choosing to 
consider the plight of the Timorese in their decision-making. The most immediate benefit 
was in international prestige as Australia was seen as a leader in maintaining regional 
security. This was particularly so as INTERFET was not a UN operation per se, and was 
instead a multinational force headed by Australia under the auspices of the UN.878 As a result, 
Australia was able to demonstrate its defence capacity to a wider international audience and 
gain credit for leading a successful military operation.  
 
Australia also benefited from operational experience, which had been a key strategic 
expectation. The end of the Cold War meant Australia found itself in an environment of 
strategic uncertainty where its defence force was required to combat a multitude of diverse 
threats. The 1991 and 1993 Strategic Reviews had already identified a need for a change in 
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Australia’s overseas defence preparedness, from one that focused on providing allied or 
coalition support, to one that was selectively skilled and could respond quickly to instances of 
regional insecurity.879  This “defence in depth” strategy was consistent with Australia’s DoA 
doctrine that moved the bulk of defence planning to the defence of the island continent, with 
the preparedness to rapidly respond to threats in Australia’s immediate strategic environment.  
 
In Cambodia, Australia’s military commitment was substantial, but still in a supporting role 
with its contribution mainly in logistics and signalling. In Timor, it led the international 
coalition – a first for Australia – and it was in response to a humanitarian crisis that required 
the capabilities of an expeditionary force. The leadership of INTERFET was an opportunity 
for Australia to exercise the “new” ADF. As General Peter Cosgrove later commented: “The 
modern historical experience of the ADF took its first big step forward in Timor Leste.”880  
 
The economic benefits were tied to its ability to negotiate a more profitable deal on oil and 
gas distributions in the Timor Gap. As I mentioned previously, Australia has been strongly 
criticized for its dealings with Timor Leste over the Timor Gap Treaty, but the reality is that 
in gaining independence Timor was able to represent itself during negotiations, and was the 
sole recipient of the funds flowing from production. From this, it was able to establish its 
own sovereign wealth fund that as of October 2014 had generated $16.6 billion.881 Australia’s 
gain was higher than Timor Leste and this reinforces the moral realist assumption that states 
are primarily in pursuit of their own interests, but this does not mean that the recipient state 
fails to reap any benefits in return.  
 
A more profitable deal over the Timor Gap had been a long-term policy goal for Australia 
that began after the 1989 Timor Gap Treaty. This agreement left Australia and Indonesia with 
three different “zones of cooperation” that resulted in a 50-50 split of revenue.882 But when 
                                           
879 Australia’s defence in depth was particularly outlined in the 1993 Strategic Review. See DoD, “Strategic 
review 1993,” pp. 44-46. Available at: 
http://www.defence.gov.au/SE/publications/stratreview/1993/1993_Part2.pdf (accessed 9 April 2014). 
880 Joe Kelly, “A tough job done in Timor Leste,” The Australian, 29 September 2009. Available at: 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/a-tough-job-done-in-east-timor/story-e6frg6z6-1225767196640 
(accessed 20 November 2014).  
881 SWFI, “Fund ranking,” (October 2014). Available at: http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/ (accessed 
20 November 2014).  
882 A copy of the 1989 Treaty can be found at DFAT, Australia Treaty Series, “Treaty between Australia and the 
Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of cooperation in an area between the Indonesian province of East Timor and 
northern Australia,” No. 9, (9 February 1991). Available at: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1991/9.html (accessed 8 May 2014). 
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Timor Leste gained independence in 2002, a year later the Joint Petroleum Development 
Area (JPDA) was entered into force that split the zone 90-10 in Timor Leste’s favour. On the 
surface, this appeared positive for Timor, however the majority of untapped oil and gas 
reserves remain outside the JPDA and in Australia’s waters. The new agreement also meant 
that the majority of the Greater Sunrise oilfields – the largest discovered in the Timor Sea  – 
remained outside the JPDA and in Australia’s territory.883 Australia was in a better 
negotiating position with Timor as a new, weak and small state no longer part of the large 
and expansive archipelago. The replacement of Indonesia with Timor as the negotiating 
partner meant that Australia was able to restrict the sea boundary to the internal and external 
line between Timor Leste and Indonesia, rather than the median line between Timor Leste 
and Australia, which would have placed Sunrise in Timor’s waters. As a result, 79.9% of the 
field is claimed by Australia and once in full production is estimated to be worth over $40 
billion.884 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Australian Department of Geoscience  
                                           
883 The Greater Sunrise agreement can be found at DFAT, Australian Treaty Series, “Agreement between the 
Government of Australia and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste relating to the 
Unitisation of the Sunrise Troubador Fields,” (23 February 2007). Available at: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2007/11.html (accessed 20 May 2014). 
884 Tom Allard, “Australia accused of playing dirty with East Timor over oil and gas reserves,” The Sydney 
Morning Herald, 28 December 2013. Available at: http://www.smh.com.au/national/australia-accused-of-
playing-dirty-in-battle-with-east-timor-over-oil-and-gas-reserves-20131227-2zzmi.html (accessed 19 May 
2014). 
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The material advantages gained by Australia in choosing to intervene in Cambodia and Timor 
Leste imply that Australia’s policy on the use of force in conflict resolution was primarily 
guided by calculations of the national interest. This conclusion was reinforced by Australia’s 
decision to intervene only when it was determined that it could reap the maximum benefit. 
This does not mean that moral considerations were absent. Indeed, they were visible in 
Australia’s push for a peaceful Cambodian settlement and this was partly fuelling its 
diplomacy in reaching an agreement amongst the various participating parties. This 
manifested itself in specific moral outcomes, the first of which was agreement on a peace 
plan that paved the way for democratic elections. Similar calculations were present in Timor 
Leste where moral outcomes were present in the holding of free and fair elections and the 
establishment of Timor as an independent and sovereign state. In this way, evidence of moral 
and material outcomes indicates that Australia chooses to participate in humanitarian 
operations when there are specific national interests involved, and when it makes this 
calculation, it can actually stand to gain material benefits in return.  
 
The moral and material outcomes of the Australia-US security partnership  
The moral outcomes in Australia’s security partnership are predictably less evident than in 
the other two policy arenas. This said; there is evidence to support a moral realist explanation 
of the alliance. The expectations of reciprocity outlined earlier established that both Australia 
and the US were mindful of contributing to regional peace and security, and this was present 
as part of the initial motivation for forming the alliance, alongside the strategic considerations 
for Australia in allying with the US as the best alliance partner to ensure its national security. 
These strategic considerations were of great benefit to Australia and have been part of its 
rational calculation in choosing to support US foreign policy at different times.  
 
Moreover, evidence of expectations of reciprocity and rational choice indicate that moral and 
material outcomes are a possibility. These moral outcomes were linked to Australia’s 
concerns for the maintenance of regional peace and stability. Not only was this decision 
fuelled by Australia’s desire to ensure its own security, it was also part of a desire to ensure 
the independent sovereignty of other states in the surrounding region, which was then linked 
to Australia’s broader strategic objectives pertaining to regional stability. This moral outcome 
was present when the partnership was still in its informal stage during WWII, when Australia 
and the US were united in removing the Japanese from Southeast Asia and the west 
 291 
Pacific.885 This went some way towards strengthening the sovereignty and integrity of the 
affected states. As Minister for External Affairs, Herbert Evatt remarked at the time, 
Australia’s fight against Japanese imperialism was about resisting their attempts “to not so 
much control Southeast Asia as a plan to dominate the whole of the illimitable Pacific.”886  
 
During the Cold War, Australia and the US expanded their cooperation to include 
intelligence and naval bases in Australia, which, apart from adding to the overall functioning 
of the alliance, also contributed to its deterrent capability. The stationing of Pine Gap and 
Northwest Cape increased the US’ ability to detect Soviet missile and naval activity in the 
Pacific region.887 And the deterrent effect of the alliance underpinned its importance to 
Australia’s national security and reinforced the partnership’s ability to facilitate regional 
stability. In identifying this as a moral outcome I am not implying that removing the threat of 
Soviet imperialism were factors that overrode the strategic threat to Australia’s forward 
defence. Instead, I am merely claiming that as a result of Australia viewing these as both 
threats to its own security and to the stability of the Asia-Pacific, other states stood to benefit. 
This was particularly so as the US-Australian partnership complemented the Northeast Asian 
US hub-and-spokes alliance system. This moral outcome is difficult to evaluate 
comprehensively, but was part of Australia’s calculations in choosing to deepen its 
cooperation with the US, despite criticisms that it was at risk of alliance entrapment.888  
 
Cooperation accelerated following 9/11, and in this instance the moral outcomes were much 
more significant. During this stage of the partnership, the moral outcomes flowed from 
increased cooperation between the US and Australia on counter-terrorism, which was 
specifically aimed at increasing security in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. 
Specifically, Australia and the US have been strongly involved in counterterrorism efforts in 
Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines and the Pacific Islands. This has also included joint task 
                                           
885 This observation has also been made by Glen Barclay, see, for instance, Glen Barclay St. J., “Australia looks 
to America: The wartime relationship, 1939-1942,” The Pacific Historical Review 46, no. 2 (1977), p. 261.  
886 Herbert V. Evatt, “International affairs: Review of the war situation,” HoR, Ministerial Statement, 25 
February 1942. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/hansard80/hansardr80/1942-02-
25/0129/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf (accessed 21 August 2014). 
887 The benefits of these bases to regional security, and to the security of both the US and Australia have been 
highlighted by Paul Dibb and Coral Bell. See For more see Paul Dibb, “Soviet strategy towards Australia, New 
Zealand and the South!West Pacific,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 39, no. 2 (1985), pp. 69; Dibb, 
“Issues in Australian defence,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 37, no. 3 (1983), pp. 160-166; and 
Coral Bell, “Managing to Survive,” The National Interest no. 2 (1985), pp. 36-45. 
888 For arguments on alliance entrapment, see in particularly Joseph Camilleri, Australian-American Relations: 
The Web of Dependence (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1980). 
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forces in drug trafficking and law and order training.889 These initiatives were the result of 
Australia’s participation in the US-led WoT and were part of the broader strategic goal of 
removing these threats to Australia’s national interest. In this regard, they were also tied to 
specific material outcomes that Australia sought from choosing to assist other states in its 
own region.  
 
This leads succinctly into the question of whether Australia actually stood to gain any 
material benefits from its security cooperation. This has clearly been the case. After 9/11 
greater US engagement in the region was a key foreign policy goal, and Australia’s previous 
alliance loyalty meant it was well placed to reap increased material gains, especially in the 
form of the US-Australia FTA. In the Pacific, US-Australian cooperation in counter-terrorism 
solidified the importance of criminal intelligence gathering as part of the security partnership. 
The number of weak and failing states in the Pacific represented a significant security threat, 
and the added training and funding by the US for combating drug trafficking, money 
laundering and other TOC increased Australia’s ability to achieve its security interests. These 
benefits were also extended to Australia’s relationship with Indonesia, where US funding and 
training was influential in the establishment of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement 
Cooperation (JCLEC), which was effective in combating the spread of JI.890  
 
These security benefits continued during the strategic pivot when US foreign security policy 
underwent a shift to focus on the Indo-Pacific in response to a rising China. Australia had 
been pushing for increased US involvement in the region for some time, and its diplomacy 
paid off with such outcomes as US participation in the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the 
decision to strengthen defence ties by stationing US troops in the Northern Territory on a 
rotating basis.891 Apart from signalling the US’ strategic commitment to Australia, this was 
also part of a desire to develop closer defence relationships with regional militaries. 
                                           
889 AFP,“ Law enforcement cooperation program,” (2013). Available at: 
http://www.afp.gov.au/policing/international-liaison/law-enforcement-cooperation-program (accessed 10 
August 2014). 
890 Bruce Vaugh, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, 16 
October 2009, p. 9. Available at: 
http://williambowes.com/Documents/CRS_Terrorism/Terrorism%20in%20Southeast%20Asia%20October%20
16%202009.pdf (accessed 12 October 2014).  
891 See AFP, “Clinton to attend East Asia Summit,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 18 September 2010. Available 
at: http://www.smh.com.au//breaking-news-world/clinton-to-attend-east-asia-summit-20100918-15glu.html 
(accessed 21 July 2014). 
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Australia’s geographic position and interoperability with the US meant it was ideally suited 
for achieving this goal.  
 
Closer US defence cooperation with Indonesia was of particular concern for Australia as the 
Indonesian archipelago was vital for freedom of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) and 
for continued success in trade and investment. The US had signalled its intention to expand 
its relationship with Indonesia following the Obama Administration’s decision to lift the ban 
on US weapon sales to Indonesia in 2010, and extending an invitation for Indonesian forces 
to join US-Australian military exercises in 2012.892 These initiatives corresponded with 
others the US was pursuing in the region, such as closer ties with Thailand and The 
Philippines, which reinforced the US’ position as regional security guarantor.  
 
Evidence of these moral and material outcomes in the US-Australian security partnership 
indicates that both moral and material calculations were indeed present in Australia’s 
commitment to the alliance. The moral outcomes were not as strong compared with those in 
aid and the humanitarian use of force, but were nonetheless consistent with the moral 
expectations of regional security identified earlier under the expectation of reciprocity. These 
expectations dictated that Australia’s support for US foreign policy was linked to whether it 
would be beneficial to the stability and security of its strategic sphere of influence. In some 
instances this led to targeted moral outcomes in increasing the ability of Southeast Asian and 
Pacific nations to combat terrorism and security threats from weak and failing states. These 
instances also led to material outcomes in strengthening US-Australian security and defence 
cooperation in areas of regional defence and intelligence. Therefore, Australia actually stood 
to gain when it decided to include moral considerations as part of its alliance partnership with 
the US.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has conducted a moral realist analysis of the evidence provided in the previous 
case study chapters. It has found that moral realism is a valuable tool for understanding 
Australia’s foreign policy choices. Expectations of reciprocity determined by geo-strategic 
                                           
892 In 2013, US troops stationed in Darwin participated in joint humanitarian and disaster relief exercises 
between Indonesia and Australia. Stephen Smith and Warren Snowdon “Australia and Indonesia conduct 
humanitarian relief and tabletop exercise in Darwin,” Joint Media Release, 7 July 2013. Available at: 
http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2013/06/07/minister-for-defence-and-minister-for-defence-science-and-
personnel-joint-media-release-australia-and-indonesia-conduct-humanitarian-assistance-and-disaster-relief-
tabletop-exercise-in-darwin/ (accessed 25 November 2014).  
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factors played a key part, and can consistently be found to have shaped Australia’s foreign 
policy choices across the three policy arenas under examination in this thesis. An analysis of 
expectations of reciprocity also reveals evidence that Australia has acted morally when it has 
expected to receive material benefits in return. For Australia, geostrategic factors tied to its 
location in the Asia-Pacific have guided where the bulk of its aid has gone, and why it 
decided to conduct humanitarian operations in Cambodia and Timor Leste. Likewise, 
Australia alliance loyalty in the US-Australia security partnership has been guided by 
expectations of reciprocity in securing Australia’s strategic sphere of influence in Southeast 
Asia and southwest Pacific.  
 
This chapter’s evaluation of rational choice has also demonstrated that the inclusion of 
morality in calculations of Australia’s foreign policy decisions have been driven by 
assessments of the costs as opposed to the benefits to its national interest. The primacy of the 
national interest in calculations of moral choices means that in some instances states will 
choose not to include moral considerations as part of their decision-making if the costs 
outweigh the expected benefits. Rational choice can therefore explain why Australia provided 
the bulk of its aid to Indonesia and PNG, in preference to states in Africa where the poverty 
rate is higher. Similarly, it can also account for the type of aid given: in other words, why 
Australia has prioritized aid in education, good governance and infrastructure over other 
areas like health or female empowerment.  
 
When looking at humanitarian operations, rational choices were also evident in Canberra’s 
decision to push for a resolution to the conflict in Cambodia, which was made after the 
conditions were right for Australia to reap the maximum benefits in return. Similarly, rational 
choice was also important in understanding why, after decades of calls for Australia’s support 
of Timorese independence, INTERFET was finally implemented in 1999. And, turning to the 
Australia-US security partnership, timing and context linked to rational choice helps explain 
Australia’s decision to align with the US during WWII as well as its ongoing commitment to 
the partnership, despite instances where it appeared that the costs outweighed the benefits.  
 
The final theme, moral and material outcomes, represents the crux of a moral realist 
approach. It connected expectations of reciprocity to policy outcomes and posits that when 
states do decide to include morality as part of their foreign policy calculations, they can 
sometimes gain national interest benefits in return. On the basis of the evidence presented 
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thus far, moral and material outcomes have indeed been evident in Australia’s aid and 
development policy, where Australia has gained economically from greater investment and 
business opportunities in a number of cases.  
 
Material gains were also apparent in Australia’s participation in humanitarian operations. In 
Cambodia, Australia received material gains in the development of a strong trade relationship 
with Vietnam, which had been a long-term foreign policy goal. Later, the benefits of the 
humanitarian operation in Timor Leste were considerable. Australia assisted in ensuring 
Timorese self-determination and gained material outcomes in negotiating a more favourable 
Timor Gap deal and in removing a “regional sore” in its relationship with Indonesia. The 
moral outcomes of the US-Australian security relationship have notable in the joint initiatives 
carried out in Southeast Asia and the Pacific assisting in ensuring the security and stability of 
the region, such as intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism training. This has achieved 
material benefits for Australia in that it has had to shoulder less of the resource burden, and 
more broadly in helping to strengthen US engagement in the Asia-Pacific.  
 
Thus I have demonstrated that in the case of Australia moral realism is a useful research tool 
capable of accounting for the position of morality in state decision-making. It is now time to 
conclude the thesis by bringing together its major findings, and considering its implications 
for understanding morality in Australia’s foreign policy choices. At the same time, it will be 
pertinent to discuss the potential limitations of moral realism as an explanatory approach, and 
revisit my employment of Australia as a most-likely case. In discussing these limitations, I 
will also outline avenues for future research.  
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Chapter Six 
Conclusions 
 
This thesis has sought to make an original contribution towards our understanding of the 
position of morality in classical realism. It achieved this by developing the notion of moral 
realism as a modified explanatory framework that could shed light on why states choose to 
include morality as part of their foreign policy choices, and when this is most likely to occur. 
The moral realist framework was developed from identifying three factors found to be in 
common amongst the classical realist scholarship of Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr 
and George Kennan. These were: (i) expectations of reciprocity between states; (ii) rational 
choice in calculating foreign policy decisions; and (iii) moral and material outcomes of 
foreign policy.  
 
The central empirical claim of the thesis was that when states choose to include morality as 
part of their foreign policy choices, they could actually stand to gain material benefits in 
return. After the factors of moral realism were identified, the thesis then applied the 
framework to evaluate the position of morality in three important arenas of Australian foreign 
policy: aid and development, humanitarian operations, and strategic alliances. Its main 
finding is that Australia was most likely to include morality when this converged with 
national interest objectives. And when this occurred, Australia was seen to gain material 
benefits in return. In sum, I found sufficient evidence to successfully answer the primary and 
secondary research questions posed by this thesis, which were:  
 
Primary research question 
 
 Is moral realism an appropriate analytical tool for understanding Australia’s foreign 
policy choices? 
 
Secondary research questions 
 
1. Are moral and material considerations present in Australia’s foreign policy decision-
making?  
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2.  Does Australia stand to gain when morality is a part of foreign policy choice?  
 
To answer these questions, the thesis was organized into 6 Chapters. Chapter 1 is where I 
established the relevance of the study by engaging in a critical discussion concerning the 
main theoretical contributions within the classical realist revival. The revival of classical 
realism in International Relations (IR) was prompted by a resurgence of scholarly interest in 
how to theorize the position of morality in international politics. Scholars like Michael 
Williams, Chris Brown, Richard Beardsworth and William Scheurman have been some of the 
revival’s key contributors, and they sought to gain insights into how to understand morality 
by returning to the work of classical realists.893 But instead of adding clarity to how classical 
realism primarily understood morality in connection with material interests, which was then 
evaluated in state policy according to its consequences, I found that these contributions 
misinterpreted classical realism by trying to recast it as a normative perspective of IR.  
 
The majority of scholars within the revival, whether writing from a cosmopolitan, critical, 
constructivist or English School (ES) perspective, view morality as normatively prescriptive. 
In other words, they have argued that classical realism was primarily concerned with morality 
as a factor that could prescribe how international politics ought to operate. This 
understanding of morality was in stark contrast to the descriptive and consequentialist 
approach of classical realism.  
 
I then argued that this mischaracterization of classical realism had occurred without much 
opposition from realist scholars. Indeed, there had been a distinct lack of classical realist 
contributions within the revival, which is why I proposed moral realism as my own offering 
that attempted a more accurate reading of how classical realists understood the position of 
                                           
893 Michael Williams, Chris Brown and William Scheurman were the major contributors towards attempts at 
converging critical theory and classical realism. For more see Michael Williams, The Realist Tradition and the 
Limits of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Williams, “Why ideas Matter 
in international relations: Hans Morgenthau, classical realism, and the moral construction of power politics,” 
International Organization 58 no. 4 (2004), pp. 633-655; Chris Brown “The ‘practice turn,’ phronesis and 
classical realism: towards a phronetic international political theory?” Millennium 40, no. 3 (2012), pp. 439-456; 
Scheuerman, William, “The (Classical) realist vision of global reform,” International Theory 2 no.2 (2010), pp. 
246-282; and Scheuerman, “Was Morgenthau a realist? Revisiting scientific man vs. power 
politics.” Constellations 14, no. 4 (2007), pp. 506-530. Richard Beardsworth primary contribution was towards 
developing a notion of “Cosmopolitan realism” that attempted to combine notions of global interdependency 
with classical realist assumptions on power and prestige. For more see Richard Beardsworth Cosmopolitanism 
and International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011).   
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morality in international politics. Classical realism actually has quite an established history of 
viewing morality as a factor that could assist the national interest, and was assessed in state 
policy according to the consequences of states choosing to consider morality as part of their 
foreign policy choices.894 Thus, I argued that there was space for an understanding of 
morality in classical realism that properly incorporated its views on the role of the state, the 
determining influence of the national interest, and, crucially, the significance of foreign 
policy outcomes.  
 
The moral realist framework in this thesis was developed through a thorough examination of 
the work of three key classical realists scholars – Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan and 
Reinhold Niebuhr. These scholars were chosen because they shared a consequentialist view 
of morality, which made for consistency in drawing out the three categories of the moral 
realist framework.895 The first category identified was expectations of reciprocity between 
states, which incorporated the classical realist view of considerations of the other. Classical 
realists argued that individuals do not exist alone in human nature and to survive they must 
realize that, in some instances, it can be beneficial to the self-interest to consider the interests 
of others. An expectation of reciprocity between states allowed moral realism to argue that 
when states are seen to act morally by considering the welfare of others, they are most likely 
doing so out of an expectation that it will lead to national interest benefits.  
 
The second category identified was rational choice in calculating foreign policy decisions. 
This followed an expectation of reciprocity in establishing that a state can choose to include 
                                           
894 The history of morality in classical realism extends back to Thucydides and Niccolo Machiavelli who both 
stated that considerations of justice, morality, and being “good” were important factors in furthering the power 
of the state. For more see Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War transl. by Rex Warner, with an 
introduction and notes by M.I. Finley (London: Penguin Group, 1972) and Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and 
Other Political Writings Stephen J. Milner transl. and ed. (London: J.M. Dent, 1995), pp.37-137. 
895 There were a number of archival and published works cited to support the argument that these classical 
realists were concerned with putting forward a consequential view of morality. However, evidence of their 
views on morality can be found in a select number of key texts. For Morgenthau, this was in “National interest 
and moral principles in foreign policy: The primacy of the national interest,” American Scholar XVII (spring, 
1949), pp. 207-212; Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 4th ed (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1966) and “The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil,” Writing File, Box 97, File 6, p. 10. 
Niebuhr’s understanding of morality was harder to interpret as he was often torn between his personal views on 
a Christian ethic and his observations on how foreign policy and international politics operates according to the 
principles of anarchy and the struggle for power. Yet, he still demonstrated support for a consequential view of 
morality. See in particular Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study of Ethics and Politics 
(New York: Touchstone, 1995) and “The moral issue in international relations,” Speeches, Articles and Books, 
Box. 16, File unknown. George Kennan was more at home with foreign policy making and foreign policy 
analysis, than he was with debates on IR theory. But like Morgenthau and Neibuhr he was in support of a 
consequential understanding of morality and this was made clear in George Kennan, “Morality and foreign 
policy,” Foreign Affairs 64, no. 2 (1985), pp. 205-218. 
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morality after a cost-benefit calculation of whether it will achieve their national interests. 
This means that the appearance of morality in a state’s foreign policy is contingent on time 
and place, and not expected to be observed in state decision-making at all times. Therefore, 
the inclusion of rational choice allows moral realism to account for when states are most 
likely to include morality as part of their foreign policy decision-making and why, in some 
instances, they may choose not to include it.  
 
The third and final category identified was the moral and material outcomes of foreign 
policy. This category connected the motives found in the expectations of reciprocity with 
foreign policy outcomes. The potential ability of moral realism to account for the motives and 
outcomes of morality in foreign policy represented an expansion of classical realism. It also 
formed the rationale for exploring the central empirical claim of moral realism: that states can 
actually stand to gain materially when they choose to include morality as part of their foreign 
policy choices. I argued that including a category on the moral and material outcomes of 
foreign policy was possible by drawing out the classical realist concern for an “ethic of 
consequence,” which describes how claims of states acting morally must be judged on the 
consequences of states choosing to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices.  
 
Classical realists argued that morality must be judged in this way, but they did not go much 
further in examining whether the inclusion of morality could lead to beneficial outcomes for 
both the state and the recipient. Therefore, this criterion represents the ability of moral 
realism to expand on classical realism, and at the same time properly incorporate classical 
realist views on consequential morality. The emphasis on establishing the results of morality 
in foreign policy is also important as a way to define moral realism as an empirical approach 
that required application to the evidence of policy decisions. This separates moral realism 
from normative approaches to morality that dominate research agendas within the classical 
realist revival, and which fail to make the connection between motive and outcomes. 
 
The application of moral realism to foreign policy evidence was conducted through the use of 
a discipline-specific single focused case study. Here, I identified Australia as an appropriate 
most-likely case, because there had not yet been an examination of morality in Australian 
foreign policy choices from such a perspective. I found that the bulk of the literature on the 
position of morality in Australian foreign policy could be categorized as employing either ES 
or realist assumptions. Unsurprisingly, previous investigations on morality from the ES have 
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been limited to finding evidence of Australia following an international societal approach. ES 
scholars and policy practitioners, like Andrew Linklater, Timothy Dunne and Gareth Evans, 
have argued that Australia’s middle-power status and history of activist diplomacy mean that 
its policymakers were naturally inclined to choose policy according to whether it followed 
the norms, rules and laws of international society.896 Yet these approaches were found to not 
go far enough in accounting for evidence that when Australia chose to act morally. Rather, I 
suggested that it was doing so out of the pursuit of the national interest, and with an 
expectation that doing so would lead to mutually beneficial foreign policy outcomes.  
 
Realist scholarship on morality in Australian foreign policy is largely absent. Realists writing 
on Australian foreign policy, such as Paul Dibb, Coral Bell and William Tow have argued 
that Australia’s policy responses have been primarily dictated by the global balance of power 
and shaped by the constraints of being a middle-power.897 For them, material rather than 
moral factors explain Australia’s tendency to prioritize strategic alliances with “great and 
powerful friends” and to seek economic advantages by utilizing its rich supply of national 
resources.  
 
I argued that the dominance of ES and realist approaches towards understanding Australian 
foreign policy was unique amongst debates concerning morality in international politics, 
which has mostly been shaped by the great debate between realism and idealism. This further 
demonstrates the appropriateness of using Australia as a most-likely test case for the 
application of moral realism. After making the case for applying moral realism to the 
evidence of Australian foreign policy, I identified three separate policy arenas that were 
representative of the potential for morality in Australia’s policy choices. These were 
Australia’s foreign policy in aid and development; its role in humanitarian operations 
conducted in Cambodia and Timor Leste; and its strategic alliance with the US. These policy 
                                           
896 Before the constructivist turn in Australian IR in the mid-2000s, the majority of those engaging with debates 
on morality from a normative perspective followed the ES assumptions on the role of international society as a 
civilizing force that could moderate state behaviour. For more see Andrew Linklater, “What is a good 
international citizen?” in Paul Keale ed Ethics and Foreign Policy (St Leonards: Allen, 1992), pp. 60-92; 
Timothy Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler, “East Timor and the new humanitarian interventionism,” International 
Affairs 77, no. 4 (2001), pp. 805-827: and Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australian Foreign Relations 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1991).  
897 For specific works by these scholars demonstrating this point see Paul Dibb, Australia’s External Relations 
in the 1980s: The Interaction of Economic, Political and Strategic Factors (Canberra: Groom Helm Australia, 
1983); Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988); and 
“Australia and the United States,” in James Cotton and John Ravenhill eds. The National Interest in a Global 
Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996-2000 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 171-192. 
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arenas reflected different expectations about the likelihood of morality in Australian foreign 
policy. This allowed moral realism to be tested on a defined sample of evidence that avoided 
focusing narrowly on one specific policy arena, or broadly on an unmanageable sweep of 
events. 
 
Now that I have outlined the rationale for why this thesis represents an original contribution 
towards the literature on morality in classical realism, and how I sought to demonstrate this 
by applying the moral realist framework to a case study of Australia, I can present the key 
findings made by the thesis, the implications for understanding the position of morality in 
Australia’s foreign policy choices, and some avenues for future research.  
 
Key findings and implications 
This thesis found sufficient evidence to answer both the primary and secondary research 
questions. I will start by presenting the findings of the first secondary research question: are 
moral and material considerations present in Australia’s foreign policy decision-making? 
Here, I found evidence of both moral and material considerations in the expectations of 
reciprocity guiding where and on what issues Australia chose to include morality as part of its 
foreign policy choices. Australia demonstrated a preference for doing so towards states in the 
Asia-Pacific, which indicated that morality was more likely to appear in its foreign policy 
choices dealing with states that are geographically close. 
 
This finding made sense given Australia’s location in the Asia-Pacific, which means it must 
prioritize relationships with states in Southeast Asia and southwest Pacific as a means of 
maintaining national security and defence. It was also the case that these states were 
economically and socially under-developed, and dealing with a multitude of security issues 
that directly affected Australia. Hence they were strategically important, and acting morally 
towards these states was likely motivated by an expectation that it would lead to national 
interest benefits.  
 
Evidence of an expectation of reciprocity also indicated that when Australia is seen to include 
morality as part of its foreign policy calculations, it is making a rational choice to do so. Thus 
morality is likely contingent on timing and context linked to calculations of the national 
interest, which means that it is not expected to appear in Australia’s foreign policy decisions 
at all times. Together, an expectation of reciprocity and rational choice can account for why 
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and when Australia is most likely to include morality as part of its foreign policy 
calculations. 
 
The presence of geostrategic interests as part of an expectation of reciprocity was found 
across the three policy arenas, which implied that in the case of Australia, it is more likely to 
include morality in its foreign policy calculations when this converges with its material 
interests. This was the case in Australia’s foreign aid and development policy where the bulk 
of its aid program was targeted towards the Asia-Pacific. Strategic considerations guiding 
Australia’s aid expectations started with the Colombo Plan and continued with Australia’s 
foreign aid being targeted towards achieving the security and stability of Indonesia and PNG.  
 
Indonesia represents the greatest potential security threat to Australia as it sits across its 
major Sea-Lines of Communications (SLOCs) and is susceptible to instability from poverty, 
separatism, extremism and Trans-national Organized Crime (TOC). Australia’s foreign aid 
has represented a means to combat these issues, while simultaneously improving Indonesia’s 
social and economic development. The same expectations of reciprocity were found to guide 
Australia’s foreign aid towards improving the stability of PNG, where Australia’s aid 
program has been provided out of an expectation of reciprocity that would contribute towards 
Australia’s strategic objective of maintaining South Pacific security.  
 
Even when Australia was seen to deviate from this expectation of reciprocity by increasing 
its aid to states outside the Asia-Pacific, as it did during the 2008 increase of aid to Africa, or 
the increase of aid to Iraq and Afghanistan, this was still determined by a rational calculation 
of whether it would achieve Australia’s national interest. In the case of Africa, an increase in 
Australia’s aid was guided by an expectation that it would assist in Canberra’s bid for a non-
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Australia’s aid to Iraq and Afghanistan was also 
guided by an expectation of reciprocity. This time, it was consistent with Australia’s strategic 
interests as part of its participation in the War on Terror (WoT).  
 
Not only does this demonstrate the consistency of expectations of reciprocity, but it also 
demonstrates the importance of rational choice in explaining changes to Australia’s foreign 
aid and development policy. Australia’s temporary change in foreign aid and development 
was not motivated by a normative shift in how Australia perceives the function of its aid 
program; instead it reflected a change in how Australia calculated its national interests. In this 
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instance, moral and material considerations converged and Australia determined that it would 
benefit from directing aid to these states. This indicates that when Australia is seen to include 
morality as part of its foreign aid policy, it is likely the result of a rational calculation of 
whether it will achieve its material interest.  
 
Expectations of reciprocity and rational choice were also present in Australia’s policy choices 
in implementing humanitarian operations. Before the end of the Cold War Australia’s 
participation in peacekeeping had been relatively modest. This changed with its involvement 
in Cambodia and Timor Leste. Australia’s decision to commit considerable resources to these 
humanitarian operations was guided by specific expectations of reciprocity, and thus 
contingent on rational calculations of whether it would reap any benefits in return. In both 
instances, Australia’s geostrategic interests in reducing the number of security threats 
emanating from Southeast Asia were found to inform the expectations of reciprocity 
motivating its decision to use force for humanitarian purposes.  
 
In Cambodia this was tied to Australia’s desire to contribute towards resolving issues of 
regional security, which was part of the Hawke government’s policy of comprehensive 
engagement with the Asia-Pacific. This expectation of reciprocity was linked to a rational 
calculation that Australia would benefit from pursuing a resolution to the conflict in 1989. 
Previous efforts at resolving the crisis had been unsuccessful, and thus Australia abandoned 
its diplomacy. This changed after the end of the Cold War, which provided the conditions for 
Australia to re-start its diplomacy in reaching an agreement on its peace proposals. This 
reinforces the importance of timing and context in understanding when Australia is most 
likely to include morality as part of its foreign policy decisions. In sum, Australia’s 
diplomacy in Cambodia was linked to a rational calculation that it would achieve certain 
expectations of reciprocity and so moral and material considerations converged to motivate 
decision-makers to resolve the crisis.  
 
A similar convergence of moral and material considerations was evident in Australia’s 
approach towards Timor Leste. Here the issue of Timorese independence had been part of 
Australia’s domestic discourse since the Indonesian invasion in 1975, yet, the decision by the 
Howard government to shift Australian policy from recognition of Indonesian sovereignty, 
towards semi-autonomy, and eventually, support for independence was a clear watershed. 
This policy change was tied to a rational calculation that the conditions were right for 
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Australia to intervene. By December 1998 Indonesia was more susceptible towards accepting 
a ballot on the future of Timor Leste and by September 1999 reluctantly accepted an UN-
mandated peacekeeping force.  
 
Australia clearly had specific expectations of reciprocity motivating its decision to support 
independence and lead the multinational coalition. The issue of Timor Leste had become an 
obstacle to closer relations with Indonesia and the conflict itself was also at risk of spilling 
over into West Papua, which represented a significant threat to the stability of Australia’s 
northern approaches. Together with the example of Cambodia, this illustrates that Australia is 
most likely to consider the use of force for humanitarian purposes when the circumstances 
are conducive to the achievement of its material interests. And where this occurs, it is most 
likely guided by strategic expectations of reciprocity.  
 
The convergence between moral and material considerations in Australia’s approach towards 
strategic alliances was less evident than other policy arenas. However, expectations of 
reciprocity were nonetheless found in Australia’s decision to align with the US as the best 
alliance partner to ensure both national and regional security. In this regard, it also reflected a 
rational calculation by Australia that in exchange for its willingness to support US foreign 
policy, Australia would receive certain benefits in return. This can explain why Australia has 
been consistent in maintaining support for the alliance, despite instances where it appeared to 
harm Australia’s national interests. In most cases the US-Australia security partnership was 
underpinned by common interest in ensuring Pacific security. For the US, Australia 
represented an attractive destination for its intelligence and naval installations and 
complimented its hub-and-spokes alliance network in the Asia-Pacific. For Australia, 
aligning with the US as the greater power in the partnership contributed to its ability to 
achieve its own security, and elevated its position in international affairs above its middle-
power status.  
 
These common interests were guided by straightforward national interest calculations in the 
first instance, but they were also partly informed by moral considerations in that mutual 
efforts to ensure regional security did lead to benefits for states that were outside the alliance. 
It was found that both the US and Australia determined that a key function of the alliance was 
to act as a deterrent against foreign intervention, and Australia’s efforts in keeping the US 
engaged in the Pacific was motivated by an expectation of reciprocity that it would achieve 
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this mutual goal. Thus, moral considerations tied to consideration of the other were indeed 
present, and converged with Australia’s material interest in maintaining the alliance. It is 
important to note that it was not always the case that Australia was concerned with the 
benefits to other states as part of its commitment to the alliance; still, my findings indicate 
that morality can nonetheless be seen in Australia’s strategic alliances. This is most likely to 
occur towards states that are central to achieving Australia’s geostrategic interests, and is the 
result of a rational calculation of whether it will produce some benefit in return.  
 
The convergence of moral and material considerations in the construction of Australia’s 
foreign policy choices indicated that moral and material outcomes were likely, and these 
were indeed found. I will start by presenting the findings associated with moral outcomes as 
these will address whether it is possible to assess morality in Australian foreign policy 
according to its consequences. I will then move on to examine whether this led to material 
outcomes. Together, this will answer the final secondary research question: does Australia 
stand to gain when morality is a part of foreign policy choice?  
 
Moral and material outcomes: Assessing morality in foreign policy according to its 
consequences 
The moral outcomes produced from Australia’s foreign aid and development policy were 
fairly clear. Its aid program in Indonesia, particularly in response to the Boxing Day 
Tsunami, led to tangible outcomes in reconstruction and education. In PNG, moral outcomes 
were also found in improving the delivery of health services and the operation of judicial 
services. I accept, of course, that these moral outcomes were relative, and it was never 
expected that Australia’s foreign aid would be responsible for absolute aid goals like 
universal primary education, or the total eradication of diseases like Tuberculosis (TB). 
Through the use of moral realism, I have merely sought to establish whether it was possible 
to judge morality in foreign policy according to its consequences and this was identified in 
the benefits to the recipients of Australia’s foreign aid and development policy.   
 
Moral outcomes were also clearly visible in Australia’s policy towards Cambodia and Timor 
Leste, which indicated that Australia’s policy choices on the use of force for humanitarian 
purposes can lead to benefits for the recipient state. In Cambodia the expectations of 
reciprocity guiding Australia’s decision to intervene led to moral outcomes associated with 
the resolution of the long-term regional crisis. Australia’s proposal for peace broke the 
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deadlock at the Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) and led to the establishment of various 
United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), which had transitional authority in 
Cambodia; implemented a ceasefire and disarmament process; and conducted free and fair 
elections.  
 
Similar moral outcomes were found from Australia’s involvement in Timor Leste. Australia’s 
decision to support Timorese self-determination, and implement a multinational PKO led to 
the resolution of a humanitarian crisis that had been a regional security issue for over twenty-
five years. Australia adopted a leadership role in garnering support for INTERFET, which 
was mandated to enforce peace by restoring law and order. This instance of peace-
enforcement led to the stabilization of Timor, the holding of democratic elections and the 
creation of Timor Leste as an independent and sovereign state.  
 
There was less evidence of moral outcomes in Australia’s strategic alliance policy. This was 
an expected finding, and implied that in the area of strategic policy Australia is less likely to 
consider morality as part of its national interest calculations when the potential risks of doing 
so are too high. This is a logical conclusion when dealing with areas of “high” politics where 
the parameters for acting outside the narrow self-interest are constrained by the balance of 
power. However, this does not mean states automatically determine that including morality as 
part of their alliance calculations cannot lead to both moral and material outcomes. The 
converge of moral considerations identified earlier as common interests in maintaining 
regional peace and security formed part of Australia’s expectations of reciprocity in aligning 
with the US, alongside national interest calculations that it would increase Australia’s 
capacity to achieve its strategic objectives. Hence, evidence of expectations of reciprocity in 
the US-Australia security partnership indicated that moral and material outcomes were likely.  
 
These moral outcomes can be seen in the ability of the partnership to complement the US 
hub-and-spokes alliance system, which extended US nuclear deterrence to Southeast Asia 
and the Pacific. This contributed to regional peace and security during the Cold War by 
acting as a deterrent to the spread of communism and Soviet imperialism. This outcome was 
difficult to find, but was reinforced by Australia’s rational calculation to continue its support 
for the partnership despite concerns that this would increase the risk of alliance entrapment. 
In fact, following 9/11 Australian-US security cooperation actually increased and led to 
tangible moral outcomes in assisting Southeast Asian and Pacific states in counter-terrorism 
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and law enforcement. The benefits to regional states from US-Australian security cooperation 
have continued in the contemporary relationship. The rise of China created anxiety over Sino 
intentions of regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific and greater US-Australian defence 
cooperation was motivated, in part, by a concern for maintaining the current status quo of US 
supported regional stability, which also led to further moral outcomes in trilateral defence 
cooperation with Indonesia.  
 
The appearance of moral outcomes in Australian foreign policy indicates that it is possible to 
understand morality in international politics by examining the consequences of states 
choosing to include it as part of their rational calculations of policy choices. And this 
enhances moral realism’s utility as a useful analytical tool capable of understanding morality 
in state foreign policies. However, evidence of moral outcomes only answers part of the 
primary research question. I must also show whether Australia’s decision to include morality 
as part of its foreign policy did lead to material gains. In this respect I did find evidence that 
Australia gained material benefits from choosing to act morally, which indicates that when 
morality is included as part of Australia’s foreign policy choices it can produce benefits that 
may not have been achieved if it had acted out of pure self-interest.  
 
In Australia’s foreign aid and development policy its decisions to prioritize certain aid sectors 
(like education, infrastructure development and agriculture) have led to economic gains. In 
Indonesia, the Australian Indonesian Building Education Partnership (AIBEP) assisted in 
stimulating trade in service exports to Indonesia, which by 2014 represented half of 
Australia’s service trade to the state.  Similarly, in infrastructure development there have 
been economic advantages from Australian businesses being awarded reconstruction 
contracts and expanded market opportunities. These opportunities were targeted towards 
areas where Australia sought to gain significant benefits, such as mineral exploration and 
mining of oil and natural gas. The type of aid Australia prioritized has varied, but when this 
has occurred it is still reflective of a rational calculation of whether Australia would benefit, 
as in Australia’s decision to prioritize good governance between 1997 and 2004, and part of 
the Howard government’s approach towards counter-terrorism and combating weak and 
failing states.  
 
Australia’s decision to participate in the humanitarian operations in Cambodia and Timor 
Leste was also found to produce important material advantages. In the case of Cambodia, 
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Australia’s push for a resolution to the conflict paved the way for closer economic relations 
with Vietnam, which had been a long-term foreign policy goal for Australia that dated back 
to the end of the Vietnam War. Resolution to the Cambodian conflict also contributed to 
greater integration of ASEAN and the potential for increased trade and business opportunities 
for Australia after Cambodia and Vietnam became members. Similar economic gains are 
noteworthy in Australia’s intervention into Timor Leste. Here the material gains were 
especially visible in Australia’s ability to negotiate a favourable agreement over the Timor 
Gap. Its leadership of the INTERFET mission also led to international prestige benefits and 
contributed to Australia’s strategic goal of participating in regional defence missions.  
 
The material benefits produced from Australia’s security partnership with the US have also 
been linked to Australia’s expectation of reciprocity in keeping the US engaged in 
maintaining regional peace and security. There have certainly been instances where Australia 
miscalculated the cost versus benefits of its alliance loyalty, as in Australia’s decision to 
participate in the Vietnam War, for example. But overall, Australia’s interests have been 
achieved in its commitment to the alliance and this has led to material payoffs in the benefits 
associated with cooperation in intelligence and defence, increasing Australia’s ability to 
respond to potential threats. During the Cold War, intelligence sharing assisted Australia’s 
ability to combat the spread of communist insurgency in Southeast Asia, and this expanded 
significantly after Australia’s participation in the WoT. Australia gained access to US combat 
planning and intelligence on counter-terrorism, and this led to greater cooperation in criminal 
intelligence and policing in the Pacific, where weak and failing states have been considered 
threats to Australia’s national security. Greater cooperation in intelligence also benefited 
Australia’s relationship with Indonesia, and especially US support in combating the spread of 
Jamah Ishlamiah (JI).   
 
Gains in defence have been equally significant. Australia’s middle power status has meant 
that its ability to secure its regional interests and defend its territory from attack has been 
limited. The extended deterrence provided by the US has not only contributed to regional 
stability, but also allowed Australia to maintain a relatively modest defence budget despite a 
geographical environment where the number of potential threats are arguably high, and 
rising. Outside of the benefits of deterrence, Australia has capitalized on closer defence 
cooperation through joint military exercises, use of US defence technology and 
interoperability with US forces, which prompted further gains during the US’ pivot towards 
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the Indo-Pacific in 2011, where greater engagement with US forces became a key strategic 
priority for Australia.  
 
The evidence of moral and material outcomes indicates that Australia did stand to benefit 
from including morality as part of its foreign policy choices. And together with evidence of a 
convergence of moral and material considerations in Australia’s foreign policy calculations, I 
can conclude that moral realism is useful for understanding Australia’s foreign policy 
choices. Yet this does not mean that moral realism is a universal explanatory panacea for all 
aspects of foreign policy. Hence I now examine the limitations of this study, as well as 
identifying some potential avenues for future research, before making some final concluding 
observations on moral realism and Australian foreign policy.  
 
Limitations of the study 
The moral realist claim to identify morality through expectations of reciprocity and moral 
outcomes is to some extent methodologically ambiguous. It will not always be the case that 
these expectations will eventuate, and unintended consequences can interfere with both moral 
and material outcomes. The framework advanced in this thesis has attempted to counter the 
potential for unintended consequences by arguing that morality guided by the pursuit of the 
national interest, rather than ideological rationalization, is less likely to lead to unintended 
consequences (or “bad” policy outcomes). For classical realists, tying morality to the pursuit 
of the national interest allows states to avoid the type of ideological driven morality they 
argued would lead to miscalculations of foreign policy. This may reduce the likelihood that 
states will pursue irrational foreign policy. However, it certainly does not fully account for 
how unintended consequences may influence the evidence of moral and material outcomes.  
 
This limitation also speaks to one of the main conceptual problems associated with theorizing 
morality in international politics: how do we discern the motives of actors in choosing to act 
morally? Normative perspectives try to resolve this by claiming that human nature has an 
inherent capacity for reason: humans can either learn that it is better to behave morally by 
considering the interests of others, or they are compelled by a moral duty to act with the 
common interest as the end goal of their actions. Moral realism, on the other hand, is less 
clear on how it assesses the source of morality, especially when it argues that moral 
considerations must be seen in the context of the state’s pursuit of the national interest.  
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I have adopted a more limited view of rationality, which was consistent with how classical 
realists understood morality to be linked to individuals’ ability to recognize that they do not 
exist alone in nature, and must – in order to survive – be mindful of the welfare of others. The 
motivation compelling states to act, as part of this expectation, was the calculation that it 
would benefit their national interests in return. This allows moral realism to retain a classical 
realist’s stance on the causal role of interests defined as power. Yet linking considerations of 
the other with the state’s national interests does open it to criticisms of moral relativism – that 
all action considered to be in the national interest is also considered to be moral. This reduces 
all moral acts to calculations of the national interest, making it difficult to identify the precise 
factors involved when states do decide to include morality as part of their foreign policy 
choices.  
 
Classical realism sought to answer the charge of moral relativism by including the ethic of 
consequence, whereby evidence of morality in foreign policy is evaluated according to 
whether it leads to beneficial policy outcomes. The classical realists examined in this thesis 
did not attempt to link expectations of reciprocity with policy consequences, and this is where 
I positioned moral realism as a perspective that could achieve this. I did so by arguing that for 
a moral act to be evaluated as “moral,” one must show whether a state’s calculated 
expectations did produce some benefit to the recipient state as the “other.” This went some 
way towards resolving the issues of moral relativism by tying claims of morality in foreign 
policy decisions to evidence of this actually occurring in policy outcomes. However, the 
problem still remains as to how to demonstrate the extent to which morality played a part in a 
state’s rational calculations.   
 
Limitations of Australia as a single case study 
The findings of this thesis are also naturally limited by the research design. The use of a 
single focused case study means that evidence of morality in foreign policy decision-making 
is limited to observations of Australia’s behaviour, rather than making generalizable 
assessments of moral realism backed up by evidence from many cases. Indeed, it could be 
argued that presenting Australia as a “most-likely” case means that the study was pre-
determined to yield positive results. This limitation can reinforce the view that moral 
decisions are inherent in the internal structures and processes of the state, and specifically 
unique to Western liberal democracies. Such a critique is not without merit, and does pose a 
challenge to moral realism’s ability to assess when, and for what purpose, states choose to 
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include morality as part of their rational decision-making. It is possible to argue, for instance, 
that Australia’s tendency to act morally as part of an expectation of reciprocity was facilitated 
by the domestic structures of it being a liberal democracy, which can place limits on a state’s 
ability to pursue narrow self-interests. Hence, Australia has been compelled to act morally 
because this was the more attractive policy option according to a liberal democratic 
conception of its national interests.  
 
Likewise, it is potentially valid to argue that Australia’s status as a middle power has meant 
that its ability to seek outcomes through simple power politics remains limited, and that it has 
therefore been more inclined to seek outcomes that would lead to reciprocal benefits. The 
framework articulated here does not directly engage with internal constraints that may affect 
the ability of states to act in international politics, except to say that the balance of power 
found in an anarchical human nature will dictate that all states will be concerned with the 
pursuit of power in order to ensure their survival. And how a state determines their interests 
will naturally vary depending on the state’s resources and capabilities. This means that moral 
realism expects to see a state acting morally when it is in their national interests to do so, 
which is argued to occur regardless of the state’s capabilities, as all states are concerned with 
furthering the national interest.  
 
Avenues for future research 
Strengthening the “moral” tradition of classical realism 
The tradition of moral thought in realism extends further than the select work cited in this 
thesis. Indeed, there is a wealth of both political and philosophical moral realist literature 
dating back to Thucydides that was outside the scope of this thesis. I endeavoured to illustrate 
the evaluative potential of moral realism as a tool that can understand the results of foreign 
policy choices, and therefore a more in-depth look at the intellectual history of classical 
realism would not have significantly improved the value of this contribution. Having said 
this, it would be beneficial in terms of future research to present a more detailed picture of 
classical realism’s long-held engagement with questions of morality, and in doing so, answer 
criticism that realism is wedded to parsimony and has little to offer outside the usual 
Hobbesian maxim that life is “nasty, brutish and short.” 
 
A more detailed study into the origins of moral realism would also complement further work 
on the three categories (expectations of reciprocity, rational choice and moral and material 
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outcomes) used to demonstrate the potential of moral realism as an explanatory tool. And as 
explained above, I deliberately positioned moral realism as an empirical approach that 
bridges theory and policy analysis. Thus, a detailed theoretical examination of these three 
categories would not have contributed much to an assessment of how moral realism can 
properly understand the position, as well as the effects, of morality in a state’s foreign policy.  
 
This said, in order to properly advance the merits of moral realism as a legitimate research 
agenda, it would be necessary to conduct a wider investigation into its applicability across 
cases, and across more scholarship. Specifically, it would be useful to extend my research 
beyond the three classical realist scholars identified in this thesis, and discover whether there 
is commonality across a broader sample of the classical realist literature. Other contributions 
towards the classical realist revival, like those put forward by Michael Williams and Richard 
Ned Lebow have incorporated the views of John Herz, Edward Carr, Thomas Hobbes and 
Niccolo Machiavelli into their work on finding areas of convergence between classical 
realism and critical theory.898 A similar study conducted from a moral realist perspective 
would strengthen claims that it remains grounded in the theoretical principles of classical 
realism, and represents a more accurate interpretation of how classical realists understand the 
position of morality in international politics. An expanded research project on morality in 
classical realism would also allow for greater engagement with some of the limitations of the 
moral realist framework identified above, particularly the problems associated with 
conceptualizing the moral motives of states in acting morally.  
 
Application of moral realism to comparative case studies 
As well as deeper research into the philosophical origins of moral realism, the strength of 
moral realism as a tool capable of understanding foreign policy results would be greatly 
enhanced by its application to multiple case studies. As identified previously, a comparative 
case study analysis would have been too unwieldy for a thesis of this type. Yet future avenues 
for research that compared like and unlike cases would allow a moral realist to explore 
whether evidence of moral considerations is specific to a certain type of state that embodies 
                                           
898 Both Michael Williams and Richard Ned Lebow were earlier contributors towards the classical realist revival 
and their work canvassed the tradition of morality in classical realism that extended beyond the more 
contemporary and well-known realist scholars. For more see Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of 
International Relations and Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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certain “moral” characteristics. For example, it would be both interesting and prudent to 
discover whether this framework would yield the same results when applied to a state that is 
classified as authoritarian or semi-authoritarian.  
 
Similarly, a wider case study sample would also answer potential criticism that moral realism 
describes some states as being more moral than others. This is particularly so when 
considering the implications of moral realism in explaining the potential for morality in the 
foreign policy choices of the great powers. The US, China and Russia might have less need to 
include morality as part of their decision-making, or have greater constraints on their ability 
to act morally. Middle-to-small powers arguably have more flexibility to include morality as 
part of their foreign policy choices, and to do so for a greater amount of material return. 
Thus, a study that considered the choices of the great powers would lend increased weight to 
moral realism’s explanatory ability, and particularly the emphasis on rational choice in 
calculating foreign policy decisions.  
 
Final observations 
In the final analysis, debates over the question of what is moral and not moral in Australia’s 
foreign policy choices are unlikely to be altered by this thesis alone. But in advancing moral 
realism in this thesis, I hope to have made a modest contribution to what has become an 
important area of research in both classical realism and international politics. I look forward 
to doing so more extensively in the future as I develop the concept of moral realism in more 
depth.  
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